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
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
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JANUARY, 1876.

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"ERRATA" IN THE APRIL NUMBER OF THE NEW ENGLANDER, 1876.

- Page 254, line 22, for "16' 53 $\frac{1}{2}$," read "16' 53 $\frac{1}{4}$."
- Page 347, line 25, for "an scholar, a historian," read "a scholar, an historian."
- Page 381, line 23, for "decent delivery," read "decent debility."
- Page 384, line 16, for "his own autobiography," read "his autobiography."
- Page 388, line 16, for "leads to the barren repetition of thoughts to words," read "leads to the barren repetition of thoughts—to words, words."
- Page 389, line 15, for "McIlvaine, excellent in his work on elocution," read "McIlvaine in his excellent work on elocution."
- Page 394, line 20, for "what it was written aforetime," read "what was written aforetime."

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furnish information of value to the royal cause. His graceful port and pleasing manner may also have done much to recommend him. At all events he was deemed a valuable man whose services were worth securing.

A position in the Foreign Office was accordingly given him. This brought him in constant communication with his chief. The acquaintance thus formed ripened into an intimate friendship; Thompson associating with Lord Germaine upon terms the most familiar; visiting him at his lodgings and dining with him almost daily.

There is abundant evidence that he discharged with fidelity the duties assigned him, and rendered important services to the English government in various ways. These were rewarded by his advancement to the important positions of Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Georgia, and Lieut. Colonel Commandant of Dragoons, in New York.

Official duties, however, occupied but a part of his time. The scientific taste that we have seen so strong in him at home, had followed him abroad and he availed himself of such opportunities as occurred for their indulgence. But it is characteristic of Thompson that from the very first he sought science, not for itself alone, but as a means for the accomplishment of important ends.

He soon attracted the notice of the English Navy by suggesting valuable improvements in their signal service; and of the Army and Navy both, by his investigations and discoveries in Gunnery.

He also made himself known to the scientific circles of London by an able paper upon the cohesive powers of different bodies. This was addressed to Sir Joseph Banks, at that time President of the Royal Society, and led to a favorable introduction of him to its fraternity of which he was elected a Fellow in 1779.

We are surprised, perhaps, at the high position so soon attained by this young man of twenty seven; after a residence in London of four or five years only at farthest. Yet so important ere long became his influence in the American Department that he was deemed, by applicants for state patronage, their most promising avenue to the governmental ear. His

exaltation became at length a source of embarrassment to him on this very account, and exposed him to serious complaints by disappointed applicants.

The journal of Judge Curwen, of Salem, an exiled loyalist and an applicant for royal favor, is an evidence of this fact. Says the needy Judge:

"May 24th, 1781. Went early in order to be at Mr. Benjamin Thompson's in time, and, being a little before, heard he had not returned from Lord George Germaine's, where he always breakfasts, dines, and sups, so great a favorite is he. He received me [upon his return] in a friendly manner, taking me by the hand. * * * and promised to remember and serve me in the way I proposed."

Two months and a half later the disappointed Judge makes another entry:

"After one hour's waiting called on Mr. Thompson in the Plantation office. He seemed inclined to shorten the interview, received me with a courtier's smile, rather uncommunicative and dry. * * * * This, my first, will be my last attempt to gain advantages from a courtier of whom I have never entertained favorable impressions."

Thompson was in London from the spring of 1776 to the autumn of 1781. He went there a very young man, a stranger and an exile, without friends and poor. By his own unaided efforts he rose to high position and he became the associate of nobles and the companion of savants.

But the foundations of such a life are quite often insecure ones. The capitulation of Yorktown was to the English ministry a terrible blow. Thompson saw at a glance that a near consequence of this must be the resignation of his chief and his own withdrawal from the Plantation office. With him promptness of action was as marked a characteristic as keen sagacity. Resigning his secretaryship he obtained orders to return to his native land and assume command of his regiment of dragoons.

Stress of weather drove the fleet, with which he embarked, to Charleston, South Carolina. Detained there for several months he betook himself as soon as possible to his troops on Long Island, and received from the hand of Prince William Henry, afterwards King William the Fourth, his regimental colors.

But the war was now virtually closed, and little opportunity afforded for any exercise of the military talents he undoubtedly

possessed, and elsewhere subsequently exhibited. After an absence of eighteen months he returned to England highly commended by Gen. Carleton, and was advanced to a colonelcy in the British Establishment with half pay for life.

Had Colonel Thompson been willing at this time to settle down to the quiet life of a scientist he was comfortably provided for, pecuniarily, and the English capital was as desirable a residence as any in Europe. But the military proclivities which he had evinced at an earlier age at home, had been revived, and he was eager now for active service and distinction.

England not affording at this time the opportunities desired, he obtained permission of the British government to travel upon the continent, partly with a view of seeking employment in the service of Austria, then at war with the Turks.

Leaving England in the autumn of 1783 (Sept. 17), he crossed the channel a fellow passenger with Henry Laurens, once President of the American Congress, and the historian Gibbon. The latter, in a letter to Lord Sheffield, says playfully of this passage:

"The triumvirate of this memorable embarkation will consist of the grand Gibbon, Henry Laurens, Esq., President of Congress, and Mr. Secretary, Colonel, Admiral, Philosopher Thompson, attended by three horses who are not the most agreeable fellow passengers."

A prominent English transcendentalist discourses learnedly, in one of his books, upon the Philosophy of Clothes. Thompson seems to have learned, by intuition, some of the principles of this intricate science, which the astute author has not elucidated. Away back a dozen years before this time, when accompanied by Mrs. Rolfe, and arrayed in a suit of the rich and showy vestures which the paintings of the ubiquitous Copley have made familiar to us, he called at his mother's house in Woburn, and the prudent old lady, in dazed astonishment and alarm, exclaimed: "Why Ben, how could you go and lay out all your winter's earnings in finery?" Away back at this early day the admiring glance of the fair widow, was certain proof that Ben's knowledge of this philosophy was far better than his mother.

Nor did he ever lose it. Soon after his arrival upon the

continent he presented himself at a review of troops at Strasbourg. Dressed in the full uniform of his rank, as an English officer, and superbly mounted upon one of the fine horses to which Gibbon has alluded, his distinguished appearance attracted the notice of the commanding officer, Prince Maximilien de Deux Ponts, a nephew of the then reigning Elector of Bavaria, and himself subsequently King of that country.

Colonel Thompson's introduction to the Prince on that occasion was followed by repeated interviews during the next few days. So impressed was Maximilien by his striking qualities, that he urged him to visit his uncle during the progress of his journey.

In compliance with his request Thompson tarried for a few days at Munich, on his way to Vienna. Here he was cordially received by the Elector, from whom he received, a short time afterwards, flattering propositions to enter his service. The consent of the British government necessarily preceded the acceptance of these, to obtain which he returned to England.

The grant of his request was not only graciously accorded, but accompanied by the flattering gift of kighthood, so that thus honored and commended both, he returned to his royal patron as Sir Benjamin Thompson.

He was now thirty years of age. An oil portrait of him in the scarlet coat of a British Colonel, taken at this period of his life, still exists, presenting a young man of compact and graceful figure, of clear, open countenance, with light hair and blue eyes, whose firm lip and resolute look indicate steady purpose and keen sagacity.

At this point of Thompson's life begins a career which splendid abilities and magnificent opportunities combined have rendered illustrious.

Bavaria, the theatre of the most important labors of his life, a country of moderate extent and lying in the heart of Europe, had, in 1784, a population of about one million and a half of people. It was largely Catholic and a good deal under Jesuit influence. It possessed a fair soil and respectable resources, but its general condition was deplorable. A pretty large proportion of its people were not only poor but degraded; its agriculture was in a wretched state, and its mines were but

partially and imperfectly worked. Its army, raised by conscription from the peasantry, was ill disciplined, badly organized, and poorly paid. Beggary was common in all sections of the country and had become not only an onerous tax but a universal nuisance.

Charles Theodore, the Elector, was an intelligent and well disposed sovereign who saw and deplored the various evils retarding the prosperity of his country, but possessed neither in himself, nor in those about him, the capacity to remove them.

That he welcomed Thompson with open arms to his capital need excite no surprise, for, he anticipated, through his instrumentality, the achievement of reforms he had long desired but never realized.

He at once made liberal provisions for his support, assigned him a palatial residence, and endowed him with such dignities as secured to him social equality and free intercourse with the administrative officers of the Electoral government.

Upon assuming his difficult duties Thompson proceeded energetically but cautiously; studying with great care the institutions of Bavaria, the genius of its people and particularly the character and causes of the evils incumbering its prosperity. The task assigned him was herculean, but he brought to its execution abilities peculiarly adapted to its accomplishment.

Four years of careful observation and reflection convinced him that the reform contemplated should begin in the Army. The most obstinate evil here presented was the abased condition of the common soldier. The example of his grandfather, who had been at one time a soldier in the French and Indian wars, and at another a worthy Woburn citizen, may have furnished the germinal thought that underlaid his whole system of reform in this department.

At all events its basal principle was the elevation of the common soldier to respectable citizenship, and, as he expressed it, "to make soldiers citizens, and citizens soldiers." To plant this new idea in European soil, from which feudalism had been as yet but imperfectly eradicated, required much boldness. To make it germinate and flourish required experience, assiduity, and sagacity of the highest order and in large measure.

The pay of the common soldier was at that time but five

kreutzers, somewhat less than five cents, a day. He at once increased it. Even in time of peace the Bavarian soldier was on duty the entire year. Col. Thompson dismissed him, on furlough, to his home for ten months and a half of that period. He improved his clothing, his food, his shelter. He established permanent regimental garrisons in all sections of the country. Attached to these were schools and to each belonged also an extensive garden, containing a plot of ground for every soldier, upon which he was encouraged to work by gratuitous instruction, by gifts of choice seeds, and by the ownership of the crops he raised.

In a short time occupation removed, in a great measure, that very prolific camp evil, ennui, and the morale of the army was entirely changed.

Contemporaneously, and somewhat in connection with this reform, he instituted means for the improvement of the agriculture of Bavaria. He encouraged the introduction and culture of clover, turnips, and especially of the potato, at that day scarcely known in most parts of the Electorate.

Nor was the improvement of its cattle and horses forgotten. Under his immediate direction a farm was prepared in the Public Garden of Munich and stocked with choice specimens of the best breeds of cattle to be found in Switzerland, Flanders, Tyrol, and other parts of the continent. This herd, replenished occasionally by fresh importations, was free to the inspection of all who chose to visit it; while a portion of its animals were occasionally sold at low prices to farmers applying for them and engaging to use them for purposes of propagation.

Stallions and brood mares were likewise procured in large numbers, and placed at different points, the latter being donated upon similar conditions to such as sought them and furnished good guaranty of their return, when needed, for the military service of the country.

But Col. Thompson's great achievement, in Bavaria, was his removal of the mendicity which had long annoyed its people. Beggars not only swarmed in the cities and large towns, but infested also the rural districts. He represents them in his essays as "of all ages, as well foreigners as natives, who strolled about the country in all directions, levying contributions upon

the industrious inhabitants, stealing and robbing and leading a life of indolence and the most shameless debauchery. * * * Stout, strong, healthy beggars, who, lost to every sense of shame, had embraced the profession from choice, infesting not only all the streets and public places, but the churches, even so that people at their devotions were continually interrupted by them, and were frequently obliged to satisfy their demands in order to be permitted to finish their prayers in peace and quiet."

Every attempt heretofore made to remove this disgusting evil had utterly failed and the people had succumbed to it in despair. His sagacity at once recognized ignorance and idleness as its cause, and education and occupation as its remedy. Upon this idea he applied himself to its removal.

In a large building in the vicinity of Munich, designated as the Military Work House, he caused to be prepared a kitchen, dining hall, baths, offices, and work rooms; some of which he filled with machinery for the spinning and weaving of tow, flax, cotton, and wool. He also appointed a corps of overseers, instructed them in their duties, and placed at their disposal a supply of food, clothing, fuel, and materials to be manufactured.

With such preparations, on the first day of January, 1790, through the agency of the police and the scattered squads of soldiers, he seized every beggar abroad; he himself arresting the first one. In Munich alone, having a population of about sixty thousand, no less than twenty six hundred beggars were apprehended in a single week.

Some of these were found, upon examination, to be worthy persons, whose insufficient income had compelled them to solicit charity. Such were dismissed with injunctions to beg no more, but to apply for needed aid to officers designated, who would furnish it.

The rest, however, were made to report each morning at the Work House before mentioned. Here they found daily and fairly compensated employment, together with a warm dinner and bread for supper at their homes.

It was not anticipated that such a herd of vagrant, dissolute beggars, of both sexes and of all ages, to whom labor was a novelty, would prove skillful operatives at once. At first they

destroyed much of the raw material upon which they had been put to work. By degrees, however, their skill increased and in time their new life became an attractive one.

This experiment, explained by Count Rumford in his published works, in all its details proved a splendid success. Cloth and clothing were manufactured for the Bavarian army and for general disposition in the market. The wretched vermin which had invested, for generations, all parts of the Palatinate—a national disgrace and a hopeless nuisance—were by his firm hand ultimately raised to self-support and converted to skillful operatives; to self-respecting and respected citizens.

How, most economically, to feed these great numbers and how best to warm and light the apartments they occupied, became at once questions of great importance and led him into fields of science at that time but little explored.

The results of the investigations thus prompted, have secured to Thompson much of his highest fame. Very truly did Cuvier say of him in his able *Éloge* before the French Institute, "*C'est en travaillant pour les pauvres qu'il a fait ses plus belle découvertes,*"—he made his finest discoveries while working for the poor.

One of the earliest subjects to engage his attention in connection with these enterprises was the economizing of the heat used in warming and cooking. For a solution of the problem presented he applied himself to a thorough investigation of the principles of combustion, and to repeated experiments with a view of devising improved forms of fire-places and furnaces. The result of these efforts was a reduction of the requisite amount of fuel to about one quarter of what it had previously been.

While seeking the most economical method of applying heat to water, he made the very important discovery that the temperature of a given volume is not raised by a transmission of heat from one particle of the water to another, but rather, by the expansion and rise to the top of the particles first heated at the bottom. He seems to have been the first to discern the practicability and economy of warming by steam.

Investigations and experiments, in another direction, re-

vealed the fact that articles of clothing are warm in proportion as they retain in the interstices of their substances the air warmed by the bodies upon which they are worn; and the further fact that this law holds good as well in the water as in the air.

Few then supposed that the taste, as it is called, which guides a skilful modiste, in combining the various colors of a lady's dress and its accessories, elegant and to uneducated eyes intricate exceedingly;—that this taste is an embodiment of unvarying natural laws, and that the skilled artiste is a philosopher as well as milliner. Yet Thompson found by patient investigation that the harmonies of colors were as fixed as gravitation—that discordant hues can no more fellowship each other than fair faced virtue and hideous sin.

Such are a few of the scientific subjects which, in all their multifarious details, engaged his attention while in the Elector's service.

But other labors of a different character from time to time employed him. To but two only of these can we allude. The first was his design and construction of their public park, called by the citizens of Munich the English Garden. Thompson, possessed as he was of a keen relish for natural beauty, had a decided taste for landscape gardening, particularly for that of the natural style, in distinction from the geometric, then most in vogue upon the continent.

On the borders of the city, as it happened, there was a large tract of waste ground, some seven and a half miles in circuit, which had ever lain unoccupied and useless. His keen eye detected, at a glance, its great capacities, and he proposed to the Elector its conversion to a park. This proposition received the royal assent, and he was commissioned to proceed at once to its improvement.

Soon the rough places were made smooth; paths and avenues were constructed; winding here in sunlight through verdant lanes, there in shade through stately forests, and passing from time to time the branching streams of the Iser, on bridges as graceful as the swans that sailed beneath them. Exquisite flowers and rare shrubs were planted, and ornamental structures for refreshment and observation were reared at

points where convenience or beauty of prospect suggested their location.

Thus rescued and embellished, this once waste tract became the most beautiful spot in all the environs of Munich—the daily resort of rich and poor alike, the delight and pride of every one.

The second important act which also called forth, in large measure, the gratitude of the citizens of Munich, was his protection of their city from the ravages of the Austrian and French armies in 1796.

When, just after their defeat at Friedberg, the Austrians were retreating before the victorious troops of Moreau, they attempted to pass through Munich, but found its gates shut against them. Exasperated at this they occupied a position commanding the town and threatened to fire upon it. The French, in the meanwhile, were advancing in pursuit upon the other side, and likewise asked an entrance. The entrance of either was a calamity to be averted, if possible, at any cost.

Environed thus, the situation of Munich was a critical one. Consternation seized upon all its people, and the Elector, fearing for his personal security, withdrew to a place of safety; first, however, appointing a council of regency with Thompson at its head.

By virtue of this power Thompson assumed command of the Bavarian troops, and, by exercise of a firmness that excited the admiration of both contending armies, exacted their respect for the neutrality of Bavaria and the security of its capital.

Such services, rendered to a people not his own, were fully appreciated by the Elector and his subjects.

The latter named him "The friend of mankind." The former repeatedly advanced him to high positions and loaded him with honors. He was made Chamberlain, Privy Counselor of State, Lieut.-General, Colonel of Artillery, Commander-in-Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Bavaria, Knight of the Orders of the White Eagle and Saint Stanislaus, and Count of the Holy Roman Empire, to which, at his request, was added the titular distinction of Rumford, in memory of the early name of the little town in New Hampshire where he found the wife of his youth and commenced life's career.

Rarely had it fallen to the lot of a foreigner to be as highly honored, by a people not his own, as was he. And to-day, now that two generations and more have passed, his name is still cherished by the Bavarian people, and from its pedestal in the Maximillien Strasse, his statue of bronze looks down upon the crowds that throng that magnificent highway, suggesting, at once, his devotion to their beloved land and their lasting gratitude.

The Elector, Charles Theodore, died in 1799, and was succeeded by his nephew Prince Maximillien de Deux Ponts, who adopted a policy unlike that of his predecessor, and surrounded himself with counsellors in sympathy therewith.

Under these circumstances Count Rumford felt free to remain in Bavaria, or go elsewhere, as his inclinations might dictate. His scientific discoveries, although made in the furtherance of Bavarian interests, were of general importance, and had attracted a wide attention. These he had detailed with great exactness, in a series of published essays, throughout the whole warp and woof of which was vividly apparent the great truth that science is useful not in itself alone, but in its application to the various economies of common life. This truth commending itself to a few intelligent and public spirited men in England, led them to resolve upon the establishment of an institution for the teaching of science in its practical application to the domestic and mechanic arts. To Rumford, as to the fittest man of that time, was intrusted its formation.

Thus was established, in the opening year of the present century, the Royal Institution of London. Its labors have been manifold and their value incalculable. To him attaches the high honor of having been its founder.

When Count Rumford left this country in 1776, his wife and infant daughter remained behind him. The former never saw him afterwards. The latter, having been educated in the best schools of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, rejoined her father in Europe, in 1796.

She was received with great kindness at Munich, by the Elector and Electress. The former was, at that time, seventy-one years old, while the latter, an Italian lady of rare beauty, was but seventeen; a fact which led the Court gossips to

remark that they were both of the same age, the figures having by some means got reversed.

But a young queen makes a joyous Court, and to its rounds of gayety the young American girl was introduced by her father and chaperoned by the Countess of Nogarola. How she got on in this new and dazzling sphere we have not time to relate here, and can only remark, in passing, that the Bavarian Sovereign confirmed to her, at her father's decease, his rank and title, together with one half of his yearly pension.

Count Rumford's wife died upon her estate in Concord, in 1792. Some years afterwards, he made the acquaintance of a distinguished Parisian lady, with whom he subsequently came into most intimate relations. She was the widow of Lavoisier, the eminent French chemist, who had been condemned to the guillotine during the awful days of the Terror, and had met death manfully, asking only a brief reprieve that he might finish, before his death, some important experiments then in progress.

Madame Lavoisier, although no longer young, still retained much of her former beauty. She possessed high culture, captivating manners, a good heart, and was very rich. She impressed deeply the heart of the lonely scientist, and for four years an active courtship of varying phases was maintained, and followed, on the 24th of October, 1805, by the marriage of the parties.

One consequence of this event was the removal of the Count to Paris, where he lived with Madame de Rumford, in an elegant mansion, situated in the heart of the city and surrounded by ample grounds inclosed by high walls.

Letters of the Count to his daughter, the Countess Sarah, reveal to us the character of his new life and its surroundings. We have time, however, to quote from them but a few sentences. In one, bearing date some two months after his marriage, he remarks :

"Our style of living is really magnificent. Madame is exceedingly fond of company, and makes a splendid figure in it herself; but she seldom goes out, keeping open doors, that is to say to all the great and worthy; such as the philosophers, members of the Institute, ladies of celebrity, etc."

"On Mondays we have eight or ten of the most noted of our associates at dinner. (Then we live on bits the rest of the week.) Thursdays are devoted to

evening company; of ladies and gentlemen without regard to numbers. Tea and fruits are given to the guests coming until twelve or after. Often superb concerts are given with the finest vocal and instrumental performers."

The parenthetic sentence, which we ought perhaps to have omitted, is an ominous one. Incompatibility of tastes began, ere long, to be manifest. The Count was a student, wishing to devote more time to science than to his wife's guests. He was also methodical and avaricious of his hours. Madame de Rumford was a gay woman, to whose happiness the blandishments and excitements of society were as necessary as air to her physical existence.

Time increased rather than diminished these differences, and in the spring of 1809 an amicable separation ensued, the Count retiring to a villa, at Auteuil, then a suburb of Paris, where were passed the remaining years of his life.

Very little of bitterness seems to have attended this separation, and the parties, living apart, continued on good terms with one another. The Countess has said that, when, on one occasion, Madame de Rumford sent word to her father that a pair of her horses had become unsafe, and that she wished he would buy them, he returned the good-natured reply that he would willingly do so, provided she would be magnanimous and not cheat him.

Madame de Rumford remained in Paris until her death in 1836, maintaining one of the finest saloons of the capital, and dispensing a hospitality almost princely to scores and hundreds of the most distinguished personages of her time.

Count Rumford has been censured for espousing interests inimical to his country during our Revolutionary War. We attempt no justification of his course during that period. It may be said, however, in palliation thereof, that undeserved persecutions, prompted by an intolerant patriotism, acting upon a proud nature, rendered moody by unjust aspersions, forced him to a course he took unwillingly.

Certain, indeed, it is that in his mature years he cherished for this country and its people the kindest feelings, and in 1798 thought seriously of resuming here his residence. But his connection with the Royal Institution defeated, for the time, this purpose, which was never resumed.

The most friendly sentiments were also entertained towards him, on this side of the ocean, and, about the close of the last century, he was cordially invited by the government of the United States to return to his native land and take the leading part in the formation of our Military Academy, since established at West Point. This flattering invitation he was obliged to decline, but subsequently testified to his lively sense of the honor done him, and of his interest in the institution, by bequeathing to it "all his books, plans, and designs relating to military affairs."

Count Rumford passed the last half a dozen years of his life at his country house at Auteuil—a house which five years ago was made sadly interesting as the unconscious witness of the assassination of Victor Noir by Prince Pierre Bonaparte. His life here was a retired one. He attended occasionally the sittings of the French Institute, of which he was a member, but rarely went abroad, devoting his working hours to his favorite studies, and those of his leisure to the embellishment of his grounds and to the culture of rare flowers, of which he was very fond.

The space allowed has permitted but a fleeting glance at a few only of the more prominent incidents in the life of this great man. A constant mingling for more than forty years in the best society of Europe gave to his manners a polish and a charm quite sensibly felt by all whose fortune it was to meet him.

In the natural sciences, and their application to the arts, he was learned to an eminent degree. He was well versed in general literature, and read and wrote and spoke the German, Italian, French, and Spanish languages with the same facility he did his native tongue. The three solid octavos which contain the record of his most important labors, investigations, and discoveries, attest not only the versatility of his genius, but the beauty and clearness of his style as a writer of pure English.

Deserved was the monument reared to his honor in the English Garden at Munich, whereon he is designated as "Friend of Mankind." With abundant opportunities for acquiring large wealth, he enriched only others, never himself. For none of his numerous inventions would he ever consent to take out a single patent. By his will, witnessed by Lafayette, he

bequeathed all of his limited property, excepting a few keepsakes and private legacies of moderate amounts, to public institutions.

His death, which was unexpected, occurred at Auteuil on the twenty-first day of August, 1814. His friend, Baron De Lessert, followed to their last resting place his mortal remains, and delivered at his open grave a brief but appropriate address. "In England, in France, in Germany, in all parts of the continent," said he, "the people are enjoying the blessings of his discoveries; and from the humble dwellings of the poor to the palaces of the sovereigns, all will remember that his sole aim was always to be useful to his fellow men."

Six months later the Baron Cuvier pronounced before his associates of the French Institute, an eloquent éloge detailing the history of his life and works.

The great mass of mankind pass across the earth and leave no lasting trace behind them. This cannot be said of Rumford. He made an impress upon the world which centuries will not efface, and memorials of his beneficent labors abound in every civilized land; in the streets and pleasure grounds of Munich; in the institutions of science and benevolence reared by him in England and Bavaria; in his generous gifts to the Academy of Arts and Sciences, and to Harvard College, in America; in the full volumes which detail, in various languages, the researches and discoveries of his busy life; and especially in his numerous inventions, wherein science, allied with art, has increased immensely the comforts of mankind.

ARTICLE II.—MIND IN NATURE.

"I HAD rather believe all the fables of the Talmud and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is without a Mind." So wrote the great father of inductive philosophy. But some of his disciples in the department of physical science do not swear in the words of their master. Having renounced faith in the invisible, as an outgrown and obsolete principle, good enough for the childhood of the race, and as a cover for ignorance, but not comporting with the certitude of modern Positivism, which limits knowledge to what can be cognized by the senses, they "say in their heart," and scruple not to declare with their lips, that this universal frame *is* without a mind; for they have not seen it, nor has the scientist detected it with his finest instruments, or his most powerful microscopes, or his most exhaustive chemical analysis. It is in vain that you attempt to reason from analogy, and point to this lesser frame of the human body whose wondrous mechanism not only implies the existence of some designing mind active in its construction, but whose living movements and rational operations imply the presence of a mind *within* it. They have analyzed the brain and have not found it; but have found instead that certain movements of the brain are invariably connected with certain activities of thought and feeling; that affections of the brain affect the thinking faculty, so called; and that paralysis wholly extinguishes it, so far as outward demonstration is concerned, which is the only evidence of reality. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that thought and feeling are the product or function of the brain, generated by it as heat is generated by friction, or light by combustion; and mind as a distinct entity nowhere exists. Or if, baffled by such reasoning, you venture to suggest that these same imponderables, heat, light, magnetism, and the rest are not the product or properties of matter, which supplies the *conditions*, but is not the *cause* of their activity; that they are the primary and actuating forces, while matter is the secondary and passive recipient—the manifestation, not the

constituent of force; that they merely reside in matter, as the life-principle in the body, and are released, not destroyed, by its dissolution; this they may admit as regards these physical forces, for so the doctrine of the correlation and conservation of forces implies; but not so of *life*, for has not Mr. Tyndall found in matter "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life?" And what is life, according to Herbert Spencer, but simply "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"—a definition doubtless plain to him that understandeth, and clear of all metaphysical conceptions, till it occurs to ask what is the power that *adjusts* these relations so wondrously and constantly to each other? To such miserable shifts of conception and definition does this school resort, to avoid the admission of an immaterial entity as the cause of material phenomena. Indeed, they cannot use the most common words without finding in them a refutation of their doctrine. *Phenomenon* is what *appears*; *substance* is what *stands under* it and does not appear, but for that reason only the more truly *is*. The belief in the invisible as the ground of all reality, is the condition of science itself; for as Coleridge has truly said, "If the invisible be denied, or (which is equivalent) considered invisible from the defect of the senses, and not in its own nature, the sciences even of observation and experiment lose their essential *copula*. The component parts can never be reduced into a harmonious whole, but must owe their systematic arrangement to the accidents of an ever-shifting perspective."

To find the *cause* of phenomena in the phenomena themselves is only possible by a denial or falsification of the *idea* of cause, and a substitution for it of a conception of the understanding drawn from sensible things. Thus J. Stuart Mill and others of the sensational school define cause to be *invariable antecedent*, according to which, if it be antecedent in *space*, a wheelbarrow is the cause of the man who wheels it; or if it be antecedent in *time*, the bud is the cause of the flower, or evening the cause of sunset; where cause and effect are simultaneous, as fire and heat, or life and its manifestations, there is no cause at all. The true idea of cause always implies some power below or behind phenomena which of course is in its nature invisible, else it would itself be phenomenal.

The bearing of these remarks on the great question which modern scientific thought has at last reached, and is facing with what vision or blindness it has (though it lies at the very beginning of the study of nature, and is the first question that opens on the mind of a child)—*the existence of a personal Creator*—must be obvious. The insufficiency of the ordinary methods of proving the existence of God, has long been apparent. The inductive or scientific method, though often tried, has never been successful, for this lies wholly in the plane of nature and natural law, and can never transcend it, or prove the existence of *spirit*. The scientific faculty, the understanding, judging only according to sense and wholly without insight, can only generalize phenomena, and call the result a *law*, or uniform method of nature's acting; but what it is that acts, or why, or the existence of any substantive *cause* other and higher than is manifest in the phenomena themselves, is confessedly beyond its province. This even so acute and devout a thinker as Sir Wm. Hamilton acknowledges. He says, "The phenomena of matter *taken by themselves*, so far from warranting any inference as to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation." Hence those minds with whom all truth is measured by the logical and generalizing understanding, who have never had any higher faculty of spiritual insight awakened in them, do not believe in a God distinct from the universe.

The defectiveness of this method is also seen when the argument is drawn not from the material but the *moral* phenomena and order of the world, as in that recently put forth by Matthew Arnold in his "Literature and Dogma." All the Deity which he admits is the existence—to adopt his own definition—of "an eternal power not ourselves which makes for righteousness." So much, he thinks, can be made out by induction. But he denies to this power personality, and identifies it with a mere impersonal law or moral order—a higher law, indeed, than gravitation, since it governs conduct and not mere matter, but as destitute as that of all the personal attributes of the God we worship. Why the existence of such a law does not necessitate belief in a *lawgiver*—a Deity who has established and maintains this order, who *loves* righteous-

ness and hates iniquity, and who will render to every man according to his works—is logically owing to that fatal incapacity of admitting what cannot be seen with the eyes or demonstrated to the understanding. Morally, it may be explained by the language of the Apostle, “because they do not *like* to retain God in their knowledge,” and because spiritual facts require a consent of the will as well as an intellectual perception, i. e., must be *spiritually* discerned. The truth is that God cannot be reasoned out by induction, or known inferentially by the understanding, any more than music can be perceived by the touch, or beauty apprehended by the smell, or the truth of poetry be logically proved by a syllogism. Always a higher faculty is requisite to complete and give validity to the argument. Spirit only can apprehend spirit. “By *faith* we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God.” And when faith, or the spiritual faculty, has once apprehended God and affirmed his existence and character, the witness of nature and the laws of the moral universe come in to confirm and illustrate the truth.

The *a priori* method of demonstration from the *idea* of God, or of the Infinite, revealed in the *reason*, is equally defective. This faculty, though higher than the understanding, deals only with abstract truth, or *ideas*. It does not reveal *being* or personal realities. The idea of God is indeed given by the moral reason, and is revealed with more or less distinctness in all men, is the inshining of that true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. But this *idea* of God is not God, though a strong presumption of his existence. Not until faith has bridged this chasm between ideas and realities, and given substance to this invisible and ideal object, not till the heart has embraced this object in love and trust, and found it real by its own vital and experimental touch and taste, has man really found God. Then only, and thus only, can we *see* God.

But short of this practical and experimental discovery of God, there is what is called the argument from *design*, which is generally supposed to be valid, and whose force was felt and acknowledged in a great degree by the late Stuart Mill, as his posthumous writings have recently shown. This argument has unquestionably much of force in it, since if intelligent and

rational design can be shown to exist in nature, it proves the existence of a rational and designing *mind* behind or within nature as its author and controller. A rational effect can only proceed from a rational cause, except with those who, discarding the first principles of philosophy, assume to believe and teach that a universe of order and beauty may have grown, or been "developed" out of chaos, intelligence out of blind force, man with his spiritual and divine powers out of a jelly-fish or tadpole.

But this argument from design, as ordinarily employed, is defective from a narrowness of conception and of treatment. It is based on the conception of the universe as a mechanical product, constructed artificially as a man constructs a watch; the mind that devises and makes it being outside of and aloof from the product. The only evidence of its existence is the traces it has left of skill and wisdom in adapting means to ends—a skill and wisdom long ago exercised, and for aught we know, exhausted in the finished product. All we can know of the character of this mind is what appears in the way of design and contrivance. We see the building, and infer an architect; we see the machine, and infer a machinist. But a man does not express all his mind and character in what is called "design." A poet or artist reveals himself not merely by his consciously intended work, but quite as much by what is unconscious and spontaneous, the effluence, or spirit, or style, that flows not from his will but his *genius*. So a man's character is revealed more truly, often, in his countenance, his voice and bearing, and even in his figure than in those products into which he puts his conscious thought and will. Those reveal the voluntary, these the involuntary and deeper side of his nature.

Now it is a favorite conception of many, especially of poets and those who have the deepest insight into nature, that this material universe is not a mere mechanical product, but the living *expression* of a living, indwelling and ever present Mind. Nature is not a machine, but a poem or picture; that is, the original from which all poems and pictures, all art and beauty, as well as all utilities, are derived; and so embodies not the contrivances merely, but the living thought and mind and

genius of the author. Or, if it be a mechanism, it is like that which Ezekiel saw by the river of Chebar, whose wheels were instinct with the spirit of the living creature which they bore: "When the cherubim went, the wheels went with them; when they stood, these stood; and when they were lifted up, these lifted up themselves also; for the spirit of the living creature was in them."

What we propose in the remainder of this article is to look at nature in the light of this broader and deeper conception, and see what evidences we have of the presence of *Mind in Nature*; seeking not so much for specific design as for rational and personal *intelligence* in the things that are made.

I. Intelligence is manifested in the manifold and endless *forms* of the material creation, and in the very existence of form.

For, consider, what is *form*, and whence does it come? Pure form is something *ideal*, a thought or idea of the mind, and can have no existence apart from mind, either as constructing or perceiving it. Take the necessary forms of geometry which the mind constructs or finds within itself. Have they any existence, or can they be conceived to exist, apart from intelligence, any more than their embodiment in outward figures can exist apart from space? They are *in* the mind as its necessary and innate ideas, or if not consciously there, recognized as soon as presented to it as its *own*, and belong to mind as essentially and inseparably as light belongs to the sun, or the property of resistance to matter.

Again, the embodiment of these ideal forms in the outward and visible world, or their impress upon material things, is no less the work and the mark of intelligence. In no other way can matter receive form except as *mind* imparts or impresses it; for outward form is nothing else but the expression of a thought, i. e., of an ideal form existing primarily in the mind itself. Therefore it is said, before the creative intelligence of God began to organize matter, that the earth was *without form* and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. Formlessness, emptiness, darkness—this is the condition of matter apart from any higher principle; a mere receptivity for form and life. Whence is "development" to come? The

Scripture answers: *And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.* Then, in consequence of this brooding of the Divine Intelligence and Will (for both are implied in the term Spirit), light, order, division of parts, and the manifold forms of life appeared. The "development" was in the beginning, what it has been ever since, *from above*, not from below, the action of a higher power, quickening, informing, and so *creating* whatever partakes of form or of life. The *order* and the *time* in which this creation was accomplished is not the main question, but the fact of Mind or Spirit as the Creator. All things were made by HIM (*O' Λόγος*, the Divine Intelligence) and without Him was not anything made that was made. All action of mind upon matter gives rise to material forms, and wherever *form* appears, there the presence and working of *mind* is demonstrated.

The origin and existence of *writing* is a confirmation of this. As thought seeks to utter itself in articulate sounds, and thus creates language, so it seeks to embody or outline itself in certain visible *forms* that address themselves to the understanding, the result of which is writing. The connection between mind and form is as close and universal as that between mind and speech. The first attempts at writing are pictorial, rude imitations of the forms and objects of nature, as the first beginnings of language are more or less imitations or expression in sound of the qualities of the object named. But whether the forms be pictorial or arbitrary, no one can fail to see that thought, intelligence or *meaning* is within and behind the form. The more perfect the form the more of mind appears in it, and the more impossible is it to have been the work of chance. Now all forms are the imprint and expression of some living thought, whether it be the simple geometric form of the crystal, the more beautiful and complicated forms of vegetable life, or the most perfect form in nature or above it—the human. Only this, since man is made in the image and likeness of God, expresses in its original and true form, not a divine thought, but the glory and beauty of the divine *person*.

We regard this argument as convincing and unanswerable, that *the existence of form implies the existence and action of mind*, or intelligence. The only escape from this is the assumption

of the empirical philosophy that mind is not the originator, but only the perceiver of form; that the circle or triangle, for example, is not an original idea generated by the mind, but a notion derived from actually existing circles or triangles visible to sense. But this assumption is refuted by the fact that we never see or can see a true and perfect circle, but only an approximate likeness or image of it. The true circle is ideal, and is the standard to which all existing circles are referred, and by which they are measured. Hence it must be before, and the original of these. Also by the fact that we learn the true properties of the circle and other geometric forms not from outward observation and experiment but from inward thought; hence they are things of the mind and not of sense or matter. So of all possible or conceivable forms, all that can be called beautiful, or which are the expression of thought or intelligence. Beauty is something ideal, a thing of the mind and not of the senses, which all beautiful objects suggest or awaken within us but do not give from without. Herein consists its charm and power, that it cannot be defined or measured by the thing called beautiful, but escapes all visible and finite boundaries and merges in the infinite. The fact that we can recognize the beautiful (*τὸ καλόν*) or the intelligible (*τὸ νοητόν*) in outward things, that they appeal to an intellectual or æsthetic sense within us, proves that they originate in and proceed from Intelligence (*νοῦς*), a Spirit in which thought and beauty abide as their eternal fountain.

When we look upon a work of art,—suppose it to be a study or outline drawing of a human form by M. Angelo or Raphael, such as are to be seen in the Pitti palace at Florence, or one of those wonderful creations of sculpture that adorn the Tribune or the Vatican,—we know with absolute certainty, without any reasoning or research, that such a creation was the work of *mind*, of thought and genius of a very high order; that it could not possibly have been the work of chance or of blind unintelligent forces; and the idea of such an origin would be scouted as the dream of a lunatic. Even the rude drawings and hieroglyphics on the slabs of Nineveh or the obelisks of Egypt, are recognized at once as the work of human intelligence, though of a lower culture, because there is thought and mean-

ing in the figures. The very scratches on the rocks of Sinai, called the Sinaitic inscriptions, though wholly unintelligible, are without question attributed to human origin, because there is too much of form and orderly method in them to be accidental or mere freaks of nature, like the pictured rocks of Lake Superior.

Now, will some scientist of the materialistic school be so good as to tell us on what principle these creations of art are recognized as the work of mind; which does not apply with equal validity to their originals—those forms and creations of nature from which they are derived. If the rude or artistic imitations cannot exist without an intelligence to create them, much less can the more perfect originals.

It may be said that human creations are isolated productions whose process can be outwardly traced from beginning to completion, while in natural creations the process is latent and repeated continually, according to a uniform and necessary law. In other words, the former is produced by a mechanical process working from without, while the latter is produced by a vital process working from within. But this only shows a different method of working—in the case of nature a more perfect method, issuing in a more perfect result—not that the power which creates is different, except also in degree, viz: a more perfect intelligence. That nature works according to a law, and repeats her creations continually after the same original types, does not make them less the work of intelligence; as the reproduction of a picture by the artist, or its multiplication by the art of engraving or chromo-lithography argues not less of genius or intelligence in its original production. Nay, what are these same *laws of nature* which are made to stand between the creation and the Creator, and even to crowd him from his place in the universe, but the living and operative *thoughts of God*? Take the law of gravitation, for example, the most universal and omnipresent of all. What is it, and how shall it be defined? Apart from the *force* which acts and which is utterly inscrutable in its nature, the only thing intelligible about it is what Newton discovered, viz: its *rationale* or mode of operating—that it operates directly as the quantity of matter, and inversely as the square of the distance.

And this is a mathematical thought or *ratio*. The reason or intelligence in the law is what our reason discerns, and nothing else. When Mr. Babbage's calculating machine works out a mathematical problem, the result is due not to the matter or the intelligence of the machine, but to the thought of the inventor working through the cunningly adjusted wheels. It is *mind* that works the problem, only this mind operates through the instrument instead of through the fingers. So when a sculptor embodies his thought or beautiful conception in marble, it is not the stone that thinks or dreams itself into the statue, but the ideal in the mind of the sculptor works through his hand and chisel, guiding every stroke, as if eye, hand, and tool were each instinct with thought and intelligence, until the inspiring and informing idea stands revealed and fixed in the stone forever. And when completed it is this *ideal* form that entrances the beholder; the material, like the ink and letters of a book, is only the medium for conveying the *thought* of the artist.

So, whether we contemplate the motions of the spheres, or the infinitely varied and beautiful forms ever growing under our eye in nature, the closer we study them in the light of thought, the more will the mere matter recede and fade from view, and the living thought and intelligence which underlies, informs, and works through all things become apparent.

Go out into your garden in some bright morning in June, and observe the wonderful variety and complex beauty of the forms of vegetable and floral life that meet the eye. Every leaf is a marvel of symmetry that grows and deepens the closer you examine it. You wonder at the exhaustless number and variety of the patterns which nature has invented and brings out from her laboratory or studio, and which are endlessly copied in works of human art and ornamentation,—architecture, furniture, tapestry, carpeting, etc.,—all putting nature under contribution for their forms and patterns, yet never exhausting them. And when you add the combinations of color, the myriad tints and pencillings of flowers, as if laid on with an artist's pencil and with more than an artist's delicacy and perfection of taste, the garden appears like an illuminated missal whose elaborated gold and crimson letters are not the less

beautiful because in an unknown language; or like some grand symphony where the notes are too intricate and full of meaning to be followed or understood except in a general, overpowering sense of delight and harmony.

As well suppose that one of Beethoven's symphonies could have written itself without that master soul to apprehend and rehearse the harmonies of heaven, as that all this beauty of form and color grew up from the earth without a *mind* whose thoughts are beauty, and whose emotions are harmony. No one can study thoughtfully the exquisite grace and loveliness of a full blown *calla*, without the feeling that the designer of that flower *loves* beauty with a passion surpassing that of any human artist. And this leads us to the discovery, which a deeper study of nature will reveal more fully, that there is in this manifold world of forms and colors and harmonies—"this wondrous world of eye and ear," not only thought but *feeling*, not merely intelligence, but *character*. The face of nature, no more than the human countenance, is not a mere combination of forms and colors and utilities, which the geometrician can measure, and the scientist analyze, and the practical man utilize for food and comfort; but it has *meanings* and *expressions* too subtle to be apprehended or understood by the scientific faculty, which only a deep feeling soul can read, which it is the province of the poet or the artist to feel and interpret. It is more than a fancied resemblance, or even a true analogy, when we speak of the *smile* of a dewy landscape lighted up with sunrise, or the *frown* that darkens a mountain's brow when a cloud rests upon it, or of the *joy* and *love* expressed in a full blown rose, which makes this flower the natural and chosen symbol of such emotions. It is the recognition of a reality within what we call nature, which is the *spirit* of its forms, and is as true and spiritual as that we are conscious of in ourselves. When Wordsworth in one of his finest sonnets describes the deep peace of a summer evening:

"It is a beauteous evening, calm and free;
The holy time is quiet as a nun,
Breathless with adoration, * *
The gentleness of heaven is on the sea, &c."

Or, when in the *Excursion*, he describes the effect of sunrise beheld from a mountain summit:

"The clouds were touched,
And in their silent faces did he read
Unutterable love ;"—

—it is not the *transfer* of his own emotions to natural objects, but the recognition in nature of a spirit kindred to his own, and awakening in him kindred divine emotions ; just as the philosopher recognizes in the *laws* of nature a reason—(*logos* or *ratio*) kindred to that which interprets them. It is the "peace of God" which passeth the understanding of the scientist, and the "love of God" which passeth all mere knowledge—a self-conscious peace and love, which is expressed in the breathless air, the reposing ocean and the silent faces of the clouds :—and which the poet feels and gives utterance to :—

"A *presence* that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and *in the mind of man.*"

What is the sense of *sublimity* that lifts and awes the soul when looking at Mont Blanc, or some stupendous gorge among the Alps ? It is not mere physical grandeur as measured by miles or feet, or anything which the senses or the understanding can explain ; but because the scene, like a human countenance, or some majestic human presence, expresses and appeals to something spiritual and divine. Power, majesty, and mystery, undefined, vast, incomprehensible—in a word, *the Infinite* is here expressed, or dimly suggested, appealing to that faculty within us which responds with trembling awe to the infinite and divine, as the eye responds to light, or the ear to music, or the heart to love. So when looking up into the glittering vault of heaven, it is not mere vastness, or unlimited space, "thick sown with stars through all its azure depths," into which we look, but it is as if looking into an infinite and omniscient *eye*, with intelligence and love and infinite pity in its gaze. "The heavens declare the *glory* of God :—" and this glory is something more than a mere physical display. "As high as the heavens are above the earth, so great (and so deep) is his *mercy* toward them that fear him." And if the scientist with his tubes and instruments finds only physical laws in the universe, it is not because mind

and spirit is not there, but because it can only be spiritually discerned. The poet is the truest interpreter of nature as he is of man, because he looks beneath its outward forms and scientific laws, or regulative ideas, to its inmost spiritual meanings;—as Shakespeare saw deeper into human nature and the human soul than all the philosophers;—and the most spiritual and devout poets (insight and genius being given) are the profoundest seers, because the pure in heart only shall see God.

The best poetry has ever flourished hand in hand with the most spiritual philosophy, and the most reverent study of nature and of man. When the present materialistic tendency in science and philosophy shall have come to its head, and nature and man are vacated of spirit, and reduced to a mere automatic machine of blind and necessary forces, poetry will die together with religion, or become a hollow sham, a mere mechanical thing of petty conceits and jingling rhymes, as soulless and unreal as as the mockeries with which it deals. *Inspiration* implies a Spirit in nature to inspire its worshippers, and a spirit in man also able to be inspired. The *ideal* which all true art seeks to find and to embody in its creations, implies a universal *Mind* in which all ideals abide and from which they are derived. And when mind and spirit are eliminated from nature, what is there to inspire or to embody? When the spirit in man, which alone elevates him above the brute, is identified in kind with the brutish instinct and understanding, what will nature be to him more than it is to the brute? High communion, and “the joy of elevated thoughts” will give place to blind wonder or contented grazing; and in place of art and poetry, mechanical artifice or a soulless and parrot-like imitation will be all that remains.

II. But there is another element or aspect of nature which requires to be considered. The *forms* of the material world are never separate from its *forces*, but have their existence only through the working and manifestation of these. The ultimate conceptions which lie at the basis of all material things, or into which all things may be resolved, are two, viz: *matter* and *force*. However these may be defined, or whatever theory we may adopt as to the constitution of matter, whether the atomic or the dynamic, its essence, as well as that of the physical forces, re-

mains a profound mystery. We can never reach, much less see, the ultimate atom, or find the invisible and unrepresentable entity which we call "force," or determine by any scientific process the question whether these two may not be essentially and at bottom one. It is sufficient for our present purpose to consider the two as distinct, yet ever present in all created things, and to represent matter as the recipient of form, or that upon which form is impressed and by which it is manifested; force as the efficient cause and producer of form.* We have already considered the origin and genesis of Form. What, now, and whence is Force? we answer :

As form is the product and expression of *thought*, so force is the issue or exertion of *will*. This will be evident from the following considerations: Force is never the object of direct perception. It is not a *phenomenon*, something visible or tangible; but only its effects, as motion and growth, are discernible by the senses. It cannot be imagined or conceived under any image that shall not be false to the reality. Force in itself, as well as form, is ideal, or rather spiritual; i. e., it exists in and for the spirit, and can be discerned by the mind alone, yet is not the less real and actual. Its *effects* can be perceived and felt and measured, but force itself no man hath seen or can see. It belongs to the realm of *causes*, of invisible and unrepresentable *powers*, which positivism discards and denies. Hence the physical forces which the modern materialist talks so glibly and knowingly about, are not forces at all, but mere *phenomena*, the motions or effects produced by them, or the fluids or atoms actuated by them. We speak of feeling the force of a blow; but all which is felt is the matter of the hand or fist propelled by the invisible power of will. So we speak of the force of gravitation; but all that we perceive of this force is its effects, the motion of bodies impelled by it according to a certain invariable law. The force itself can no more be seen than a volition, or the exertions of our own will can be outwardly perceived.

This is indeed the only true conception of force, that which

* Have we not here the ultimate source of the male and female principle, which is so wondrously manifested throughout nature? For "two great sexes animate the world." In the beginning, *force* obviously represents the *masculine*, *matter* the *feminine* principle.

we are conscious of in ourselves when we put forth a volition. There is no other true and ultimate conception of *power* than that which is found in our own consciousness, and proceeds from a conscious and personal *will*. In ourselves is the key which interprets God and the world to us. It is because *we are* that we have an idea of *being*, or substance, below and other than the outward surfaces and shifting, unenduring *phenomena*, which is all that the senses can perceive. It is because we are *causes*, that we have an idea of cause other and truer than mere antecedent. And it is because we are *powers*, and continually originate forces that produce effects in nature, that we can apprehend physical forces and whence they proceed. But power or force is not the less a mystery, alike unfathomable whether exerted by ourselves or witnessed in the world around us. Force can become visible only as it is embodied first of all in *motion*, as a thought is embodied in a word or outward form. And just as we refer all intelligible or artistic forms to some *thought* or intelligence behind them, so with the same intuitive certainty we refer all force, however manifested, to a *will* or volition behind it. This idea of force is not invalidated (except to the few who have outgrown its teachings) by the fact that the Bible everywhere sanctions this view; retaining the primitive, if unscientific, conception that "power belongeth unto God," and is the same in kind, however different in degree, with power in man. The powers of nature according to the Bible, are not blind and necessary forces, but the direct exertion of the divine will: "Who by his strength setteth fast the mountains, being girded with power." "The strength of the hills is his also." This truth was recognized by the great Newton, who defines gravitation whose law he had discovered, to be nothing else than *the constantly exerted might of God*.

The objection which at first view may present itself against resolving all force into will-power or divine volition, viz: that it makes the operations of nature arbitrary, and is inconsistent with the constancy and necessity that characterize its laws and workings,—this objection is plausible, and demands to be considered. That will power is arbitrary and inconstant, is an assumption, or inference derived from human and weak or depraved exhibitions of it, and does not apply to its highest and best manifestations in human character, least of all to the Divine

will, where reason and therefore law, is supreme. The regularity and constancy of natural forces is not secured by their being blind and unintelligent. On the contrary, intelligence, will, purpose, especially if grounded in the highest reason, are the surest guarantees of order and constancy in human affairs, holding the body and all other instruments steadily to their tasks, when mere "nature" would flag, or capriciously desist or fly off.

If it be said that will is a *free* power, while physical force is necessary, or under a law of necessity, and so stands in contrast with the former as belonging to a different category,—this is true in a certain sense, and indicates a most important distinction. But let us first understand the true meaning of freedom and necessity, and to what these terms apply. As applied to human actions or volitions, they respect the origin or *genesis* of the act, and not its quality. Thus the will is free, because it is itself the true cause and originator of its own acts, irrespective of the certainty or uniformity of these acts. It is not caused to act by any external power—the reasons or motives in view of which it acts, being subject to its own self-determining power to follow or reject, and so are merely counsellors not controllers, influences not causes of the action. So the Divine will is the true cause of its own acts, which are yet ever in accordance with the highest reason and wisdom. Hence it is free, even in its constancy and uniformity,—free to maintain or to countervail or suspend, or even annul, if need be, the laws of nature, as it was free to ordain them, according to His own eternal counsel. But the *issues* of these acts, which come within the sphere and cognizance of sense, are not free. Thus a stone thrown into the air is not free to remain there, but must fall to the earth, since the *cause* of its motion is wholly without itself. All facts and events once set in motion in the physical world are under this law of necessity, which becomes a law and enforces itself only because the will of God so ordains. Thus even physical necessity is grounded in freedom, and does not bind, as some maintain, the will either of God or of man.

Human freedom belongs wholly to the inner spiritual sphere, the sphere of the will; but so soon as an act is *done*, it passes into the outer sphere and system of nature, which is under the control of the Divine will, and subject to laws which are necessary

in relation to us, but free in relation to God, since they emanate from and are kept in force by the Divine volitions. These are not fitful and arbitrary, like human volitions, but constant, ubiquitous, and eternal, as become the volitions of an eternal, all-wise and omnipresent Spirit, "with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning." The strength and precision of these mighty physical forces measures the energy and accuracy of the Divine volition. Is the regular and ceaseless pulsing of the Divine will through this universal frame any more incredible or incomprehensible than the regular pulsations of the heart in the human body? And if the force which drives this mysterious engine of life within us is not as in the workings of the brain and the hand, our will but the Divine, it only makes more palpable the truth, so little apprehended or believed, that "in Him we live and move and have our being."

What a grand and impressive view does this give of the Divine immutability, and of the connection between the physical forces and the final ends of the creation, since both are united in the one supreme will! At the same time a free and consistent place is found for miracles and Divine answer to prayer; since the system of nature is not a mere dead mechanism, but a living organism instinct throughout with intelligence and will, and as pliant to the indwelling spirit as the body of a man is to the soul. This view affords also a guarantee for the certain execution of God's moral laws and promises, which proceed from the same will that constitutes the stability and constancy of natural law. "Thus saith the Lord; if ye can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, that there should not be day and night in their season, then may also my covenant be broken with David, my servant."

"His word of grace is sure and strong,
As that which built the skies;
The power which rolls the stars along
Speaks all the promises."

Another objection sometimes urged against this view is that it is *pantheistic*. But this can only hold with those who fail to distinguish clearly what pantheism is; which is not the immanence and working of God in nature, but the confounding of God with nature, and especially the denial of the Divine per-

sonality and freedom. So long as God is conceived as a free personal Spirit, distinct from the world and from man, there is little danger of falling into pantheism.

At the same time there is a truth in pantheism which needs to be recognized, as a corrective to our dead, mechanical, and really atheistic conception of the universe. It is that which is taught in such passages as these: "Upholding all things by the word of His power. "For He (the Logos) is before all things, and in Him (not *by* Him) all things consist." "He is not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being": where the representation is that both we and all things have their true being in God, who is therefore the *substance* of all created things, as far as they have any substance in distinction from mere phenomenal existence;—that God is in some true sense the light of reason and the life of the spirit in all men—the supporting ground, the upholding power and the informing organic law of all organized existence, in whose intelligence and will all things consist, or come into system and harmony as a universe.

Combining now these two conceptions, as they are combined in every law and operation of nature, viz: thought or *idea* as the constituent of *form*, and *will* as the constituent of *force*, we have the Divine side of nature, or Mind present and active in every manifestation of created being. This is the active and intelligible principle in nature. There remains only the passive and unintelligible *matter* or stuff upon which form is impressed, through which force is manifested, and out of which, as out of a dark chaotic mass or material, this wondrous universe is created. *What* this is, and whether it be eternal, as the materialists assert; or a mere phenomenon without any substance, the negative pole of being to which the positive is in eternal antagonism—a kind of shadow cast by substance and necessary to its relief and visibility, as idealism would say:—or, following Plato's conception, whether it be the seat and symbol of the evil principle, which God is evermore contending with and overcoming, transforming continually into life and beauty, by informing it with the ideal and divine. until it wholly disappear in the new spiritual creation, except the *slag* or dross which may remain, to be destroyed in the con-

summation of all things:—this insoluble question we leave unanswered.

But regarding matter simply as the material on which form is to be impressed, let us see how the joint action of thought and will, acting as one power, accomplishes this result. Take the simplest form of matter, the crystal, in the process of shooting. There is the *nisus* or force present as the active principle of the stone, which so soon as the conditions are supplied acts upon, or within, the semi-fluid mass, not blindly or at random, but under the guidance of an *idea*, viz : a geometric form ; and the result is a perfectly shaped cube or other symmetrical figure with pyramidal apex, according to the pattern in the Mind of nature. Whatever defect appears in the completed result, whatever falling short of the actual form from the ideal type, is to be attributed to defective conditions, or to the "evil" inherent in matter, or in nature as fallen, which necessitates a difference between the ideal and the actual in this world.

Ascending in the scale of nature, let us take the next kind of form, that of *vegetable life*. Here the idea to be wrought out is more complex and beautiful, and the operating force proportionally complex and protracted. The vital principle, unlike the *nisus* in the shooting of the crystal, does not realize its end by a single impulse, but, like an architect, builds up the structure *seriatim*, and piece by piece, or like a sculptor, shapes the form stroke by stroke, until the whole is completed. What is especially to be noticed is that this whole complex idea seems to be wholly present in every part and stage of the process, guiding intelligently every increment of growth, and causing preparation to be made beforehand, as by a thoughtful provision, for what is to come afterward ; as in the pre-formation of leaf and flower or fruit buds, and in all the wondrous and complicated arrangements by which the seed is provided for, as the consummation of the plant life. As an architect has the idea or plan of the building he is erecting in his mind or chart, which guides the shaping and laying of every stone, so nature, or rather the mind that works in nature, works not blindly but intelligently after an *idea* which determines the form and structure of every leaf and stem and blossom, and is identical with what we term *kind* or *species*. Hence in the original creation of

plants, God is said to have formed them each after its *kind*, i. e., after the specific thought or idea in the mind of the Creator. And as God's thoughts are never confused, however complex and varied, the grand distinctive types of genera and species in the creation are never confused by transmutation of one into another, as the Darwinian theory supposes. Hence, too, the profound meaning of the Psalmist's meditation: "*Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect, and in thy book all my members were written which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them.*" This too disposes of the development theory; for the development we witness in nature is not of mere matter, since there is nothing in it to develop, but of the *idea* contained in the life principle, which enters into matter from above and works it up into a realization of the type or species, which is ideal and invisible, but not the less real. This idea, moreover, is not a mere mental conception formed by generalizing particular forms into a general notion, and having only a subjective and ideal existence, but a real *power* present in every living organism, which makes it what it is. Plato's doctrine that Ideas are the constitutive soul of things, is based in the deepest philosophy. These Divine Ideas differ from ours in that they *constitute* the things in which they inhere, whereas our thought of things is passive and without power except to know them; also that in our minds we dissociate the power which acts from the law or mode of its action, whereas in nature they never are dissociated, but exist and act together as Thought and Force, or Intelligence and Will.

Ideas, in this sense, are the truth and essence of things, and not mere images derived from them, the true objects of knowledge, which we reach when our thought coincides with the Divine thought or idea that is here embodied.

We need not pursue the gradation begun into the next form or type of life, the *animal*, except so far as to indicate a single fact which has an important bearing on the question of the origin of man. We have seen it to be a characteristic of vegetable life that the formative principle, or generic idea, is wholly present in every part of the organism, intelligently guiding and shaping it with reference to results not yet apparent, but contained potentially in the vital principle. What the tree is to be we cannot tell

from the germ, and only imperfectly from the sapling, for nature seems to hide her secrets of form and beauty, not disclosing them till the time for development is come. But not so in respect to animal life. Here the informing idea, at least in the higher species, appears to stamp itself upon the form almost from the beginning; so that even the embryo or foetus is, in little, the image of the perfect animal, and this even in respect to the smallest and most delicate organs. Notably is this true of the human foetus—showing that nature has, so to speak, perfected her idea before she began her work, and expressed it at the beginning, leaving no room for afterthought or change of plan. The bearing of this fact on the development theory must be obvious. The idea of the animal being not for a rational or social existence, but for a mere earthly and material one, its form and structure and every limb and organ are shaped with reference to this end and nothing higher. Its limbs are made for support and running, or for the prehension of prey or food, and not for serving the mind. Its head and senses are prone and earthward, for converse with the ground and not with heaven or with beauty. Its vocal organs are adapted for inarticulate cries, not for talking or the discourse of reason. The idea of *man* being for higher and nobler ends, for a rational and spiritual as well as a physical life, this idea is stamped upon his form from the beginning. The physical (which being the basis of the spiritual, takes the general type of higher physical organisms), is everywhere made subordinate to the intellectual. The limbs of the human infant, unlike those of quadrupeds or the young of other animals, are unable for months to sustain its own weight; which fact, together with its tender and unprotected body, and the absolute helplessness and dependence of the frail being, presupposes social and intellectual conditions wholly unattainable by animals. When, too, we consider the miracle of the human hand—which no animal paw approaches—and the corresponding miracles of art which it is adapted and formed to create; and the supernal light of reason and love reflected in the *smile* that is kindled in the face of the little one by the beaming looks of the mother—which no animal face is capable of wearing;—and especially when the divine *form* of man and the celestial beauty of his coun-

tenance is superadded to the rest, as it were the seal and signature of the Divine artist, to show that he is indeed made in the image of God,—we see that what man is in the highest altitude and dignity he has yet attained, was manifestly *designed*, and belongs to the primordial idea of man as stamped upon his structure from the beginning. To suppose otherwise, or to suppose that this grand distinction of man over all other creatures, this godlike form, with the Divine attributes of reason and love and spiritual intelligence, were smuggled in, so to speak, by accident upon a mere animal nature, or were “developed” from the brute instinct and bestial form of “a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears,” by a process of “natural selection” without a special divine creation, is to forego reason itself and approximate the level of intelligence from which the theory claims that man has arisen.

From this perhaps too extended disquisition, the abstruseness of which may be pardoned for the sake of the important issues involved,—one or two thoughts of practical interest suggest themselves. We see what true Science is, and what relation it sustains to Religion.

Natural science is nothing else but the reading of God's thoughts in nature. It is not a dull tracing of mechanical effects to mechanical causes, or antecedents, but the communion of mind with Mind. Hence the devout enthusiasm which has ever characterized the truest scientific thinkers and discoverers, which is admirably expressed in the exclamation of Kepler: “O God, I think thy thoughts after Thee!” Little enthusiasm and little inspiration will those have who ignore the existence of mind or thought in nature, and confine their inspection to mere phenomena, the bare *letter* of the book of nature, as if there were no divine thought or meaning below it. All honor to the grammarians, whether in the field of literature or of science. It is needful to know the structure, the history and logical connections both of words and facts, that we may not mistake false for true readings. But it is no less needful to look below and through the letter to the thought or *idea* expressed by it, and especially to believe that there *is* an idea. Faith and reverence are necessary, whether in reading the book of God's word, or the book of God's works. All the greatest

discoveries in science have been made by men of devout faith in God. And the reason of this is evident; for science in its highest range is communion with God; and its truest motto would be, "In thy light shall we see light."

If there is mind in nature, which it is the object of science to reach and interpret, it is an infinite mind, whose thoughts as revealed in things are inexhaustible. "Thy thoughts, O God! are very deep," says David; and what student of nature has not found them so? Where, then, is the limit of science, if there be any, in searching out these thoughts of God? Shall we restrict our exploration to what are called material causes,—(which if in the sphere of phenomena are not causes at all), and ignore any deeper or final causes? So the modern scientist asserts, but not so thought the great Sir Isaac Newton. "The principal object of natural philosophy, says this great man, is to ascend from effects to causes, even till one arrives at the first cause of all, which certainly is not mechanical, and not only to explain the mechanism of the world, but above all to resolve questions such as these: whence comes it that nature does nothing in vain; and whence springs this order and this beauty in the animal creation, which are made with so much art, and for what ends have their different parts been disposed? Has the eye been formed without any knowledge of optics, and the ear without the knowledge of acoustics?"*—questions which we refer to Mr. Tyndall to answer.

* *La Philosophie Anglaise.* See *Revue des Deux Mondes* for March, 1875.

We append the following continuation of the above extract: "A ces questions profondes, Newton répondait qu'il existe un être incorporel, vivant, intelligent, omniprésent, qui dans l'espace infini, comme dans son *sensorium*, voit les choses en elles-mêmes, les perçoit dans leur intégrité, les comprend pleinement parce qu'elles lui sont immédiatement présentes, tandis que les images seulement en sont transmises à nos sens par la perception. Dieu pour lui était non pas seulement l'âme du monde, mais le seigneur universel, *παντοκράτωρ*. La domination de l'être spirituel constitue Dieu, et Dieu à son tour, en tant qu'il dure et existe partout et toujours, constitue l'espace et la durée. L'unité de la personne humaine n'est qu'une image de l'unité de Dieu. Dieu est tout entier semblable à lui-même, et en quelque sorte tout œil, tout cerveau, tout bras, dans un sens incorporel; de même que l'aveugle n'a pas idée des couleurs, nous n'avons aucune idée de la manière dont le Seigneur souverainement sage, sent et comprend tout. Nous ne le connaissons que par sa sagesse et par l'admirable structure des choses *per optimas rerum structuræ*. Telle est dans ses traits généraux la théologie de Newton, et nous pensons avec M. de Remusat que jamais plus grand autorité n'aura été donnée à la preuve que Kant appelait physico-théologique."

Such being the nature and legitimate object of science, its affinity with religion must be manifest. For religion is also communion with God; only this communion is not limited to the thoughts of God in the physical creation, but comprehends also other and more spiritual revelations, especially those made in the Scriptures and in the human soul. To restrict religion to the region of *emotion*, and deny to it that of *knowledge*, as belonging exclusively to *science*, according to Mr. Tyndall, evinces a most inadequate idea of the nature of religion. Divorced from reason and knowledge religion becomes superstition. Religious faith is, in fact, the highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of God; only this knowledge is not that of the understanding considered as a sense-faculty conversant only with things of sense or phenomena, but is that of the higher intuitional and spiritual nature, which includes the will and emotions as well as the reason.

A conflict or antagonism between science and religion is only possible through a false conception of one or both, and their harmony will be brought about by holding a higher and truer idea of their essential unity, and will result in exalting and quickening the spirit of science and in broadening and enlightening that of religion.

When religion shall enlarge her faith to the reception of all truth as divine, and as needful to her complete and harmonious growth and stature; and when science shall cease to be dogmatic, and be content to learn as a little child; and when it can recognize realities other than what the senses can detect or the understanding conceive and measure, and has learned the true meaning of the word *cause*;—in short, when it can discern a divine *mind* in nature, as the ground and substance of all phenomena and the constituent of all its laws and forces,—the dawn of a new *Instanratio* will have come.

“Science then will be a precious visitant,
And then, and only then, be worthy of her name.”

ARTICLE III.—EMPIRICAL DISSENT FROM MR. SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY.

Problems of Life and Mind. By GEORGE HENRY LEWES. First Series. The Foundation of a Creed. 2 vols. London, 1874-75.

MR. GEORGE HENRY LEWES is the author of a "Biographical History of Philosophy," published in 1847, and republished afterwards under the title of "A History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte;" of special disquisitions on Comte and Aristotle; of a Life of Robespierre, the standard biography of Goethe, an essay on the Spanish Drama, a novel or two, a tragedy or two, and papers too numerous to mention on Psychology, Physiology, the Positive Philosophy, and things in general. These works have given the author a somewhat exceptional position among philosophical writers of the day, not unlike that of George Eliot the novelist, a name always mentioned by the British reviewer with bated breath, as of one whose utterances are wholly beyond the range of ordinary criticism. Not, of course, but what there are critics in plenty who venture to differ from Mr. Lewes, but that no critic is capable of the impropriety of forgetting that it is Mr. Lewes from whom he differs. Nor are we; on the contrary we record an impression derived from some acquaintance with the documents themselves that Mr. Lewes's biographies of other great men are chiefly remarkable from the instructive light they throw on the biographer—the life and works of Goethe for example serving as a kind of translucent screen through which the action of Mr. Lewes's mind glows upon us; and the History of Philosophy for its impressive disclosure of the way in which philosophic thought has ever tended, with the imperturbable gravity of natural law, from the clouds and quicksands of primeval Metemprics to the solid ground of Mr. Lewes's opinions.

What those opinions are and how they have arisen we now

learn in a direct and compendious manner from the latest product of Mr. Lewes's genius, the *Problems of Life and Mind*. It appears that so long ago as 1836 Mr. Lewes had planned a treatise on the Philosophy of Mind in which the doctrines of Reid, Stewart, and Brown were to be physiologically interpreted.* It turned out upon trial, however, that the doctrines of those misguided men were incapable of physiological interpretation, and very properly, therefore, Mr. Lewes abandoned the Scotch Philosophy to its fate. Other studies and labors intervened until 1860, when Mr. Lewes, believing that his researches into the nervous system had given him a clue through the labyrinth of mental phenomena (where the clueless Scotchmen had been lost), turned for their better interpretation to the simpler phenomena of Animal Psychology. But here, in spite of the *filum labyrinthi*, he was thwarted by that Minotaur which has been so fatal to theologians, to wit: Anthropomorphism; an inevitable catastrophe, "since, obviously, it is only through our knowledge of the processes in ourselves that we can interpret the manifestations of similar processes in animals"—or in gods; and hence "we are hampered by the anthropomorphic tendency which leads us to assign exclusively human motives to animal actions." Let us pause here a moment to observe that Anthropomorphism—our propensity to read ourselves into the phenomena we study—has some good points about it too, although of course the kind of anthropomorphism that man has will depend very largely on the kind of man.† It is this, for example, as we suggested before, which lends such charm to Mr. Lewes's biographies of Plato and Goethe.

Returning from these unfortunate excursions into the Scotch Philosophy and Animal Psychology, Mr. Lewes at last began

* Preface.

† The kind of philosophy a man chooses, says Fichte, depends on the kind of man. This is true too, although quoted by Mr. Lewes to show what a whimsical thing Metempiricism is. Fancy, says Mr. Lewes, an Evangelical Geology or a High Church Chemistry! It is to be feared that both these absurdities are on the cards; that is, each of the special sciences ends in certain generalizations, and the kind of interpretation put upon these will depend upon the kind of man. So we have what we may call the Evangelical Physics of Prof. Clerk Maxwell, and the Ultramontane Anatomy of Mr. St. Geo. Mivart, and so on.

in 1862, where, perhaps it is a little surprising that he did not begin in 1836, with an investigation of the physiological mechanism of Thought and Feeling in Man, an investigation which involved a wide range of research into Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Insanity, and the Science of Language. The immediate result of this research was the conviction that "Psychology is still without the fundamental data necessary to its constitution as a science—is very much in the condition of chemistry before Lavoisier, or of Biology before Bichat." Perhaps the first impulse of the reader on hearing this confession will be to say that Mr. Lewes has come to grief again; that his investigation of the physiological mechanism of Feeling and Thought begun in 1862 has borne no better fruit than his physiological interpretation of the Scotch Philosophy in 1836, or his investigation of Animal Psychology in 1860. But a little reflection will suggest that if researches into Physiology at last authorize Mr. Lewes to affirm that Psychology lacks the necessary data for its constitution as a science, it must be that Physiology is in possession of the data itself. If as yet we have no Science of Mind it is for the sufficient reason that we have gone on looking for the data of the science where they are not to be found. From Socrates to the year of grace 1862 Psychologists have been groping among the phenomena of consciousness, its sensations, perceptions, memories, ideas, intuitions, for the wherewithal to interpret consciousness. But mind is only a special form of life, and "life" is only our comprehensive abstract term for the functions of an organism. Now functions are determined by structure, and he who would constitute a Science of Biology, or of Psychology, must go for his fundamental data, not to Vitality, or Life, as biologists did before Bichat, or to Mind, as Psychologists did before Mr. Lewes, but to the organism itself, whose various reactions under stimulus on the surrounding universe are what we call in our abstract, comprehensive way, "life," and "mind." This is a momentous discovery on either side of it. If Psychology must draw on Physiology for its data and if Physiology is able to honor the draft; if it be really true that "function" knows how to interpret "structure," or, conversely, that structure has among other functions this one of self-consciousness and self-

interpretation—then certainly we are on the eve of total revolution in both sciences alike; and in whatever depends upon them, which is nothing less than the conduct of life and the order of society. So far Mr. Lewes is perfectly right in declaring that speculation has been astray for 2,500 years and in affirming his restatement of the problems of life and mind as the “Foundations of a Creed.”

It is somewhat surprising to find that a work of this grave intent and long labor bears the evident traces of indecision and precipitation. Not only is the formulation of the new Creed, i. e., the constitution of Psychology on Physiological data, postponed to the future, but the foundation of the creed, which is all that is offered to us here, appears to be no solid structure but only an accumulation of building material drawn from “a huge mass of heterogeneous manuscript,” which in turn has grown out of a “varied set of detached investigations”—in Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Insanity, and the Science of Language. And the direct purpose of the accumulation is not to lay the foundation of the new Creed but to discredit the metaphysical Method of the old one. This is not a criticism of ours but an explanation of Mr. Lewes's. The work “having grown up heterogeneously, its structure is heterogeneous. Sections now brought together have been wrought out at the distance of years, and without reference to each other,” which surely is not heterogeneous structure but none at all; “while during repeated revisions and remodifications many repetitions and cross references have been inserted, and sentences which bear the obvious trace of 1872 or 1873 appear in pages originally written perhaps eight or ten years previously. The reader is also sometimes called upon to accept results for which the evidence can only be produced in subsequent chapters or volumes.” The reader will not guess how true this description is until he has made a careful study of the work itself. The Introduction to the whole on the Method of Science and its application to Metaphysics, the first, second, and third problems on the Limitations of Knowledge, the Principles of Certitude, and the passage from the Known to the Unknown, are all variations upon the same theme, what we do not know, what we do know, and how we come to know it; in the Fourth,

Fifth, and Sixth Problems on Matter, Force, Cause, and the Absolute, we make some headway certainly, but even here Mr. Lewes thinks it necessary to remind us incessantly that if the circuit is wider the centre is the same. Moreover this redundancy equally characterizes what may be called the minute structure of the work, section following section and paragraph paragraph in a round of untiring iteration. Now there is a redundancy which is a legitimate and a very high form of art. Descartes for example was a great master of it. The "Discourse on Method" with the accompanying papers, in which he first sketched his system, drew him into correspondence with half the learned men in Europe, and every new criticism elicited a new statement of his ideas. But the new statement never darkened the earlier one; it presented another face of it, or a deeper development of it, or flooded the whole domain with light from another sun. Mr. Lewes's repetitions are not of this sort. "Wrought out at the distance of years, and without reference to one another," the later sometimes obscure the earlier and sometimes contradict them, so that one needs an exegesis of a very critical character to determine exactly what it is that Mr. Lewes would have us understand. So again there is a reticence which has a strength of emphasis and suggestion better than any speech, but we are constrained to say that Mr. Lewes's reticence is sometimes a suppression of the capital articulations of his thought, and sometimes, as he says himself, the provisional assumption of results for which evidence is to be produced hereafter. Now Mr. Herbert Spencer has made us wary of these "provisional assumptions," for the evidence ultimately assigned for them turns out in many cases to be assumption too; as when assuming the constitution of consciousness we infer the persistence of force, and then assuming the persistence of force we infer the constitution of consciousness. On the whole our conclusion is that the Problems of Life and Mind not only lacks the complete and homogeneous structure requisite to the foundations of a Creed, but the structure Mr. Lewes would himself have given to it in time if some special exigency had not precipitated the publication of the work.

What is this special exigency? It cannot be any threatening

manifestation of fresh vitality and aggressiveness on the part of the Intuitional Philosophy which Mr. Lewes is about to supersede, for in all the storms of its long career that Philosophy has never been so patient as it is to-day under the affronts of Empiricism; and Mr. Lewes at any rate believes it to have said its last word long ago and to be now in the article of death. Platonism, Mysticism, Scholasticism, Idealism, Rationalism, Kantism—all these schools have had their day and finished their work, have built the Creed foundation and superstructure; and whether the work will stand or fall there can be no more need of impatience and haste in disposing of it than of any other historical monument of the past. But what if some other Empiricist is in the field with a Creed which anticipates Mr. Lewes's, or which denies it and so compromises the whole philosophy and faith of the future? Then we can understand that both for his own sake and for the sake of truth and of humanity, it would be necessary for him to go upon record at once whether ready or not; not only to organize the coming revolution, which might be a work of leisure, but to protect it from the blunders of other revolutionists, which is a work of urgency. "Is it not a justifiable hope, says Mr. Lewes, that England may some day possess a philosophy, the absence of which during the last two hundred years has been a serious defect in her culture? Science she has had, and Poetry, and Literature, rivalling when not surpassing those of other nations. But a Philosophy she has not had, in spite of philosophic thinkers of epoch-making power. . . . There has been no noteworthy attempt to give a conception of the World, of Man, and of Society, wrought out with an effort to systematise the scattered labors of isolated thinkers. Mr. Herbert Spencer is now for the first time deliberately making the attempt to found a Philosophy"* (i. e., is the first to make the attempt). Why not leave the enterprise then in the hands of Mr. Herbert Spencer? There seems to be only one satisfactory answer to this question. Mr. Spencer is doing what Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, English thinkers of epoch-making power never thought of, what Kepler and Galileo, Descartes and

* i, p. 84.

Bacon began but did not complete; he is founding a Universal Creed for the future, a "Positive Philosophy to embrace the World, Man, and Society on one homogeneous Method;"* but in the opinion of Mr. Lewes he is not founding it well, and his errors are of such capital importance that prompt denial and rectification of them is demanded in the interest of Empiricism and of posterity.

At any rate whatever the motive of the work, whether co-operation with Mr. Spencer, or correction of his errors, or independent investigation, there can be no doubt of the fact that the Problems of Life and Mind, starting from the common Empirical doctrine concerning the sources and limits of human knowledge is either a point-blank denial or a radical modification of every important principle, one excepted, which Mr. Spencer has drawn from that doctrine. In the entire range of the Intuitionist Philosophy from Plato to Kant there is not an instance of deeper dissent and sharper contradiction than between our two Empiricists; and it is only in the light of this dissent from Mr. Spencer that we can understand Mr. Lewes's dissent from the Intuitionist Philosophy, and the real character of the Creed he proposes to found.

All thorough-going philosophy begins with a single cognition and a provisional skepticism concerning everything else. What I know with instant and absolute certitude is this, that I am. To this I immediately add the affirmation, that I have been; an immense addition—so immense that it really contains all the materials on which I am going to philosophize;† and so wholly different from the first affirmation ("I am") that it requires to be protected against my provisional skepticism. In common with all others of his school Mr. Spencer escapes the brunt of the battle by taking the certitude and the assumption together as of equal validity, and so secures as the basis of his philosophy the entire contents of consciousness, the feelings we have in the present and the feelings we remember to have had in the past. His method of treating the materials is the empirical—analysis and classification, the decomposition of the com-

* i, p. 86.

† Since present experience becomes memory in the act of philosophizing upon it.

plex states of consciousness into their constituent elements, the comparison of the elements with one another to find the character or characters common to them all, and the reconstruction of knowledge upon the basis of these common characters. Briefly stated the results are as follows:—The constituent elements are all alike in this that they are manifestations of Force. What we may call the ultimate unit by whose combinations in different multiples all the complex states of consciousness are built up is the simple impression of resistance. "This is the primordial, the universal, the ever-present constituent of consciousness."* Of course there can be no such thing as a "simple" impression of resistance for this impression decomposes at once into an impression of a something which acts and an impression of another something which reacts. It implies what Mr. Spencer describes elsewhere as the "incomprehensible duality of force." Action—Reaction, Influence—Resistance, Pressure—Tension, Attraction—Repulsion, this is the antithesis latent in every "ultimate unit," involved in every composite "multiple" of feeling. And were it not for this complexity, inconceivable as it is, the ultimate unit would be of no avail for Mr. Spencer. Out of the initial antithesis flows the whole of his philosophy, yielding successively: (1) the antithesis between Feeling and Motion, or Self and Not-self, Subject and Object, Mind and the World—the antithesis "transcending all others;" (2) the antithesis between Motion and Matter, or Action and Agent; (3) the antithesis between Force and Work, or Cause and Effect; (4) the antithesis between Properties and Substance, Phenomena and Noumena, Relative and Absolute, Apparent and Real, the Knowable and the Unknowable. As the fundamental antithesis includes already each of these derivative antitheses, so too its persistent recurrence in all changes of consciousness along with fortuitous combinations of the multiples of consciousness gives us again (5) the distinction, or antithesis between Necessary and Contingent Truths; propositions which are true of this, or that, or the other thing—propositions whose contradictions are inconceivable and therefore impossible, which *must* be true of all things everywhere and forever. These necessary truths are the Per-

* Psychology, ii, p. 232.

sistence of Force, the Indestructibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and the consequent Evolution of the Universe from the primordial diffusion of homogeneous matter through Space down to Man ; Consciousness itself with its triumphant synthesis of the past, the present, and the future being only the latest outcome of the Evolution it interprets ; like anything else a product of the concurrent redistribution of Matter and Motion due to Persistent Force.

This is manifestly a form of the Intuitional Philosophy ; and a form in which intuitions have been applied with uncommon audacity and latitude. Intuitive certitude is wrought into the very root and fibre of it ; necessary objective truth is written all over it. From the simplest element of consciousness through all grades of composition up to the immense and intricate multiples of ratiocination, mind is a thing separated from the universe outside of it by an antithesis transcending all others ; never to be assimilated while consciousness lasts with motion or with matter or with any of their redistributions. If this is so—and we are quoting, not paraphrasing Mr. Spencer—then the knowledge the mind has of matter and motion and of the laws of their redistribution is knowledge of its own ; and to derive not only the knowledge but the very faculty of knowing, not only memories, perceptions, and reasonings, but mind itself from evolving matter and motion, is to falsify what went before, to assure the collapse of the whole system ; for it is certain that nothing can be derived from matter and motion, by any process of redistribution, that is persistently antithetic and unassimilable to themselves.

There is no hope for Mr. Spencer ; he is beyond saving. All that can be done is to take one side of his philosophy and leave the other. The remarkable thing is that the intuitional side is the easier to take. A single resolute amputation suffices to restore organic consistency and coherence to all the rest. We have but to withdraw mind as a product of universal evolution in order to accept, subject of course to revision and correction, all Mr. Spencer's antitheses, the existence of the objective universe, the laws of its development, and the ultimate reality behind it, as explicit or implicit affirmations of consciousness. But if we restore mind as a mode of motion, or a function of

matter, as a something due to mere redistribution, then the antitheses must go one and all. It is an heroic remedy but for the empiricist there is no other. The merit of Mr. Spencer's philosophy is to have submitted the alternative. It is Mr. Lewes's to have made up his mind—very nearly; and to have accepted the situation—almost; it is his misfortune not to have been able to accept it altogether.

Mr. Lewes, then, begins where Mr. Spencer does, with the facts of Feeling. But (1) he denies entirely the antithesis between Feeling and Motion, i. e., between subject and object. Motion does not produce feeling; or arouse feeling; or turn into feeling; or go before feeling; in no such sense is it a cause of feeling. It is impossible that it should be, and if it were it could never be known to us. Conversely, feeling is in no sense the cause of motion. With this single denial Mr. Lewes blows away the whole philosophy of Transfigured Realism along with the Crude Realism and the Hypothetical Realism from which Mr. Spencer has distinguished it. Motion *is* feeling—feeling *is* motion; the subject *is* the object—the object *is* the subject. There is no real separation, no dualism, no antithesis between the two, but absolute identity; and it is the identity which makes knowledge possible. Feeling is simply the “subjective side” of motion, motion the “objective side” of feeling. (2) Mr. Lewes denies the antithesis between Motion and Matter. Again the phenomena are not two but one; only as before motion is the “active side” of matter, matter is the “passive side” of motion. Of course since motion is at the same time the objective side of feeling and the active side of matter, feeling must be the subjective side of matter. (3) We need not say that Mr. Lewes identifies Motion and Force; but further he denies the antithesis between Force and Matter. Force is the “dynamic aspect” or side of matter, matter the “static aspect” of force; feeling again being the subjective aspect of both. (4) Mr. Lewes denies the antithesis between Force and Work, Factors and Facts, Cause and Effect. “Cause is the condensed expression of the *factors* of any phenomena, the Effect being the *fact* itself. Cause is the group of conditions which passes into the effect, ideally distinguished from the product but not really separable. In cause and effect there are not two things,

one preceding the other but two aspects of one phenomenon successively viewed. The effect is the . . . *procession* of the cause."* "The process and the product are one viewed under two aspects." (5) Mr. Lewes denies the antithesis between Substance and Properties. Mind *and* its modifications, or matter *and* its properties are not two but one. Substance is but one name for the whole group of properties, qualities, actions, changes. This involves the denial of the antithesis between Phenomena and Noumena, the Relative and the Absolute. The relations *are* the absolute, the phenomena the only reality there is. Things *are* what they *seem*; groups of relations and nothing more. Here, however, Mr. Lewes's language is contradictory. In the introduction the Suprasensible element involved in every phenomenon is dismissed from consideration on the ground that it is an Unknowable something whose functions are known. Later in the work its existence is unequivocally denied, and the denial is plainly indispensable to the consistency of Mr. Lewes's philosophy, for if there be an Absolute behind phenomena and relations, and distinct from them, it is impossible to exclude it from one theory of phenomena on the ground that its functions are known, for no man can know what are or are not the functions of the absolutely Unknowable. The absolute is therefore simply the "other side" of the phenomena, that is the possibility of other relations than the relation known to us. (6) Mr. Lewes denies the antithesis between Necessary and Contingent Truth. All truths are alike feelings, ideally distinguishable according to the aspects under which they are viewed, but no one of which is any more contingent or any more necessary than another. This denial is involved in the others. There is no motion apart from feeling which determines the feeling, for the motion *is* the feeling; there is no force apart from matter which compels it to move, for the force *is* the matter, as matter is motion—differently viewed; there is no essence or substance which determines the properties for the substance is the whole group of properties; there are no causes outside the effects, no laws outside the processes, no reality outside the phenomena, no

* II, p. 361.

absolute outside the relations, which determine things to be as they are and not otherwise, for all these are different sides of one and the same thing. All truths are equally contingent since they all express feelings which come and go within consciousness: all are equally necessary since they are all reducible to an identical proposition ("whatever is, is"), or to an equivalent proposition ("things equal to the same thing are equal to each other"). Therefore to say that force is persistent, Matter indestructible, and Motion continuous, each independently of the other, is a contradiction in terms since these are but persistent aspects of the same thing; and this persistence itself is a necessary truth only so far as it is given in experience; so that Mr. Spencer's Theory of Evolution sinks at once to the rank of a "good working-hypothesis," a logical artifice, or ideal construction which we invoke as the best explanation available of the known phenomena, which we are ready to exchange for a better one when it offers. So of the Atomic Theory, or the Aethereal Medium, or Physiological Units, or Pangenesis, or Natural Selection. We know nothing whatever of the existence of these substances or processes. They are ideal constructions by which we assign hypothetical factors for known facts, and a higher art of idealization may at any time suggest a better hypothesis.

It follows therefore that the pursuit of forces, causes, laws, as something antithetical to phenomena, necessities imposed upon them from the outside by some will, or fate, or chance, or unknowable Power, is chimerical, for outside the phenomena there is nothing. The goal of all knowledge is a complete enumeration of the facts of feeling, co-existent and sequent, and the factors of the facts. Some of the factors are missing and until they appear we must supply their places by the best hypothesis in our power; and so limited is the range of our experience that there is no hope that we shall ever get beyond the need of hypothesis into actual possession of all the factors; but if we ever do there will be no more to be done. Knowledge of phenomena is knowledge of substances, causes, forces, laws: complete science of the process is omniscience.

Here then at last, by mere dint of differing from Mr. Spencer we seem to have got, what we have never had before, an uncom-

promising application of the Empirical Method without ambiguity or *arrière-pensée*, crowned by a complete synthesis without contradiction or omission. We have taken the contents of consciousness in all their multitude and diversity and by courageous comparison and classification we have got beyond the formidable antitheses which stopped Mr. Spencer into that Oneness which is the aspiration of the intellect and the goal of all philosophy. The mighty barriers have melted out of consciousness at the touch of Mr. Lewes's wand like the mountains of a mirage. For us there is nothing but Feeling, whose subjective side is sensations, perceptions, memories, reasonings, the ideal constructions of science and philosophy, emotions, pleasures, pains; whose objective side is motion, matter, force, cause, the absolute. It is a seductive synthesis; and there is that in the confidence and tranquil daring of the discoverer which doubles the seduction. For these be days in which we sadly need a leader who knows his own mind and has the courage of his opinions. Philosopher has followed philosopher with his half-comprehension, his halting faith and the timid guess-work of his "provisional hypotheses," leaving us more confounded by the paradoxes of the universe, more hopelessly puzzled by the intricacy of its phenomena than ever. It is a comfort at last to hear the voice of one crying in the wilderness who claims to know all about it and all about the way out of it. At the same time long wandering has cast us down and repeated disappointment has made us wary. It is a misfortune therefore that Mr. Lewes's promises should recall so vividly the failure of the last one made to us. How is it that his doctrine is so exactly and so minutely a contradiction of Mr. Spencer's? Mr. Spencer is a great man, but is he so great a man that simple denial of his propositions will lead us into knowledge of the truth? Surely a true explanation of the Cosmos is to be got, if at all, by observation of the Cosmos and not by merely contradicting Mr. Spencer. We ourselves, for example, have ventured to differ from him on important points without in the least approaching a solution of the great mystery. And when we find what, on careful comparison, we do find, that the foundations of the new Creed are built up, block by block and grain by grain, from the ruins of the

Synthetic Philosophy, we cannot resist the discouraging conviction that Mr. Lewes is but the latest victim of that hallucination which has kept speculation roaming in the desert.

Herauf, herab, und quer und krum for 300 years; the hallucination that the universe is to be explained by simply rectifying the previous explanation.

The Cartesian Philosophy received its highest development at the hands of Malebranche in the doctrine of Occasional Causes. Mind with its ideas and feelings is so antithetic to Matter with its extension and motions that it is impossible that either should act upon the other. Their concurrent action therefore must be due to some third power beyond; it must be the incessant interference of the deity which adjusts the changes of one to the changes of the other. This doctrine died a natural death but it suggested to Leibnitz the alternative doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. The accord of mind and matter is not due to incessant interference of the deity, but to the perfect structure given in the act of creation. Mind and matter run together because God made them to run together from the beginning, each being adjusted at the outset to the predetermined changes of the other. This again evidently would not do and in time we have Mr. Spencer's alternative of Transfigured Realism. The changes we call Mind are wholly unas-similable to those we call Motion (the antithesis remaining as transcendent as ever), but the former are in correspondence with the latter because evolved from them. But to Mr. Lewes this is as absurd as Pre-established Harmony or Occasional Causation. So Mr. Lewes takes the only alternative that is left. Mind is not in accord with motion or with matter at all; it *is* motion and it *is* matter. We say that this is a most suspicious pedigree. The Reasoned Realism of Mr. Lewes is suggested, apparently, not by the facts of experience; not even by researches into Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Insanity, and the Science of Language—of which to our surprise we hear next to nothing at all in the Problems of Life and Mind—but by the necessity of contradicting the Transfigured Realism of Mr. Spencer, who had to contradict Leibnitz, who had to con-

tradict Malebranche.* But the explanation of Malebranche, was wholly verbal, an enunciation of propositions without any intelligible ideas attaching to them; for to say that when I have a modification of the mind corresponding with the motion of a body it is God who produces the modification, or that when a body moves according to one of my volitions it is God who produces this motion—all this is to account for the phenomena by a more unfathomable mystery than their own, is a roundabout way of saying that we do not understand what we perceive. The first explanation being verbal the presumption is that all later ones which are rectifications of the first are verbal too. We know that the Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz was; we have it on Mr. Lewes's authority that the Transfigured Realism of Mr. Spencer is; and the question now arises whether the Reasoned Realism of Mr. Lewes, the propositions that "Subject is Object," that "Motion is Matter," that "Cause is Effect," in general the proposition that all the contrasted phenomena of the world within and all the contrasted phenomena of the supposed, antithetical world without are reducible to a common term—"feeling," are not also wholly verbal propositions. We submit that they are, and we appeal for proof to the manifest fact that they all break down in Mr. Lewes's own hands upon any attempt to render them into

* We do not forget the century and a half between Leibnitz and Mr. Spencer, who has, however, himself indicated the relation between them. (Psychology i, iv, ch. 3.)

Leibnitz compared Mind and Body to two watches which keep time exactly together, and reduced the possible explanations of the synchronism to these three:

- (1.) That each watch controls the action of the other. (The simple affirmation of consciousness.)
- (2.) Some one adjusts the watches to each other from time to time. (Occasional Causes.)
- (3.) The maker made them so perfectly at first that they always go together. (Pre-established Harmony.)

To these alternatives the following, which Leibnitz did not take the trouble to consider, have been added since, all turning on the question whether there are really two watches.

- (4.) Watch B is an optical illusion of watch A. (Idealism.)
- (5.) A is a special function of B. (Transfigured Realism.)
- (6.) A is the "subjective aspect" of B. (Reasoned Realism.)
- (7.) There is no watch at all. All these run into one another. Transfigured Realism avoids Idealism by a *petitio principii*; Reasoned Realism is Idealism; Idealism is incipient Scepticism; Scepticism is delirium or idiocy.

intelligible ideas, the identity or equivalence asserted of the phenomena of conscious experience disintegrating at once into the multitude, the disparities, and the contrasts which have baffled philosophy from the beginning.

First of all, the fact stares us in the face throughout the Problems of Life and Mind that the common term in which all things are merged is not one but many. Consciousness is not Feeling but an incalculable multitude of feelings, each of which, for example, a feeling of Sound or of Light, maintains its individuality in the midst of the multitude. Indeed we owe to Mr. Lewes himself a much-needed reinstatement of the fundamental truth that change is indispensable to consciousness, that number and difference are prior to the similitude and unity which Empiricism seeks for. What is it that has pulverized Feeling into feelings; or what is it that has bound up feelings into Consciousness? Will mere enumeration, however exhaustive, explain either the multitude and the individualities, or the cohesion and the unity? What has determined Feeling to be Many, and what has determined the Many to cling together as One? In the second place each distinct feeling is not simple but compound. It has its different sides, or aspects, subjective and objective, active and passive, static and dynamic; differences which persist, never merged in one another, never confounded together. All are aspects of the same thing if you please, but that is no explanation of the fact that the aspects differ. Again in the third place, each fact of feeling, says Mr. Lewes, must have at least two factors. The fact, to be sure, is but the sum of the factors, the effect but the procession of the causes, the product but another aspect of the process; but what has split the factors in two, or merged them again in one? how does it happen that the process changes in aspect when "successively viewed?" Is this protean consciousness explained by a mere record of its transformations? All these questions point to that omission which we have already indicated as the fatal misfortune of Mr. Lewes's philosophy. He has denied the antitheses insisted on by Mr. Spencer between Subject and Object, Feeling and Motion, Motion and Matter, Matter and Force, Cause and Effect, Relative and Absolute, Phenomenal and Real, but he has neglected to deny

the fundamental antithesis from which all these were derived between the opposite manifestations of Force. It is true he resolves all forces into Pressure, but pressure is only known to us as arising in obstructed motion,* which at once restores the "incomprehensible duality of Force." Now Mr. Spencer would have been glad to escape the necessity of recognizing this duality, for it *invalidates, within the range of experience, his universal postulate or criterion of truth*, based upon the impossibility of inconceivables. He could not do so, however, and therefore did the next best thing, the only thing, indeed, open to him to do; he accepted the obvious fact in spite of the postulate and made it the foundation of his whole interpretation of consciousness. And precisely as the affirmation of the duality of force supplies a base for Mr. Spencer's philosophy, so the failure to deny it knocks the bottom out of Mr. Lewes's; or to speak more adequately, it leaves a difference in things not to be expressed in any identical proposition, a source of changes not to be ascertained by mere enumeration of the phenomena; and so forces upon him that half-recognition of Mr. Spencer's antitheses involved in the propositions that "every fact requires at least two factors," that "every feeling has its contrasted aspects," that "change is necessary to consciousness."

Perhaps we shall be able to simplify the discussion by an artifice.† Let us, in imagination, allow the universe, over which we have all been puzzling so long, to vanish, and in its place let there be two of the ultimate particles of matter at a given distance, say a yard, apart, in empty space. The question is, Are the phenomena explained by simple enumeration? They are—two atoms, a yard apart, in an infinite vacuum. The enumeration is complete: is there any explanation?

If now we yield to the impulse which has animated human intelligence and determined the whole character and course of philosophy hitherto we shall insist on the following inquiries: (1) How came the atoms there? Have they been there forever; have they happened there; or have they been put there? Self-existence—existence from eternity—chance-existence—or

* ii, p. 359.

† It has often been used and is objected to by Mr. Lewes on the ground that it postulates impossibilities. We use it subject to all criticism simply for the purpose of getting the points in question distinctly stated.

creation? (2.) Why are there not three atoms instead of two? Why not four; or a hundred; or a myriad; or an infinite number; or one? or why any at all? Even Mr. Lewes indirectly raises this question by his doctrine of hypotheses. Thus: he admits the Atomic Theory as a possible explanation of things, that is, he affirms the possible existence of atoms; but he denies that the existence of atoms is certain, that is, he affirms the possible existence of something in the place of them. The universe that is may be constituted in any one of several ways; why then this way? Or returning to our artifice, why two atoms and not three? Why atoms and not something else? To put it in the picturesque manner of Leibnitz, here is an infinite number of possible universes all "equally pretending to existence in the mind of God" who has selected the particular universe that is for some "sufficient reason" which can only be this, that it is "the best of all possible universes." (3.) The two atoms are either exactly alike, or they differ. Why alike and not different? Or why different and not alike? Prof. Clerk Maxwell, who considers that the physical constitution of the universe points to the existence of uniform atoms, declares that this uniformity is the unmistakable stamp of design, the "trade-mark of the manufacturer;" they could not be so without having been *made* so. There are other indications, however, viz: the seemingly inconvertible forms of force, which point to original differences in the constituents of matter; but these differences equally announce design. (4.) Why a yard apart? Why not two, or twenty, or an infinite interval, or contact? To all these questions or others of the sort, it is open to the Empiricist to reply, nobody knows or can know; which is simply to say that there is an explanation beyond the phenomena but forever inaccessible to us whose knowledge is limited to sensible experiences. This answer, whether true or not, is at least logical and consistent. It is Mr. Spencer's, and on it he has built up, but not logically or consistently, that strange superstructure of Ontology and Religion which is the most remarkable feature of his system. Mr. Lewes's answer is the directly opposite one, that the phenomena explain themselves and require only to be enumerated. Beyond them there

is—nothing, the *Leere*;* no substance, no force, no cause, formal, efficient, or final, no intelligence, no power, no absolute reality determining them to be, and to be as they are. How came Mr. Lewes to know all that? for that is Omniscience. No man can have a knowledge of the inner nature of phenomena and of the regions beyond them more comprehensive, more exhaustive, more absolute, than to be able to say, There is nothing there. The fact is that with reference to all these transcendental inquiries of substance, origin, cause, and law, the what, the whence, the how, and the wherefore of phenomena, Mr. Lewes has extinguished the Intuitional Philosophy with the most stupendous of intuitions.

Leaving the ontological aspects of our two-atom universe and considering exclusively what may be called its sensible aspects, let us suppose that a change occurs, that the atoms quitting their places begin to move. The factors and conditions now are—two atoms, a yard apart, in an infinite vacuum; the product is—motion. The enumeration again is complete; is there any explanation? Certainly not, for the same factors and conditions gave us a moment ago the contrary product—rest. That is, we are driven beyond the phenomena for an explanation, are obliged to postulate a something distinct from the atoms which *not* acting a moment ago, or acting differently, left or kept them in place; which beginning to act, or to act differently, compels them to move; and this, which neglects, or restrains, or urges the somethings we call atoms is only conceivable as itself a something which we call force. If the atoms instead of moving off aimlessly into space move toward one another, then we differentiate and localize the force as two specific forces each resident in one of the atoms, and we define their action as the reciprocal attractions of gravitation. Any other construction of the record is impossible. To say that the atoms are but static aspects of the forces, the forces but dynamic aspects of the atoms, is pure verbiage or suppression of the facts that under the same conditions the atoms were at rest a

* "Goethe wisely forbade the 'search for what might lie behind phenomena; it is the phenomena themselves that form the doctrine—*man suche nur nichts hinter den Phänomenen; sie selbst sind die Lehre*'—and I would add—'*hinter ihr das Leere.*'" Vol i, p. 45, note.

moment ago and are moving now. Once more, let us suppose that the atoms approaching each other meet and fly back to their first places. The situation now is greatly complicated and interpretation correspondingly difficult. The factors are all the previous factors—two atoms a yard apart and two forces of attraction, *plus* the previous product—motion toward each other; the product is—recoil upon collision. Why do not the atoms cling together on meeting? For attraction so far from being suspended by collision is then at its maximum according to the law of inverse squares. The only answer open to Mr. Lewes is that the motions induced by the forces antagonize the forces. But these motions are but the “active aspects” of those same atoms of which the forces are the “dynamic aspects;” which commits us to the ludicrous proposition that the static aspects have assumed dynamic aspects which have assumed active aspects which have torn the static aspects asunder in spite of the dynamic aspects—all these aspects being the same thing (or no-thing, Leere) “viewed successively.” Again we say this is pure verbiage, or suppression of the facts that distinct substances have been acted on by antagonistic forces. We may shuffle Mr. Lewes's cards forever, we shall never turn up the card we want, for it is not in the pack; we are compelled to go beyond the phenomena for an explanation, to postulate a new force of *resistance* inherent in the atoms, which overcomes on collision the inherent forces of attraction postulated before. Supposing the atoms to be “indestructible” and the forces to be “persistent” we shall have “continuous” motions of approach and recoil, an everlasting see-saw of one two-atom universe. But once more suppose that a new charge occurs interrupting the see-saw, that the atoms parting fly off into space, or melting cling together, or clinging together turn up a new body with properties unlike those of the constituent atoms. As before, enumeration of the facts is no explanation of the changes; we must postulate a new force of repulsion, or cohesion, or chemical affinity. Finally, to complete the statement, we ourselves who have been philosophizing in this way remain to be accounted for by some process other than enumeration; one observation of the structure and functions of the two-atom universe is not to be explained as the “subjective” aspect

of the phenomena, but only by postulating some substance or mode of being apart from them. To sum up, our hypothetical universe of two atoms and a spectator manifests in every one of its differences and changes a duality or plurality of force which, whether incomprehensible or not, is not reducible to any identical or equivalent proposition and is not to be got rid of as different aspects of the same thing or no-thing successively viewed.

For this artifice of ours substitute the sublimer one of Science; in place of the two atoms a yard apart let there be an infinite or an indefinite number homogeneously dispersed through space; and, omitting the ontological inquiries which Mr. Lewes has suppressed with an intuition, let us suppose that the atoms all begin to move toward their common centre, which we will call provisionally the centre of gravity. Mr. Lewes confounds us at once by another intuition. Neither the two atoms of our artifice, nor the atoms in unknown number of science, will do anything of the sort under the conditions supposed, for there can be no such thing as action at a distance. Body can act only where it is and not where it is not. To say that *is* here and *acts* there, that from this point it pulls another body a yard away or myriads of bodies scattered through space, is to say that it *is* in two or myriads of places at the same time, which is the contradiction of an identical proposition. What will surely happen to atoms under the given conditions is to stay where they are. Something other than themselves must fill up the spaces between them before they can act on one another and begin to move. So *nous voilà* in the middle of the 17th century gravely debating the Infinite Plenum of Descartes.

As it stands, however, the doctrine of a Plenum is of less than no avail. It introduces new embarrassments and does not get rid of the old one. An infinitesimal vacuum must paralyze force as certainly as an infinite vacuum; the *Plenum* therefore must be a *Continuum*; and to bear the enormous strains put upon it the *Continuum* must be a *Solidum* of inconceivable elasticity and rigidity. Moreover the doctrine, so far, does but emphasize the distinction between the atom as a substance and the attraction as a force inhering in it, for the force is transmitted while the atom is left behind. There is but one way

out of this dilemma, which is to deny that bodies attract each other at all; and if in point of fact they move toward each other, to explain the motion as the result of pressure from behind. "If bodies 'attract' each other, says Mr. Lewes, across empty space"—and the same thing holds of unoccupied space—"we can only understand this attraction as a moving toward each other in the line of a resultant pressure."* Instead, therefore, of atoms scattered through space and drawn toward their centre of gravitation, which is the starting point of the theory of Evolution, we have a Plenum pervaded by pressure of which tension is the differential result.† "The conception of a Plenum, says Mr. Lewes, is simply an unavoidable conclusion from the conception of Existence as continuous; and this continuity is itself the correlative of the impossibility of accepting the pure Nothing otherwise than as a generalization of our negative experiences;" that is, we have no experience of that which occupies space in the intervals between sensible bodies, which "negative experience" we generalize as Nothing; but in reality the Nothing must be Something because body cannot act where body is not, and the vacuum being demonstrably the scene of continuous activities the Something must be a continuous Plenum. "But if continuity of existence is thus necessarily postulated it does not interfere with the utmost variety in the modes of Existence, and with every variation in mode there is a superficial discontinuity. When a feeling changes it is because another feeling has replaced it." "The new mode is unlike the old, discontinuous with it; but it is nevertheless only a new form of the fundamental continuity of Feeling."‡ Being, then, the Cosmos, is a continuous Plenum which pressure breaks up into superficial discontinuities whence arise the differences of Feeling or the changes of Consciousness.

All things considered, this seems to us the queerest paradox in philosophical literature. The basis of the whole is the single assertion that action at a distance is impossible. We have called this an intuition; Mr. Lewes calls it an identical

* I, Appendix C.

† Again it is interesting to notice how, item for item, Mr. Lewes's theory is the contradiction of Mr. Spencer's. Compare *First Principles*, Pt. I, ch. ix.

‡ Appendix C.

proposition. The name is nothing; what concerns us is the certain fact that the proposition, not only is not derived from experience (which is supposed to be the note of an intuition), but that it flagrantly contradicts experience. From the motions of the celestial bodies to the closest juxtapositions of cohesion and chemical affinity, all actions are actions at a distance, since all matter is compressible, and they cannot be otherwise known to us, save by an illusion, since action at insensible distances, much more at no distance at all, would be insensible to us. The sum-total of experience, brute and human, is necessarily exclusive of action at no distance and necessarily built up of experiences of distant action. Yet Mr. Lewes not only declares that action at no distance is possible but that the uniform testimony of all experience to distant action is *necessarily* false. Having thus brushed away with a single sweep of his identical proposition the cobwebs of sensitive and conscious experience Mr. Lewes has no difficulty in disposing of so much of science as is founded upon that, the whole conception of attraction of gravitation which has yielded the various theories of Nebular, Stellar, and Organic Evolution. There are no such things as forces of attraction; there are no forces at all apart from substances; there are no substances apart from properties; no reality behind phenomena, no absolute behind relations; no cause, no power, no will, no intelligence other than the eternal process itself. Mr. Lewes has spread his wings over the Cosmos and over infinite Space; he knows exactly what is not there; and to cap the climax he knows what *is* there, viz: the Plenum. And all this omniscience flows out of the identical proposition "a body cannot be in two places at once." Now we have no prepossessions against the Infinite Plenum, universal Pressure, and differentiated Tensions; or for Atoms, Attractions, Repulsion, and Evolution; are fully prepared to take any theory of things that will only go on all fours. What we have to point out is that Mr. Lewes's theory, far more than even Mr. Spencer's, is a very vicious form of the Intuitionist Philosophy; that his identical proposition not only is made to do the work of an intuition but that it is applied with a defiance of all experience and an extravagant (extravagant) sweep beyond the bounds of experience of which no chastened Intuitionist has yet shown himself capable.

However there is, perhaps, no serious objection to Mr. Lewes's masquerading as an Empiricist if he finds it amusing; the practical question is, will his theory of things go upon all fours? Granting that the conception of a Plenum is the *unavoidable* conclusion from the conception of Existence as continuous, and that the continuity of Existence is *necessarily* postulated (the italics are ours), does it follow that the utmost variety in the modes of Existence necessarily results, or can result at all?

The Plenum as defined by Mr. Lewes is simply a plenitude of relations, and the relations are simply aspects of the no-substance (*Leere*) successively viewed. There are static aspects which have been generalized in our human consciousness as Matter, dynamic, active, and subjective aspects generalized as Force, Motion, and Feeling. Were there no spectator with a serial consciousness to note the successive aspects (no subjective aspects to note the objective,) would there be any aspects at all to be noted? Mr. Lewes gives us to understand that there would be; how then have they arisen? The static aspect, if we understand Mr. Lewes's dialect, is the Plenum itself; the dynamic aspect is Pressure. Evidently the pressure is common to the whole Plenum, otherwise there are static aspects which have no corresponding dynamic aspects and so are separated by a most "transcendent" antithesis from the static aspects which have. Evidently again the universal pressure must be pressure in one direction, otherwise there are static aspects tending one way, and static aspects tending another, or others; which gives an antithesis, not only between the static but also between the dynamic aspects, that is our old "incomprehensible" friend, the duality of force. The result is, we have the Plenum uniformly tending under universal pressure in the same direction, a tendency which forever excludes all possibility of "variety in the modes of Existence." There can be no interruption of the uniform tendency, no resistance to the universal pressure, no differentiations of the Infinite Plenum—no atoms, no molecules, no chemical elements, no cohering aggregates, no stars, no stellar system, no organisms, no life, no feeling, no consciousness, no science, no "Foundations of a Creed," unless we postulate an original counter-force in the bosom of the Plenum.

Here, strictly speaking, the discussion closes, the argument having reduced Mr. Lewes to the dilemma occupied by Mr. Spencer before, that is, the necessity of accepting a postulate to account for the facts of being which contradicts the "universal postulate" of the one and the "principles of certitude" of the other. It will be worth while, however, to concede the duality of force to Mr. Lewes in order to see whether out of a Plenum so constituted and equipped anything like the universe known to us can possibly have arisen. First, it is to be observed that the Plenum must be infinite, for a finite Plenum, however capable of motion due to tractive forces acting from within, is wholly incapable of motion due to pressure from without. The portions at the surface of a plenum, say a mile in diameter, being subject to no pressure can undergo no motion, and, consequently, can exert no pressure upon the adjacent portions within; these again undergoing no pressure can exert none; and so on to the centre of the plenum. So of a plenum two miles in diameter, or myriads of miles, or of any other finite plenum whatsoever; it can no more move than our two atoms in a vacuum. To get pressure and so motion we must either go back to the conception of attraction or gravitation, or we must have an infinite plenum. But what is an infinite plenum? Unlimited being has no more meaning for us than absolute being, being out of all relation; the phrase does not signify any positive mode of Existence whose structure and functions are known to us, but is simply a condensed expression of the fact that the structure and functions supposed by Mr. Lewes are logically and physically impossible in any conceivable plenum. To get the known universe we are obliged to postulate, not only the Unknowable, the Inconceivable, but that which is impossible in any conceivable thing; which is to draw the teeth of Empiricism. Similarly, in the second place, not only must the plenum be infinite, but inasmuch as it is continuous it must be infinitely divisible. According to Mr. Lewes the whole discussion upon the infinite divisibility of matter has been vitiated by an equivoue. No limit can be assigned to the divisibility of the ideal, extension, but whether such limit exists in the concrete reals known as matter is a question of fact not to be answered by inferences

from extension which is in another category. Mr. Lewes's conclusion is that matter is "divisible into indivisible parts," which is reasonable and no doubt true; but the effect is to divorce the Plenum from Matter and to relegate it to the category Extension, for being continuous it must be exactly co-extensive with Space, and if Space, or Extension, is divisible only into parts that are divisible, i. e., *ad infinitum*, so must the Plenum be; a second Inconceivable. The full importance of this conclusion does not appear on the face of it, for, in the third place, Matter is divisible into parts that are indivisible; how then is Matter to be got out of the Plenum? Mr. Lewes seems to think that the atom is indivisible only *qua* atom; it can be divided but not without ceasing to be an atom. The English Nation is divisible into the families which compose it, but the Nation disappears if the division is actually made, if the families are dispersed; so the family ceases if divided into its component individuals; the individual if divided into its component elements; the elements into atoms; the atoms into its parts if it have any. The inconvenience of this supposition is that the process goes on forever, so that if we start at the other end with the original Plenum it would take infinite time to get up to an atom which could serve as a constituent of concrete matter; a third Inconceivable. Moreover, Matter is known to us in all its shapes, simple or compound, as the result of a process of integration. If it has arisen out of the Plenum it can have done so only by integration of the Plenum; and the Plenum cannot have integrated without leaving vacua which require another Plenum to fill them; and so on forever, i. e., an infinite number of Inconceivables. The ice is thin everywhere; whatever step we take lets us through into the abysses of Metempirics, plunges us into a set of Inconceivables as fatal to reason as that other set which is the scorn of Mr. Lewes. The practical result is that the Plenum is worthless as an explanation of the actual universe. In Mr. Lewes's *patois* the static aspects of Feeling which we call Matter and the dynamic aspects which we call Force, cannot be derived by any ingenuity of construction from the static and dynamic aspects of what we call the Plenum; that is, atoms, elements, and aggregates, cohesive, chemical or organic, with the forces

of attraction, repulsion, affinity, vitality, heredity, sensation, self-consciousness, and so on which they manifest, are as unaccountable as they were before.

All this commentary exposes us to the civil sneer with which the *Saturday Review* recently extinguished an unhappy metaphysician who wanted Mr. Spencer to explain how chemical affinity, vitality, and mind, could have arisen by mere redistributions of matter and motion. Such questioning, said the *Saturday Review*, is irrelevant because it misapprehends the real "intent of a scientific hypothesis." What then is this intent? According to Mr. Lewes, an hypothesis is pure artifice, an ideal construction of the mind by which the actual facts of feeling, the phenomena as known in our consciousness, are provided with temporary factors until the real factors appear. It is quite possible that the hypothetical are not the real factors; they are the stop-gaps and make-shifts of philosophic consciousness, provisional links in the chain of processes which we are always ready to exchange for more adequate substitutes when such occur to us, or for the real links if they ever appear. Science and Philosophy, indeed the whole fabric of abstract analytic and synthetic intellection which has arisen out of Feeling, distinguishing the Rational from the merely Sensitive Animal, consists of such idealizations as these, some of which are in the crudest stage of hypothetical elimination, some of which have ripened into approved theories, but all of which until the real factors appear are only a dignified sort of guess-work, the best provision possible under the circumstances, and subject to correction as circumstances shall determine. We hold on to Atoms, for example, or the *Æther*, or Evolution, without in the least committing ourselves to them; if anybody will fill up the gaps, restore the missing stages of the processes in a more adequate manner we will gladly set up his hypothesis in place of our own till some cleverer idealist contrives better ones still. Nothing can be more ingenuous and conciliatory than all this. It is the very sweetness of humility added to the very light of intelligence. The Empiricist, says Mr. Lewes, sits down in a most childlike manner to an interesting game which he confessedly does not understand but which he proposes we shall all study amicably together. But it turns out

promptly enough that his notion of hypothesis has some extremely awkward consequences for anybody on the other side. We, perhaps, remarking on the multitude and differences of things about us suggest in explanation of their reciprocal adjustments and concurrent action the hypothesis of an intelligent, capable First Cause. That is no explanation, says Mr. Lewes, as you will see yourself if you go on to define your terms, for to postulate an intelligent, capable First Cause is to postulate inconceivable upon inconceivable, each involving you in fatal contradictions. And then Mr. Lewes proceeds to lay down an hypothesis which presumably is innocent of all these vices, perhaps the hypothesis of Atoms and an *Æther*. But, we object, one of the greatest of physicists says that the uniformity of the atoms is an unmistakable mark of manufacture; to which we may add the remark that both the atoms and the medium being invented for the express purpose of accounting for the phenomena it surely follows that if they really exist it is for the purpose of producing the phenomena, which is adaptation and design; so that your hypothesis leads into the very jaws of teleology—involves *ours* of a First Cause over again.* Oh! replies Mr. Lewes, your criticism shows that you don't understand the real intent of a scientific hypothesis. When I assign atoms or an *æther* or any extra-sensible thing of the sort as an explanation, it is a pure artifice of mine for the purpose of supplementing the sensible facts by ideal factors; and to demand explanations of, or to draw inferences from, things whose existence I do not assert is very unphilosophical and unmannerly of you. Upon this we turn to another set of phenomena, the falling of bodies and the motions of the

* This observation applies to all, or nearly all scientific hypotheses. A substance or a process is conceived for the express purpose of accounting for certain phenomena, and then is endowed sometimes with the most contradictory characters, to account for other contrasted phenomena. Thus the *æther* in Mr. Spencer's hypothesis is imponderable, to preserve its continuity; it offers resistance, to explain modifications of motion, a contradiction; it is elastic and rigid, to transmit force, another contradiction; and so on. If now the artifice has hit upon fact then the actual *æther* must be artificial—an adaptation of means to ends. We do not know whether the remark has been made before; the fact is that Empirical Science has been leading for a hundred years straight into teleology; its explanations carry an inevitable implication of final causes and we insist that it should be held to the consequences.

planets; and we propose in explanation the hypothesis of tractive forces which bind all bodies into a system. We are the more confident of our hypothesis this time as it seems, when once stated, a most innocent transcript of the facts themselves, a beautiful empirical generalization, but it appears that we are still in the gall of bitterness and the bonds of iniquity, for to affirm all this of bodies and tractions is to affirm the possibility of action at a distance which is absurd. Here our consternation at the astonishing force of Mr. Lewes's play can only be likened to that of Truthful James when the Heathen Chinese "laid down a right bower" which had just been dealt unto James. Why! we exclaim, that is *our* card for that is an intuition! Oh no, Mr. Lewes replies, that is not an intuition, that's an—identical proposition! But, we go on, the moon surely *does* go round the earth and the earth round the sun and the sun no doubt round something else, and so on indefinitely; body is held to body and system to system throughout the universe; if there are no forces to hold them, how then are they held? Whereupon Mr. Lewes tranquilly takes the last trick with his Infinite Plenum. It appears then that we are rigorously held to the consequences of our explanations and come to grief accordingly, while the Empiricist escapes by not being held to the consequences of his; or returning to the figure, our cards are to be left on the table or in the pack subject to scrutiny and the vicissitudes of the game, while our adversary's having been played with fatal effect are slipped back up his "long sleeve" until wanted again. With due deference to every body we submit that if this is the law of the game then the real intent of the scientific hypothesis is the "intent to deceive."

We have remarked a curious thing in our reading to which we call attention, as it seems to offer a way out of this complication. When an Empirical thinker describes hypotheses as ideal artifices which commit nobody, it almost always happens that it is other peoples' hypotheses he is thinking of and not his own. To Comte and Mill the doctrine of a luminiferous æther seemed an artifice of a very objectionable kind, but Prof. Tyndall claims to have no more doubt of the real existence of the æther than he has, for example, of the intelligence and integrity of

the President of the British Association. How do we know the President of the British Association is a knowing and honorable man? Because he *acts* as if he were. Similarly we know that light and heat are undulations of an æther because they act as if they were. So the Theory of Evolution is only an unverified artifice for Mr. Lewes, but for its author it is necessarily true; any other genesis of the universe is inconceivable and therefore impossible. And so to the Infinite Plenum which is explicitly discarded by Mr. Spencer and of whose difficulties Mr. Lewes himself is not unaware* is yet for its author "the unavoidable conclusion from the conception of Existence as continuous" and the continuity of Existence is "necessarily postulated." Therefore Prof. Tyndall at least may be held to all the consequences of his hypothesis; and Mr. Spencer to those of his; and Mr. Lewes to those of his. We have seen that the necessary postulate of an Infinite Plenum is saturated with metempirical implications of the most vicious character, and is helpless to account for any single phenomenon of concrete existence from the atom to the organism. The very disqualifications which were fatal to the hypothesis of a First Cause (that it is inconceivable and explains nothing) attach to the Plenum; and so anybody is entitled to call on Mr. Lewes to get rid of them; or to say frankly that he can't.

* ii, p. 331.

**ARTICLE IV.—ON THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE PERIODS
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.**

No one who has paid any attention whatever to the study of our earlier tongue can have failed to notice the controversy that has been for some time going on in regard to the use of the word English. It is hardly necessary to observe that the subject having been elevated to a dignity much beyond its real importance has had imported into it all the virulence, not to say vituperation, with which matters of little moment are usually discussed; and it is not impossible that this particular essay may turn out to be a fair illustration of the truth of this very remark. In the sixteenth century a revival of the study of our early language began, and was carried forward with considerable activity in the seventeenth. After wavering for a time between Saxon, English-Saxon, and Anglo-Saxon, scholars generally adopted the last named term as the one best suited to designate the oldest form of our speech. It recommended itself on the score both of fitness and of convenience. It recognized the claims of the two leading Teutonic tribes, the Angles and the Saxons, which had subjugated Britain. It was a convenient designation for a period in the history of the language distinct from any that has since existed; distinct not simply in the form of the words, but in the large majority of the words themselves; distinct still more in having the full inflections and complicated syntax of a synthetic language, as opposed to the simple structure of an analytic tongue like Modern English. No one who knew anything about the subject at all—and it was hardly worth while to take into account the opinions of those who did not know anything about it—ever thought of claiming that the two tribes which conquered England ever spoke of their speech as the Anglo-Saxon. The received belief was that the Saxons called their dialect the Saxon; the Angles called theirs the Anglisc, or English; and that in process of time the designation of the latter tribe as being the far more numerous one and being also the first to

develop a literature, came naturally to be applied to all; so that though the kings of the West-Saxons gained the rule over all the Teutonic tribes that settled in Britain, yet the tribes themselves and the tongue they spoke received in general the name of English. And this has been the term that has come down to our day.

But the main reason which led men to call the oldest form of our language Anglo-Saxon was the fact that there was between it and modern English a difference not simply of degree but of kind; a difference, indeed, as great and as clearly marked as that which divides Latin from Italian or French. That there is at least a very wide distinction, no student of our speech will venture to deny, whatever may be his views as to the nomenclature that should be employed. That it is also a distinction of a different character from that which exists in the history of other modern European tongues, can not well be disputed. Old French, for instance, in its passage into modern French follows certain laws which are clearly defined. It is not simply that there is nowhere any absolute break; there is not the slightest loosening of continuity. Just the same statement is true of the transition of the English of the fourteenth century into the English of our day. With very little study Chaucer can be read as easily as Shakspeare; he can be understood with far less. But between our language as spoken in the eighth century and as spoken in the fourteenth, there is a difference, due not simply to the modifying influences to which all languages are more or less subject, but to an actual disruption caused by the intrusion of foreign elements and foreign ideas. Chaucer could have read Cædmon with no greater ease than we, even had he had the same helps in the shape of grammars and dictionaries. We, likewise, with regard to it are under the same need of special study that we labor under in the case of any foreign tongue; and it is certainly much harder for us to master than any of the leading Romance languages.

But of late a new school of writers has arisen in England which has attacked with great bitterness the use of the words Saxon and Anglo-Saxon. The employment of these terms has, according to them, been productive of the most

deplorable consequences. This nomenclature has, indeed, been the stumbling block in the way of the successful study of the original forms of our language. It confuses the mind of the student and prevents him from paying any attention to the early history of his own tongue. But as soon as he discovers that what we in the nineteenth century have called Anglo-Saxon was in the ninth century called English, all difficulties of whatever nature at once vanish. He immediately applies himself with assiduity to that to which he had before been indifferent. Declensions and conjugations at once receive a new charm. His mind can never rest till by a thorough knowledge of the earliest forms he is able to give a satisfactory account of the peculiarities and anomalies of modern English. Let it not be supposed that these are exaggerated expressions. They are really nothing more than what are constantly put forth in books and periodicals of various kinds. Dr. Morris, in the preface to his "Historical Outlines of English Accidence," insists very strongly on this view. "By not regarding the earlier stages of our language as English," he says, "all the necessary helps to a rational treatment of its grammatical forms and idioms have been cast aside." And he goes on to attribute the attention paid of late to the study of our tongue directly to the revolt against these obnoxious terms. "This outcry," he adds, "against an absurd nomenclature has been productive of good results, as is seen in the growing tendency that manifests itself nowadays to study the older stages of English, for the sake of the light they throw upon its later and more modern periods."

To us, on the contrary, the most noticeable effect of this outcry is the fact that many of the new text-books published in England are remarkable for nothing so much as for the faithfulness with which they seek to substitute a new and more satisfactory terminology and the felicity with which they fail. Whatever success they have had in this direction has been only in the way of confusing the mind of the student. The "Historical Outlines of English Accidence," already referred to, have in this respect a somewhat happy preëminence. Under the general term of Old English, Dr. Morris frequently includes the language before the Norman conquest and that spoken several centuries later, joining under one name things essentially dis-

tinct. The ordinary student is in consequence almost certain to be led into error, not necessarily from the statement of any incorrect fact, but from the incorrect impression which he receives as to what is the fact. Thus take the remark that "the letter *n* disappears as usual before *s* in Old English." The reader, who has not been prepared for the statement by any previous study, will be certain to assume that this is a characteristic which distinguishes Old English from Modern English; whereas it is a characteristic which early distinguished the Low German dialects and the Norse from the High German and the Gothic, and has of course been transmitted to the later forms of those languages. When he does not make use of this misleading terminology, Dr. Morris is obliged to resort to the clumsy circumlocutions of English of the First Period for Anglo-Saxon, English of the Second Period for Semi-Saxon, English of the Third Period for Old English, English of the Fourth Period for Middle English, and English of the Fifth period for Modern English. Again for Anglo-Saxon he uses the term Oldest English, and if there are other ways which can be devised to express obscurely and uncomfortably what is at once clearly recognized as soon as we meet the term Anglo-Saxon, a close examination of his work would doubtless reward the anxious inquirer. Indeed this terminology has been not only too much for his students, but has apparently been too much for Dr. Morris himself. In a later educational work he has divided the periods of our language into Old English, Early English, Middle English, and Modern English, Old English standing for Anglo-Saxon and Early English for Semi-Saxon.

But Mr. Freeman is the real apostle of these new views, and the one to whom they owe in great measure whatever headway they have made. In a note "On the Use of the Word English," appended to the first volume of his "History of the Norman Conquest," published in 1867, he gave his reason for denouncing the names Saxon and Anglo-Saxon; and since that time in the columns of the *Saturday Review* he has found no words of reproach sufficiently vituperative for those who use any other term than English in speaking of the earliest form of our language. In this note, indeed, he called all such

persons "unscientific philologers;" and as up to that time Saxon and Anglo-Saxon had been the titles in general use among scholars, and particularly among those who had made a special study of our early tongue, it necessarily followed that in the year 1867, Mr. Freeman was the only scientific philologist extant. In these views of his he is governed mainly by sentimental considerations, though he himself clearly fancies that he has reached his conclusions by the purest of logical processes. He is a firm believer in race, the firmest sort of a believer in the Teutonic race. Everything characteristic of that is essentially good, good at least for its time, whether it be language, laws, or institutions. In his "Old English History for Children," a most entertaining and instructive work, he tells these unsuspecting and confiding innocents that the collection of dry and meager annals, called the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, in which there is not a single flash of genius, and even in its poetry scarcely a spark of imagination, is a work which they should learn to reverence, next after the Bible and Homer. Had he lived in the Middle Ages, no one could have persuaded him that our tongue was not the original language of the garden of Eden, and that the introduction into it of any foreign elements was one of the saddest results that had taken place in consequence of the fall. Let it not be thought that this is an undue inference from the feelings he displays, or the opinions he advances. In this very note he makes this characteristic remark in regard to our speech: "The tongue which Ælfred in the days of its purity called English, we must not venture to call English till the days when it had received a considerable infusion of French:" as if the English of to-day was somehow less pure than that spoken in the days of Alfred. These sentimental feelings of his, it may be remarked, detract in no way from the value of his history; indeed, they have the effect of making it more entertaining. Byron, it is well known, in speaking of Mitford, reckoned among the merits of that historian, wrath and partiality; qualities essentially valuable, because they make a man write in earnest. There is no doubt, indeed, that Mr. Freeman has in like manner added largely to the interest of his works by his aggressive Teutonism. In a world where so few men have ideas of their own, at least

ideas that they care much for, it is not unpleasant to come across a writer who believes in his assertions, even on the most unimportant points, so earnestly that he is ready to fight for them in season and out of season, to wanton into long digressions about them, to overflow in an inundation of note and commentary in regard to them. His "History of the Norman Conquest" is a fair illustration of his characteristics in this respect. Every volume has an appendix of discussion amounting always to more than a hundred pages, and the first has one of nearly two hundred and fifty, in which the letters of the alphabet are three times exhausted in making references. Such excess of annotation not only shows a lack of real literary skill, and of that artistic self-restraint which keeps a man within the limits of his subject, but it also bears witness to the existence of a feeling that the assertions of the text need to be bolstered up, from the consciousness that many points under discussion have not been thoroughly investigated. The note on the use of the word English is, indeed, a fair illustration of Mr. Freeman's peculiar manner of treating evidence. Not that he makes, designedly at least, the slightest false statement. Not that he entirely ignores testimony opposed to his views. On the contrary, he affects candor, and, indeed, is a master of the art of breaking the force, as far as possible, of opposing facts, by making a reference to them as if he had thoroughly considered them; though the references are by him usually made in a somewhat slighting manner. Still no reader can gain from this note on the use of the word English anything like a clear idea of the actual facts of the case, ignored, explained away, or indifferently alluded to as they are in numerous instances. An examination of some of the opinions and statements made by him will be sufficient to prove clearly the truth of what is here charged.

At the very beginning of this note Mr. Freeman lays down with great solemnity a proposition which he seems to look upon in the light of an axiom. "I hold it to be a sound rule," he says, "to speak of a nation, as far as is possible, by the name by which it called itself in the age of which we are speaking. This alone would be reason enough for using the word 'English' and no other." The operation of this principle, in a subsequent part of his note, he extends by implication, to the language as well as to the people.

Now it is very evident that this rule, whether a sound one or not, has never been universally followed, has never, indeed, been of any particular practical importance. We do not, for illustration, have any hesitation at the present day in speaking of the Greek race or the Greek language instead of the Hellenic, nor did the Romans from whom we borrowed the term. Indeed the use of the latter word in many cases would justly render the speaker liable to the charge of pedantry, and to the uninstructed would make him unintelligible. No one can seriously claim that much misery or confusion has been wrought in this particular case by the non-observance of this rather loudly-vaunted rule. The Romans were certainly not prevented from studying the Hellenic language because they called it Greek, nor is there any evidence that this "absurd nomenclature" had the least effect in retarding the attention paid to it. Or an illustration can be found nearer home. The race which speaks the new High German tongue calls itself *Deutsch*, or, as we express it, *Dutch*. Such also is the term it gives to its own language. But when we at the present time speak of the Dutch language, we mean the language of Holland. Two or three hundred years ago, indeed, such would not have been the case. But can it be seriously pretended that we have less clear ideas in regard to the High German race, because we call its members by a name by which the men belonging to it do not call themselves; a name imposed upon them by foreigners, and never adopted into the vernacular speech as their own. In fact, the moment one begins to examine it, this sound rule is found to be no rule at all; it is simply a particular view of Mr. Freeman's, and not a generally accepted principle of the human race. The name we apply to a nation depends on a large number of circumstances and conditions, of which the title it gives itself is one of the important and controlling ones; but it is not the only one, nor is it in many cases the controlling one, as the history of races and languages shows clearly.

The question, as Mr. Freeman puts it, is whether a Teutonic inhabitant of Britain, living before the Norman conquest, and speaking in his own name of the whole nation, ever used the word *Saxon*. It is perhaps better to quote his precise words,

for it will be found that every line has been very carefully considered. "I am not aware," says he, "of any instance in which a Teutonic inhabitant of Britain, living before the Norman Conquest, and speaking in his own tongue and in his own name of the whole nation formed by the union of the various Teutonic tribes in Britain, uses the word 'Saxon.'" The ordinary reader simply gets from this curiously constructed sentence the impression that Saxon is a term never employed in early times, that it is only in late periods that it has come into use. For the sentence has been very skilfully drawn up so as to exclude all the uncomfortable exceptions that can be brought against it; in fact, there has been an almost diabolical ingenuity displayed in the framing of the language so as to produce upon the mind all the effect of the most positive statement and yet escape from all responsibility for it. The numerous modifications must be carefully noted. In the first place, the speaker who uses the word Saxon must belong to the Teutonic race; for it is a well known fact that the Celtic inhabitants, from the earliest times to the present day, have called and do call the English Saxons, and not English. In the second place, the speaker must be not only a person of Teutonic race, but he must be an inhabitant of Britain; for members of that race on the continent were guilty of the solecism of calling our ancestors Saxons, as even at this period some of the "unscientific philologists"—to use Mr. Freeman's words—who have appeared among them, persist in doing. In the third place, this Teutonic inhabitant of Britain must live before the Norman Conquest, in order to have his authority of any weight. After the Norman Conquest there is no doubt as to the use of the word Saxon by native writers; and consequently this third limitation becomes necessary. In the fourth place, this Teutonic inhabitant of Britain who lives before the Norman Conquest must speak in his own tongue; for when he wrote in Latin, which he was very apt to do, there is plenty of proof that he spoke of the Saxon race. In the fifth place, this Teutonic inhabitant of Britain who lives before the Norman Conquest must not only speak in his own tongue, he must also speak in his own name; for Mr. Freeman in his reading has observed one or two instances where this Teutonic inhabitant, who fulfills all his other conditions, does

speak of the Saxons, and in these instances it is necessary to assume that he is not speaking in his own name, but is adopting the phraseology of the Celtic inhabitants. And in the sixth place, this Teutonic inhabitant of Britain who lives before the Norman Conquest and is speaking in his own tongue and in his own name, must also speak of the whole nation; for if he does happen to mention the Saxons, according to Mr. Freeman's theory, he means the Saxons as opposed to the Angles, and not the whole people. And as if this were not enough, the historian fortifies himself still farther by the prefatory phrase, "I am not aware."

This phrase, it must be confessed, is the most exasperating part of the sentence. No more convenient expression was ever used by any writer to produce upon the mind of the reader all the effect of positive assertion, and yet save himself from the pains and penalties which ought to attend the making of it. It is perfectly well known that English is the term generally applied, especially in the native literature, to the race and language after the middle of the ninth century; and if the term Saxon used of either can be found, it is not likely to be found often. Still if only two or three instances are discovered, the whole superstructure raised by Mr. Freeman topples at once; unless, indeed, he can buttress up his theory with some new and as yet unthought-of condition. For he does not claim that he has made any examination of Anglo-Saxon prose literature on this particular point, in order to make his assertion. He has clearly given it only that same general attention which any ordinary reader would, who notices that the term English is the one almost invariably used. But the writer who disputes his assertion must, in order to prove his negative, go carefully through the whole of Anglo-Saxon prose literature—a course of penitential reading which is enough of itself to cast a gloom over existence—and if, after all this trouble, he succeed in finding a few instances, Mr. Freeman can gracefully retire with the assertion that he was not aware of them, and, indeed, was particular to state that he was not aware of them. At the same time, he produces upon the mind of the reader the impression that no such term is ever found at all, which may be true, but which he has not shown to be true.

It is hardly necessary to state that in the examination of this question no such conditions as Mr. Freeman has laid down can ever be rightfully imposed. No one claims that the term Saxon, if ever used to denote the whole nation, was ever used so exclusively. Every one admits, on the other hand, that after the various tribes were united under one government, Saxon, if ever much used, was in time almost entirely supplanted by the term English. But as for four centuries after the Teutonic invasion there are but few existing monuments, and in the native language, at least in prose, practically speaking none at all, one possibility of any answer to the statement, as he puts it, is at once shut out. To Anglo-Saxon poetry we have a complete glossary, owing to the labors of one of the "unscientific philologists" whom Mr. Freeman mentions. But in that, while there is mention both of Saxons and of Angles, neither the people nor the language is ever called by either name. We are consequently reduced for our answer to Anglo-Saxon prose, none of which goes farther back than the latter part of the ninth century, and all of which has not as yet been printed. Even the Chronicle, whatever may have been the way in which the information contained in it was handed down, can hardly be ascribed to a period in which the term English had not become the general term applied to the whole nation. Yet as in his reading of a work which stands next in his eyes to the Bible and Homer, Mr. Freeman has come across one or two passages in which the word Saxon occurs, it is worth while to observe how he gets along with them. It is here the terrible Celtic influence begins to be felt. A passage occurs in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, under the year 605, in which Augustine is represented as saying to the Welsh bishops that if the Welshmen were unwilling to be allied to them, they would perish at the hands of the Saxons. The unscientific philologist reading this infers that by the term Saxon here is understood the whole English race, and he is confirmed in this belief by the fact that the prediction ascribed to Augustine was accomplished by the army of the Anglian king of Mercia. But we now have Mr. Freeman's authority, not precisely for saying that Augustine never used the word, but that if he did use it he was a Roman and not a Teuton, and the chronicler, with a nice discrimination

in the use of language worthy of all commendation, inserted it with the knowledge that he was putting the expression into the mouth of a foreign and not of a native inhabitant; and, at any rate, both the English archbishop and the writer were following the custom of the Celtic-speaking people. "Here," says Mr. Freeman, "is a story, probably preserved by Welsh tradition, in which a Roman speaking to Welshmen is made to adopt a Welsh form of speech;" and with his facility for getting comfort from every thing which militates against his theory, he goes on to assure us that "the contrast between this passage and the ordinary language of the chronicles makes the ordinary usage still more marked." In Latin, indeed, Mr. Freeman admits that the use of "Saxon" is more common. But he is always fortunate enough to find some reason for it, and usually also some reason which, as in the above mentioned instance, makes the ordinary usage still more marked. Thus Asser, in his life of Alfred, speaks of that king's subjects as Saxons. But Asser was a Welshman, and his use of the term is a strong proof of the genuineness of his work. So Bede, in the first part of his Ecclesiastical History, speaks of *Angli* and *Saxones*, indiscriminately; but then he is drawing from Welsh sources or repeating Welsh traditions. It ought to be added, however, that in the account which this historian gives of the interview between Augustine and the Welsh bishops already referred to, he, unlike the writer of the Chronicle, is apparently not drawing from Celtic sources or repeating a story preserved by Celtic tradition. For according to Bede, it is at the hands of the English and not of the Saxons that the recusant Welsh were to undergo the vengeance of death. Of this discrepancy, for some reason, Mr. Freeman takes no notice.

Even when the Celts cannot be held responsible, the transcriber can. While the appendix to his volume was going through the press, Mr. Freeman "lighted on," as he says, four additional passages, one of which, taken from that one of the manuscripts of the Anglo-Saxon chronicle written at the Abingdon monastery, is devoted to the point under consideration. In this, under the year 867, Æthered is said to succeed to the kingdom of the Saxons. This does not disturb Mr. Freeman's confidence in the slightest. As the other copies have "kingdom of the

West-Saxons," he remarks that this is "most likely" a slip of the pen. Now there is no telling how many similar passages needing explanation may yet be "lighted on" by the students of this period; and in the lack of positive knowledge on the subject, the only honest way seems to be to refrain from positive assertion. Of course, by arguments such as these we have quoted, any body can prove anything. It is not, it must be added, that Mr. Freeman means to be untruthful or unfair. Far from it. He has simply formed his theory in a hurry, and spends his leisure in making rebellious facts conform. It is on a small scale an exhibition of precisely the same quality of mind which led him, during the height of our civil war, to publish the first volume of a work entitled "The History of Federal Government from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States." It was not in this case that he was specially hostile to the North, or that the wish was father to the thought, any more than with thousands of his countrymen who had come to the conclusion that the bubble had burst. He had simply settled in his own mind the inevitable result of the war, and was unfortunate enough to rush into print with his opinion. It is hardly necessary to add that this work has never been completed.

It has already been remarked that no native prose literature existed for four centuries after the Teutonic invasion. By the very necessity of the case we are for this period obliged to resort to the Latin. The chief, and, indeed, for us in this discussion almost the only valuable source of information is contained in the *Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici* (6 vols., London, 1839-1848), published by the English Historical Society, and edited by John Mitchel Kemble. This work contains a series of charters, emanating from the courts of the various Anglo-Saxon kings, and other instruments, such as wills, and the records of decrees of ecclesiastical and of county courts. Documents of the first kind are far the most numerous, and extend from the beginning of the seventh century down to the Norman conquest. They consist usually of a grant of estate and of certain beneficial rights, such as pasture, estover, felling and carrying wood, together with immunity from certain burdens which ordinarily lay upon the possessor of land; and end usually

with a damnatory clause against the violator of the provisions of the grantor, which in the ecclesiastical sanctions was apt to be composed in a peculiarly savage spirit, cutting off the wrongdoer, unless he repented, from the communion of the faithful, and devoting him with much opulence of diction and infinite variety of objurgatory phrase to the eternal fire of hell, along with Judas and Satan. The collection, though some of the documents are forged and others of doubtful authenticity, has, of course, a great value in the light which it throws upon the manners and institutions of our Anglo-Saxon forefathers. It is, necessarily, of comparatively little use in the illustration of the language, for most of the instruments, except the wills, are in Latin, and even the earliest genuine will contained here is of the ninth century. Still it incidentally adds largely to our information on many points; and that Mr. Freeman has not examined it with anything like the care which a writer who makes assertions so positive is under a moral obligation to do, will be made apparent, in the further discussion of his note. Indeed, one conspicuous instance of this neglect, though entirely foreign to the present subject, is well worth remarking. In the "Additions and Corrections" to his first volume, he changes the year 800 of the body of the work to 802, and, as he says in explanation, takes the opportunity of the most important date of the period to express his adhesion to the arguments of Professor Stubbs, in his preface to *Roger of Howden* (London, 1868), where he shows that from 752 to 849 the chronology of the *English Chronicle*, which has been followed by all modern writers, is wrong by two years, and that the Northumbrian reckoning, preserved by Simeon of Durham, is to be preferred; and he adds, that he only wishes he had read the preface soon enough to make the changes throughout the text. Certainly there is no need of impugning Professor Stubbs's investigations, which may have been perfectly independent, and which have a particular value in fixing the precise dates. But it is the least act of justice to Kemble to say that in his *Introduction to the Codex Diplomaticus* (vol. 1, pp. lxxxv. et seqq.), published as long ago as 1839, he had both pointed out and proved the same general fact; and in particular had stated that this very year 802, given by the

Northern chronicles, was the date of Egbert's accession to the throne, and not 800, as given in the Anglo-Saxon chronicle.

We have said that for us in this discussion the *Codex Diplomaticus* is the most valuable source of information, because much of it is more ancient than any other, and none of it is liable to the charge of that terrible Celtic influence, which the original inhabitants seem, in Mr. Freeman's eyes, to have had upon the language of our early writers, when speaking of their own tongue, perhaps as a sort of compensation for the admitted fact that they never had the slightest influence upon the language in any other way. It must not be supposed, however, that on this account Mr. Freeman's resources fail him here. No matter how embarrassing the circumstances, how unexpected the emergency, he always rises to the height of the situation. No possible difficulty can thrust itself forward which he is not ready at once to explain away by some new hypothesis, adorned with a liberal supply of qualifying words and phrases, such as "doubtless," "undoubtedly," "I think," "I suspect," "as far as I know," "I feel no doubt," and others, similar in nature and equally forcible in logic. Indeed, the number of times in which these phrases occur in this one note, do far more credit to Mr. Freeman's power of varying his expression than they do to the strength of his reasoning, or to the fairness and freedom from prejudice with which he discusses the subject. For the charters are somewhat troublesome documents, at least to a man with a theory. They persist in speaking of the Saxon language, to an extent of which Mr. Freeman himself seems hardly to be aware. Yet he is at least aware of it, and is obliged to admit it. How grudgingly he does it, how assiduously he tries to parry the force of it, can be seen by the following extract:

Besides these instances of Celtic influence on English speech it is not uncommon to find in the charters the word "Saxonice" used as a definition of language, where the vernacular definition would undoubtedly (*sic*) have been "On Engliſc." In West-Saxon charters the usage is in truth no more than we might have expected. The words and things spoken of were Saxon in the strict sense. Baeda too not uncommonly (iii. 7, et al.) uses "Saxon" as a description of language, but it is usually, if not always (*sic*), when he is speaking of persons or places which are strictly Saxon. He may (*sic*) therefore mean "Saxon" as opposed to "Anglian." But the usage certainly now and then passes these bounds, and we find the word Saxon and its derivatives applied to objects which were not strictly

Saxon. Thus in a charter of Ecgrith of Mercia in 796 (*Cod. Dipl.*, i, 207), we find the words "celebri vico qui Saxonice vocatur aet Bathum." Though even here it is worth remarking that the place spoken of, though at that time under Mercian rule, was in a district originally Saxon. So in a deed of Archbishop Oswald as late as 990 (*Cod. Dipl.*, iii, 253), we read how a certain grant "in ista cartula Saxonici sermonibus apparet." But the land concerned is in Worcester-shire, also a district originally Saxon.

Now for these instances of the use of "Saxon," which are far more numerous in the charters than would be inferred from the above extract, neither the Celtic inhabitants, nor the transcribers of the documents can be held responsible. Somebody or something else must bear the burden. Mr. Freeman is ready at once with his explanation. It is, "he thinks," mainly to be attributed to the tendency, one which has more or less influence on almost all Latin writings then and since, to use expressions which sounded grander or more archaic than those which were in common use. He "suspects" that the occasional use of "Saxon" instead of "English" was very much of a piece with the use, not uncommon in the charters, of Albion to express Britain. To talk of "Saxonia," "Saxonice," &c., was, according to him, "doubtless" one of the elegancies of the *Kanzleystyl* of those days. It is an archaism, an affectation, an instance of "the grand style." Under these circumstances it becomes important to examine the charters on this point, and as occasional instances of the employment of the word Saxon, as applied to the language, are often quoted from them as something unusual and remarkable, it will be well to collect together all the cases in which this expression occurs in the *Codex Diplomaticus*. It is hardly necessary to add that in the quotations the Latin of the originals is followed precisely; but as the writers of these charters had frequently grammatical views of their own, it may be as well to state it.

The first one of these has already been mentioned by Mr. Freeman as being in a charter of Ecgrith, the ruler of the Anglian kingdom of Mercia. The date of this is 796. There are two copies of this document, between which exist considerable variations, but there is no variation in the epithet applied to the language. The particular passage here referred to reads in the one, "in celebri vico qui Saxonice vocatur aet Bathum;" in the second it reads, "in celebri monasterio quod

Saxonice nominatur aet Bathum." It is hardly necessary to comment on the weak attempt to break the force of an expression contained in a document emanating from the court of an Anglian King, by the assertion that the place mentioned was originally Saxon.

The second instance of the use of "Saxonice" is in another document belonging to the same Anglian kingdom of Mercia, and bearing the date of 836 (i, 314). The charter enumerates as one among the immunities of the monastery to which the grant is made that it shall be free "a difficultate illa quam nos Saxonice faestingmen dicimus." It can hardly be pretended here that the persons designated as "faestingmen" were Saxons instead of Anglians. A new explanation is in this case imperatively demanded, as also in several cases which follow.

The word next occurs in a charter of Æthelwulf of Wessex, which bears the date of 839 (ii, 1). The passage reads "in commune silva quam nos Saxonice in gemennisse dicimus."

It occurs for the fourth time in a charter of Berhtwulf of Mercia, with the date of 844 (ii, 23), and containing the same expression which has before been used, in regard to "faestingmen;" only in this instance the drawer-up of the document had his own opinion as to the gender of "difficultate," as the passage reads in this place, "a difficultate illa quod nos Saxonice dicimus festingmen."

A charter of Æthelwulf of Wessex, bearing the date of 855 (ii, 57), contains the fifth instance of its use in the passage "Unam villam quod nos Saxonice anhaga dicimus."

The sixth instance is in a charter of Burgred, King of Mercia, and bearing date the same year as the last, 855 (ii, 60). In this, among other immunities, the monastery to which the grant is made is to be free "a pastu et refectione illorum hominum quos Saxonice nominamus wahlfaereld und heora faesting and ealra angelcynnes monna and altheodigra raedefastinge."

In a charter of Æthelbert of the year 863 (ii, 74), in which he styles himself King of the West Saxons and of the Kentish men, mention is made of "pascua porcorum que nostra lingua Saxonica denbera nominamus."

The seventh instances is found in a charter of Bishop Denewulf, bearing the date of 900 (v, 144). The passage reads

"in illo celebri loco qui Saxonica lingua aet Lidgerd dicitur." A charter of the same bishop, bearing the date of 904 (v,155), furnishes two additional instances of the use of Saxon as applied to the language. In the body of the document mention is made of certain persons dwelling "in eodem loco quod Saxonice dicitur aet Stoce," and at the end the instrument is said to have been written "in illa venatoria villa quae Saxonice dicitur Bicanleag."

A charter of Edward bearing the date of 904 (v,158), is particularly noticeable, not only because it three times uses Saxon as a description of the language, but also uses English in one instance, as if the two epithets could be applied with equal propriety. Two subsequent charters of this monarch, dated the same year (v,160 and ii,147), are spoken of as having been written "in illa venatoria villa quae Saxonice dicitur Bicanleag," and in the last named, Edward styles himself "rex Anglorum."

The fifteenth instance occurs in a charter of Bishop Wilferth, of the year 922 (v,185), in which he declares that "haec donatio quae in ista cartula Saxonice sermonibus apparet, confirmata ac donata erat." Then follows the instrument in Anglo-Saxon.

The sixteenth instance is found in a charter of Eadred of 951 (v,324), making a gift of land to a soldier; to this is appended the sentence "Vere limites ejusdem Saxonico ydionate."

The seventeenth instance occurs in a charter of Edgar, of the year 975 (iii. 122), in which mention is made of a place "qui dicitur Saxonice aet Stoce."

The eighteenth instance is the charter of Archbishop Oswald, of 990 (iii.253), one of the two cases referred to by Mr. Freeman. This is very similar to that of bishop Wilferth mentioned above, and the Latin employed in describing the language is precisely the same in both. To this also the charter in the native tongue is appended.

A charter of Æthelred of 995 (iii,285), in which he speaks of himself as "Anglorum rector," contains the following sentence: "Est autem praedictum rus talibus circumcinctum terminis qui continentur in originali codicello isto literis Saxonice et Saxonico idiomate conscripti, etc."

To a charter of Edward the Confessor (iv. 194), without date, is appended a sentence which shows that the original instrument must have been written in the native tongue. The sentence begins as follows: "*Haec est translatio cartae regis Eadwardi in lingua Saxonica translata in Latinum.*"

A still more curious instance is another charter of Edward, also without date (iv. 218), written in the native tongue and followed by a translation into Latin. The scribe, by a singular mistake, speaks of the version as having been made from Saxon into English, the passage reading, "*Haec est translatio cartae regis Eadwardi in lingua Saxonica translata in linguam Anglicanam.*" The vernacular version, it is to be added, is evidently a copy, as the language used is much later than the time of the Norman Conquest.

To these twenty-one instances are to be added the three following, which are not contained in the body of the document but are appended to it; and perhaps the sixteenth instance, mentioned above, should be regarded as of the same character. The first is in a charter of Osmund of Sussex, bearing date Aug. 3, 765 (v. 49), to which is added "*Testes in lingua Saxonica.*" To a charter of the same king, dated 770 (v. 50), is appended the description of the boundaries in the following words, "*Deinde sequuntur bundae sive metae terrae praedictae in lingua Saxonica.*" The third instance occurs in a charter of Æthelberht of Sussex, of about 774 (v. 50), in which a similar statement is made in the following words: "*Tunc sequuntur limites in lingua Saxonica in dorso cartae originalis.*"

These twenty-one instances are all taken from the genuine charters. The doubtful ones would furnish four more, one in an instrument of Offa, king of the Mercians, of the year 781 (i, 172); one of Beorhtric of Wessex of 801 (i, 217); one of Berhtwulf of Mercia of 841 (ii, 11); and one of Æthelstan of 980 (ii, 166).

Here then we have at least twenty-four undoubted instances, in which the term Saxon was applied to the language. They are found in documents extending from the eighth century to the Norman Conquest. They are not confined to charters issuing from the courts of kings strictly Saxon, as opposed to Anglian, but appear also in grants made by the Anglian kings of Mercia. They occur most frequently of all after the various Teutonic tribes that settled England had been consolidated

under one monarch ; but some of them go back to a period from which no native literature has been handed down to us, and necessarily for that period they are our sole authority. It does not follow from these facts, that Saxon was the common name of the language, or that indeed it was a common name. It simply makes perfectly plain that it was a term by which our speech was then sometimes designated, and if we feel the need of the authority of our ancestors to so designate it now, we can have it without question. Against this natural and necessary inference Mr. Freeman can only say, that the documents in which these expressions are contained are all in Latin and not in the vernacular, and that the use of Saxon is, in his opinion, only an illustration of "the grand style," whatever that style is, which is found in Latin writings. But it may be remarked, that this tendency to the "grand style" did not prevent the use of the corresponding word "Anglice," as applied to the language. It has already been pointed out that this word interchanges with "Saxonice" in a charter of Edward the Elder ; just as in a charter of Eadwig of the year 958 (v, 395), that monarch in the body of the document speaks of himself as "rex Saxonum," while he signs it as "rex Anglorum." In fact, as we come down the years, "Anglice" becomes more common than "Saxonice," as might naturally be expected. The word is not used in any documents contained in the *Codex Diplomaticus* before the tenth century ; although, previous to that, there are three instances in which the phrase "Angli dicunt," is used to introduce the Anglo-Saxon translation of a Latin word. There are, it is to be observed, no documents in this collection from the great Anglian kingdom of the Northumbrians. Had there been, there is little doubt we should have had frequent instances of the early use of "Anglice." But from the tenth century on, English as applied to the language becomes common in the varying expressions of "Anglice," "Anglica appellatione," "Anglico vocabulo," and others similar in import. The "grand style" dies out in these Latin writings, or at least shows itself only in an occasional application of the term 'Saxon,' to the language and race.

So much for the word Saxon. Now let us come to the term Anglo-Saxon, in which Mr. Freeman's statements are, if anything, more unfortunate ; at least they betray a less careful examination of the authorities. He quotes with great approbation

two sentences of Sir Francis Palgrave, in which that author speaks of "the unhistorical and conventional term Anglo-Saxon." Yet Mr. Freeman himself admits the early existence of the word. He states that the name Anglo-Saxon, though rare, is a genuine and ancient description of the nation; that it is used by Asser, by Florence of Worcester, and by Simeon of Durham; that in the Latin Charters, especially those of Eadwig, it is not uncommon; and in an earlier charter of Edward the Elder, he twice calls himself king of the Anglo-Saxons, and even speaks of the whole country as "Angul-Saxonia;" that accordingly "Anglo-Saxon," unlike "Saxon," is a description fully justified by ancient authority, but still a description which never passed into common use. Like "Saxonice," it is only another instance of the "grand style."

Now rareness is a relative term, and a charge of inaccuracy or dishonesty can not often be successfully brought against the man who employs it. Still, whatever Mr. Freeman may have meant by the use of the word, he unquestionably produces by it on the mind of the reader an entirely wrong impression as to the actual fact. In the *Codex Diplomaticus*, the phrase "king of the Anglo-Saxons" occurs thirty-eight times in the genuine charters, twelve times in the suspected ones. Now the use of a term in fifty instances may unquestionably be called by comparison rare; but it is not rare in the sense in which readers of Mr. Freeman's note will understand that epithet. The *Codex Diplomaticus*, it may be added, furnishes ample and satisfactory information as to the employment of the name. In the genuine charters it makes its first appearance in one of Edward the Elder, bearing the date of 900; and during the reign of that monarch, which extended to 925, he almost invariably speaks of himself as king of the Anglo-Saxons. We have, indeed, no charters of his preserved of a later date than 910, but of those which appeared before that time there are seventeen. In thirteen of them he speaks of himself as "Angul-Saxonum rex," in one as "Anglorum rex," in one as "occidentalium Saxonum rex," and again in two written in the native language simply as "cyning." "King of the Anglo-Saxons" is, indeed, the title which the son of Alfred seems to have assumed to himself. It is his common designation instead of being a rare one, as is the natural inference from Mr. Free-

man's words. Under his successor, Æthelstan, the title is much less frequent, "*rex Anglorum*" becoming from this time far the most common, though there were never any fixed definite terms in which that king and his successors invariably spoke of themselves. But the expression, "King of the Anglo-Saxons," occurs at intervals in the charters of Eadred, Eadwig, Aethelred II, Cnut, and of Edward the Confessor. Of these, it is the most common in those of Eadwig, as Mr. Freeman has stated; but it is not so common absolutely in the charters of that monarch as in those of Edward the Elder, and far less relatively. As used by Eadwig, indeed, it occurs only eight times in all, while he speaks of himself as "*Anglorum rex*" more than five times as often, besides using a number of titles varying from both of these. The last instance of the use of "King of the Anglo-Saxons" is found in a charter of Edward the Confessor (iv. 238), bearing no date, but probably later than 1060.

In addition to these Latin documents, there are two instruments in the native language in which the monarch is spoken of as "King of the Anglo-Saxons." One of these is a version of a Latin original, and belongs to the year 934 (v, 219). The document is signed by Æthelstan as "*Ongol-Saxna cyning and brytenwalda ealles thyyses iglandæa.*" A still more striking instance, however, is found in an ecclesiastical document belonging to the year 955, and dating from the reign of Edgar (ii, 303). Immediately following the proem, which declares that all wisdom is placed in the treasury of the Almighty, it goes on to add, "he has honored King Eadred with the kingdom of the Anglo-Saxons (*mid cynedome Angulseaxna.*)"

The doubtful charters exhibit evidence of the same character. In them, however, the term Anglo-Saxon appears earlier than in the genuine ones. In the latter it occurs first as a title of Edward the Elder; in the former it is also used as a title of his father, Alfred the Great. In a charter of this monarch (ii, 118), he speaks of himself, or perhaps in this case it would be better to say, he is spoken of as "*rex Anglorum et Saxonum,*" and it is with this title that he subscribes the document. In the body of the charter also occurs the phrase "*populi Anglorum sive Saxonum,*" *sive* of course meaning in this place "and," as frequently it does in Low Latin. In a doubtful charter of the

same monarch belonging to the year 891 (ii, 128), he is described as "Anglorum Saxonum rex," and his son Edward has the same title in a similar charter, though without date (ii, 142). But outside of these instances the two words are invariably joined together so as to form one; the usual term being "Angul-Saxonum rex." Nowhere in the *Codex Diplomaticus*, it is to be added, is the name Anglo-Saxon applied to the language, though the country is twice called Angulsaxonia, once in a genuine charter of Edward the Elder, and again in a doubtful one of Æthelred II.

But with these fifty instances of the use of Anglo-Saxon before him, as used by our ancestors, with what propriety can Mr. Freeman speak approvingly of Sir Francis Palgrave's assertion that the term is "unhistorical and conventional?" There is, indeed, in the manner with which certain scholars express themselves in regard to this name, a sort of petulance, as if the use of it by others was to them of the nature of a personal grievance. Mr. Cockayne in his preface to the "Leechdoms, Wortcunning and Star-craft of Early England" (London, 1864-1866), spoke of the "oldest written English" as being "abusively called Anglo-Saxon;" though he, it is to be remarked, frequently applies to it the term Saxon. Mr. Sweet, in the Preface to his Edition of King Alfred's Version of *Gregory's Pastoral Care*, states in a note that he uses 'Old English,' throughout the work, "to denote the unmixed inflectional stage of the English language, commonly known by the barbarous and unmeaning title of 'Anglo-Saxon.'" Some of the editors of the Early English Text Society often make use of the phrase "so-called Anglo-Saxon"—a phrase which is itself the justification of the name, as it is found necessary to employ it to denote precisely what period of the language is meant. But the climax of impatience and impertinence is reached in the statement of Mr. Freeman, that the term is the one found "in the technical language of unscientific philologists." These reprehensible individuals, from whom that author gets either directly or indirectly whatever knowledge he possesses of philology at all, speak both of Anglo-Saxon and Semi-Saxon—the last term being, according to him, the most absurd to be found in the nomenclature of any human study. And he goes on to add the element of fatuity to that of impertinence by

saying that it is manifest that with such a nomenclature as this, the true history of the English language and its relation to other Teutonic languages never can be understood. As if we had been obliged to wait for the appearance of Mr. Freeman's note to know accurately the history of our own tongue or to understand its position in the Germanic family; or as if calling it English through all its stages was of itself to throw a flood of light on its character or on whatever was obscure and uncertain in its development.

One of the most prominent of these "unscientific philologists," Professor March, took the pains to defend the use of the controverted name against these attacks. Accepting Mr. Freeman's statements of fact as correct and exhaustive, he showed that even then there was ample authority for the use of the term, if we needed any authority at all; and pointed out clearly and conclusively, how wide was the difference and how complete the separation between the language of King Alfred's time and that of to-day. This article caused Mr. Sweet certainly to modify his views, at least the expression of them, for at the conclusion of his "*History of English Sounds*" (London, 1874), he appended a few remarks upon the Periods of English. As his arguments are in some respects more ingenious than ingenuous, and as they will serve as a fitting introduction to a brief consideration of the principles which must underlie the subject of terminology, it will be well to quote his exact words.

"One of the most troublesome questions of English philology is that of the designation of its various stages. I have throughout this paper adopted the threefold division of Old, Middle, and Modern; it will, therefore, be necessary to say a few words in its justification.

"The first question is, shall we retain the name "Anglo-Saxon" for the earliest period of our language, or discard it entirely? The great majority of English scholars are decidedly hostile to the word. They argue that it is a barbarous half Latin compound, which, although justifiable as applied to a political confederation of Angles and Saxons, is entirely misleading when applied to the *language* spoken by these tribes, implying, as it does, that the English language before the Conquest was an actual mixture of the Anglian and Saxon dialects. The reverse was of course the case, and we conse-

quently have to distinguish between the Anglian dialect of Anglo-Saxon and the Saxon dialect of Anglo-Saxon. The most serious objection, however, to the word Anglo-Saxon is that it conceals the unbroken development of our language, and thrusts the oldest period of our language outside the pale of our sympathies. Hence, to a great extent, the slowness with which the study of our language makes its way among the great mass of educated people in England—if people can be called educated who are ignorant of the history of their own language.

“These arguments have lately been vigorously attacked by a leading English philologist—Professor March. In his able essay he brings out the distinctive features of the two extreme periods very forcibly, and has so far done good service. At the same time he has greatly exaggerated the difference between the two periods. Thus, in phonology, he says that Anglo-Saxon had sounds now lost in English, such as French *u*, German *ch*, and initial *wl*, *wr*, and that *i* and *ū* have become diphthongs. Now any one who has read this paper with any attention will see that this part of the argument is worth very little, for all these sounds were preserved unchanged in the sixteenth century, which belongs unmistakably to the Modern period.

“The well known statement that Johnson’s Dictionary contains 29,000 Romance words out of 43,500 is a great exaggeration. A large proportion of these 29,000 are words which are never used in ordinary speech or writing, very many of them are quite unknown to the majority of educated people, and not a few of them never existed in the language at all. When we speak of the proportion of Romance elements in English, we mean the English of every-day life, not of dictionaries and technical works, and of the two extremes the estimate of Turner is certainly fairer than that of Thommerel. * * *

“While differing from Professor March on these points, I fully agree with him in protesting against the loose way in which ‘Old English’ is made to designate any period from Alfred to Chaucer. It is quite clear that the inflectional stage of our language must have a distinctive name, and therefore that Old English must be reserved for it alone. The difficulty is with the later stages.”

To us, at this distance, Mr. Sweet seems the one man in England from whom Anglo-Saxon scholarship has most to hope for; and it is, accordingly, rather discouraging to find, even in this work, again popping in upon us that inevitable Englishman, who seems from all accounts to be the stupidest product that has yet appeared in the upward development of the race, whose knowledge of the history of his own language is to be lost or whose sympathy with its study to be chilled by calling its earliest period Anglo-Saxon. If no stronger argument for change can be brought forward than the grievances of this imaginary individual, far better that the discussion had never been opened at all. Most certainly the assertion that the majority of scholars are opposed to the term Anglo-Saxon is a mistake, at least if spoken of any other country than England; we doubt if it would be found correct of that. With us its use is universal, and in Germany, which has done more for the study of our tongue than America and England combined, and which numbers among its philologists some men whom even Mr. Freeman might venture to call scientific, there is no one who has made English a speciality, who does not employ this term, save Zupitza. Wülcker, indeed, the only other scholar of repute, there, who has even noticed the controversy, takes particular occasion to express his preference for the name. Indeed, it seems to us, in the very admission he makes in the last paragraph quoted, Mr. Sweet gives up the main point in dispute. The question of terminology is a question of detail, which can be settled at last, if ever settled at all, only by common consent. Outside of the reasons that led originally to the choice of the name Anglo-Saxon, there is still one of great importance. Every one who uses it has himself a perfectly clear idea of the period meant by it, and is in no fear that it will be misunderstood by others. There is no danger of its being confounded with any other stage in the history of the language. It gives precision, the all important thing in nomenclature; and its usefulness in this respect can be constantly seen by the very practice of its opponents, who, whenever they wish to mark clearly the inflectional stage of the tongue, speak of it as the "so-called Anglo-Saxon." No such definiteness can ever be attained by the use of the term Old English; for the language

of Chaucer is to us in one sense Old English, just as the language of Cædmon is in another. Such a name, as applied to the period before the Norman Conquest, is not only purely arbitrary, which is no objection to it at all, but it must be always constantly liable to lead to confusion from the wide sense in which a common word like "old" cannot fail to be frequently used. Surely, it is hardly worth while to employ a nomenclature which is certain to confound for the majority things essentially distinct, for the sake of accommodating some hypothetical beings who may be led into the belief by the present terminology that the language they speak to-day has no relations whatever with the language spoken by their forefathers.

At the same time, there is no particular reason why the term Anglo-Saxon should be employed in preference to any other except on the score of precision and prescription. But the term which displaces it, if it is to be displaced, must at least be equally definite; and definite is an epithet which can never be applied to "Old English." Precisely the same thing can be said of the names given to any of the later periods. There is nothing sacred about any one of them. It is convenience and accuracy that are to be consulted, not any eternal immutable principles existing in the nature of things. What our forefathers called their language at any particular time is in the question of terminology by no means so important a matter for us, as that we get clear and definite ideas of what the language they spoke really was. To substitute the former for the latter is merely to substitute a knowledge of the sign for a knowledge of the thing signified. At present a wide diversity exists, in both the dates and names given to the various periods of English. Hardly any two authors agree in either. Nor, indeed, can they be expected to agree. The work which is essential to any satisfactory settlement of the points in dispute has not only not been completed; it has hardly even been more than begun. Not all Early English literature has been printed; but little of that which has been printed has been subjected to anything but the most cursory examination, and the most superficial analysis. And even when the task of separating the local from the general shall have been accomplished, there are certain difficulties inherent in the subject which will always prevent names and dates from having

anything but an approximate value. For the development of a language, like that of an individual, is always of a noiseless character. Unseen influences are ever operating upon it, unheeded agencies are ever moulding it into new and strange forms. While the alteration is going on it is little noticed, if noticed at all. It is only when we come to compare what is with what has been, that we begin to realize how mighty are the changes that have been wrought, how wide the gap has grown that divides the present from the past. Dates in the history of a language, which are convenient for reference, can never be worth much for exact accuracy of statement. Men do not speak one form of language one year, and another form the following year. No matter into what periods English may be divided, the special peculiarities of the one will survive for a while in the one which succeeds, though in no proper sense of the word being a characteristic of the latter. Thus the three plurals in *-n*, in *-s*, and in *-th* of the present tense of the verb, which formed a marked peculiarity of the period which Mr. Sweet calls Middle English, lasted down to the seventeenth century in the Modern English period. Still it is perfectly proper to say that they belong to the one and not to the other; and, it may be added, it is perfectly proper to make the same statement in regard to the Anglo-Saxon sounds, which Mr. Sweet declares were preserved unchanged in the sixteenth century; so that, to use his own words, any one will see that this part of his argument is worth very little. Surely because *his* was retained to the end of the sixteenth century as the sole genitive of *it*, there is no reason for us to say that the use of *its* instead of *his*, as this genitive, is not one of the differences between Modern and Early English.

Another difficulty inherent in this subject from its very nature is the fact that the English of Mr. Sweet's Middle period advanced far more rapidly toward its modern form in some parts of the country than in others. What might be true of one section of England would not be true of another. In particular, in the North the movement was rapid. Inflections began to be dropped early, and many of the peculiarities of Modern English there made their first appearance. On the other hand, the South was conservative. It clung to the old forms, and

gave up the inflections with comparative reluctance. It is accordingly evident that what might be perfectly true of a period of the language as spoken in one part of the country might be absolutely false of the language as spoken in another part, at the same point of time. This shows at once the difficulty that will always exist of making general statements which shall be perfectly accurate; and, in the present state of our knowledge, of making any statements that can be deemed thoroughly trustworthy.

In his remarks upon the proportion of the Romance element in English, Mr. Sweet seems to us still more out of the way; and as this is a topic upon which much nonsense is constantly vented, it may be well to give the subject a little notice. It must first be premised that it is somewhat difficult to tell precisely what is meant in the passage here referred to. "When we speak," says Mr. Sweet, "of the proportion of Romance elements in English, we mean the English of every day life, not of dictionaries and technical works." The question naturally arises, To which class does our literature, in the strict sense of the word literature, properly belong? Is, for instance, the English of Shakspeare and Milton the English of dictionaries and technical works, or the English of every day life? It can hardly be said to belong to the former; it would be a most happy tribute to every day life if it could be truly ascribed to the latter. In fact, while the phrase "the language of every day life" is a correct enough one under certain circumstances, and conveys in a general way a sufficiently clear idea, it is wholly out of place as the basis of any scientific argument, from the utter lack of any definiteness and precision attending it. When we set out to express the simplest wants and necessities of our being, the language of every day life is to all intents and purposes the same for every rank and condition. But when once we have ascended from these topics, it immediately begins to diverge. The language of every day life of an educated man is altogether different from that of an ignorant man; but certainly a scholar has no business on that ground to attribute any superiority to the latter, or to speak of it as being an example of "unconscious, unsophisticated development." With us, necessarily, the more a man knows, the wider the circle of

his intellectual sympathies, the more he addresses the understanding and not the feelings, the more he will be called upon to use the Romance element of our tongue. But, necessarily, there can be nothing but indefiniteness in any discussion upon the language of every day life, not only because it differs widely in the mouths of different persons, but because there is no one who can call completely to mind, or make a complete list of, the stock of words which now constitute, or may have constituted, his vocabulary. It is only in a general way even that he can say that he uses the Saxon element in preference to the Romance. It is of the written language alone that we can speak with certainty, for there alone are to be found the precise facts from which precise inferences can be drawn; and of course, when we begin to compare the proportion of Romance and of Saxon elements in our tongue, we are in duty bound to take that portion of its literature which exhibits the fullness, scope, and power of the language in the highest degree. These characteristics are necessarily found best in the writings of its greatest authors. No other test can justly be applied.

Fortunately this work has been done for us to a certain extent, by a scholar in whom we can have confidence. Mr. Marsh, in his "*Lectures on the English Language*," has given us the result of his investigations of the proportion of the elements existing in our tongue, as exhibited in those cases in which the total vocabulary has been collected. Necessarily there are two methods of computation. The first is to make a comparison of the entire stock of words used in any one work, or by any one author; the second, of the proportion habitually employed in it or by him. In the latter case the Saxon element must always largely predominate, from the constant repetition of the numerous particles, pronouns, auxiliaries, and common words, which are of Teutonic origin. But when we come to examine the total number of words found, the two elements are at once seen to be nearly equally represented. "In the vocabulary of the English Bible," says Mr. Marsh, "sixty per cent. are native; in that of Shakspeare, the proportion is very nearly the same, while of the stock of words employed in the poetical works of Milton, less than thirty-three per cent. are Anglo-Saxon." And in a note he points out that conclusions based on data so in-

significant in amount as those given by Turner are entitled to no confidence whatever. Picked passages are selected from an author as representative of his language, and not entire works varying in subject and purpose. Yet it is only by this latter method that any test can fairly be made. And this consideration forces us to say that a note of Mr. Sweet to the paragraph under discussion is neither ingenious nor ingenuous. "By one-side arguments like these," he says, in speaking of the language of dictionaries and technical works, "it would be easy to prove that Modern German is quite as mixed as English;" and to make good his statement he quotes a very short passage from an author whose name is not given, who, if not writing a technical treatise, is at least writing here on a technical subject. In this he points out a large number of Romance words. Of course this is the merest travesty of an argument, as no proper comparison can ever be made, save between the two literatures, using literature in its strict sense. A man of Mr. Sweet's high attainments and ability does not need to be told that in regard to vocabulary, English and German can never be put upon the same footing. In the close intercourse now existing between nations, languages will borrow more or less from one another, will borrow, to a large extent even, terms that are not needed. But the difference in this respect between these two tongues, while it is a simple one, is also a fundamental one. A German author may make use of Romance words: an English author must.

Necessarily, a writer can with us become conspicuous by the employment of a specially Latinized diction, as he can of a Saxon; and of the two the latter is not only at this period preferred, but, it seems to us, should on principle be always preferred, where the subject is such as to admit of it without the loss of clearness. But in the use of neither element can we get along without words belonging to the other, and any attempt to do so, beyond a certain legitimate point, serves simply to sacrifice both perspicuity and sense and to cripple expression. It has been and still is a favorite amusement of some persons to heap together a mass of Latin derivatives, generally very uncommon and often unheard-of ones, stuff them into the same sentence, and present that as a

fair sample of a Latinized diction. The practice began in the sixteenth century, and has been kept up ever since. One illustration will suffice. Cockeram appended to one of the editions of his dictionary (1639) a second part consisting of a list of common words, explained, as he says, by a more "refined and elegant speech;" by the use of which a person not satisfied with saying to his friend, "If you'll allow me, I'll wake you early, and then we'll take a walk together," might refine his speech as follows: "If you'll approbate, I will matituti-nally expergify you, and then we will obambulate together." It is hardly necessary to say that no such sentence as this, or any resembling this in character, was ever seriously spoken by one human being to another; and yet men of straw of this kind are constantly set up to be knocked over, by unfledged purists who fancy that in so doing they are making themselves the champions of English undefiled. The latest serious performance in this line that we have met with is by Mr. Kington Oliphant, who in his work entitled "Standard English," furnishes us with an illustration of the practice: in his case not only a harmless amusement, but also a suitable achievement, coinciding as it does closely with numerous absurd opinions of his own of all kinds advanced in his book. Certainly the belief that the Romance element of our tongue is not as much English as the Saxon element, can safely be left to scientific philologists like himself and Mr. Freeman.

ARTICLE VII.—CHRISTIAN CLASSICS.

The Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius. Edited for Schools and Colleges. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1874.

THIS book is the first Greek author, we believe, in the series of "Christian Greek and Latin writers," edited for school and college use. It contains the first book and selections from the second, third, fourth, and fifth, of *Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History*, with intermittent notes, and a geographical and historical index. This index is taken bodily from Dindorf's edition, without omitting the parts which have nothing to do with the selected passages of text, and the assertion at the head of it, "*Fecit Gulielmus Dindorfius*," hardly agrees with his own statement that he has taken Schwegler's index, "*paucis mutatis*." The unevenness of the notes—on three-fifths of the text there are only nine pages of notes, and part of that is mere titles of chapters—is explained in the preface as due to a desire "to please both those who like to have their classes use the nude text, and those who like many explanations and grammatical references." There is a third class, including most teachers, we should hope, of those who like judicious notes in plenty, which may help and stimulate the student to thorough preparation of a lesson by himself, whose wishes this book fails to meet. In both selections and comments there is an evident lack of critical scholarship. It will seem sufficient proof of this that the selections include the letter of King Abgarus to the Saviour, without a hint in the notes as to its genuineness; and the answer of Jesus with a note calling attention to coincidence of phrase with his language in John's gospel, but whether to suggest genuineness or forgery is not indicated. In general, too, there is nothing in the notes to inform the student as to the peculiarities of the period of the Greek language shown in Eusebius—so far as they indicate he might be reading the Greek of Herodotus or Demosthenes or Arrian.

Leaving now this particular book, we propose to take the opportunity of expressing an opinion about the plan of the series

to which it belongs. The brief notice prefixed to the series explains and defends this plan. It opens with a statement that conveys a false impression—"For many centuries, down to what is called the Pagan renaissance" (we doubt whether that adjective is usually prefixed), "they (the writings of the early Christians) were the common linguistic study of educated Christians." Now that statement conveys a false impression in two respects; first, that there was during all that time a choice made between two things equally ready at hand for use, and second, that the Christian fathers were during that time studied in schools and colleges as the Greek and Latin classics are now. As to the first, we had supposed it to be generally admitted that the Greek and, in less degree, the Latin classics were for many centuries virtually lost from existence, gone from the knowledge of men, so that they were not within reach for use, if wanted, and so it seems uncandid to imply that they were continually and deliberately passed over and the Fathers preferred to them. As to the second, is it not a familiar reproach of the dark ages and a chief cause of their darkness, that even the Fathers were not used in schools and colleges as a means of teaching language? Must we recall to the writer the words *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*, whose meaning Webster's Dictionary explains, and remind him that neither history nor philology nor the Fathers are included in those courses of study? Gibbon tells us that before the "Pagan Renaissance" Greek "was not taught in any university of the west," and Hallam (*Literature of Europe*), and Woolsey (*New Englander*, Oct., 1864), repeat nearly the same statement with greater fulness of detail. How can it be truly said that the Fathers "were the common linguistic study of educated Christians," when there was before "the revival of learning" no linguistic study in the modern sense, and no considerable number of "educated Christians?" "Classical Philology," we are next told, "took its ideal of beauty from Pagan Greece and has filled our schools" with heathen authors, but not, as we have seen, by driving out the Fathers. "The Modern Science of Language has again changed the point of view. It gives the first place to truth; it seeks to know man, his thoughts, his growth; * * * it values books according to their historical significance. The writings of the early Christians embody the history of the most important events known to

men, in language not unworthy of the events; and the study of Latin and Greek as vehicles of Christian thought should be the most fruitful study known to Philology, and have its place of honor in the university course." These remarks, true enough in themselves, with a qualification as to the value of the writings of the Fathers and the eminent excellence of their style, are but a specious plea in this connection. For they confuse together general study, that is, the study of independent mature scholars, and the study carried on in schools and colleges. This latter is for a special purpose, and for that purpose the patristic Latin and Greek are very unsuitable. Let us now justify that opinion by stating our own views.

What is the object in view in studying a foreign literature? It may be any one of the several objects for which a man may study his own, or an entirely distinct one,—that of learning what thoughts men of different stock and training and surroundings from his own have so expressed that their countrymen value them, of learning in that way to some extent another people's life and history, and so of widening his own mental horizon. To this end also the study of a foreign language, even without mastery of the literature as a whole, contributes in its measure. The differences of inflections, of constructions, of meanings of apparently identical words (naturally one thinks in writing of the languages of Europe, which are all more or less kindred), of forms of sentences, of idioms, are such that the study of a foreign language almost compels comparison with one's own, and so educates the mind and improves the power of expression. Now this process of comparison would be impossible if any two languages were exactly alike, if that supposition may be allowed. It is the difference between the linguistic products of two nations, which in part makes the study of the language or literature of the one by the other, a profitable study. And so it may be truly said that the greater the difference, within reasonable limits, the greater the benefit. As change of climate generally improves health, or as the education gained by travel is in proportion, *cæteris paribus*, to the extent of the travelling, so it is with the change of mental atmosphere, the range of mental journey, involved in the study of a foreign language.

There is yet one other possible object in studying a foreign language—one which is connected especially with schools and

colleges—that of general discipline of the mind as a preparation for subsequent work and life. For the young, as an instrument of this discipline, we hold that the study of foreign languages is eminently useful in the way that has just been pointed out. For them especially we should insist that it is desirable that the language and literature studied should be decidedly different and even remote from their own.

The classical literatures of Greece and Rome seem to meet this condition as no others do. They are far enough and not too far removed from us. When an Englishman reads a modern German or French book, he finds there the same views of the shape of the world and the operations of nature, the same knowledge of Christianity, the same background of modern history, the same logic, the same general conceptions of law and government and society, as in an English book and in his own mind. There are, of course, differences on some of these points, which are full of interesting suggestions, but they are comparatively slight differences. When he reads Homer or *Æschylus*, or even *Thucydides* or *Demosthenes*, he finds a very different mental furniture. The world is flat, the rivers are gods, the deities are local, the state is a city, science is in its infancy, the family is a religious bond, the cardinal points of history are all different. These variations naturally exercise his imagination and his discrimination. It is the same human nature that he finds in all ages, but working under different conditions from those familiar to him, and he can hardly help learning something from the combination of things new to him with things old. He can trace the growth of the modern out of the ancient, he can overlook, so far as he has the ability, the course of human history in its most interesting part, he can distinguish between the permanent and the transient. He does not need to go farther from the modern standpoint, to the literature of India or China, for instance, because this is far enough, and he does better to take this than any other equally remote literature, as that of the Norse languages, because there is here not only fuller and more varied material, but also a beauty which is not found elsewhere. This we claim is the best intellectual food. This brings the mind of the student under the influence of the best writers the world has produced, the models of subsequent literatures.

When in this point of view we look at the writings of the

Christian Fathers, we find something very different. Christianity has come into the world, and these writers are all concerned with it more than with anything else. This one fact brings them into the same sphere with modern writers, no one of whom can ignore Christianity, and destroys that element of diverseness, that entirely different polarity, which is one great advantage of the classics as a historical study. Instead of philosophy we have in the Fathers theology, the history is church history, the oratory is preaching, the very poetry is hymns and such a tragedy as *Χριστὸς πάσχων*. We admit that they are eloquent sermons, acute and profound theology, invaluable history, but the Christian, and in so far the modern element is in them all. Therefore they cannot give to the student the knowledge of human nature under widely different circumstances, the starting point for extended study of history, the understanding of our modern world by contrast, which the ancient classics give and which is the best foundation for culture. In the cultivation of taste and style, there can be no argument as to which set of writings furnishes the better discipline.

In another respect, involved to some extent in what has been said, we hold the ancient classics to be preferable as material for college study to the Christian Fathers. The former are a genuine spontaneous literature, the latter comparatively an artificial one. The former reflects faithfully the life of the people among whom it grew up. It was written by men who had no knowledge (whatever the poets claimed) not accessible to all men, who adapted themselves to the wants of their time, and strove, many of them, to give the best direction they could to its wishes and tendencies. It was written, to a remarkable extent, without motive of official duty or pecuniary interest. There was a demand in the minds of men for such epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry, for instance, a demand which had created the occasions for their public delivery. All the popular beliefs, the vague, groping, guessing theories of the universe, the every day morality drawn from experience, the humors and the fears and the hopes of the life of that far off time, are represented in this life-breathing literature. With all their exquisite finish, these writings seem not so much deliberate works as natural growths, even as the literature itself (we have that of Greece in mind now) grew up through successive natural stages. On the other hand the writings of the

Fathers, considered as a literature, seem like exotics or an artificial product. They bear a relation to the classics like that of Virgil to Homer, or of the pastoral poetry of Pope's time to Cowper and Wordsworth. They are writings of men laboring to educate and elevate the people about them into the knowledge and practise of a supernatural religion. It is a noble work, and the writings it produced are of inestimable value, but their value is not mainly in the direction of literature. We do not to-day look to our theological schools or missionary societies to supply our literary wants. Undoubtedly their work is a grander and more lasting one, but there is something still to be said for those who do the other work. In ancient times religion entered into literature as into politics and other forms of life, being itself of no higher origin than they, but in our day there is a distinction, not a gulf, between them, which it is hopeless to try to destroy by this use of the Fathers.

In thus objecting to the use of the Christian Greek and Latin authors as text-books, we do not mean to deny to them all literary merit. We readily admit that such writings as Augustine's Confessions, Chrysostom's sermons, Tertullian's apologetics, are perhaps the best specimens we have of the style of their day, and worthy of a place of honor in the literature of the world. We claim, however, that they belong rather to the special advanced student of church history, in a wide sense of that term, to the theologian, or to him who can devote a lifetime to the study of all literature in its varying phases. They are after all important rather for the thoughts they contain than for the form of expressions. Eusebius, with his traditions, and visions, and wonderful conversions, can only be valuable when critically studied, as he could not be by a schoolboy. If it is worth while for young men in the course of general education to study Greek at all, as we maintain that it is and always will be, they ought to have the best Greek and the best literature accessible in Greek, for the little time that they give to it. And for a young man who expects to be a minister, it is even more important not to anticipate in any such way as this his professional study, but to read the heathen literature with his conscience sensitive and his mind uncorrupted, as he surely may, and then enter upon the study of theology with as much knowledge as possible of the condition of the world without Christianity.

ARTICLE VI.—WHAT IS THE BIBLE?

ALL Protestant theology has its source in the Bible. We Protestants acknowledge no other fountain of religious truth. We have no reverence for the authority of the Fathers of the church, except as learned and devout interpreters of the Scriptures. We accept no doctrines but those professedly founded on holy writ. Rationalism, in its ordinary meaning of a reliance upon human reason for religious truth, we repudiate as the worst of theological evils. When any new interpretation of human life, or any new answer to the problems of human destiny is put forth, we unanimously cry,—“to the law and the testimony,” and demand first of all a goodly array of proof-texts from the Bible.

Since, then, the Holy Scriptures are the basis of all our dearest hopes and firmest convictions as Protestant Christians, it is most important that we should have clear ideas of what they really are. It is the height of inconsistency for Protestants to claim that the Bible alone is the source of all religious truth, and yet be contented with vague and unsettled notions as to the extent of its authority, or confused ideas as to the nature of its inspiration. For, treat it as we may, questions are continually arising about it to which we must give an intelligent answer, or else the skeptic on the one hand or the fanatic on the other will remain master of the field, and our own position be rendered very uncomfortable, because we shall feel it to be logically untenable. The fundamental doctrine of Protestantism cannot be left, with safety, in an unsettled or misty condition. In this day, when the very foundations of all things are called in question, as never before, it is not enough to say, “I believe that the Bible is the word of God,” or, “I believe the Bible to be an inspired book.” For the question is instantly retorted, in almost every circle of thought, “in what sense the word of God?”—“to what extent inspired?”

And these questions must not and cannot be answered *a priori*. That is, we cannot say in reply, “the Bible is exactly

such a book as man needs, according to our understanding of his wants," or, "the Bible is thus and so (giving our conception of it), because God could not have made a different book." For this would be the worst kind of rationalism as well as a begging of the question, logically considered. The only legitimate method of reasoning on this subject is to study the book itself, to compare it with other books, to investigate its influence in the world, and the way in which it has been used and valued by the wisest in all ages. To perform this duty is not at all our present purpose. Fortunately, the work has already been ably done by many theologians of the first rank.

All that we design doing at present is to present some of the results of their labors in such a form as may tend to give greater clearness to the popular ideas on the subject of the inspiration of the Bible. Practically, there are two classes of views on this subject current in the Protestant churches, which, though they may sometimes be found shading off into each other, are nevertheless radically distinct. To the unlettered Christian the Bible generally seems to be a book written by the hand of God himself, complete in all divine perfections, containing a perfect system of theology, and a clearly stated system of moral law on its sacred pages, and furnishing all the knowledge, upon every subject, which man can possibly need here below. To such indiscriminating minds the Bible is a literary unit, written by a single author, put forth at a single time, equally divine in all its parts, and as much inspired in the vernacular translation as in the original text.

This unreflecting view of Holy Scripture we should naturally expect to prevail in the early ages of the church, before a fixed and accurate theory had become necessary, or while the attention of theologians was as yet wholly absorbed with the important doctrines of the Trinity and the lost condition of human nature. Such was in fact the case, and we may even trace it still further back. The Jews, before the New Testament Scriptures were written, had fallen into an unreasoning and mechanical doctrine concerning the inspiration of the Old Testament writings. They treated the holy text with a narrow-minded literalism which called out severe rebuke from Christ himself. They counted its words and letters with loving, scrupulous care, lest

any of them should be lost, yet they missed its spirit widely, often, and sank deeper and deeper into a bottomless quagmire of fanciful interpretations, arising out of their belief that every letter was written by the hand of God, and their consequent determination to find some wondrous meaning in every word. These facts, which could be easily proved by quotations if space permitted, show that the Hebrew sacred writings were regarded with an unreflecting veneration for the very letter, not in the light of a settled and consistent doctrine of inspiration.

Very naturally, too, this mode of thought or feeling passed over into the Christian church, and the early disciples of the new religion, accepting without question the holy books of the Jews, found no occasion for accurately defining the nature and extent of inspiration, but simply received the books, as a whole, with full faith in their completely divine origin. And when the various writings of the New Testament came to be collected together, and to be circulated throughout the church as a single book, that book was of course looked upon in the same light, used in the same way, and regarded with the same veneration as the holy writings of the Jews, which now became the *Old Testament*. In short, all the writings of the early church which have come down to us, appeal to the Bible as inspired of God, written by the Holy Ghost, infallible and perfect in all its parts,—and yet most of them expounded it with a fantastic arbitrariness which shows that they had formed no clear or careful doctrine concerning its origin or nature.* For instance, Barnabas (so-called) finds a reference to Christ in the number of the persons circumcised by Abraham, 318, in Greek *TIH*, the *T* standing for the cross, and the *IH* being the two first letters of the name of Jesus in Greek! Clement of Rome makes the scarlet thread hung out by Rahab to have been a plain prophecy of redemption through Christ. Justin Martyr makes the twelve bells on the robe of the high-priest represent the twelve apostles of our Lord. Tertullian not only finds the number of the Apostles in the gems of the high-priest's robe, in the stones which Joshua took from the Jordan, and in the fountains of Elim, but also the sacrament of baptism in the

* See the proofs in Luthardt's *Compendium der Dogmatik*, Westcott's *Introduction*, and other easily accessible works.

passage of the Red Sea ; and the whole early church interpreted the prophecies of Christ with such a gross literalism as to expect a speedy beginning of the thousand-year reign of the Lord and his saints upon the earth. In a later age, so great a scholar as Origen adopted the theory of a three-fold interpretation of the Scriptures, the historical, the moral, and the mystical,—a theory which affords splendid opportunities of making the Bible mean anything you please. These men undoubtedly had a true veneration for the Bible, and for the most part used it rightly, with a correct appreciation of its value and sacredness. But the fanciful vagaries in which they nevertheless indulged in using it, in many cases, and the childish character of many of their interpretations, compel us to class them with those who receive the Bible with an unreasoning, uninstructed faith in its perfection,—without any intelligent attempt to settle what it really is.

A well-jointed doctrine on the subject of Holy Scripture was not constructed until the time of the Reformation. It is easy to see why the subject assumed at that time a position of greatly increased, in fact of fundamental importance. The reformers, having given up all belief in the infallible authority of the Pope and the Church, were compelled to seek in the Bible the same kind of infallibility which they had lost. And when their opponents charged them with destroying all authority, and making each individual an infallible judge of all truth for himself,—they could reply that they believed the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be possessed of infallible authority, to be the court of highest appeal in all things, the only fountain of truth, law, and justice. They required some basis as firm as that of their opponents, some authority to oppose to that of Pope and Council, some foundation on which they might feel that their new building was secure for all time. They found this requisite in a strong doctrine of inspiration. They could have found it nowhere else, and they taught the literal infallibility of the Bible in the strongest terms.

Luther, indeed, took great liberties with the sacred text, calling James' epistle an epistle of straw, placing the epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse in a kind of subordinate rank, and attributing complete authority only to the very

words of Christ himself. But this free handling of Luther's self-confident spirit was itself a reason for the stricter doctrine of his successors, for it drew the fire of the Romanists, by which the Protestants were compelled to take shelter in a more rigid doctrine of the verbal inspiration and infallible authority of the whole Bible. This was carried so far that at least one synod declared the Hebrew text of the Old Testament to be inspired of God in its consonants, its vowels, and its pointing. Theologians of the first rank, in describing inspiration, compared the sacred writers to pens in the hand of the Holy Spirit, or to amanuenses, writing the very words which God dictated, and declared that the Holy Scriptures were inspired in every, even the least part.

This doctrine is evidently merely a formulation of what we have called the unreflecting view of the subject, drawn from the exigencies of controversy and the requirements of dogmatic systems, rather than from examination of the book in question and careful induction from the facts observed. It would be needless to argue against this theory of the Bible, because it has long been abandoned by all the Protestant churches. Not a single Protestant theologian, of any note, still adheres to it. Theologically it is dead beyond all hope or fear of resurrection, dead as the Ptolemaic theory of the earth, or the Phlogistic theory of Chemistry. How much practical life and force it still retains will be the subject of inquiry further on in this essay. As a theory it speedily broke down when it began to be discussed in the light of modern learning and candor, and tested by the keenness of modern criticism, and when the great controversy which seemed to require it had been hushed.

Two facts, well known to all intelligent readers of the Bible, could never be explained by the theory of verbal inspiration, and are enough of themselves to render it untenable. The fact that there are different readings of the text shows the believer that he can never be absolutely sure that God wrote or spoke every word of the Bible as it now exists,—while it is incredible that a verbally-inspired book would be left to the uncertainties of a thousand human copyists. It would be as easy to inspire the copyists as the first writers. And the fact that many passages are differently interpreted by various learned men, while parties

and sects have been founded on these interpretations, in behalf of which many martyrs have gladly suffered death,—shows that we have not in the Bible a practically infallible and un-mistakeable book. It is incredible that the very words should be inspired of a book which good men dispute about, while bad men can twist it into justifying innumerable errors. Indeed the way in which the theologians of the Reformation used the sacred text,—disregarding some texts, explaining away others, twisting others, disputing about others, and forcing each one his own peculiar system of dogmas upon the inspired writer,—shows that even they did not hold the verbal theory consistently or intelligently, after careful study of the book itself, but dogmatically, as a necessity of their position.

What, then, is the other theory of the Bible to which we have alluded? Let us try to come at it in the same way. An intelligent modern Christian, reading the Bible, finds in it a series of some sixty-seven separate books, letters, histories, poems, and prophecies, written by about forty-six different authors, some of whom are unknown and some doubtful or disputed, but whose lives extended over a period of more than a thousand years. One who is well-instructed also knows that the Bible is written in popular language, as distinguished from that which is scientifically exact; that it contains no formal creed, no regular system of theology; that it lays down no complete moral code, but teaches chiefly by example, and deals in broad general principles and rules of conduct. Mr. Matthew Arnold's remark, "that the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific," has met with almost universal approval and commendation from the religious press and the pulpit.

No intelligent Bible-reader looks into it now for information in geology, astronomy, or metaphysics, or any other science; though he may turn to it to learn what the state of science was at the time when any given part of it was written. He finds in it a text-book of religion and devotion, but nothing is further from his thoughts than to use it as a manual of science, art, or literature. And the formal definitions of the theologians are in the same vein, among almost all modern Protestant schools.

A few definitions of the word "inspiration," from strictly orthodox sources, will show the present position of Protestant theology on this subject. Professor Park, in his lectures at Andover says:—"Inspiration is such an influence upon the minds of the sacred writers as caused them to teach in the best possible manner whatever they intended to teach, and especially to communicate religious truth without any error." Moses Stuart wrote:—"Were I to choose a simile for illustration, I should say that the inspired man ascends an intellectual and moral eminence so high that his prospect widens almost without bounds, and what is altogether hidden from ordinary men is, more or less distinctly, within his view." Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, says:—"The Church has never held what has been stigmatized as the mechanical theory of inspiration. The sacred writers were not machines. Their self-consciousness was not suspended; nor were their intellectual powers superseded. * * * * The sacred writers impressed their peculiarities on their several productions as plainly as though they were the subjects of no extraordinary influence. * * * As the believer seems to himself to act, and in fact does act out of his own nature; so the inspired penmen wrote out of the fulness of their own thoughts and feelings, and employed the language and modes of expression which to them were the most natural and appropriate. Nevertheless, and none the less, they spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and their words were his words."

The following is from "*Lee on Inspiration*"—"By inspiration I understand that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, guided by which the human agents chosen by God have officially proclaimed His will,"—a definition which seems carefully framed to include all the preaching and teaching of inspired men, as well as their writing, and yet to leave the nature and extent of their infallibility an open question. From the theologians of Germany, if we were to consult them, we should get definitions far more liberal than these, but our present purpose permits the citation only of those who are well known and of acknowledged orthodoxy. Almost all Protestants who have reflected on the subject would unite in the formula that "the writers of the Bible were inspired in such a

sense as makes their teachings, when properly and fairly interpreted, the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice in religion and morals,—and in no other sense.”

Indeed, it would not be too bold to declare that this has been the real doctrine of the Christian Church in all ages. For the church has given comparatively little attention to this subject, and has made very few formal declarations or definitions of the doctrine of inspiration; and although we may find some writers who have interpreted the Bible with an arbitrary and fantastic literalness, and some who have thought it necessary to maintain the miraculous origin of the words and letters of the sacred text,—yet these peculiarities have been due to the vagaries of individuals and to the supposed necessities of controversy. The early writers referred to above, who indulged in the wildest of allegorical interpretations, nevertheless held, for the most part, a doctrine of inspiration almost identical with that of the present day; while those who formulated an extreme theory, were unable to adhere to it in practice, but used the holy book very much as other men have used it,—forcing their own ideas into it, and squeezing their own systems out of it, as though it were a code of human law, or a mere “rule of faith and practice.”

The question inevitably arises at this point: Is the practice of the Church abreast with its theory? Since nearly all who have formed a careful opinion on the subject are found in agreement,—do intelligent Christians treat the Bible as they define it, or do they use it like an infallible text-book of all branches of knowledge, every syllable of which is written by the hand of God himself? On this point also the testimony of history is instructive. For the opinions and practices of men have a strange tendency to perpetuate themselves through centuries, and in history we may often see ourselves as in a mirror. When modern astronomy began to show that the blue sky is not a solid expanse “spread out like a garment” and studded with stars as with jewels; that the sun is not a luminary appended to the earth, but a vast and powerful body, swinging the earth and many others planets in the emptiness of space; that the moon is not the co-equal of the sun, created at the same time, but an infinitesimal reflection, a youngest grand-

child of the central glory; orthodoxy was profoundly alarmed. The authority of the Bible and the Fathers was thought to be at stake. The new scientific theory of the heavens was deemed a dangerous heresy. The aged Galileo, among others, was called to a severe and solemn account for affirming, in answer to the arguments which his opponents drew from the Bible, "that the Bible accommodates its language to common notions, and does not aim to teach scientific truth." The strongest arguments at the command of the Inquisition were resorted to for extirpating the noxious and dangerously unscriptural error, that the earth moves around the sun!

It is very easy for us to see, at this distance of time, how the orthodoxy of that day, by declaring war upon science, was endangering the very foundations of Christian truth. For when any fact in the physical world is once proved by the methods of physical science, every healthy mind, if adequately informed, at once yields assent. From that moment all opposition is not only fruitless, but seems fairly absurd. To oppose the authority of the Fathers or of the Holy Scriptures to a well-established fact of science, seems to the scientific mind utterly unreasonable, almost inconceivable. Hence the authority which is thus over-strained snaps asunder, loses all strength, on all subjects, and the mind falls into utter unbelief. But the men of that day feared that the whole structure of their religion would topple down, if they suffered any rude hand to touch what they deemed its key-stone,—the literal infallibility of the Scriptures and of the Fathers.

Let us come a little nearer home. When the science of geology first began to prove that the world was not made in six literal days,—began everywhere to exhume fossils which everybody saw must have been parts of living animals thousands of years before the Bible chronology, the religious world was seized with a profound alarm. The Protestant world was moved against geology, much as the Catholic world had been against astronomy. The arguments employed were not so forcible as the rack and the stake of the Inquisition, but were equally unscientific. It was thought by many that every geologist was by necessity an atheist, and geology the deadly foe of religion. The figure of Antichrist was changed from

that of a woman sitting on a scarlet-colored beast, to a well-dressed man with a hammer, breaking open boulders to see what they were made of, and studying the rocks. We can now clearly see that the greatest danger to religion was from these injudicious defenders, who overloaded the Bible far beyond what it was intended to bear, and made the authority of revelation answerable for things far outside of its purpose. We are all ready now to admit, we even claim, that the Bible has nothing to do with science, either physical or metaphysical.

In theory, the verbal inspiration and the scientific infallibility of the Bible are now almost universally abandoned. No one argues now that the sun goes round the earth, or that the world was made in six days, because the Bible seems to say so. Yet, so inveterate are the habits of the human mind, we often find ourselves acting upon theories which we have long since rejected, admitting unconsciously what we consciously deny. For instance, there are many who hold the modern theory of inspiration, and yet spend much time and thought in trying to reconcile the first chapter of Genesis with modern geology, and cannot give up the idea that its author was inspired with a knowledge of that science. They pin their faith upon some ingenious explanation of the six days of the Mosaic creation as long periods or as visions; and that in such a way, that if the explanation should be proved scientifically false, their belief in all revelation, in all religion, would be shaken, perhaps destroyed. Such a position of mind as this, has its basis and only logical standing in the doctrine of verbal inspiration. For, though the votaries of science are extremely fallible and often mistaken, yet science itself, properly so called, is infallible; the very meaning of the word is,—accurate, exact, well-ascertained knowledge. When any fact has been scientifically established, they who oppose it on grounds of authority are beating the air.

Even those who disbelieve in all inspiration may sometimes be detected in a similar inconsistency of thought concerning the Bible. For instance, Mr. Matthew Arnold, from whom we have quoted the widely received formula, "that the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, or scientific," and who describes the Bible as "a book of con-

duct,"—nevertheless proceeds to extract from it the intensely metaphysical definition of God as "that stream of tendency by which all things fulfill the law of their being." Mr. Arnold even attempts to prove that the writers of the Bible, and Christ himself, thought of God, in his relations with human life, under the thoroughly abstract form of "the Eternal, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." Thus the abstrusities of pantheism are read between the lines of the very book whose simplicity, artlessness, and outwardness, this entertaining author has so beautifully described. A combination of the verbal inspiration of the Reformers with the fantastic exegesis of the Fathers, could alone logically account for such extraordinary literary results as these!

And perhaps inconsistencies might be found nearer home, between our theories about the Bible and our practical way of using it and speaking of it in public; between the way in which ministers reason about the human element in the Bible, when preaching on inspiration, and the way in which they base great doctrines or whole systems upon a single verse; between their theories concerning the nature of prophecy, and the way in which they read a detailed history of the world between the lines of Daniel and the Apocalypse; between the doctrine of inspiration as taught in our theological seminaries, and as implanted in the minds of the young in our Sunday schools. There can be no doubt that our theological professors and educated ministers are far in advance of the laity of our churches in clear and consistent opinions upon the great question,—*"What kind of a book is the Bible?"* Have not the clergy then an important duty in this matter, namely, to teach exactly what they believe, and conform their public utterances, both formal and casual, to their theories?

If the modern theory of inspiration is dangerous to be taught to the people, or to be practically used in the pulpit, the prayer-meeting and the Sunday school, then it must be false, and we ought to abandon it and return to the theory of verbal inspiration, and literal infallibility. But if every pastor finds, in his practical work, that this verbal theory is dangerous, leading to perfectionism, millenarianism, antinomianism, and other errors, he will not be likely to expect much relief from

returning to it in his formal, public teaching, but will rather be led to apply the other theory more consistently. If any one fears to lose his authority, or to weaken that of the holy book, by claiming a perfection less than absolute for the text book of our religion,—he ought to remind himself, it seems to us, that there is far more probability of his destroying his own influence and the power of religion, either by preaching a theory which the intelligent part of his hearers will instantly reject, or by coolly taking such a theory for granted, in all practical ways, while formally rejecting it.

ARTICLE VII.—LAY-PREACHING.

VARIOUS circumstances have combined, within a few years, to bring the subject of Lay-Preaching into special prominence, and to work something like a revolution in public sentiment with respect to it. Prejudice has gradually yielded to reason, and facts have opened such a broadside to false theories as to shatter and sink them. This effect is more noticeable, perhaps, among Congregationalists and Presbyterians, in this country, than among other denominations of Christians; for these ever insisting on preaching as the prominent function of the ministry, in distinction from the sacerdotal conception of it as occupied chiefly about "the altar" in celebrating the sacraments, have been jealous of practices which might seem to lower its qualifications, or to undervalue its work. One need revert to the ideas and customs of a time not farther back than twenty or thirty years, to find a frown upon the ecclesiastical face at the bare mention of lay-preaching, while its practice was sure to call down explicit censure.

A leading Presbytery in the State of New York, in 1840, took condemnatory action, when one of its pastors invited a young man to preach for him, who was studying for the ministry, had passed through college, and had completed one year in the theological seminary, but had not been formally licensed; and though his labors, at the instance of the pastor in question, had led by God's blessing to the most interesting revival of religion which that church had known for many years. This did not argue any special bigotry on the part of that Presbytery; it did but follow the example of the General Assembly, which as far back as 1710, placed this action upon the Minutes: "Upon information that David Evan, a lay person, had taken upon him publicly to teach or preach among the Welsh in the Great Valley, Chester Co., it was unanimously agreed, that the said Evan had done very ill, and acted irregularly, in thus invading the work of the ministry, and (he) was thereupon censured." Similar condemnation was expressed in another case, that of Mr. McCalla, by the Assembly, in 1821. The preva-

lence of this opinion in both of the denominations mentioned may be seen from the fact that, until within a very few years, the students in their theological seminaries have usually been forbidden to preach until near the close of their course; even during the vacations, when it could not interfere with their studies, might aid their finances, might afford them useful practice, and might be helpful to pastorless churches and unevangelized neighborhoods. So tenacious is theory; so tyrannical is prescriptive custom! As many minds are not yet clear upon the subject, it may be useful to consider the right and duty of lay-preaching, its dangers, and its appropriate sphere.

I. *The right and duty of lay-preaching.*—The right and the duty may be said to go together; for, under the Christian law of love, what a man may rightfully do to promote the interests of religion, he is bound to do. Within the limitations which God has fixed by nature and Scripture, he should make his influence felt in every possible way for the promotion of holiness in this sinful world. In forming a judgment as to lay-preaching let us inquire, then, into the nature of the case, into the teaching of Scripture, into the history of opinion, and into practical results.

What valid reason can be given why a layman should not preach, according to his ability and opportunity? Religion must be diffused by words and by deeds; by teaching and by living. There would seem to be a place for lay-influence in both of these respects. Laymen must lead a holy life, and they must consecrate their speech to Christ. And if their private conversation may aid religion, why may not their public discourse, such as they use with notable effect in connection with secular topics? The highest influence of woman, indeed, may require a certain degree of privacy and modesty in her labors; but it is otherwise with man, who is made for public life. Why, then, should he shrink back, or be forced back, into a woman's sphere, any more than she should be pushed forward into a man's sphere?

Perhaps it will be said, that preaching should be limited to ministers, on the same principle which limits the practice of law to lawyers, and of medicine to physicians. But that principle only partially applies in this case, and at most is not entirely restrictive. Law and medicine, so far as they are re-

stricted, deal with difficult matters which require much technical knowledge and professional training, to handle them wisely and safely. But religion, in its most important bearings, has to do with the simpler truths and with personal testimony. Allow that a professional minister may be required to discuss difficult theological, exegetical, and ecclesiastical questions; what is there beyond the reach of ordinarily intelligent laymen, in the explanation and enforcement of the Christian doctrines which have to do with repentance for sin and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ? The words of Scripture on such points are not obscure, and it has been a characteristic tenet of Protestantism, that it was safe to place the Bible in the hands of every one who could read it; the way of salvation being so plainly pointed out in its pages that mistake was scarcely conceivable. If this be so, a man of little learning might usefully repeat its truths to others, reading and applying its searching words, and adding a corroboration from his own experience. Thus the teaching of religion is largely parallel to that general common sense advice which every intelligent man is continually giving as to matters of law and government, of health and disease. One may not be qualified to practice in the courts, and to manage technical details of legal procedure, and yet may be abundantly qualified to manage private business so as to avoid legal difficulties, to direct a neighbor as to the best course to pursue in many of life's emergencies, and to enter into politics as one entitled to speak and to vote upon questions of legislation. And so one may shrink from the grave responsibilities of a physician, and yet be qualified, as a father, to care for the general health of his family, or, as a friend, to caution his acquaintances against habits which generate disease.

Moreover, in religious affairs, an approximation to preaching has long been sanctioned, in the exhortations of our prayer-meetings, where laymen are accustomed to speak freely, touching now upon doctrinal and then upon practical topics, quoting, explaining, and applying Scripture; and that in the absence as well as in the presence of ministers; laymen, indeed, frequently conducting the exercises. And then we must not forget, that in these days of general educational facilities, a large proportion of the laity are more intelligent than in some ages

the body of the clergy were, on religious as well as on other subjects; while in every community will be found laymen of liberal education, who, as lawyers, physicians, editors, authors, artists, engineers, teachers, legislators, and merchants, are leading men, and fitted to exert a wide-spread Christian influence. Why such men should be silent, or should be restricted to the narrowest limits of speech, in advocating the cause of Christ, is not very evident from the nature of the case.

Such a rule accords, so far as we can see, neither with their spirit as Christians, nor with their ability and opportunity as men. Love to God as their Heavenly Father, gratitude to Christ as their Saviour, and compassion for their fellow-men as needing to know and accept the gospel, would naturally prompt those who have had experience of the gospel-salvation to make it known as far as possible. If then a man has gifts of thought and expression, which enable him to influence others in the affairs of ordinary life, why should he not employ these with corresponding freedom in the realm of religion? And the pressure of duty or the feeling of privilege would seem naturally to increase, in proportion to the manifest need of employing such an agency. This need is scarcely to be overrated. When we think of the slow progress of the gospel, even in nominally Christian lands; when we call to mind the masses of the population who never come to the house of God, and are indifferent to religion and prejudiced against its ministers, and who must consequently be sought out in their homes and haunts, and have the gospel preached to them in the places where they congregate, by persons of whom they will not be suspicious as acting a professional part; there would appear to be a wide door of usefulness open to earnest and intelligent lay-preachers. In numbers these might quadruple the regular clergy, while for specific effect in reaching the common people for evangelistic purposes, they would have great advantage.

If now we enquire after the teaching of Scripture, to ascertain whether it reveals limitations divinely appointed, to the duty under consideration, we are immediately confronted with the fact, that it nowhere recognizes in the Christian church the distinction of clergy and laity, as of distinct orders, to the former of whom alone were committed, as sacred func-

tions, the duty of preaching the word and administering the ordinances. As in a republic there is no aristocracy, or any permanent rank or caste, but all men alike are citizens, though some are appointed to do a special work in legislative, judicial, and executive offices, so in the New Testament church we find everywhere Christian equality of rights, with a convenient distribution of labor. There were pastors (called also bishops and elders) and deacons, to serve as officers in the local church; and there were evangelists or missionaries, whose time was devoted to a general propagation of the faith wherever opportunity offered, from place to place. But there was no priesthood, or hierarchy, separate from the membership. The hereditary priesthood of the Mosaic system was typical of Christ, and expired when he ascended on high, to plead his own sacrifice in our behalf. Christian ministers more nearly represent the duties of the ancient prophets. The New Testament doctrine is that so far as any priesthood exists on earth it belongs to all Christians. Thus Peter in his first epistle (ii, 5, 9,) writes: "Ye also as lively (living) stones are built up a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God by Jesus Christ. * * * * But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people, that ye should show forth the praises of Him who hath called you out of darkness into his marvelous light."

This would seem to lay the broadest foundation for Christian work, and to forbid official monopoly of religious instruction, while leaving local pastors to discharge the special functions, in their own church-meetings, which they are appointed and paid to perform. Thus while a bishop or presbyter must be a man "apt to teach," and must, as a pastor, "feed the flock," he had no exclusive right to preach. Others also might use their gifts of speech in the church-meetings and elsewhere, provided the people were willing to listen; for the right of speaking must always be co-ordinate with, and limited by, other people's right of hearing. Paul's instruction to the church at Corinth is harmonious with this idea, in regard to the liberty which he accorded to all (but the women) to prophesy; that is, to speak under the promptings of the Spirit: "For ye may all prophesy, one by one, that all may learn and all may be com-

forted." And the whole account which Paul gives, in that connection, of the ordinary public worship of the primitive church shows that it was much like that of the synagogue, with which the first converts in each city had been familiar. There was no formal sermon; but after the reading of the Scriptures, remarks were made, usually upon the portion read, by the elders and other brethren.

There is now attached to the word, to "preach," a technical and formal idea which is not known to the New Testament. We think of a "Reverend," duly educated in theology and ordained by the clergy, who ascends a pulpit, and, after conducting devotional exercises, gives out a verse or two of Scripture, upon which he founds a carefully prepared logical and rhetorical discourse, which is quite too much the prominent feature of the service. Of course, untrained men would make poor work in imitating this procedure, which has for centuries proved edifying to the church. But in the New Testament, "preaching" means any proclamation of gospel truth, whether brief or protracted, with or without a text, by church officer or private member. The ministers themselves did not deliver a sermon after the modern fashion, but commented on the lesson of the day, or discussed a needed topic, introducing quotations from Scriptures in support of their views. And thus everybody preached. *It was a Christian rather than a ministerial function.* The pastor did it regularly, in his own church, as the official teacher, but claimed no exclusive right; much as in our schools and colleges the principals and professors teach as officers in their respective institutions, but without thought of forbidding anyone to teach who can find a pupil elsewhere.

The historic narrative confirms this view; for in the book of Acts we read: "There was a great persecution against the church which was at Jerusalem, and they were all scattered abroad throughout the regions of Judea and Samaria except the apostles. * * * They that were scattered abroad went everywhere preaching the word." Later we read: "They who were scattered abroad upon the persecution that arose about Stephen, traveled as far as Phenice, and Cyprus, and Antioch, preaching the word to none but unto the Jews only. And some of these were men of Cyprus and Cyrene, who, when they

were come to Antioch, spake unto the Grecians, preaching the Lord Jesus. And the hand of the Lord was with them, and a great number believed and turned unto the Lord." And this was the beginning of that famous church of Antioch, which almost could dispute with that at Jerusalem for the honor of being the mother-church of Oriental Christendom, so great was its missionary power, and so noted was it as having originated the name Christian. (Acts xi, 19-26.) And all this we are informed was approved and rejoiced over by "the church which was in Jerusalem."

A very marked individual case of lay-preaching we apparently have in the person of the celebrated Apollos; for it is doubtful if the word "minister," (*διάκονος*) applied to him in 1 Cor. iii, 5, is there used in a technical sense: it being one of the most generic words in the New Testament, and applied to persons in all kinds of service, whether as apostles, evangelists, pastors, deacons, deaconesses, or private members. The historical account in the Acts of the Apostles (xviii, 24-28) furnishes no intimation that he was other than a layman, who was well read in the Scriptures and eloquent of speech, and who came to Ephesus ignorant of a fully developed Christianity, and acquainted only with the reformation commenced by John the Baptist. He began to preach this Johannean doctrine in the synagogue, where he was heard by Aquila and his wife Priscilla; who, seeing in him the elements of great usefulness, "took him unto them, and expounded unto him the way of God more perfectly." This private instruction of the gospel by the tent-maker and his wife, was all that Apollos seems ever to have known of a theological seminary and a ministerial ordination. Filled now with a still more intense zeal to save souls and promote true religion, he crossed over to Greece, to Corinth and the adjacent region, where his biblical knowledge and persuasive eloquence had a powerful effect upon the Jews in converting them to Christianity. "For he mightily convinced the Jews, and that publicly, showing by the Scriptures that Jesus was (the) Christ." When he went upon this mission, he took commendatory letters from the brethren of the Ephesian church, who "wrote, exhorting the disciples to receive him."

We have thus an illustration of primitive doctrine and

practice, and can understand the process by which Christianity was so rapidly spread through the Roman empire. The church did not confine itself to clerical preaching, but used the talent of the entire male membership. As though to authenticate this procedure for all time, and to give every Christian brother a warrant for using his tongue, in persuading men to embrace Christ, the message which the glorified Jesus sent by his servant John, in the closing chapter of the Bible, is this: "The Spirit and the Bride (the whole church) say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely." As the invitation is to the whole perishing race, so the message is meant to be communicated by all the redeemed church.

And how have this right and privilege of laymen to preach the gospel been treated, in the succeeding history of the church? There was no denial until hierarchical assumptions were set up, and that which had fallen to the ministers, as a matter of order in the stated services of the large churches, was claimed as the prerogative of the class. Neander (*Hist.*, I, 193, etc.) well comments upon "the formation of a sacerdotal caste in the Christian church" as a "radical change," and as "something wholly foreign to the Christian consciousness." It took several centuries to suppress the New Testament idea. We find Tertullian (in his treatise on Chastity, c. vii) saying: "Are not even we laics priests? It is written: 'He hath made us kings and priests to his God and Father.' It is the authority of the church and the honor which has acquired sanctity through the joint session of the Order, which has established the difference between the Order and the Laity. Accordingly where there is no joint session of the ecclesiastical Order, you offer (the sacrament of the supper) and baptize, and are priest, for yourself alone. But where there are three there is a church, although they are laics." In his treatise on Baptism, he says (xiv): "I think baptizing was lawful to him to whom preaching was," and (xvii) "Even laymen have the right, for what is universally received can be universally given. If bishops, or priests, or deacons are not present, disciples in general are called to the work. The word of the Lord ought not to be hidden by any :

similarly baptism, which is equally God's arrangement, can be administered by all." In the so-called "Apostolical Constitutions," which, with later additions, embody much traditionally derived from the primitive church-customs, we find (viii, 32) this significant injunction in the name of Paul: "Let him that teaches, although one of the laity, if skillful in the word and grave in his manner, teach; for (it is said) 'They shall be all taught of God.'" Hilary, also, commenting on Ep. iv, 12, concerning the ministry, says: "At first all were accustomed to teach and to baptize. In order that the people might increase rapidly, it was permitted in the beginning, to all to evangelize, to baptize, and to expound the Scriptures." The historian Eusebius also states (vi, 19) that when Origen left Egypt and took up his abode in Cæsarea, he was requested by the bishops to expound the sacred Scriptures publicly in the church, although he had not been ordained a priest; and that when Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, complained of this preaching of a layman before a bishop, as an unheard of irregularity, the bishops of Jerusalem and Cæsarea declared that such a position was "far from the truth; for, indeed, where-soever there are found those qualified to benefit the brethren, these are exhorted by the holy bishops to address the people;" and they specify several instances with which they were acquainted.

But, as time went on, the hierarchy had things its own way, and the laity were reduced to silence and passivity by the Romish church, save as in case of extremity, where no priest could be had, the baptism administered by laymen was conceded. The Council of Carthage forbade a layman to preach except by invitation of the bishop, and Leo prohibited monks and laymen to preach at all, as that was the right of the bishop only! This was the consummation of Romish usurpation.

Among the first beginnings of resistance to Rome we find this point coming up. Thus Jerome, of Prague, a knight and not an ecclesiastic, taught, over a century before Luther began his work, that anyone who could might preach, baptize and administer the Lord's Supper, and he preached, himself, throughout Bohemia and Moravia in castles, houses, streets, and fields. And in this he did only imitate Wickliffe, whom he greatly

admired, and who taught more than half a century earlier still, that laymen might preach and administer the sacraments. (See *Tracts and Treatises* of Wickliffe, pp. 27, 155.

Among Protestants, a variety of opinion has existed; some leading minds and ecclesiastical bodies condemning the practice of lay-preaching, while other high authorities have defended its scripturalness and expediency. The Archbishop of Canterbury, in his recently published letter on the preaching of Mr. D. L. Moody, declares that no objection was to be raised on the mere ground of his being a layman, as the English Church had always recognized the propriety of such efforts to promote religion. And this has been the ground taken by consistent Congregationalists also, the opposition coming rather in late days, and from those who leaned to Presbyterian ideas; as will be seen by considering the arguments against it urged by Rev. John Mitchell in his "Church Member's Guide." That author is puzzled to draw the line beyond which laymen may not go in religious speech, though he thinks it is in taking a text and preaching a formal discourse! which leads Rev. Preston Cummings (Congl. Dictionary, p. 223) to this comment: "He does not inform us whether the sin consists in the text, or the formal method, or the theological chemical compound. Laymen, he admits, may pray, exhort, read, and comment on the Bible, warn the impenitent, reprove sin, and address a promiscuous assembly; but they must not preach."

But on the other side we may quote that renowned Congregational layman, John Milton, who in his *Treatise on Christian Doctrine*, says: "The apostolical institution did not ordain, that a particular individual, and he a stipendiary, should have the sole right of speaking from a higher place; but that each believer in turn be authorized to speak." In like manner, Rev. John Robinson, the pastor of the Pilgrim Church which landed on Plymouth rock, wrote a treatise in defence of lay-preaching, called "The People's Plea for the Exercise of Prophecy against Mr. John Yates his Monopolie." Also the learned John Owen, in his "Duty of Pastors and People," takes the ground that private Christians have a right to make known whatever is revealed to them out of God's word, and, if called in God's providence, to preach the gospel. And so one

might cite Thomas Hooker, Cotton Mather, Stephen More, the Savoy Confession, the decrees of the Belgian Synods mentioned by Robinson, and other eminent authorities. And it will be remembered that the Pilgrim church at Plymouth, whose pastor remained behind in Holland, with a part of the members, was for years regularly ministered to, in the preached word, by William Brewster, a layman, who was a "ruling elder" of the Presbyterian sort, but who with needless scrupulosity forebore to administer the sacraments, lest he should touch the ark with unhallowed hands! The Pilgrim Fathers, far in advance of their times, as they were, could not free themselves from all the superstitions of the past. In England, our Congregational churches have had a freer system, in this matter, than ourselves; as may be seen by the fact, that when the young student who was censured by a New York Presbytery for preaching without a license, spent his next vacation across the ocean, he was invited to preach by Rev. John Angell James, of Birmingham, and by one of the London ministers, and learned that it was customary there for all students to exercise their gifts in preaching, from the first, and that laymen did evangelistic work of this kind continually and closed their exercises with the benediction. Thus it would appear that prudishness on this point is rather American and provincial.

What light is cast on the practice by its results? We are not to cite apparently good results in contradiction of a plain doctrine of Scripture, as some do, to justify woman's preaching; for, in such case, the final results will be found rather to justify the Biblical prohibition. Time and wide experience are often necessary to show the true effect of a procedure, and a present local advantage may be followed by permanent and general injury. But in the case before us no such contradiction of Scripture is involved, and we may safely aid our judgment by inquiring after the results of lay-preaching. In the primitive age, there is reason to believe, that it would have been impossible to secure the rapid proclamation of the gospel throughout the Roman Empire in any other way. Time, money, and men were wanting, for such a slow process as the preaching of ministers alone. The primitive church was pervaded with a missionary spirit, and each member felt the obligation to win

as many souls to Christ as was possible. Each was thus pressed in spirit to become a preacher. And how natural this is for a genuine disciple, in the freshness of his love, is pleasingly evidenced by the recent testimony of a missionary in Japan, who found that the chief obstacle in the way of quite a number of young men, in uniting with the church was, their idea that each would of course be expected to preach ; and they did not feel that as yet they knew enough of the gospel to warrant such action. This sense of universal obligation led in the primitive church to constant and private labor, and to wondrous victories of the cross.

The same has been true in every earnest, aggressive period of the history of the church. Puritanism wrought by the aid of this instrumentality, as Neal in his *History* abundantly shows. A petition was sent to Parliament by citizens of London, praying that unordained men of good parts and character might be permitted to preach, since there was so much of ignorance and vice in the land. Lord Clarendon, who ridiculed this movement of the time, said : " Liberty of conscience was now become the great charter, and men who were inspired preached and prayed, when and where they would." The same historian declares that Cromwell and his officers preached and prayed publicly with their troops, and that the common soldiers as well as the officers did not only pray and preach, themselves, but went up into the pulpits in all churches and preached to the people, who quickly became inspired with the same spirit (Neal, ii, p. 38). And when Methodism began its grand career, and aimed in the true Christian spirit to carry the gospel to the masses for whom none cared, the wise leaders relied greatly on pressing into the service, as exhorter and preacher, every man who had the grace of God in his heart, and any capacity to address others. It has been noticed, also, that whenever a powerful revival of religion has impressed our land, it always brought out this same tendency. Laymen felt prompted to put all their gifts to use, and to preach Christ to the unconverted. Hence, ever since the revival of 1858, especially in connection with the Young Men's Christian Associations, there has been a steady widening of the field of lay-effort, and one and another has begun to preach, in the camps, in the public

streets and parks, in prisons and hospitals, on vessel-decks, in theatres, halls, and tents; and finally in the churches. And so we have had Moody and Burnell and Whittle and Durant, in our own denomination, while other similar workers have been raised up in sister denominations. And as the laborers have increased in number and experience, the happy results have multiplied, till within the last two years a climax of interest has been reached, quite surpassing anything on record, by the effect of the visit to Great Britain of Mr. Moody and his singing assistant, Mr. Sankey. The immense crowds in attendance on the meetings (which have been of the most simple and spiritual character) the presence of all classes in society, from the nobility to the beggar and outcast, the concurrence of many of the clergy of nearly all denominations, the quickening influence upon Christians, and the multitudes of genuine conversions from a life of sin, indicate the power of the gospel when earnestly, simply, and aptly preached, even by a layman of less than ordinary education. The hand of God is in the movement, and one must be blind not to see that He is pointing the church thereby to the results of victory which may be secured by a vigorous use of the lay-talent which has lain so nearly idle.

II. *But it is well to inquire concerning the dangers of lay-preaching.*—Power is always beset with danger, in the moral as in the physical world. It has no safeguard in itself, but only in those who guide and use it. If they are ignorant, inexperienced and rash, mischief will occur; and something of these qualities accompanies ordinary human nature. It could hardly be otherwise, then, than that lay-preaching should bring out the defects as well as the excellencies of laymen. This is the result in the case of clerical preaching as well, and the stupidities of some ministers, the ignorance of others, the rashness of others, and the obstinacy, or the presumption, or the fancifulness, or the heresy of yet others, has made occasion for remark and contention, from Paul's days to the present. It is not difficult to specify the principal dangers which attend the preaching of laymen. There are four.

1. There is the danger that the success of their efforts will lead to an underestimate of the value of the regular ministry.

If they do not yield to this temptation, their special friends and admirers may do so. A successful privateer, in time of war, has sometimes led foolish people to depreciate the regular navy, and to propose that the country should rely upon a hastily armed commercial marine. And so, early in our late conflict, there were thoughtless people who imagined, that a volunteer general, fresh from business or politics, was as good a military officer as a West Point graduate, if he had patriotism, courage, and native talent. Experience is the best cure for such error. In the matter of preaching it is soon seen, that what may be advantageous for certain classes and places will not answer for all occasions; that what is adapted to the treatment of a few simple topics will not suffice for universal discussion; and that what interests for a limited time, under peculiar circumstances, may fail to hold the mind in the continuous work of a parish. This is so evident, that one need scarcely fear, in this age of intelligence, when the demands upon the pulpit for discourses combining knowledge, culture and variety, are more severe than ever, that very many hearers will wish to substitute lay-preaching for that of professional clergymen. It is more possible that such a substitution may be favored by a few in connection with temporary revival-work. But this will be only under the excitement of novelty; for common sense will soon perceive that in no circumstances more than in those of a revival is there greater need of religious intelligence and training, of sober judgment and mature experience; and that it would be poor policy to take scenes of temporary excitement out of the control of those who are responsible for the permanent well-being of the churches. And it is but justice to those laymen who have been prominent among us as preachers, during the last two or three years, to say, that they have manifested no disposition to disparage the clergy, even as the clergy have been remarkably free from a jealousy of their labors.

2. A second danger pertains to the explanation of Scripture. To expound the Bible extensively, requires learning as well as piety and prayer and study. We properly make the sacred volume the basis of preaching; not only by founding a discourse upon a text, but also by continual reference throughout

it to Scriptural proof, and by accompanying it with Scriptural readings. Lay-preachers have of late given themselves much to what they call "Bible Readings," in connection with specific topics. After study and practice they have acquired not a little skill in marshaling passages, and expounding their meaning, running hastily through the Old and New Testaments, to show the harmony, fullness, and variety of the presentation of the particular subject under discussion. This has often been found to be an attractive and edifying exercise. But there is danger that the exegesis of uneducated men may sometimes lead astray, especially if they are of an enthusiastic and self-confident temperament, are given to mysticism, and have adopted fanciful principles of interpretation. And the climax of absurdity is sure to be reached, if they fall into the snare of Satan, and imagine that they are so taught of the Spirit, that they need consult no commentaries, and even advise their hearers to avoid such human helps! For no more patent folly can well be exhibited, than for a lay-preacher to go about collecting audiences of Christian people, to listen to his oral comments on Scripture, and warning them not to consult other men's printed comments. In addition to the self-conceit and delusion manifest, the advice creates a suspicion that he fears that some of his favorite interpretations will be disturbed, if his hearers should consult the commentaries of able scholars. Half-educated expounders of Scriptures, who have zeal and imagination, are especially liable to be carried away with novel interpretations (novel to them, though old and exploded in reality) which wear a plausible appearance; and it is mischievous to have them sow these broadcast, in the minds of simple, ingenuous disciples, who accept them as inspired truth. The final effect is, to bring the study of the Bible into disrepute, and to create doubt of its inspiration, or else of the correctness of evangelical interpretations. For there will be present persons of intelligence, who will see that explanations are given which do violence to the context; that words are made to mean the same thing in all parts of Scripture, which denote quite different things in different places, so that much of the quotation is little else than punning; and that the multiplication of "types," without any warrant from inspired declaration or

use, but only through the inventive genius and wild fancy of the expositor, is misleading, and brings the Bible into contempt as a book capable of being made to mean anything one pleases.

3. Kindred is the danger of erroneous doctrine. Doctrine must rest upon exegesis, and an untrustworthy expounder of Scripture will preach error with the truth. This is a real danger, as history proves, and must be guarded against with care. Paul wrote to the Church of Corinth: "How is it, brethren? when ye come together, every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation, hath an interpretation." It was unfortunately true, that, during the civil wars in England, when lay-preaching was at its height, doctrinal extravagances were ventilated as never before, and new sects sprang up, like mushrooms over-night. Our salvation is, that the fundamental truths of the gospel are so clearly taught in the Bible, and appeal so strongly to the conscious spiritual wants of men, that they cannot long be obscured. Yet it must be obvious, that men, not theologically and exegetically trained, and of earnest character, will easily be led to embrace erroneous theories, and to advocate unbalanced half-truths. They will readily mount a prophetic or a doctrinal hobby, and ride it in the full belief that nothing else can draw the car of salvation; and it will be strange if their admirers do not attribute their practical success to these peculiarities rather than to the simple and generally received gospel-truth. We have all probably heard crudities of interpretation, and mechanical expositions of doctrine thus set forth concerning the personal advent of Christ at a near date, or the nature of the atonement, or the manner of the justification of a sinner, or the relation of law to grace, or the character of present salvation through Christ, or the true idea of separation from the world, or the duty of Christian union.

4. It follows, of course, that there must be more or less danger in lay-preaching to personal character. All preaching involves this, and laymen have some special dangers just at present, while novelty attends their efforts. Paul instructed Timothy that in introducing men into the pastorate, he must not take "a novice," "lest being lifted up with pride, he fall

into the condemnation of the devil." When one is suddenly brought from obscurity to conspicuity, and his efforts are not only applauded by men, but seem to be owned and blessed by God, he needs peculiar grace to keep him in humility. Over praise, continued excitement, visible success, and a perpetual coddling by the admiring female saints, is enough to turn any man's head. He will gradually be tempted to self-consciousness, vanity, airs of infallibility, and other traits which will disgust the intelligent, even while the unintelligent are burning their incense before him. I do not think that our American lay-preachers have fallen into this snare, as yet; they have shown a remarkable simplicity of spirit, modesty of demeanor, and consecration to the one work of saving souls. Prayer and faith and watchfulness have preserved them. The danger rather is, that good men and good women will overdo the matter of admiration and praise, and thus intensify the temptation. Let them beware of unwittingly leaguering in that manner with Satan.

III. *We are now prepared to understand the sphere of lay-preaching.*—It is supplementary, in some respects, to the work of the regular ministry. It reaches where that cannot go. It avoids prejudices which that is compelled to face. It utilizes talent which otherwise would be lost to the cause. It thus increases manifold the working capital of the church. It adds a new and needed testimony, before the world, to the value of the gospel. Ordinarily, it will find its work at and near home, there being no seeming necessity for a layman to visit the churches of one or more lands to address Christians, who enjoy the instructions of pastors, and who also have the benefit of exhortations of their lay-brethren; especially if they are to be called upon to pay his expenses. Yet when a lay-preacher has a special talent for reaching the masses, and for instructing others in the secret of so doing, or has other peculiar inspiring power valuable for its effect upon ministers and churches, as is manifestly the case with Mr. Moody, the wide world may become his field. God gives such a man a mission, and makes it unmistakable. The providence is to be hailed with gratitude as furnishing a new and needed instrumentality. But commonly a lay-preacher must look for his work where he lives and gains his livelihood

by personal labor. Much of the value of his preaching comes from the fact that being known and respected by the community in a secular calling, he stands up to bear witness for Christ, out of a pure love for dying souls, and regard for the honor of his Saviour. He exhorts in the weekly conference meeting; he lifts up his voice in jails and almshouses; he speaks in mission-school buildings; he preaches Christ to those who never enter the sanctuary, whether he can assemble them in a railway depot, or under a shady tree. The power is in the love which reaches after men of every condition, and which carries the wondrous story of the cross of Christ to sinful souls with no thought of theologic victory, but with a burning desire to save men from eternal death. And thus it serves an individual as well as a public use: for it is an outlet for an inward passion. It is the response of the disciple to his Lord's injunction: "Let him that heareth say, Come." It is the act of one who, having himself "taken of the water of life freely," and quenched the burning thirst of his soul, is anxious to lead every other fainting and dying pilgrim to the same fountain. Indeed, to succeed in such labors, one must have ardent desire and strong faith, as when Mr. Moody, at leaving Chicago for his visit to Great Britain, was asked why he was going, and answered: "Ten thousand souls for Christ!" There must be a sympathy with the feeling of the prophet, which made him exclaim: "His word was in my heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary with forbearing, and I could not stay." When this is the experience of our lay-brethren, there will be vast accessions to the ranks of lay-preachers, in fulfillment of the language of the Psalmist: "The Lord gave the Word: great was the company of those that published it." They will not be waiting to see what the ministers will do or say, but perceiving the magnitude of the work and the comparative fewness of the laborers, they will press forward, whoever may deride or forbid.

In the language of an able "Defence of Lay-Preaching," published anonymously fifty years ago, by a relative of the writer, who having acquired a fortune in business in Philadelphia, afterwards preached as a layman, and finally became a minister (Rev. John Magoffin): "Their silence is prevented by

the noble sentiment of the Apostles, in the midst of all that weakness and sinfulness of heart common even to the good, 'Obey God rather than man.' Persuade lay-preachers that damnation is nothing, and all in a moment is peace. Show them that mankind are not perishing in sin, or that the gospel is not the power of God for the salvation of the world, and it will save them a vast deal of trouble. 'I will make you leave preaching, for, you are a heretic,' said Chrysostom to the pious Novatian bishop of Constantinople. 'I will give you a reward,' replied the latter, 'if you will free me from so great pains!'

ARTICLE VIII.—THE GERMAN GYMNASIUM.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the place which the Gymnasium occupies among German educational institutions. Its methods and its discipline render possible the preëminent scholarship developed afterward at the universities. Here, the forms and rules and the copious vocabularies—necessary foundations of linguistic acquisitions—are indelibly impressed upon the youthful memory. Here the chief facts of history are taught with such system and in such interdependence as never in subsequent life to be forgotten. At the Gymnasium is acquired that graceful accomplishment of the classical scholar, the ability to compose with elegance and ease in the Latin language. Here the study of the literatures of the two most important languages of the ancient world opens to the student's intelligent appreciation the life of the ancients. Provision is made at the Gymnasium for the study of the grammar of the mother tongue, according to its historical development, and the pupil is taught, while he reads the Epic poems of the German Heroic (Middle) Age, that the language whose successive developments he studies is no derived or mixed speech, that it has its own original character, and is the sister of the Latin and of the Greek.

It would be an interesting investigation to trace the steps of the progress by which the cloister Latin school of the middle ages has developed into this training school with numerous departments which bears the name Gymnasium. It would be interesting, too, to search out, in the manuals of the history of Paedagogy, those theories of the mutual relation of different studies, and of the order in which they may most properly succeed each other, which, having finally been accepted by public opinion as correct, have determined the present plan of studies. But it is no part of our plan, at the present time, to enter upon either of these inquiries, and we are content with observing that the Gymnasium owes its present external form, in no small degree, to Baron von Stein and to the distinguished scholars and philosophers under whose advice and

with whose coöperation, amid and after the struggles with France at the beginning of this century, the universities of Berlin and Bonn were founded, and the entire system of education was thoroughly considered, and, to a considerable extent, remodeled. Since then, the conception of the work which the Gymnasium should do has been perfectly clear, and the differences which have existed between the Gymnasiums in different parts of Germany, have been due, rather to inequality in the intellectual advance in the different sections, than to any difference in theory as to how such establishments should be conducted. The last twenty-five years have witnessed an attempt, to a good degree successful, to bring the Gymnasiums of South Germany, and especially of Austria, up to the standard of similar institutions in North Germany; and there is reason to believe that the time is not far distant when the *Abiturient*, or graduating examination upon all the studies of the course, from entrance into the Gymnasium to departure from it, which is the passport of admission into any German university, will testify to uniformity of scholarship.

How unequalled an apparatus of training establishments is this: two hundred and fifty preparatory schools, whose regular teachers have all received, as the certificate of original research, the Doctor's degree, presenting yearly to the score, or score and a half, of the universities, their quota of young life, equipped with the training which is the indispensable preparation for the independent investigation to which the years at the University are devoted! Certainly no other country in the world can show anything approximating to the Gymnasiums of Germany, either as regards the number of establishments of a uniformly high grade, or as regards the amount and the quality of the work which is performed in them.

It seems especially natural, that teachers in America should make themselves familiar with the plan and with the methods of study in the Gymnasium, because in its aims and its extent, the course of study nearly corresponds to the combined courses of study in our best preparatory schools and our colleges. Take, for instance, the course of instruction in the Boston Latin School, add to it the course of instruction at Amherst College, and compare the result with the completed course at the

Gymnasium: the verdict would probably be, in respect to acquisitions in the ancient and modern languages and history, in favor of the German school; as regards proficiency in mathematics and natural science, in favor of the combined courses of the American school and college; as respects knowledge of the history and literature of the mother tongue, in favor of the Gymnasium.

The scope of the plan of studies of the Gymnasium is so extensive, and the number of subjects embraced in a scheme which covers nine years so great, that, if the writer may judge from his own experience, visits to the Gymnasium, even when made under the most favoring circumstances, are liable to confuse by the multitude of facts and of new methods which they bring to notice, and can not be expected to prove in a high degree profitable unless they are preceded by some accurate knowledge of the plan of study. It is natural to refer, for the information desired, to the annual programme, which the director of each Gymnasium publishes every spring, and which, in addition to a learned dissertation by some member of the faculty, and a summary of the events of the school year, contains, in more or less detail, the plan of studies for the ensuing year as approved by the Department of Public Instruction. Through the kindness of a friend,* the Programme of the Gymnasium of Schwerin, Province of Mecklenburg, has recently come into the writer's hands. With this programme, the excellent director, Dr. Büchner, issued the invitation to attend the annual examination of all the classes, to be holden March 30 and 31, 1871. A new building had, at this time, just reached completion, and its occupation by the school seems to have been regarded as marking a new departure, and to have been the occasion of the unusual fulness of detail with which the subjects of study are given, and the methods of instruction described. This outline of study the writer has determined to translate, and to append thereto, in the order indicated by the programme itself, such remarks as his own visits to some of the more famous Berlin Gymnasiums, in the winter of 1872, have suggested.

* Dr. Autenrieth, Director of the Gymnasium in Zweibrücken, Bavarian Palatinata.

The Gymnasium Fredericianum, of Schwerin, is a normal Gymnasium in six classes: Sexta, Quinta, Quarta, Tertia, Secunda, and Prima. Pupils spend in Sexta, Quinta, and Quarta each, one year; in Tertia, Secunda, and Prima each, two years. The Gymnasium course covers accordingly nine years; the intention being that pupils shall enter the institution at the completion of the ninth, and leave it at the completion of the eighteenth year of their age.

[A. Science.]

I.—RELIGION.

(a.) Lower section, including Sexta, Quinta, Quarta, and Tertia, age 10–15.

(b.) Upper section, including Secunda and Prima, age 15–19.

Sexta, 3 hours weekly, age 10–11.

The more important Scripture narratives of the Old Testament as far as the Kings, according to some compend of Biblical History; the text of the Bible not being employed, at this stage of progress, as a means of instruction. Immediately before the chief festival days of the Christian year, the passage of the New Testament which describes the institution of such festival is made the subject of instruction. At the Festival of the Reformation, Nov. 10, the dates of the more important events of that era are learned.

Catechism: the first article of the provincial catechism explained and learned, review of Luther's smaller catechism (already learned at the common school), and recitation of the same.* Church hymns, and catechism proof-texts in moderate numbers, are first read, then explained word by word, and finally memorized; 8–10 hymns, 4–5 in each Semester, are thus learned, in connexion with, and with reference to, the festival days.

* Luther's catechism (shorter and longer), is divided into five articles, viz: 1. The Ten Commandments. 2. The Apostle's Creed. 3. The Lord's Prayer. 4. The Sacrament of Baptism. 5. Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The work, in size and scope, may be compared with the (shorter and longer) catechism of the Westminster Assembly, and the various statements are fortified, as in that work, with numerous Scripture proofs. There exist special editions, sanctioned by the departments of public instruction, for use in each German State.

Quinta, 3 hours weekly, age 11-12.

New Testament Biblical history, after a lesson book ("The Life of Christ until His Ascension.") The contents and the names of the books of the Bible in their order, the last got by heart. Facts connected with the Reformation more thoroughly learned.

Catechism: review of Art. I. and of the accompanying proof-texts; Art. II. then explained and, with its proof-texts, memorized.

Church hymns: review of hymns already learned, and six new ones, three in each Semester, learned in addition.

Quarta, 3 hours weekly, age 12-13.

Bible readings from the more important portions of the Old and New Testaments; from the former, those passages which recount the story of the children of Israel; from the latter, the chief events recorded in Matthew, Luke, and the Acts of the Apostles. Enlargement of pupil's Bible knowledge.

Catechism: review of Arts. I and II, also of proof-texts and hymns already learned; Art. III, explained and with its proof-texts memorized. Six new hymns, three in each Semester, learned, and Arts. IV and V of the catechism (without Luther's exposition of the same) committed to memory. As opportunity may offer, the more important facts of the Geography of Palestine are taught from a wall-map.

*Tertia, 2 hours weekly, age 13-15.**(a.) Lower Tertia, course 1 year.*

Connected history of the Life of Christ, according to one of the synoptic Gospels, accompanied with references to such Messianic or prophetic passages in the Old Testament as bear upon the Gospel in hand.

Reading of single Psalms: review of History of the Reformation, with particular reference to its causes and its results.

Catechism: review of the five articles, and of the accompanying proof-texts; review of church hymns, with facts as to their authorship, and date of their composition; four new hymns are learned, and with them the number of hymns to be compulsorily memorized is completed.

(b.) Upper Tertia, course 1 year.

Review of work of preceding year. History of spread of the Christian Church; of the life and work of the Apostles. Missionary journeys of St. Paul. Careful minute review of History of the Reformation.*

*Secunda, 2 hours weekly, age 15-17.†**(a.) Lower Secunda, course 1 year.*

(Summer.) Acquisition of Biblical knowledge, especially in the Old Testament. Reading and study of historical books, and of single Psalms. Special weight is to be laid upon the Prophetical and Didactic books. Such passages as are significant with reference to the history of doctrine and morals are to be read, and such as predict the coming of Christ. Review of Catechism, with explanation of the mutual relation of the different articles; also of proof-texts and of sacred hymns.

(Winter.) Reading of New Testament, at times in the original Greek; at times in Luther's translation. Especially recommended for such reading are Paul's Epistles to the Ephesians and Philippians, the Epistle of James, and the first Epistles of John and of Peter. Review of Catechism as in Summer Semester.

(b.) Upper Secunda, course 1 year.

(Summer.) Reading and exposition of the Acts of the Apostles.

* As many scholars leave the Gymnasium in Upper Tertia to enter upon the duties of life, special weight is to be laid at this point upon the review of the catechism, the proof-texts, and the hymns, as well as upon the origin and growth of the reformation movement, as this knowledge is reckoned as a safe-guard and a defense for their future life.

† Here begins the study of the Bible, and the reading of Biblical selections, from the Old and New Testaments, with the design of exhibiting the character of the Kingdom of God in the world. It is not intended that critical and scholastic introductions to the separate books of the Bible should be given, but that they should be considered (singly or in groups) in their chronological order; that the necessary facts as to their authorship and the date of their composition should be given; and finally, that such extracts should be read as may aid the scholars to recognize the development of God's Kingdom as traced in the Old and New Testaments; the progressive character of the Divine Revelation; the history of the Fall and Redemption of Man.

(Winter.) Bible study (selected passages from the Old and New Testaments). Review of select hymns and proof-texts.*

Moreover (in Winter Semester), abstract of Church History during the first four centuries. Study of the Reformation more in detail. The epochs and work of Spener, Francke, and the history of modern (German) missions. Chapters from Christian biography. The religions of the ante-Christian world characterized, and their relation to Christianity explained. Occasional review of catechism, proof-texts and hymns.†

Prima, 2 hours weekly, age 17-19, course 2 years.

Study of Dogma and Ethics, of Doctrine and Morals in their mutual relation.

Rapid survey of works which describe the development of Christian Doctrine, special attention being given to the apologetic ecclesiastical documents of the Lutheran Evangelical Church in century XVI, and above all (as basis of union for Evangelical Christians) to the *Confessio Augustana*, or Augsburg Confession, which is to be read (especially the first part containing the chief articles of Christian Faith) in the original Latin. Criteria, or Tests, by which orthodox is distinguished from heretical doctrine. Apologetics, or Defence of the Christian Religion.

Reading of New Testament in the original Greek, as follows:

Gospel of John; Epistles to the Romans and Galatians. Extracts from the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

Review of Church History, of History of the Reformation, of proof-texts, hymns, and Pater Noster.

The material to be mastered during the two years of *Prima* may be disposed as follows over the four Semesters.

1. Review of Church History, History of Faith and Morals.

2. Introduction to the controversial ecclesiastical literature of century XVI (*Symbolische Bücher*), and reading of *Augustana* (Augsburg Confession).

* In reading the New Testament in the original Greek, weight is to be laid, in reference to the religious education of the scholar, chiefly upon the sense, the philological point of view, involving the frequent use of Grammar and Lexicon, being as far as possible avoided.

† Since Roman history is studied in Upper Secunda, and in the Winter Semester the history of the Roman Empire (see p. 154), it is fitting that the History of the Christian Church, in the first four centuries, should be taken up at this point.

3 and 4. Reading of Epistles.

The review of catechism, proof texts, hymns, &c., may be distributed over the four Semesters. Object of entire religious teaching, to impress upon the scholar's memory the contents of the sacred Scriptures in their connection, and the fundamental doctrines of the (Lutheran) Evangelical Church.

II.—GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY.

Sexta, 4 hours weekly.

(a.) Geography, two hours, first principles of physical and mathematical geography. Distribution of water and mountains over the earth's surface.

More detailed instruction respecting the native province and its relation to neighboring countries (in the present case respecting Mecklenburg and its relations to Prussia).

Practice in the use of globes and maps.

(b.) History, two hours, is first approached in connection with Biblical history. The instruction is at the outset chiefly biographical; important characters form central points, around which the events are grouped in which they played a part. Then follow Legends from Greek, Roman, and German early history.

Quinta, 3 hours weekly.

(a.) Geography, two hours. Review of work of previous year; then the principal countries of the earth, especially of Europe (Germany excepted) with the chief rivers, mountains, and localities. Practice in map-drawing.

(b.) History, one hour. Review of work of previous year. Study of special epochs of Greek or Roman history, e. g., the invasion of Greece by the Persians as related by Herodotus.

Quarta, 4 hours weekly.

(a.) Geography, two hours. Review of pensum* of Quinta, then special study of geography of Germany, of the North German Empire, and of the native province. Map-drawing.

(b.) History, two hours. (1.) Greek history, chief events and chief persons from the Messenian wars to Alexander the Great. Survey of barbarian nations, especially the Persians

* *Pensum* = prescribed task.

and the Egyptians. The more important dates of Greek History. (2.) Roman History from the founding of the City to the extinction of the House of Augustus. A glance at the fortunes of the Western Roman Empire, and the migration of nations. Use of historical maps. The chief dates in Roman History.

Tertia, 4 hours weekly.

(a.) Lower Tertia, course 1 year.

1. Geography, two hours. Review of pensum of Quarta. Geography of Germany, and specially of the North German Confederation, with special attention to the political significance of the same. Briefer consideration of geography of other countries of Europe, and of the non-European countries which stand in special commercial relations with Germany.

2. History, two hours. German history from the migration of nations to the Peace of Westphalia. History of other European nations summarily considered, especially in its relations to German history.*

(b.) Upper Tertia, course 1 year.

1. Geography, two hours. Review of pensum of Lower Tertia; then general review of entire field of geographical study, with special stress upon the more important facts, and close of instruction in geography.

2. History, two hours. German history from the Peace of Westphalia to the national war for Independence (at beginning of present century). Special prominence is to be given to Prussia's history, culminating in the organization of the North German Confederation, with herself at its head, and to the history of Mecklenburg. Review of history of the Reformation.

Secunda, 3 hours weekly.

(a.) Lower Secunda, course 1 year.

Ancient History (not including Roman History).

Constitutions of chief Greek States: their development, acme and decline to 148 B. C. The history of Persia and the constitution of the Persian monarchy to be handled as an episode;

* In German history, the era of the Reformation is to be treated with special fulness. See the scheme for religious instruction in Lower Tertia.

in the same manner, but with more fulness of detail, the early history of Macedonia; the later history (from the reign of Philip) merges in Greek history and requires no separate treatment.

Ancient Geography, especially of Greece. History of manners and customs of the ancient Greeks ("Cultur-Geschichte").

(b.) *Upper Secunda, course 1 year.*

Roman History from the foundation of the City to 476 A. D. with special reference to the development of Roman public law (Staatsrecht). Study of Roman private and social life ("Cultur-Geschichte"). Geographical survey of Italy and adjacent countries and islands. Careful study of the extent and divisions of the Imperium Romanum.

Prima, 3 hours weekly.

Medieval and Modern history, distributed as follows: (a.) Lower Prima, course 1 year: from the migration of nations to the reign of Chas. V, special attention being paid to manners, customs, development of arts, manufactures, &c. (b.) Upper Prima, course 1 year: history of Europe from the reign of Chas. V. to the close of Germany's wars for Independence, 1815. Finally, more briefly, European History from 1815 to the present time.

III. ARITHMETIC AND MATHEMATICS.

Sexta, 4 hours weekly.

Review of the four elementary rules, and exercises in the same with abstract and concrete numbers. The tables of weights, moneys, measures, &c., chiefly for the sake of practice in reduction ascending and descending. The Metrical System (now legalized throughout the German Empire). The various operations performed with and upon Vulgar Fractions; exercises in mental arithmetic. Occasional examples to be worked at home, *yet such only as are simple and contain only small numbers.*

Quinta, 3 hours weekly.

Review of Fractions, Rule of Three, illustrated by questions involving entire and fractional, abstract and concrete numbers.

Occasional examples to be solved at home, yet always simple and involving only small numbers.

Quarta, 4 hours weekly.

Compound proportion (double Rule of Three), with application to practical questions. Decimal Fractions. One hour weekly devoted to the study of the elements of Plane Geometry as far as the doctrine of coincidence of triangles.

Tertia, 4 hours weekly.

(a.) *Lower Tertia, course 1 year.*

1. Geometry: Plane Geometry as far as the circle and mensuration of rectilinear figures (not including the mensuration of the circle nor the doctrine of similar figures).

2. Arithmetic: Use of letters and symbols in arithmetical operations, (Algebra). Arithmetical and geometrical proportions. Extraction of roots.

(b.) *Upper Tertia, course 1 year.*

1. Geometry: review of pensum of Lower Tertia; its scope being enlarged by the solution of geometrical problems, including such as have an infinite number of solutions.

2. Arithmetic: scientific basis of rules of common Arithmetic; substitution of letters for figures in reckoning, and equations of the first degree with one unknown quantity.

Secunda, 4 hours weekly.

(a.) *Lower Secunda, course 1 year.*

1. Geometry: Plane Geometry finished. Practical exercises in the various departments of plane geometry.

2. Arithmetic: Review of ground already gone over, and further practice in solution of examples. Doctrine of powers; of roots. Equations of the first degree with several unknown quantities.

(b.) *Upper Secunda, course 1 year.*

1. Geometry: Plane Trigonometry with examples, especially in the application of Trigonometry to the mensuration of surfaces. Problems calling into use the principles of Plane Geometry.

2. Arithmetic : Quadratic equations with examples and problems. Arithmetical and geometrical series. Logarithms.

Prima, 4 hours weekly, course 2 years.

1. Geometry : Mensuration of surfaces and solida. Practical exercises.

2. Arithmetic: Algebraic problems, especially in the application of Algebra to Geometry. Indeterminate Equations. If possible, the elements of Conic Sections.

IV. NATURAL SCIENCES.

Sexta, 2 hours weekly.

Natural History : in Summer Botany, and the insect world ; in Winter Zoölogy, especially the vertebrate animals. Some account of the habits and manner of life of the chief species of animals.

Quinta, 2 hours weekly.

Review of pensum of Sexta, and further extension of the same by the study of the varieties of species. Subject matter distributed as in Sexta.

Instruction in the natural sciences is left out in Quarta and Tertia.

Secunda, 2 hours weekly.

(a.) *Lower Secunda, course 1 year.*

Introduction to Physics. Solid bodies. Systematic survey of the three natural kingdoms. Crystal-forms of minerals.

(b.) *Upper Secunda, course 1 year.*

Liquid and Gaseous bodies : Sound and Heat.

Prima, 2 hours weekly.

Light, Electricity, Magnetism, Statics and Mechanics, Mathematical Geography.

[B. Languages.]

V.—LATIN.

Sexta, 9 hours weekly.

The regular inflections, viz : declinations of nouns, pronouns, and adjectives ; conjugation of verbs, including deponent verbs.

The simple sentence is made from the outset the basis of instruction, the significance of the different case-endings being developed orally and illustrated by means of it. Then follows a similar explanation of the verb *esse* and of the several conjugations. The paradigms are then committed to memory, the pupil being constantly exercised by new examples. The rules, for gender, with a limited number of exceptions follow; later come comparison of adjectives, numerals (cardinal and ordinal), and prepositions. Oral and written exercises in translation from Latin into German and *vice versa*. Once every fortnight a short written exercise (more carefully prepared than those just mentioned). Memorizing of Latin words and short phrases.*

Quinta, 10 hours weekly.

Review of pensum of Sexta; then the irregular verbs, the marked and rarely occurring irregularities being still carefully excluded. Constant practice in the interpretation and in the composition of simple Latin sentences. The simplest rules of Syntax. The constructions of the accusative and infinitive and of the ablative absolute; first noticed as occurring in Latin examples for translation; then inculcated and their use made familiar by practice in making Latin sentences in which they are introduced; yet without any attempt at a scientific explanation. The construction of the names of towns. Memorizing of words and phrases as in Sexta. Two short written exercises (composed at home) weekly. Reader.*

Quarta, 10 hours weekly.

Careful review of all forms learned, both regular and irregular. The Syntax of the cases. All rules learned, imprinted upon the memory by frequent repetition. The chief rules for the dependence or sequence of tenses; oral and written translations. Reader and Cornelius Nepos: toward the end of the second Semester, selected fables from Phædrus. Two weekly written exercises (German into Latin) to be composed at home.

* Text-books: Grammar and Reader of Lattmann & Müller; reproduced, in English form, by Professor Gildersleeve of the University of Virginia.

*Tertia, 10 hours weekly.**(a.) Lower Tertia, course 1 year.*

Review of rules for Syntax of cases. Doctrine of the Tenses, Sequence of Tenses, fundamental rules for the employment of Moods, Complex and Compound Sentence, and the Conjunctions. Chief Prepositions and their varied use. Scientific explanations of the two constructions: acc. with infin. and abl. absol. In connexion with the daily recitations, extemporaneous exercises in making Latin. A weekly written exercise (composed at home) in turning German into Latin. Memorizing of phrases and of selected passages selected from the scholar's previous reading.

Authors read: *Caes. de Bell. Gall.*, lib. I-III. *Ovid, Metam.* (selections), in all *circa* 1,000 lines: The hexameters read aloud, and in connection with them the necessary rules of meter and prosody. Historical and literary data in reference to each author read: such data, communicated to the pupils as they begin each new author, form a part of all instruction subsequent to this point.

(b.) Upper Tertia, course 1 year.

Rigorous reviews and extension of grammatical knowledge gained in Lower Tertia, special stress being laid upon the doctrine of the moods; conditional and concessive sentences; direct and indirect narration (*oratio directa* and *obliqua*); dependent sentences, e. g., indirect questions, and the rhetorical question of appeal. A weekly Latin exercise (composed at home), and frequent extemporaneous exercises in making Latin (in the class).

Authors read: *Caes. de Bell. Gall.*, finished; *Sallust de Bell. Jug.*; *Ovid. Metam.* (Selections); Review of metrical and prosodial rules.

*Secunda, 10 hours weekly.**(a.) Lower Secunda, course 1 year.*

The doctrine of the Moods as a whole, special prominence being given to single parts, e. g., the hypothetical sentence, and the use of the subjunctive mood. Special exercises, oral and written, in the application of the principles of this part of Grammar.

As before, extemporaneous exercises in making Latin, and, at home, the carefully prepared weekly Latin exercise.

Authors read: The easier Ciceronian Orations, e. g., *Quatuor Orationes in Catilinam*; *pro Archia*, *pro Deiotaro*, *pro lege Manilia*; also *Laelius* and *Cato Major*; *Livius*, lib. I et II; *Verg. Æneid*, lib. I et II. Private reading: selections from *Sallust* and *Caes. de Bell. Civ.*

(b.) *Upper Secunda, course 1 year.*

Review of grammatical knowledge already acquired, *with which the study of Grammar ceases*. Structure of the sentence and of the period; order of words in Latin prose. Weekly written exercise and extemporalia in the class. Here begins the composition of simple Latin historical essays, with subject at first previously assigned; two months being allowed for each essay.

Authors read: *Cicero*; *Orationes selectae*, especially *pro Roscio Amerino*, *pro Sulla* and later, *de prov. consularibus*, etc. More cursorily is to be read *Livius*, lib. III–VI; *Virg. Æneid*, lib. III–VI, also single *Eclogues* and selections from the *Georgics*.

Private reading: *Cicero* and *Livius*.

Prima, 8 hours weekly, course 1 year.

Review of special grammatical points called up in connection with authors read. Principles of Latin style. Exercises and extemporalia. Latin essays: one every two months. Authors read: *Cicero*, public orations: *pro Milone*, *in Verrem*, *pro Murena*; further, *de Officiis*, and *Epistolae ad Atticum*, especially Bk. I; *de Oratore*, *Brutus*, *Tuscul. Disp.*, Bk. I; *Tacit. Annales* and *Germania*; the *Odes*, *Satires* and *Epistles* of *Horace*.

Private reading: *Cicero*, *Livius*, *Tacitus*.

When *Prima* is broken into two divisions, the work to be done is distributed as follows over the two years.

(a.) *Lower Prima, course 1 year.*

Cic. pro Milone, *in Verr.*, *pro Murena*, *de officiis*, *Epistolae ad Atticum*. *Tacit. Germania*: *Horat. Carmina*, lib. I–III. Memorizing of single odes. The *Horatian meters*.

Private reading: *Cicero* and *Livius*.

(b.) Upper Prima, course 1 year.

Cicero: Brutus, de Oratore, Tusculanae, lib. 1. Selected public orations, pro Sestio, pro Plancio; Tacit., Annales; Horatius, single odes reviewed, then Satires and Epistles.

Private reading: Cicero, Livius, Tacitus, esp. Vita Agricolaë.

VI.—GREEK.

Quarta, 5 hours weekly.

The regular inflections as far as and including pure, mute, and contract verbs. (The method is the same as in Lat. vid. Lat. Sexta, i. e., everything is to be carefully explained before it is required that it be memorized). Translation of Greek into German after a Greek reader (Jacob's Greek Reader, part I). Toward the close of the year, exercises in oral translation from the German into the Greek, followed by short exercises to be written out at home, with a view to firmly imprinting in memory the accents and verbal forms. Memorizing of Greek words.

*Tertia, 6 hours weekly.**(a.) Lower Tertia, course 1 year.*

Review of pensum of Quarta; then liquid verbs and verbs in -μι; the more frequently recurring irregular verbs are learned, and repeatedly called for in recitation until they are firmly fixed in the pupil's mind. The prepositions and their commonest uses. The simpler rules of syntax; a short written exercise (German into Greek) weekly. Memorizing of Greek words and of short phrases. Matter read: Part II of Jacob's Greek Reader (selections from Attic writers); toward the close of the year, also Xenoph. Anab., I, 1.

(b.) Upper Tertia, course 1 year.

Incessant reviews of ground already mastered, especially of the forms of the verb. Irregular verbs finished, i. e., all of them got by heart. Chief rules for the government of cases. Weekly written exercise. Authors read: Xenoph. Anab., Bk. I; toward the end of the year Homer, Odys., Bk. I, 1-150. Introduction to the forms of the Homeric dialect.

*Secunda, 6 hours weekly.**(a.) Lower Secunda, course 1 year.*

General review of inflections already learned. Rules for government of cases in their orderly development. Chief rules of syntax, e. g., syntax of the article, of the pronouns; attraction of the relative pronoun; the moods and tenses; the commonest conjunctions and the moods with which they are joined; constructions of infinitive and participle. Weekly written exercise. Memorizing of short sentences.

Authors read: Xenoph. Anabasis, 2 Bks., Hom. Odyss., I-IV, the study of the Homeric dialect finished.

Private reading: Xenophon and Homer's Odyssey.

(b.) Upper Secunda, course 1 year.

Review of rules for cases (govt. of substs., &c.), while the forms are kept in memory by frequent repetition. Then follows the syntax of the moods and tenses systematically developed. Compound sentence, especially the hypothetical sentence, and the particles and conjunctions. At this point *the systematic instruction in grammar ceases*. Weekly written exercises. Authors read: Xenoph.; Cyrop. Hellenica, Memorabilia; Plutarch's easier Biographica, e. g., Agis and Cleomenes, the Gracchi and Camillus; Herodotus; Hom. Od. V-VIII.

Private reading, Xenophon and Homer's Odyssey.

Prima, 6 hours weekly.

Chief aim; the interpretation of the Greek classics in all their manifold relations to the life of the Greeks. Occasional grammatical remarks as illustrating the finer shades of meaning. Grecisms, or short passages illustrative of Greek idioms, accompanied by the appropriate grammatical rule. Fortnightly written exercise (German into Greek). Distribution of authors to be read, when Prima is divided into upper and lower Prima, as follows:

(a.) Lower Prima, course 1 year.

The easier Platonic dialogues, e. g., Crito, Euthyphron, Apology, Phædo; the Philippics of Demosthenes; Homer, Iliad I-XII.

Private reading: farther selections from the above authors.

(b.) Upper Prima, course 1 year.

Demosthenes and Plato, read cursorily; selections from Thucydides; Sophocles and Euripides: *Ilias* XIII-XXIV.

Private reading: Plato, Demosthenes, Thucydides, Sophocles.

VII. — GERMAN.

Sexta, 3 hours weekly.

Reading (from a German Reader), and relating what has been read, with careful attention to pronunciation and delivery. Memorizing of set poems, and recitation of the same; the poems to be learned by the entire class. Grammar follows, yet taught constantly in connection with reading, care being taken to employ the same phraseology in explaining German idioms which is becoming familiar to the young scholar through his study of Latin. Parts of speech in this manner distinguished, and the simple sentence separated into its members. Prepositions and the cases which they govern. Orthography and the principles of Punctuation. As manual for reference, a German Grammar (that of Wigger) is employed, and the rules of orthography there laid down are to be strictly observed in all succeeding classes.*

Quinta, 3 hours weekly.

Reading and Grammar as in *Sexta*; the study of the simple sentence with modifiers follows, and the simpler forms of the compound sentence. Conjunctions. The theory of Punctuation and Orthography continued. Simple compositions upon subjects discussed in the class; one every fortnight. Memorizing of selected poems, and recitation of the same (cf. course of study in *Sexta*).

Quarta, 3 hours weekly.

Reading and explaining (*erklären*) of selected passages, in prose and verse, from the Reader. Exercises in freely reporting (in the pupil's own language) the same. Recitation of poems committed to memory (from the Reader). Grammar follows in connection with the matter read in the class. The use of the *oratio indirecta* in German, with suitable reference to the same

*The instruction contemplated in this scheme for *Sexta* is chiefly oral: the text-book is used only as a manual of reference.

idiom in Latin. Compound sentence and the Period. Review of rules for Punctuation; Orthography continued according to precisely the same rules as in the preceding classes. Study of foreign words in the German language. Fortnightly essays of an historical or narrative character; also, occasionally, such as describe personal experiences.

Tertia, 3 hours weekly.

(a.) Lower Tertia, course 1 year.

Reading and explanation (discussion, &c.), of selections (in prose and poetry) from the Reader, especially of Epic and Lyric poems. Instruction in the general metrical laws of German verse. More precise instruction in the doctrine of forms and sentences (Etymology and Syntax): strong and weak declension and conjugation. Recitation by the entire class of forms assigned to be committed to memory. Brief original declamations (or recitations) on historical subjects; especially episodes of ancient history. Essays upon subjects of a narrative nature, analysed and discussed in the class in primary reference to the formation of a good German style. (Written) translations from other languages into German. Fortnightly German essay.

(b.) Upper Tertia, course 1 year.

Elucidation of passages in prose and poetry from the Reader, as in lower Tertia. The course and divisions of thought are carefully traced in the selections read, the design being to train the pupil to the analysis of subjects with reference to original composition. Exercises in recounting, in the pupil's own language, the chief events of episodes of history with which he is familiar. Essays on subjects (themes) already discussed and analyzed; toward the end of the year the analysis is no longer given, but the theme is simply discussed and the necessary ideas are suggested, which the pupil is left to arrange. One such essay every fortnight or three weeks.

Secunda, 2 hours weekly.

(a.) Lower Secunda, course 1 year.

The essential characteristics of the different species of Poetry, (Epic, Lyric, Elegiac, &c.), and the external form (variety of meter), appropriate to each (Poetics), are illustrated by examples from the Reader. The more important facts, biographical

and literary, respecting the more eminent German poets. Extemporaneous speaking on themes drawn, partly from the ground covered by the historical study, partly from the field of private reading of the ancient authors. Outlines of Rhetoric. Principles underlying the proper arrangement of topics or arguments in any (finished) written production. Essays, preceded by an original analysis of the theme; one essay every four weeks. Formation of style by the aid of translations from foreign languages into German. Declamations.

(b.) Upper Secunda, course 1 year.

The classical (German) literature of the Middle Ages. Brief outline of German (Teutonic) Grammar according to its historical development. Ulfilas and the elements of Gothic Grammar. Selections from the old epics (Nibelungen, Gudrun, &c.) are read. Review of facts learned in Lower Secunda as to the theory of Poetica. Themes for essays only assigned from regions with which the scholar is thoroughly acquainted, e. g., from subjects falling within the historical course, the obligatory or private reading of the ancient authors, or from the portions of German literature above indicated. An essay every four weeks. Declamations.

Prima, 3 hours weekly, course 2 years.

Survey of the history of (German) literature from Luther to the present day (the second classical period). Reading of passages from the German classics, especially from Goethe, Herder, Lessing and Schiller. The Romantic school and its influence upon the literature of to-day. Essays with exercises in classifying or analyzing subjects. One essay every four weeks, or five in each Semester. Extemporaneous oratory upon subjects selected at the speaker's will. Declamations.*

VIII. FRENCH.

Quinta, 3 hours weekly.

Pronunciation. Reading exercises. Regular inflections (Declinations, Auxiliaries, Conjugations). Oral and written

* It is the intention, at an early day, to add to the studies pursued in Prima with an allowance of time of one hour weekly, 1. Introduction to the study of Philosophy, 2. The chief facts of Empirical Psychology, 3. The essentials of formal Logic.

exercises in translation from French into German, and, toward the end of the year, from German into French. Short exercises to be prepared at home, one weekly, yet only in the latter part of the year. Memorizing of words and of idiomatic phrases. Necessary elementary facts as to the order of words in the French Sentence. Reader.

Quarta, 3 hours weekly.

Review of pensum of Quinta. In addition: pronouns, numerals, the comparison of adjectives, the partitive article, the simple sentence in interrogation, also negative, and negative and interrogative forms. The more frequent irregular verbs, and the chief rules of Syntax; farther facts as to the arrangement of words in the sentence. One short weekly written exercise. Reader.

Tertia, 3 hours weekly.

(a.) Lower Tertia, course 1 year.

Review of pensum of Quinta and Quarta. The irregular inflections finished. Rules for cases. Rules for arrangement of words finished; weekly written exercise. Memorizing of idiomatic phrases. Reader.

(b.) Upper Tertia, course 1 year.

Review of pensum of Lower Tertia. Rules for the use of the tenses and moods. Weekly written exercise, also frequent extemporalia and exercises in off-hand translation and in conversation. Author read: Voltaire, Chas. XII, or Chrestomathy.

Secunda, 2 hours weekly.

(a.) Lower Secunda, course 1 year.

Review of regular and irregular inflections; chief rules of Syntax. Systematic investigation of principles governing the arrangement of words in the French sentence, and the use of the moods and tenses. Conjunctions and the compound sentence; proper and improper prepositions, and the participial constructions with the probable theory of their origin. Fortnightly written exercise. Extemporalia and exercises in oral (free) translation from German into French. Exercises in French conversation. Author read: Voltaire, Chas. XII, or a suitable Chrestomathy.

(b.) Upper Secunda, course 1 year.

Review of pensum of lower Secunda (and close of grammatical instruction). Here begins the reading of the French poetical literature. The chief metrical rules. Written and oral exercises as in Lower Secunda. Authors read: Ségur, history of Napoléon; Thiers, Bonaparte en Egypte, etc.; Molière; Scribe, or a Chrestomathy.

Prima, 2 hours weekly, course 2 years.

Review and general survey of the grammatical rules, with a view to disclosing the formal (conventional) character of the French language, accompanied by reading and exercises; the latter after an exercise book (Plotz.) A fortnightly written exercise. French conversation.

Authors read. A Chrestomathy, or alternately from various classic French authors; also dramas of Corneille, Racine, Molière, accompanied by literary and historical critical remarks.

IX. HEBREW.

Secunda, 2 hours weekly, course 2 years.

Mutual relation of the Hebrew vowels, and Pronunciation. Reading exercises. Inflections: the conjugations (as far as the *verba quiescentia*), declensions, pronouns.

Exercises in translation, from Genesis. The chief rules of Syntax. Memorizing of Hebrew words.

Prima, 2 hours weekly, course 2 years.

Review and completion of the study of forms and inflections. Syntax completed. Written exercises. Ground read: the historical books of the Old Testament, the Psalms, and selected passages from the Prophets.

X. SINGING.

Instruction in Vocal Music is obligatory except in Sexta and Quinta. The same begins in Quarta and is given to Quarta and Tertia (united in one body) simultaneously. Those members of Secunda and Prima who have special vocal talent, in addition to instruction by themselves, also join this class.

Four hours weekly are assigned to instruction in Singing, apportioned as follows: 1 hour for the preliminary training of the voices of the *Quartani* whose singing lessons have just be-

gun ; 2 hours to the practice of the Alto and Soprano *Quartani* and *Tertiani* ; 1 hour to choral practice of the four upper classes, when the four parts, base, tenor, alto, and soprano, are all represented. Special attention is given to the practice of the Church hymns (Chorals). Motetti, Psalms, Songs, &c., are taught at the discretion of the music teacher.*

XI. GYMNASTICS.

Gymnastic exercises for the entire school take place, in summer, twice weekly, Monday and Saturday 5-7 P. M., in the open air in the Schelf-meadow. They are directed by the instructor in Gymnastics and attended by one of the teachers of the Gymnasium, the duty of being present coming in rotation to all the teachers with the exception only of the Director.†

In winter, Gymnastic practice is restricted to the *Primani* and *Secundani*, who meet, for this purpose, twice weekly in the public Gymnasium under the supervision of the instructor of Gymnastics alone, who at this season selects the most skillful gymnasts to act as captains and teachers for the whole school in the general summer exercises above described.

Having now placed before the readers of the *New Englander* the course of study as prescribed for a normal Gymnasium, we subjoin such additional facts and reflections as our own observation and inquiry have suggested.

Age at entrance, and length of course of the Gymnasium.

The age at entrance is not absolutely uniform ; perhaps for the majority of Gymnasiums ‡ it is fixed at the completed 10th year ; while, as to length of the course, it is to be remarked that although bright boys, or such as have the advantage of special assistance at home, not unfrequently complete the studies of *Sexta* and *Quinta* in a half-year each, yet the number of those is probably larger, who find the pensum of *Quarta*, in which Greek is begun, or even of *Lower Tertia*, where the

* The Director alone has the right to excuse from the exercises in Vocal Music.

† Instruction in Gymnastics is obligatory, yet may be dispensed with on application, with sufficient grounds, to the Director.

‡ Some Gymnasiums have connected with them a Pro-Gymnasium with additional classes, *Septima*, *Octava*, and *Nona*, and then the pupil often passes twelve years in the establishment.

Homeric dialect must be learned, too much for a single year, and who are therefore obliged to add a year to the course.

The theory of obligatory religious instruction.

In forming our judgment as to the wisdom of introducing so large an amount of positive religious, and even theological, instruction into the Gymnasium, we must not picture to ourselves a state of things precisely corresponding to that in our own country. For: First, it is natural enough in theory that a paternal government which has under its patronage and control the ordinances of public worship, and pays the salaries of the religious teachers, should provide also for religious teaching in the public schools. The morbidly religious or pietistic character, too, of King Frederic William IV, led during his reign to a greater prominence in the place assigned to religious teaching in all educational institutions than had been before contemplated. The excess consisted, not so much in increasing the length of the prescribed course of study, as in denying the teacher discretionary power, and rigidly insisting upon the memorizing of a large amount of Scripture passages and upon dogmatic religious teaching, at a time when the feeling of the age was out of sympathy with such instruction. Under Müller, who was succeeded by Falk as Cultus-minister only three years since, the same *régime* had been maintained; and it is really a matter of surprise that, in defiance of the unanimous public opinion of the educated classes, it could have endured so long. Secondly, the Germans are habituated to receiving their religious education in the schools. The Gymnasiums are the outgrowth of Monastic schools, where Latin and Religion were originally the chief subjects taught, and have remained such. There are (practically) no Sunday schools in Germany, nor do parents, it is believed, communicate much religious instruction to their children: the tendency is, as is common all over Europe, to hand over the *Cure* of Souls to the pastor and teacher. The result is, in Germany, a more systematic religious training, but the awakening of less religious interest than with us. The Bible is less read in Germany than in England and America. The Old Testament, particularly, which has played so important a part in forming the religious impressions in New England is, in Germany, almost an unread book.

The value of religious teaching.

The value of the religious teaching of the Gymnasium depends almost entirely upon the character of the teacher; if, as often happens, the subject is distasteful to him, and the time spent upon it, in his judgment, wasted, the scholars quickly adopt the tone which they mark in him, and neglect the lessons which are taught in a perfunctory way.

It is the intention that the religious teacher shall be a theologian or a settled pastor, so that the instruction may come from one who has professional acquaintance with, and enthusiasm for, the subject. Non-Lutheran scholars are excused from the regular religious course, and either receive instruction (the Catholics from a Priest, the Jews from a Rabbi) at the same hours as their classmates, or, if the number be too inconsiderable for this, are required to devote a sufficient amount of extra time, at the convenience of their religious teacher, to prepare what corresponds to the pensum in the school, faring however, it is probable, in most cases, somewhat more easily, as regards the work required of them, than the evangelical scholars.

The religious teaching has undoubtedly its political significance. When a Protestant Power, like the North German Empire, has among its subjects a large minority who are Catholic, it is natural that it should deem it important that its Protestant subjects should be thoroughly grounded in the reasons for the national movement which separated North Germany from the Roman church. Hence the great weight laid upon the history of the Reformation. That the history of this period, however, is interpreted in an unfair or partizan spirit, cannot be claimed.

Hymns.

Every student of German literature has learned to admire the beautiful religious hymns. These are by no means of equal merit. Gerhardt's are, on the whole, the finest, and there is a host of later hymn-writers who have caught a similar measure and movement, but little of his poetic feeling, or of his religious fervor. The twenty hymns committed to memory in the Gymnasium at Schwerin, are, no doubt, all of the highest order—soul stirring, noble lyrics. The number was formerly much larger, rising often, twenty years since, to 80 or 100, the prac-

tical result of which is that, in German congregations on Sunday, the whole assembly can usually unite in singing the chant without the aid of a book.

Close of Elementary Religious Instruction.

The elementary religious instruction closes with Upper Tertia; at this point the scholar will have at least completed his fourteenth year; and now, if he desires to leave the school and to enter upon a practical calling, he must be confirmed. Should he however contemplate the completion of the course of the Gymnasium, it is common to delay confirmation to a riper age, perhaps until shortly before the close of the course.

Augustana, &c.

It is natural that those statements of the Reformed Faith which were called forth by the Reformation should find place in a scheme of religious instruction, and especially that the Augsburg Confession (*Confessio Augustana*), which is justly regarded as affording common meeting-ground for all German Protestants, should be taught. The latter is usually laid before the pupils in its Latin original and quaint German translation, which is, in itself, a valuable monument of the German language of that period.

Geography and History.

Geography is taught as the necessary forerunner of History. Most of the earliest instruction is from the teacher's lips, seconded by the admirable wall-maps, with which at State cost every Gymnasium is supplied; and the facts thus communicated are written out by the pupil. After the first principles of Geography have been taught, the native province is made the starting point alike of geographical and historical instruction.

The method of instruction, and the gradual steps by which the pupil's knowledge of history and geography is extended, clearly appear from the outline of study. It may deserve remark that the legends of Greece, Rome, and of our German ancestors, so fascinating to a child, are among the first facts taught in the historical course.

Arithmetic and Mathematics.

The Germans regard mathematics, in its higher departments, as a study for the specialist; hence its place in a scheme of for-

mal preparatory training is less prominent than that which it usually occupies in our colleges. The necessity of frequent explanations, and of avoiding difficulties which may discourage the scholar, is felt. The caution to teachers, twice repeated in the plan of instruction for Sexta and Quinta, against assigning to scholars, for home-work, problems possibly beyond their powers to solve, may be particularly noticed. The plan of study—the use of the words Arithmetic and Geometry in a somewhat wider sense than we are accustomed to employ them, so as to cover what we should designate as Algebra and Trigonometry, being noted—is perfectly clear and calls for no further remark.

Natural Sciences.

The object of this department is to awaken the observing faculties, and to impart such an acquaintance with the external world, and with the divisions of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms as the educated man should possess. The drawbacks to the highest efficiency of the course are two: the lack of illustrative apparatus; and the small number of teachers who are specialists in the natural sciences. Yet the exercise, occurring only thrice weekly, furnishes a pleasant variety and is a relief from the constant pressure of the severer lessons.

Latin.

This department is, by general consent, the central one of the Gymnasium, and to it all others are regarded as subordinate. It has never been forgotten that the Gymnasium was originally a Latin school, where Latin was not only taught, but also, to a large extent, was the vehicle through which instruction was communicated; and that Gymnasium would be considered to have failed of its purpose, whatever else it might teach, which should not, in fact, introduce the scholar into a thorough comprehension of the Latin, and through the Latin, of the Greek literature. In the hope of enabling those, who may not have visited Germany, to cast a glance into the interior of a German Gymnasium, and to become familiar with the way in which instruction is given in the classical languages, the writer proposes to subjoin, at this point, his recollections of a forenoon passed (in the winter of 1872) in the three lower classes of the

"Gymnasium zum Grauen Kloster" in Berlin.* The writer's visit was made in February; and Sexta, which was the first class which he inspected, had been engaged upon the Latin language since the beginning of studies at Michaelmas of the previous year, or about six months. Sexta was divided for convenience (irrespective of scholarship) into two sections, each containing about forty boys.†

The intention was that study should be done chiefly under the teacher's eye; and the home-tasks were not intended to involve more than from a quarter to half an hour's labor. The forty boys who filled the room assigned to the first division of Sexta were handsome, bright, little fellows, averaging perhaps 11 years in age, many of them of noble families, and all, apparently, ambitious and sensitive. They seemed such boys as one may see in the lower classes of the Boston Latin school.

Dr. N., a young scholar, who had taken his doctor's degree with some distinction at the University of Berlin a year before, was the teacher, or ordinarius of Sexta. He began the recitation by giving out, to one boy after another in succession, a number of German phrases to be turned into Latin. These were such as the following: "the lofty tree," "the beautiful house," &c. He continued to give out such phrases until he had more than made the round of the class. If there was hesitation, on the part of any one, in giving the Latin equivalent, the question passed to the next. Then followed the principal parts of

* This Gymnasium was, before the Reformation, a convent of the Franciscan monks, and takes its name, "The Gray Cloister," from the color of the Franciscan habit. When it was secularized, a portion of its property took the form of a school fund, the income of which is applied to the increase of the salaries of its teachers, to a majority of whom it gives also free quarters. In consequence, it secures the services of a more uniformly able corps of instructors than any other Gymnasium in Germany, and draws also to itself, as scholars, the élite of the youth of Berlin. The Director, Dr. Bonitz, distinguished as a student and commentator of Aristotle, was called less than twenty-five years since to Austria, and charged with that much needed and difficult work, the reform of the Austrian Gymnasiums upon the North German model, an undertaking which he was, in the main, successful in carrying out.

† The text-books in the three lower classes, Sexta, Quinta, Quarta, visited by the writer, were the time-honored Latin Grammar of Goediké, a famous teacher in Berlin at the beginning of the present century, the Latin Reader of Simon, and Cornelius Nepos; but the larger part of the instruction was really oral, and was devised and given out by the teacher.

the verbs already learned, called for and given as rapidly as possible ; and next, the chief rules for gender. The head boy of the form reported, at the commencement of the lesson, the names of the absentees, and whenever, on the commission of an error, the teacher judged it gross enough to say *Tudel* (censure) he recorded a demerit against the one who had blundered.

In Quinta and Sexta, the influence of emulation is called in, and the boys go up and down, as one answers a question which others have missed, scrambling behind each other on the form on which they sit. One boy received a box on the ear for inattention. In general, however, the attention was excellent, and the eagerness to answer very evident.

The teacher of Quinta was Dr. E., who had recently returned from active service as an officer in the French-German war. Beside his duties in the Gymnasium he was occupied as one of the editors of Boeckh's miscellaneous writings. Dr. E. was in appearance a true Prussian. His bearing was decidedly military ; his complexion light, and without a particle of color ; and his eyes a faded blue. He was at the same time severe and sympathetic. While holding his scholars well in hand and ready to repress on the instant any levity, it seemed impossible for him to reprove otherwise than with perfect fairness. He gave out questions with great distinctness and accuracy, requiring the same precision in his scholars' answers. The subject which he was illustrating at the time of my visit was the idiom of the accusative with the infinitive. This he did by the use of numerous examples. I recollect also that a part of the lesson seemed to be the different meaning of *consulere* as followed by different constructions, e. g., *consulere aliquem, alicui, in aliquem*. No book whatever was opened during this recitation. The boys were so wrought upon by their zeal to answer the questions of this stern, impassive teacher, that many could not sit still in their seats, but maintained a half-sitting, half-standing posture.

The teacher and ordinarius of Quarta was Dr. W., who had been connected with the Gymnasium for many years, and is the author of several Latin school-books. This exercise began with the recitation of the principal parts of verbs, forty or fifty possibly in all, taken at random from the full list which had

been memorized. Mistakes were made, I remember, upon *cogo* and *lego*. Then followed the lesson in translation, a passage in Cornelius Nepos. The writer cannot say whether it was expected that the scholars should have got this passage out at home or not, for it was not the habit to fix definitely the limit of the lesson, but as much was read in the class as the time allowed. Certainly one or two of the boys called up appeared to be working out, for the first time, the meaning of the passage which they had to translate. It was very interesting to see the little fellows approach the sentence in so systematic a way, considering, first, the general signification of the verb, and the special limitations imposed upon the form in hand by tense and number; then distinguishing the subject and object, and assigning the various modifiers of each to their proper place. These scholars thought, so to speak, aloud, and the course of thought by which they proceeded to the comprehension of the sentence before them was methodical and unwavering, and entirely different from the guess-work by which one attempts to solve a puzzle. These youthful Quartani, was the thought of the writer, are already accomplished scholars as far as they have gone; their knowledge is perfectly definite; and passages of a certain difficulty they can undertake to read, at sight, because the elements necessary to such an achievement are already in their possession. The paradigms they know; the meaning of the inflexional forms they understand. To misplace the parts of a sentence is for them impossible. They cannot do otherwise than translate correctly as far as they go, and though they may be ignorant of the meaning of a single word, they will be able to assign even to it its proper grammatical construction.

The Latin of each sentence was always read aloud before it was translated. The writer noticed on the teacher's desk several maps of Asia Minor and Greece, which had been drawn, voluntarily, by scholars of the form, to illustrate the campaigns of the military leaders, the story of whose life they had been reading in Nepos.

In addition to the lessons just described of these consecutive classes, the writer was present at two recitations in upper Tertia; the first, an Extemporalium; the second, a recitation in Cicero.

The vocabulary for the Extemporalium appeared to be drawn from the ground lately read in Cicero, who is read at an earlier point, in the course of the Gymnasium at Berlin, than in the one from which we have given our outline of studies. The exercise was an interesting one. A German sentence was given out to one of the boys, and he was required to turn it into Latin; each Latin sentence thus made was written down by the whole class in their exercise books, to be afterwards carefully corrected. The teacher passed freely from desk to desk during the progress of the exercise, and he understood well the art of first stating in a strong light a mistake and then clearing away the ignorance which had occasioned it,—an effective means of guarding against repeated blunders. The class in Cicero were, it was evident, still struggling with the difficulty which young students usually find in their first approaches to that author. All Latin teachers know, by experience, that there exists no author whose style is such as easily to bridge over the interval between Cæsar and Cicero. This class seemed unequal to its work, discouraged and careless, and bad blunders were made, e. g., *respondere* was mispronounced, and *Pisonem* was translated *Pisonus*. The teacher was patient and kind. At the close of the exercise a knock at the door was heard, and the Director of the Gymnasium entered, the boys all rising, for a moment, and then resuming their seats. He read a list of names (five in all) of boys whose standing, at the last conference of the teachers, had been pronounced unsatisfactory. The departments in which there was deficiency were French, Mathematics, and Latin. The Director addressed a few words separately to each culprit, words especially severe to those who were deficient in Mathematics (the school requisitions in which, he said, all could meet) and in French (which any one could learn). Three of the boys evidently smarted under the reproof; the others were seemingly quite unconcerned. A word may be required here in reference to the Extemporalia and Exercitia, both exercises in making Latin; the former more frequent and often accompanying other recitations; the latter written out by the pupil at home with no other help than his grammar and his dictionary. At the close of an Extemporalium the teacher sometimes collects all the books in which each

member of the class has written the Latin made, and corrects them at his home; but a more usual course is to correct carefully on the spot the book of one scholar, and then to read aloud clearly and distinctly the Latin thus corrected, and to depend upon the scholars to make the necessary corrections each for himself. The *Exercitium* is invariably carefully corrected for each scholar by the teacher and returned. The labor which this constant correcting of exercises imposes upon the teacher is very great. In the upper classes where the Latin exercises become Latin Essays it often makes demands upon his time to the extent of six or eight hours per week. It will be noticed that it is intended that with Upper Secunda the character of the instruction should undergo a change. Specifically grammatical instruction is to cease, and henceforth, both in Latin and in Greek, the weekly allowance of time (8 hours) is to be devoted to the reading of the classics, to exercises in Latin conversation and composition, and to the study of the life of the ancient world.*

The question will naturally arise how the scheme proposed for private reading is actually carried out. The means adopted to secure this end are more or less searching according to the character of the different Gymnasiums. The scholar is frequently obliged to select, at the beginning of each Semester, a given author, or a certain part of the works of a given author, and to pass an examination thereon at the close. It is, for example, a part of the scheme, in most Gymnasiums, that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, entire, shall be read during the course. A certain part of this work is included under Private Reading, and promotion to a higher class may be made to depend upon the performance of whatever amount is prescribed. In the Endowed School at Pforte, perhaps the first of all Gymnasiums in Germany as regards zeal for classical learning, studies are so arranged as to secure to the older scholars

* The writer reserves his remarks upon the varying success in securing the objects contemplated by this more liberal character now to be given to instruction until he shall speak of the position and influence of the Director; it is, however, pertinent to remark here, that a considerable part of the time which it might be supposed could be disposable for private reading is actually employed in preparing for that most rigorous test of the pupil's work hitherto, the *Abiturient*,—or Graduate's, examination.

(Primari) certain entire days, without the interruption of school tasks, for private reading. Also at the Gymnasiums of Schleswig-Holstein, on the Baltic Sea, which are remarkable for the number of distinguished men whom they have trained up, there is, during the last two years of the course, an occasional suspension of regular recitations, so that the student may prosecute more at his own will his private reading. Such indulgence, it will be readily understood, can be safely granted in the Gymnasiums referred to, because the potent traditions of the place second it, and the older scholars recognize an obligation to employ the time placed at their disposal for private reading according to the intention with which it is allowed them. Another influence which encourages the student to private reading is that the subject for the Latin and (frequently) for the German Essays of the last two years is taken from ground covered by it, and cannot be well handled if it be neglected.

Greek.

The pupil is introduced to the elements of the Greek language, in the Gymnasium at Schwerin, after the same method which has been illustrated as applied to elementary Latin instruction. Important features of this method are, that each paradigm be carefully explained before it is memorized, and that the material learned be kept fresh in the recollection, by frequent reviews. The scholar, from the beginning, brings his exercise book with him daily into the class, and has constant practice in writing out Greek inflections in full, with the German equivalent of each form. The fact that Latin has been studied for two years before Greek is begun, and that considerable insight has been already gained into the nature of one ancient language, enables the pupil to progress rapidly. Some of the ablest gymnasial educators (the writer has von Naegelsbach specially in mind) have maintained that, while, from the tender age at which the pupil begins the study of Latin, it is impossible to make the study of that language, at the outset, scientific; in Greek, on the contrary, from the very beginning, a scientific method and terminology should be employed. Many other educators, e. g., Dr. Büchner in the Programme which forms the subject of remark in this Article, hold that what has been found to be the easiest and most natural

introduction to Latin, will be the same for Greek, and that the study of the *actual facts* as to forms and euphonic changes, is the first thing; to be followed afterward by the scientific theory of the development of those forms and the causes of those changes. How strong in Germany the friends of the new scientific methods are, and to what extent the new grammars are displacing the old, can best be learned, by inquiring what per cent. of the Gymnasiums have adopted Curtius's Greek Grammar. According to the writer's best impression, three years ago, when the 10th edition (each edition numbers 4,000 copies) of Curtius's Greek Grammar appeared, it was stated that the book had been introduced into between one-fourth and one-fifth of all the Gymnasiums.

German.

No part of the plan of studies is more carefully elaborated than that according to which the native language is taught. It is doubtless more easy to lay out such a systematic course of instruction for a language which, like the German, is no mixed or derived speech, but has its independent development. The language itself, too, has more pronounced characteristics than the English, and the more important phases of the historical development are easier to follow than in our own language. It certainly has, in its great national epic poems, sources of interest to which the English can offer no parallel. The writer believes, then, that this department is made more interesting and profitable to German youth than the study of the English language and literature in our schools and colleges. The method by which the student is gradually and almost insensibly conducted to original German composition is worthy of careful notice. One important principle is expressly enunciated (vid. scheme of studies in upper Tertia), that the pupil cannot be expected to write unless the teacher supply him with ideas; and directions are given, even to the very close of the course, that subjects be assigned only from regions with which the scholar's (obligatory or optional) reading shall have made him familiar.

French and English.

The Germans set a great value upon the ability to converse with elegance in the language of that European nation which

they most dislike. The course of study at the Gymnasium does not, it is true, enable the student to converse fluently in French, yet it makes him so good a French scholar that, with the opportunity for conversation, facility quickly follows. In nearly all the Gymnasiums there is opportunity of instruction in English for such as desire it; and in North Germany our language, which the German learns with great rapidity (for literary purposes, not colloquially), is usually learned at the Gymnasium. The writer has observed with surprise that no provision is made for the study of English in the programme of the Gymnasium at Schwerin.

Hebrew.

Those only ordinarily study Hebrew who have the profession of theology in view. Instruction is usually given by the religious instructor, who, as has been remarked, is commonly the pastor of the town where the Gymnasium is located. By being extended over the four years, although the weekly quantum of time allowed to it is limited, such progress is made, that, at the close of the course, the student is familiar with a large part of the Old Testament in the original tongue. The method of instruction, even to the memorizing of words to form a vocabulary, is the counterpart of that employed in Latin and Greek.

In closing this article it is desirable to observe the weekly allowance of time for each study; this appears from the following table:

	Sexta.	Quinta.	Quarta.	Lower Tertia.	Upper Tertia.	Lower Secunda.	Upper Secunda.	Lower Prima.	Upper Prima.	Numbers representing proportion of time allotted to each study.
I. Religion,	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	21
II. Geography and History,	4	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	31
III. Mathematics,	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	35
IV. Natural Sciences,	2	2				2	2	2	2	12
V. Latin,	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	8	8	85
VI. Greek,			5	6	6	6	6	6	6	41
VII. German,	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	27
VIII. French,		3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	20
IX. Hebrew,						2	2	2	2	8
Hours of weekly work in each class,	25	27	32	32	32	34	34	32	32	

The vacations may be roughly indicated as follows: one month at Easter; two weeks in early summer (Trinity Sunday); one month during dog-days, middle of July to middle of August; ten days at Michaelmas, *circa* 1st October; ten days at Christmas. Total thirteen weeks. The Winter Semester begins at Michaelmas; the Summer Semester at Easter.

The question might arise whether a plan of study so carefully elaborated, and in its minute details so rigidly carried out, may not, by limiting the sphere of the teacher's activity, operate adversely to the true interests of the scholar. This question must be answered, in the writer's judgment, decidedly in the negative. A well arranged plan of study should rather be regarded as, in itself, an unmixed good; nor is there ground for apprehension that the minute directions which may accompany it, if only they have been suggested by the experience of wise and practical men, will hamper the teacher, whose ingenuity the daily varying demands of the class-room will still abundantly exercise, after all the aid which a careful ordering of the work can give has been afforded. The Germans are in no danger of supposing that external appliances, however complete, can ever become a substitute for skillful instruction, and German individuality, both in scholar and teacher, is too strong to be repressed by the regulations which give an external uniformity to educational establishments. Goethe remarked, at the beginning of the present century, when the German estimate of German character was somewhat different from what it is to-day, that his countrymen excelled only as school-teachers; and it is to the multitude of able and devoted teachers that the unequalled excellence of German schools, and the very development of the theory and methods of education whose result is the Gymnasium, are due.

The Germans demand from their educational institutions a more positive moulding influence upon character, than we are wont to expect in this country. They expect every course of study to produce certain definite results, and to confer acquisitions and capacities which can be measured and described. It is common for a German teacher, at the outset of a new course of study, to inform his pupils, not only what ground he proposes to take them over, but what the results (in the way of

capacity to perform new operations) of the said course will be. In the same way, the discipline of the Gymnasium, so severe and half-military in its character, and holding the scholar under its influence during the ten most impressionable years of his life, is expected to bring his character into a certain form, and to confer a type of mind which shall testify to the training which produced it. The aims of the German education are as definite, in a certain sense, as the aims of the Spartan education, although they are less narrow. It would be judged altogether unsatisfactory to be able to claim for the Gymnasium, as the advocates of classical education in this country have often done, only a discipline, vaguely understood, and quite undefined ;—rather, would such results as these be expected : an acquaintance with the more important classical authors ; the ability to write a good Latin or French essay ; the power to relate the leading events in any important episode of history.

That there is a certain hardness, not to say brutality, connected with the discipline of the Gymnasium, can not be denied. The German scholar must also be a soldier, and the soldierly qualities of obedience and industry are those most valued in a pupil, while that side of education regarded in America and England as so important, the desirableness of influencing by love, and of always appealing to higher motives, is, in comparison, kept in the background. Education is thought of as a serious business, as a path over which one must be driven as well as led.

Since the plan of study in the Gymnasium is based upon the capacity of the average pupil, who receives no aid at home, and is perhaps insufficiently supplied with books, there would seem to be danger that the bright scholar might be disgusted and fatigued (or as the German phrase is "*abgestümpft*") by the incessant reviews and repetitions of the earlier years of the course. It is, in fact, very common, for such parents as concern themselves closely with the progress of their children, to spare them the drudgery of the lower forms, by employing an older *Gymnasiast*, or a philological student, to carry them, according to the methods employed in the Gymnasium, but more rapidly, over the work of *Sexta* and *Quinta* ; nor does it appear,

though Gymnasial teachers affirm that pupils so grounded are never afterward so "nagelfest" (firmly grounded) in the elements as those who have been in the Gymnasium from the outset, that the year or year and a half thus gained, is gained at the sacrifice of thoroughness.

The Gymnasium in its working and its results may be fitly compared to a great overshot-motor-water-wheel, the efficiency of which should not be judged by its apparent occasional pauses and halting, faltering revolution, but by the multitude of smaller wheels which it maintains in steady motion. The casual visitor, at a single Latin recitation in Quinta, would be likely to think it "German slowness" which imposed upon the scholars a lesson which they could learn in from fifteen to thirty minutes. Yet a better acquaintance with the school would show that the shortness and easiness of the single tasks is justified by the large number of lessons; the progress in each department being slow, but many departments being carried simultaneously forward. Two years (the entire allowance of time for Sexta and Quinta)—the teacher, accustomed to more hasty progress, might exclaim,—devoted to the study of Latin forms and inflections! Four years bestowed upon the Latin inflections and syntax, and besides only three books of Cæsar and 1,000 lines of Ovid, while in America boys are through the Freshman class in college: how absurdly slow! Yet these scholars, who are withal only fourteen years old, have already acquired the elements of French, and would, beyond the shadow of doubt, acquit themselves better, though their reading has been so limited, upon unseen Latin, than college Freshmen. But as in the plan of a great campaign devised by an able general, the far-reaching wisdom of the combinations in their smallest details and the significance of each detail in producing the grand result, are only clearly seen at the close when crushing blow succeeds blow, so it is at the later stages of the Gymnasium course that the substantial results of the earlier years testify most fully that they have been wisely spent. Whether these results are fully realized, and whether certain dangerous tendencies, inherent in the system of training, are avoided, depends chiefly upon the Director, to whose influence indeed, in a country where the average quality of instruction

is so high as in Germany, the superiority of one Gymnasium to another must be chiefly ascribed. The Director's supervision may extend even to the lowest classes, as is illustrated by the practice of Director Bonnell of the Werder Gymnasium in Berlin, who is in the habit, the writer was informed, of making a weekly visit to Sexta and holding there a review of the work done in Latin. But the Director's special charge is the classical instruction in Prima, where the object is, by encouraging to that private reading of the classic authors which alone confers an intelligent appreciation of ancient life, to transform dependent pupils into independent scholars, and to awaken that interest in classical study which is a pledge of its continued prosecution in subsequent life.

Upon the Director it depends, whether his pupils, before leaving the Gymnasium, acquire the colloquial use of Latin, and whether, in Latin composition, they add elegance and ease to the correctness which the training of the lower classes has given them.

The severe discipline of the Gymnasium, continued through so many years, loses finally, in a certain degree, its power. The novelty has long been entirely gone, and the prescribed regularity of daily life becomes tedious; the child, moreover, has become a man within the Gymnasium walls, and demands a different treatment from that which he has hitherto received. It rests with the Director to extend, at this point, to the older scholars who are specially entrusted to him, that judicious indulgence, unmixed with weakness, which shall give the student opportunity to show himself worthy of the independence which his nature demands, and which, by making the life of the last months more free in its character, shall take away the too vivid recollection of the severities of the early years, and render less likely that tremendous rebound for which the removal of all outward restraint, at the entrance of the University, is often the signal, and from which many promising students never return to sober ways. When the Director fails in this respect, the entire upper class of the Gymnasium may become demoralized, as was the case, the writer remembers having observed, in Prima of the Katharinum at Lübeck, where a demoralization showed itself in the disposition of the class, on the smallest

provocation, to burst into a roar of laughter, and where it interfered most seriously with the advantage which the later months of study were intended to give. There are among the Directors very many who entirely meet the varied demands which their duties make upon them. Far more numerous than the dry formalists, are those others like Nitzsch of Hanover, von Naegelsbach of Erlangen; and, among the living, Classen of Hamburg, who add to a wide erudition, and to self-sacrificing devotion to their pupils, a contagious enthusiasm, and an *αἵσθημα* for all that is noble, and possess that ripeness of character and sympathetic nature which is the living testimony to the worth of classical culture. The strongest argument in the hands of the opponents of classical study in our own country, is found in the scanty results which classical training in America gives. If, in the time allotted to the study, no intelligent comprehension of the ancient languages has been acquired, and no glimpse of the transforming light with which the ancient world is seen to be illuminated by him who enters it through the portals of ancient speech, then the forms and rules blindly and laboriously acquired may as well be forgotten; and the unhappy condition of such a person is described in no exaggerated language by the fine passage of the *Odyssey*. Bk. xi, 593-8.

Καὶ μὲν Σίσυφον εἰσείδον κρατέρ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα,
 λαῶν βαστάζοντα πελώριον ἀμφοτέρῃσιν.
 ἦ τοι ὁ μὲν κηριπτόμενος χερσὶν τε ποσὶν τε
 λαῶν ἀνω ὠθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον· ἀλλ' ὅτε μέλλοι
 ἄκρον ὑπερβαλεῖν, τότε' ἀποστρέψασκε κραταῖς
 αὐτίς ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλινδετο λάας ἀναΐδης.

In Bryant's translation—

There I beheld the shade of Sisyphus
 Amid his sufferings. With both hands he rolled
 A huge stone up a hill. To force it up,
 He leaned against the mass with hands and feet;
 But, ere it crossed the summit of the hill
 A power was felt that sent it rolling back
 And downward plunged the unmanageable rock
 Before him to the plain.

The hill of learning has steep ascents, but, at various altitudes, table lands; and the pleasure in exploring these will abundantly reward the labor which it has cost to reach them.

It is only he who, from lack of original ability, or of patience, or of skillful guidance, has failed to gain even the lowest plateau, whose climbing must be considered as having been, from the beginning, a mistake.

Let us watch a party of mountain climbers, and seek to learn a lesson from their progress. One hurries up the first part of the ascent, looks little to his footing, slips frequently in consequence, and though, at the outset, he flew past all the rest, is probably obliged, long before the summit is in sight, to desist altogether from the ascent. Of such impatient climbers there will be, indeed, some who, owing to great natural strength, may even gain the summit, but then they sink down, stiff and sore, too weary to enjoy what it has cost them such effort to gain.

There are, however, others who from natural wisdom, or, as is more probable, aided by the counsel and companionship of experienced mountaineers, set out with great slowness, walking along the gradual slopes at the base of the mountain, and, since their strength and attention are not fully occupied by their easy progress, acquiring a fund of useful information about the mountain, and what is to be found at its summit, and, as their curiosity is active and their memory is keen, acquiring it readily and holding it firmly. As the declivity becomes more abrupt, they may be observed looking carefully to their footing, never shifting the weight from one foot to the other until a firm support has been secured, and making in this way slow, but encouraging, progress. If they are wise climbers they will not allow themselves to sit down, but, if they pause occasionally for a moment, they will remain standing, lest they lose the positions and aptitudes to which their limbs are becoming accustomed. Each step, so carefully made, accompanied always with a positive gain, and taken constantly with greater freedom, gives actual pleasure. Progressing to higher altitudes, these fortunate, wisely directed climbers, find that their exertions have brought them new vigor instead of fatigue, and they enjoy the occasional glimpses backward over the way they have passed and forward towards the summit before them. There are occasional places of special difficulty in their route; steep, almost perpendicular rocks, and miry, slippery soil; yet, as their strength is trained by their previous experi-

ence, and has not been wasted by ill-directed exertion, they confidently approach each new obstacle and find an excitement in overcoming it which is, itself, a pleasure. The higher regions into which classical culture introduces those who secure it, abound in what may be compared to the meadow-lands on the summit of Mt. Rigi in Switzerland. When these are gained, the recollection of the hard climbing below gives zest to the easy progress: the foot passes lightly over the springy mountain sod; pure, clear air invigorates every fiber of the frame; an ever-changing prospect and an ever-widening horizon so enrich and so enlarge the mind and heart of the beholder, that he not only seems to himself to be, but he has in fact become, an entirely different person from what he was before.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

TOWARD THE STRAIT GATE.*—Dr. Burr's foregoing works, "*Ecce Cælum*," "*Pater Mundi*," and "*Ad Fidem*," prepared the way for a wide appreciation of whatever might follow from his pen. It was well that he first designated his authorship as from "a Connecticut Pastor," and we should have liked to see not only his office, but the name of his parish, Lyme, associated with those of his works on the title-page of this volume, as suggestive of the literary work that may be done in a rural parish, and as due to the interest his people take in his reputation. We are more than willing to see the series of Latin titles here giving way to the English. The author's present work is moreover of a character for which he is the better fitted by his pastoral experience, as meant for guidance in the matter of personal religion. The writer describes it, in the preface, as "the natural successor to *Ad Fidem*." He properly distinguishes two ways of dealing with an inquirer of ordinary intelligence; the one assuming him to be wholly ignorant on the subject, and setting forth the appropriate Bible truths in a system, reserving the application of each till all have their place, while the other, taking advantage of the truths already known and admitted, employs and urges each as it is brought to view in its order; and of these he as properly adopts the latter. The same discrimination and method belong to ordinary preaching, which should deal with the hearers not as beginners, which they are not, but as traditionally knowing enough of Christianity to be used as an argument and persuasion for learning and doing more. The book comprises thirty-three chapters, or brief discourses, (as they may have been and should be) addressed to one who is so far an inquirer as to be ready to listen, with a view to his conversion. It is marked by the clear statement, vigorous thought, happy illustration, and vivacity of expression, for which the author is already so favorably known. There is also the same fidelity to revealed truths. His most judicious admirers will be the better satisfied if the rhetoric is here less florid, as we hastily judge, than in some of his earlier works. We

* *Toward the Strait Gate*; or Parish Christianity for the Unconverted. By Rev. E. F. BURR, D.D. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, & Co. pp. 535. 1875.

cannot forbear taking exception to the word "featy" on p. 238. The purpose and quality of the book, together with its neat mechanical appearance, make it a fit gift for the thoughtful from Christian friends, and should introduce it into parish and Sunday School libraries.

BELFAST LECTURES ON SCIENCE AND REVELATION.*—This volume comprises nine lectures called forth by Prof. Tyndall's address before the British Association in Belfast, in 1874, and delivered in that city during the winter following. They are by eminent Professors and clergymen of Belfast and vicinity, and treat severally the following subjects: Science and Revelation; Design in the Structure and Fertilization of Plants; H. Spencer's Biological Hypothesis; the Doctrine of an Impersonal God in its effects on Morality and Religion; Miracles and Prophecy; Prayer in relation to Natural Law; Man's Responsibility for his Belief; the Life and Character of Christ an Evidence of the Truth of Christianity; The achievements of the Bible a proof of its divine origin. The series of lectures was adapted to its purpose. The publisher has simply bound the pamphlets together, without even taking trouble to give the volume a continuous paging.

THE CHURCH AND HER CHILDREN.†—The oneness and perpetuity of the Church of God, Patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian,—its charter in the Abrahamic Covenant,—its qualification for membership, faith in Messiah,—its basis in the family rather than the individual,—its sign and seal, first circumcision, then baptism,—the membership and relations of baptized children,—these are the topics of this work, argued from the Scriptures, and from the early Christian fathers. The "introductory note" gives as the author's reason for undertaking it, that while the several topics are ably treated here and there, they are not elsewhere brought together in their mutual relations as he thinks they should be.

The argument is careful and clear, and as a whole the work seems to us well suited to diffuse comprehensive and profitable views, both of the Church (in the larger sense) and of infant baptism.

* *Science and Revelation*; a Series of Lectures in reply to the Theories of Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, Spencer, etc. Belfast: William Mullan. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong. 1875. Price \$2.00.

† *The Church and her Children*. By WILLIAM BARROWS, D.D. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. 12mo, pp. 348.

Perhaps too large a part of the space is devoted to historical matter, yet this branch of the argument is handled with unusual interest and skill. The Congregational Publishing Society have done good service in issuing such a work.

LEWES' PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND, Vol. II.*—The first volume of this work has been before the public for a considerable time. It contains an introduction treating "The Method of Science and its application to Metaphysics," and "The Rules of Philosophizing," and a statement of "Psychological Principles." It also treats the first problem, "The Limitations of Knowledge."

The second volume treats five other problems: "The Principles of Certitude," "From the Known to the Unknown," "Matter and Force," "Force and Cause," "The Absolute in the Correlations of Feeling and Motion."

These two volumes are an expansion of what the author appears to have begun as an introductory chapter. Together, under the common title "The Foundations of a Creed," they constitute an introduction to what was originally projected as the main work, and which is yet to appear.

It has often been demonstrated that any theory of knowledge, which limits it to phenomena perceived by sense, logically issues in universal skepticism. The history of thought has confirmed this demonstration by showing in repeated instances, not merely that philosophy and theology are impossible, but also that empirical science itself cannot be constituted within the limits of this theory. Mr. Lewes attempts to escape this difficulty by teaching that it is not true that "experience only means Sensation." It includes "a *sensible experience* or its *rational equivalent*;" it includes knowledge of "the Sensible and the Extrasensible; excluding altogether whatever is supra-sensible." "Every explanation is a classification of facts by means of ideas which originally were observations, and is a true classification in proportion to the extent of the observations and the accuracy with which the ideas represent them. An explanation to be valid must be expressed *in terms of phenomena already observed*; that is, either drawn directly from the observation, or indirectly from a comparison of inferences with sensations." "The law of inverse squares—that

* *Problems of Life and Mind*. By GEORGE HENRY LEWES. First Series, the Foundations of a Creed. Vol. II. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1875. Crown 8vo, pp. 487. Price \$3.00.

potent symbol—could never have been an observation; but it is an ideal construction from very precise observations, and is found to express them with sufficient accuracy to be accepted as their rational equivalent.”

Accordingly he avows his belief that empirical science, metaphysics and religion may be reconciled. “Religion will continue to regulate the evolution” of humanity; “but to do this in the coming ages it must occupy a position similar to the one it occupied in the past, and express the highest thought of the time, as that thought widens with the ever-growing experience.”

It will be seen that his method of harmonizing metaphysics and theology with empirical science is by eliminating from them all that is essential and distinctive, and thus reducing them to empirical science. His theory of knowledge, therefore, is simply this, that empirical science, consisting only of sensible experience or its transformations, constitutes all the knowledge possible to man. Thus it does not differ in principle from the phenomenalism of Comte, which empirical scientists generally reject as a theory of knowledge too narrow for the constitution of empirical science itself. And as to solving the great problems of life and mind, the confronting of which the human reason can never escape, the author is as far from it as any phenomenalist who has preceded him.

PILGRIM MEMORIES IN THE BIRTH-COUNTRIES OF CHRISTIANITY.* —“The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.” Mr. John S. Stuart-Glennie is just the man spoken of by the Psalmist. He not only says in his heart “There is no God;” he proclaims it to a long benighted world, in a book, with transcendent scorn of the superstitious souls who think they see in the universe a creative intelligence and will. *Souls*, did we say? Nay, in his theory, there are no souls; “all mental action whatever is but an aspect of a certain mechanical action; every feeling, every thought, every desire or volition implying, rather than being a consequence of, certain molecular motions and mechanical changes.”

Having given this verdict on Mr. Stuart-Glennie’s *Pilgrim Memories*, we need not say much more; yet if any reader of ours would see how stupendous is the folly which attempts to “dis-

* *Pilgrim Memories, or Travel and Discussion in the Birth-Countries of Christianity with the late Henry Thomas Buckle.* By JOHN S. STUART-GLENNIE, M.A., Barrister at Law. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1875.

pense with the hypothesis of a Creator," we commend to him the study of this pretentious volume. Such is its impudence of unwarranted assumption and assertion—such its audacity of misrepresentation—such the insolence of its invective against the Bible, against Christ, and against "an almighty Creator-God"—that the author's self-conceit would be simply wonderful but for the thought, "There is more hope of a fool than of him." He understands the universe. By his new idea of causation—a discovery which he describes as "an advance from the conception of one-sided determination to that of mental determination"—all mysteries are solved. By his acceptance of "that great inductive generalization which defines Evolution as the change from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from comparative simplicity to comparative complexity," the supernatural is expelled. Great is Evolution (with a capital E), and Mr. Stuart-Glennie is one of its prophets.

Does evolution explain all things? How then, most "learned Theban," is the evolution to be explained? The phenomena of nature are in some sort explained when we analyze them, and classify them, and find the laws to which they are conformed. But whence are those laws? Generalize them as we may, the question remains. Whence are they? "O fools and slow of heart to believe!" Know ye not that a law of nature traced to its last analysis is of all miracles the greatest—the most significant of the Creative Mind and Will?

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

PROFESSOR GILLETT'S HISTORY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.* —Among the latest labors of the lamented Professor Gillett, was the task of revising his History of the Presbyterian Church, in order to divest it of its character as a "New School" version of a story on which "Old School" Presbyterians put a different construction. In its revised form, that history has been accepted and is now published by the Board of Publication of the reunited Presbyterian organization. Professor McGill, of the Princeton Seminary, certified that he, by request of the author and of the

* *History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.* By Rev. E. H. GILLETT, D.D., Author of "The Life and Times of John Huss," "The Moral System," "God in Human Thought," &c., &c. Revised edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Board of Publication, performed the office of censor "with a view to suggest alterations which the late reunion has made proper;" and that the author, as well as the official "editor," manifested "the utmost readiness to expunge anything like a partisan tinge, and to render the work unexceptionable to the whole church." He gives his cheerful testimony "that candor, amity, and a truth-loving heart have conceded everything that 'Old School' men could reasonably ask in this revision."

We observe that this "revised edition" is printed from the old plates; and the necessary "changes and modifications of statement" seem not to have involved, in any instance, the recasting of one stereotype page. We are glad that a work which exhibits so faithfully the origin and the genius of *American* Presbyterianism is thus commended, officially, to all Presbyterians.

HISTORICAL SCENES FROM THE OLD JESUIT MISSIONS.*—Those who have been acquainted with the collection of the "Letters" of the Jesuit Missionaries, written between 1650 and 1750, and published some years ago in France in forty seven volumes, know what a mass of interesting and valuable information is there to be found respecting the early missions of the Society of Jesus in all parts of the world. Bishop Kip of California has rendered the public a good service by making a selection, from this great work, of fourteen of the "Letters," and furnishing an English translation. He has added, also, brief explanatory notes. Among the most interesting of his selections, is an account of the early Jesuit missionary operations in Lower California in 1702. Other letters describe the "Monasteries of Mt. Lebanon," in 1721; the "Knights of Malta," in 1711; the "Grecian Isles," in 1711; the "Court of China," in 1778; the "Trials of a Hudson Bay Missionary," in 1694; "Explorations in the Delta," in 1712; the "Monasteries in the Thebaid Desert," in 1716; the "Paraguay Mission," in 1726; and the "Earthquake at Lima," in 1746. The eighth selection is from a letter of a "Father Fauque," in which he gives an account of the ravages of a Rhode Island privateer, "Prince Charles of Lorraine," on the coast of South America during the "old French war" in 1745. It appears that the ship was commanded by "Captain Simeon Potter, a native of New England," and that it

* *Historical Scenes from the Old Jesuit Missions.* By the Right Rev. WM. INGRAHAM KIP, D.D., LL.D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 12mo, pp. 375.

was "fitted out to cruise with a commission from Williems Guéene, Governor of Rodelan." Bishop Kip has ascertained, by inquiry, that some of the silver articles taken at that time "from Oyapoc," still remain in Rhode Island in the possession of the descendants of the gallant privateersman.

MADAME RÉCAMIER AND HER FRIENDS.*—We only give expression to a feeling which must be very general, when we say that there is great reason for thankfulness that Madame Lenormant has been induced to supplement the "Memoirs" of her aunt, by this new book. Perhaps we can in no way better characterize the position in French society of this remarkable woman, than by saying that any sketch, however short, of the lives of a score of such men as Chateaubriand, Matthieu de Montmorency, Balanche, Ampère, will always be considered incomplete which does not make mention of the fact that they were her friends. There was a charm about her which did not depend alone on her beauty, but was based on real worth, and a benevolence, and a kindly feeling which seemed to prompt every thought. But while she attracted almost universal admiration, she confined her friendship to a select few. Mme. Lenormant says: "As members of a secret society recognize their brethren by certain signs, so natures of a high moral order are prompt to understand each other, and open their ranks to those who resemble them." Mme. Récamier said herself: "There is a certain taste in perfect friendship, to which commonplace characters cannot attain." It was for this reason that a warm attachment sprang up on the very day of their first meeting between Mme. Récamier and Ampère. He was only twenty years old, and she twenty-seven years older, but such was the "exquisite delicacy of his soul, the generous enthusiasm of his aspirations, and the rectitude of his intentions," that at once he was admitted to her fire-side on the footing of a son and brother; and for thirty years was as one of her family. Among the charming episodes in this book, some of the most interesting are in connection with this friendship. In 1823, Ampère was one of a select party who accompanied Mme. Récamier to Rome. A charming picture is given of their manner of living. They travelled by slow stages. "During the mid-day halt, as well as in the evening, they talked of what they had seen, they read

* *Madame Récamier and her Friends.* From the French of Madame Lenormant. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 12mo, pp. 281.

aloud to each other, or Ballanche and Ampère earnestly discussed methods of history and philosophy. Mme. Récamier had the wonderful faculty of instantly transforming the meanest chamber of a way-side inn, and giving it an air of elegance; a cloth thrown over a table, books and flowers arranged upon it, a muslin coverlet spread upon the bed, and her own distinguished air and inimitable grace, transported every one as by enchantment into the realm of poetry." The book is particularly valuable for the letters of Mme. Récamier herself which it contains. We are allowed to see how it was that this attractive woman succeeded so well in saying kind things *in a kind way*. Writing her usual letter to Ampère, with difficulty, from Naples, after having been sick in bed for five days, she tells him how uncomfortable she has been, and adds: "Only the fear lest you might be uneasy gives me strength for it. I prefer that you should be alarmed on the score of my health, rather than my friendship;" and again, when Ampère was about to return to Paris from Bonn, where he had been studying in the University with Niebuhr, she wrote: "Hasten to animate by your narrations our poor *salon* at the Abbaye, which you have been pleased to call your *patrie*." In some respects, we think that this book is even more full of interest than the Memoirs.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MRS. FLETCHER.*—The husband of Mrs. Fletcher was, during a long life, a prominent Whig advocate of the city of Edinburgh, who was an intimate friend of all the celebrities who made that famous capital of Scotland such a centre of political and literary interest throughout the reign of George III. He died in 1828, at the age of eighty-two; and his widow survived him thirty years. Her friends of many different nationalities all speak of her with enthusiasm as a representative Scotchwoman of the highest culture and attractiveness. The following, which is only one of many references to her which we find in the book, gives a pleasing picture of her when she was sixty years of age. "Her appearance is so engaging that the mere looking at her is itself a pleasure. In her youth she was brilliantly beautiful. She retains so much symmetry of feature, so much fine expression of countenance, and so much grace of deportment, such a gentlewomanliness of manner, with such an

* *Autobiography of Mrs. Fletcher*. With Letters and other Family Memorials. Edited by a survivor of her family. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 12mo, pp. 376.

expression of goodness, as make her absolutely lovely. She is rather fat than thin, and her beauty is matured more than faded. Her conversation is delightful, full of variety and anecdote. She is an enthusiast in politics, and on what is called the Liberal side; but there is such a feminineness in all she says and does, that even her politics could not alloy the charm of her agreeableness. She has a most extensive acquaintance with literary persons, and her conversation is a stream of lively anecdote continually flowing." She was intimately acquainted with Southey, and Dr. Arnold, and Wordsworth, of whom she tells the story that he had so little interest in sculpture that he went to sleep in Florence when looking at the Venus de Medici! She knew La Harpe, and Bunsen, and Mazzini, of whom she says that Dr. Arnold declared him "perfectly honest and truly disinterested." She was herself a devoted friend of the celebrated Italian republican, and says of him: "If ever there was a soldier that took righteousness for his breastplate that soldier is Mazzini." Few biographies are so interesting and instructive as this.

THE GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.*—

The title of this book would lead one to expect rather more than is to be found; but we do not say this in the way of adverse criticism, for the volume is a valuable and an interesting one. It contains sketches of the lives of two men of German birth, whose services in our War of Independence will always be remembered with gratitude by the American people—Baron von Steuben, and General John Kalb. The story of their career is told in an animated and breezy way, which cannot fail to awaken in every reader something of the enthusiasm with which the accomplished author regards everything which pertains to the Revolution. Old Gen. Steuben is perhaps the most picturesque character of the war. Kalb first visited this country in 1768, as the confidential agent of Choiseul, to report to the French government the state of feeling in the colonies towards England. His report gives very valuable information. When he came a second time with Lafayette, in 1777, it seems that he was actually instructed by De Broglie to intimate to Congress that France would make it an imperative condition of assistance that a foreign "military and political leader," should be placed at the head of

* *The German Element in the War of American Independence.* By GEORGE WASHINGTON GREENE, LL.D. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 12mo, pp. 211.

affairs! On reaching Philadelphia, Kalb had the tact to see at once that it was best to keep his own counsel, and leave his "instructions" in his portfolio. A chapter on the "German mercenaries" closes the book; which is good as far as it goes, but the reader is left with the feeling that the story is only half told. It is to be hoped that Mr. Green will add another chapter, and complete this part of the work.

CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE BATTLE OF LEXINGTON.*—This is the first of a series of publications which will do much to revive the spirit of patriotism in the country. During these next eight years we shall all live over the eventful days of the Revolution, sharing with our fathers in their privations and sufferings and rejoicing with them in their final triumph. The town of Lexington has done well to put on permanent record in this handsome manner what was said and done on the 19th of April last, when so many thousands gathered in that historic village, to listen to a recital of what took place on that famous "green" one hundred years before. The oration delivered by Mr. Richard Henry Dana, Jr., was worthy of the occasion. The very roll of the drums can be heard in it. "We broke no bonds. We were never bound. We were free-born." * * * "We were not the revolutionists. The king and the parliament were the revolutionists. They were the radical innovators. We were the conservators of existing institutions. They were seeking to overthrow, and reconstruct on a theory of parliamentary omnipotence. We stood upon the defence of what we had founded and built up under their acquiescence, and without which we could not be the free and self-governing people we had always been. We broke no chain. We prepared to strike down any hand that might attempt to lay one upon us. There was not one institution, law, or custom, political or social, from the mountain-tops to the sea-shore, that we cared to change." Besides the oration of Mr. Dana, the volume contains the Poem written by Whittier for the occasion, and all the Addresses then delivered.

* *Proceedings at the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Lexington*, April 19, 1875. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks & Co. 1875. 8vo, pp. 170.

BELLES LETTRES.

THE SHIP IN THE DESERT.*—This last volume from Mr. Miller has not given us as much pleasure as the "*Songs of the Sun-Lands*," noticed last year in the first number of this journal. As a foreign critic has said, "Whatever the faults of style which disfigure his poems,—and they are many and flagrant,—there can be no doubt that he possesses the genuine poetic faculty," and this, put forth with a certain audacity of treatment, on the sierras, cañons, plains, and wild border life of our new world, accounts for the enthusiasm his first appearance excited abroad. He does not appear to as much advantage in one longer poem, such as we have here, where the narrative amounts to little, and is obscure at the best. Familiar as he has become with certain modern poets, as shown even in occasional partial imitations of their manner, he might be expected by this time to have rid his composition of palpable blemishes arising from want of early culture. His versification is impaired by repeated use of such words as 'sires' and 'towers,' as if they were two syllables, and 'contemplate' with the accent misplaced. 'Antelope' is vulgarly used as a plural. He is addicted to 'pouting lips' in his personages. He seems to grow repetitious also in his descriptions. Yet these pages abound in brilliant imagery and picturesque allusion. The work is dedicated to his 'dear parents,' and the preface, addressed to them, is crowded with characteristic recollections, though perhaps excessively elaborate.

THE POETICAL WORKS OF RAY PALMER.†—Our readers are already favorably acquainted with Dr. Ray Palmer, and his hymns need no introduction nor recommendation. But this volume, besides being a complete edition of his poems, including his recent longest work, "*Home, or the Unlost Paradise*," already fully noticed in our Journal, is one of the most beautiful gift-books for the season. It is a splendid specimen of paper, type, and binding, befitting the amiable and sacred quality of the contents. In common with a multitude of his friends, we welcome the life-like portrait of the author. The volume is fitly inscribed to Dr. Mark Hopkins. Most of the poems have been before published in one form or

* *The Ship in the Desert*. By JOAQUIN MILLER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875. pp. 205.

† *The Poetical Works of Ray Palmer*. Complete Edition. New York and Chicago: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1876. 8vo, pp. 372.

another, and some are well known treasures in our Hymnology, but others are new. They are classified here as "Hymns and Sacred Lyrics," "Translations," "Home," (nearly ninety pages,) and "Miscellaneous Poems." Several pages of Appendix contribute comments, and among these we are glad to see the origin and some incidents of the history of the hymn beginning, "My faith looks up to Thee," which has given the writer a place that many volumes of theology might have failed to win in the hearts of the church universal.

MISS PRESTON'S "CARTOONS."*—This is one of the most enjoyable of the poetical contributions of the season. There are fourteen short descriptive poems founded on well known events in the lives of the "old masters." In the first, the story is told of Leonardo da Vinci's long protracted efforts to satisfy himself with a portrait of "Mona Lisa." The second relates the confession of his crime, wrung from him by remorse, by Andrea del Castagno, who had assassinated his friend, Domenico Venetiano, in order that he might be the sole possessor of the secret which he had confided to him respecting the then new method of painting in oil. The titles of some of the others which follow are "Victoria Colonna to Michael Angelo;" "Sebastiano at Supper;" "Raffaele and Giulio Romano in the Sistine;" "Poussin and his Master;" "Albrecht Dürer and the Baron's Daughter." Following these are twenty poems founded on legends of the middle ages; and thirty-five on subjects of contemporary interest. These "cartoons" are themselves worthy the hand of a master; and compare favorably with those of a similar character by Robert Southey. They are not spun out. The interest is well sustained throughout; and there is a simplicity and a directness in the style; a harmony in all the parts; and an element of pathos, which will make the collection a favorite one with a large class of readers.

WHITTIER'S SELECTIONS FROM THE SONGS OF THREE CENTURIES.†—It is no small matter to have as a guide through the innumerable volumes of poems which have been published in the last three centuries, one in whose taste we can have such confi-

* *Cartoons*. By MARGARET J. PRESTON. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 12mo, pp. 240.

† *Songs of Three Centuries*. Edited by JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. 12mo, pp. 352.

dence as we have in that of the poet Whittier. Besides, to one who is somewhat familiar with the metrical authors of this period, it is interesting to see what extracts such a man will make as illustrations of their "wisest thoughts and rarest fancies." Mr. Whittier's object has been evidently to make an attractive book, and his plan has led him to confine himself to the lyrical productions and briefer poems of the authors quoted, and to give great prominence to the poetry of the present century. The Selection is a charming one; and yet we will mention, as an illustration of the difficulty of doing such a work to the satisfaction of all, that the two first among the present writer's favorite living authors—one an Englishman and the other an American—whose names he looked for, are represented only by a single short poem—and that by no means one of their best. Perhaps, too, there is no reason why it should not be added that the works of both these authors are published by the firm who publish Mr. Whittier's present Selections.

GUIDO AND LITA.*—The celebrity which attaches itself to the author of this poem will secure for it doubtless many readers. It is a new version of "the old, old story"—how Guido, who was nobly born, loved Lita who was the daughter of a lowly fisherman. The scene is laid in the Riviera di Ponente, or the southern slope of the Maritime Alps, which is just now more than ever the favorite resort of British tourists. In the tenth century it was exposed to constant piratical invasions from the Saracens who had established themselves in Corsica and Sardinia, and were fast acquiring a foothold on the main land. At last the inhabitants rallied, and, with the help of Pisa and the Count of Provence, drove out the Mohammedan invaders. It was in this troubled period that Guido and Lita lived and loved. Of course there were obstacles in the way of their happiness. But, at last, it was by the signal services which each rendered to their countrymen in repelling one of these Mohammedan raids, that all obstacles were removed and they became husband and wife.

THE BERTRAM FAMILY.†—It is the verdict of the reading public generally that the "Schönberg Cotta Family" excelled all the other

* *Guido and Lita*. A Tale of the Riviera. By the Right Hon. the MARQUIS OF LORNA. With illustrations. New York: MacMillan & Co. 1875. 12mo, pp. 102.

† *The Bertram Family*. By the author of "Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family." New York: Dodd and Mead, Publishers. pp. 336.

works of the same author, in the merit of the execution and the interest it awakened. The superior effect was due, no doubt, in part to the novelty of her method, and somewhat also to her subject, in the Reformation, and the close adherence to historical incidents and personages. "Kitty Trevelyán" and the "Draytons and Davenants," treating of the times of the Commonwealth, and of the Methodist revival in the last century, were scarcely inferior in the interest of the subject or in literary skill. The same may be said of some of her briefer sketches of the early Saxon Christianity. But the volumes in which the same author treated of the early centuries, and the conquest of Paganism, were too diffuse, with too little of historical interest. In this latest work she returns to the journalizing method of her most successful delineations, still dealing with religious themes, but with questions and conflicts of the present day, ritualism, rationalism, and fervent evangelical sentiment. The delineation is of the Christian family of a clergyman of the English Church, through the note-books of the older members. A thread of pedigree connects them with the Davenants of the earlier story. It comes short of the works before named in not grouping the personages and sentiments around historical incidents, and in being taken up too largely with reflections. The sentiment tends here and there to sentimentalism. There is a mechanical aspect, and something of monotony, in the distribution of the matter among the several note-books, and giving all the characters their parts, and also in conducting religionists of different types through opposite transitions to the writer's standpoint. We must complain too, of the growing habit in this devout and amiable writer, of breaking up the composition into the briefest fragmentary paragraphs, often only of a line or clause, a French literary fashion carried to the extreme. Yet beautiful thoughts and happy illustrations abound in these pages, and the reader will find himself attracted by their delineations of Christian character and fervent expressions of evangelical thought and feeling. In the thirtieth chapter one of the principal persons sets forth her own "experience" of what is called the "higher life," though mildly dissenting from that phrase, thus bringing into view the recent religious movement in England under the auspices of R. P. Smith from this country.

VICTORIAN POETS.*—We have arrived at a period in which the proportions of what will be called hereafter, and is beginning to

* *Victorian Poets*. By EDMUND CLARENCE STEDMAN. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. 12mo, pp. 441.

be called even now, the "Victorian Era" in English Literature, have taken very definite form. In the past forty years, every department of letters has been impressed by the spirit of the times, and the public taste and the accepted canons of criticism have run through almost a complete cycle. The productions of the English metrical writers, during these years, present a field for the student and critic full of attractiveness. It is upon this field that Mr. Stedman has entered, and we have the results in the book whose title we give above. The arrangement which has been followed is that of criticism of the foremost poets, in such a way as not only to present an historical review of the whole course of British poetry since the accession of Queen Victoria, but to include a discussion of all the different phases of poetic art and life. The book is not one which is to be hurried through of an evening, but one which will repay careful study. Some of the questions which are discussed are such as these. The effects of culture upon spontaneity; the influence which science has exerted upon poetry; the possibilities of harmony between them; the relation of the prevalent scepticism to creative art; the advance which has been made in poetry as an art during the period under review; the modern revival of the dramatic instinct. It will be seen that the book is suggestive in a very high degree.

LITERARY NOTES.*—This book presents a series of what can hardly be called Essays—nine in number—on such subjects as Insufficiency; Extremes; Disguises; Standards; Rewards; Limits; Incongruity; Mutations; Paradoxes. The chapters on these subjects will remind the reader of the man who waded through the Dictionary, and declared that it was a very interesting book, but that there did not seem to be much connection in it. There is after all some "connection" in these chapters, but it is the connection of a classified *Index Rerum*. Even the Table of Contents of this collection of anecdotes, and bright sayings, will be found to be entertaining. Fortunately, too, there is a good Index.

THE YEARS THAT ARE TOLD.†—If Miss Porter had been trained to use the brush of a painter, the sentiments and the descriptions

* *Literary Notes*. By A. P. RUSSELL. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 12mo, pp. 401.

† *The years that are told*. By ROSE PORTER. A. D. F. Randolph & Co. New York: 12mo, pp. 234.

of life here embodied would have been presented on the canvass in a series of paintings with the titles of Day-dawn—Morning—Noon—Afternoon—Even-tide. However, in place of the brush, she has used the pen; yet her illustrations of these themes which can never grow old, and which can never be devoid of interest, show that she has true poetic insight. The “studies” of her five sketches are found in the memories of an aged Christian woman who is about to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of her wedding day. Perhaps some readers may be disposed to criticise Miss Porter’s work in respect to what might be called her *technique*, yet no one can fail to be charmed with her manner of developing her themes, or to be impressed anew with thankful reverence for every beautiful exhibition of the Eventide of a long life well spent.

MISCELLANEOUS.

CURRENCY AND BANKING.*—This little book by Professor Bonamy Price contains the substance of the lectures on the principles of currency and banking delivered by him at the University of Oxford. His first chapter is devoted to the consideration of a metallic currency, the second chapter to the subject of paper currency, and the third to banking.

Professor Price is very happy in the employment of simple language and a perspicuous style, and in the avoidance in great degree of technical terms. If to some readers he should seem to dwell too much on the primary principles it must be remembered that in this country propositions which are almost self-evident are called in question. His discussion of the subject of currency is very clear and satisfactory, as well as timely. We should question the correctness of the proposition which he argues at some length, that there can be no excess of a convertible currency; if by convertible he means a currency which *may be*, but is not actually, converted. The history of the currency in this country has shown that there may be a tacit understanding not to demand of the banks payment for their issues; and that the existence of a large excess of currency tends to stimulate overtrading, or in other words to find new and unnecessary uses for the excess of currency which cannot be used in the legitimate channels of trade. This is, however, incidental to the main argument which is full,

* *Currency and Banking*. By BONAMY PRICE, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

clear, and convincing on the absolute need of a currency based on and convertible into coin.

The chapter on banking is interesting and able, exhibiting the same characteristics of style and in the use of language as that on currency. In this, also, he descends to elementary truths and develops his views in a forcible manner. His illustrations are naturally drawn from the Bank of England, the working of which is clearly explained. It is worthy of the careful perusal of all bankers and business men. We think many in this country would dissent from his views on the subject of bank reserves. This, however, is a pet theory of his and does not seriously detract from the value of the essay.

The book is printed in beautiful style and is quite attractive in its general appearance.

PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE.*—The author of this book devoted the greater part of his active life to journalism in the interior of the State of New York, and sustained an influential position. He was one of the early promoters of telegraph companies in this country, and his investments in this direction proved very remunerative. After his retirement from journalism he gave more study than he had been able to give during his active life, to the subject of political economy, and this posthumous publication is one of the results of his investigations.

It is such a book as might be expected from such a man, confident and decided in its views, and fearless in conducting an argument to its conclusions, but without scientific analysis or arrangement. It is a discussion of the principles which underlie the doctrine of free trade. A large part of the book is devoted to the idea of *value*. He combats with much vigor Bastiat's definition of *value*, that "it describes the relation existing between two services exchanged" and Professor Perry's explanation that "it is a relation which one thing holds to another thing." He follows these writers very closely through their processes, and if he sometimes disproves some collateral position, he does not seem to us to sustain his attack on the main point or to establish his own position that value is an intrinsic, inherent quality of things.

* *Protection and Free Trade*: an enquiry whether protective duties can benefit the interests of a country in the aggregate; including an examination into the nature of value, and the agency of the natural forces in producing it. By ISAAC BUTTS. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1875.

The chapters on the relation of the natural forces to labor and on the principles of protection and free trade are good specimens of the application of strong common sense to abstract subjects. The author is a firm believer in free trade and presents the usual arguments in favor of it, and against the arguments of the protectionists in a forcible and striking manner.

CIVIL LAW AND THE CHURCHES.*—The authorities of the Union Theological Seminary in New York obtained for their students, last winter, two lectures from a learned Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States on the relations of churches to the law of the land. Judge Strong's reputation as a jurist is a sufficient voucher for the quality of his teaching now that it has taken the form of a book. The modest sentence at the ending of his second lecture indicates the aim and the value of the work. "Fully sensible as I am that what has been said is not a full exposition of the subject, . . . and that it will not make you lawyers, it has, I hope, revealed to you something that you may hereafter find convenient and useful." Clergymen, of all denominations, need to understand definitely what the State has to do with churches; and those who read the little book and keep it in their libraries, will learn more from it, and more accurately, than they could have learned from a mere hearing of the lectures.

SCHILLER'S *DIE PICCOLOMINI*.†—This volume is the second of the series, entitled "German Classics for American Students," which is to be edited by James Morgan Hart, LL.D., and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons. The volume which preceded it was the Hermann and Dorothea of Goethe. The critical apparatus furnished for the use of students who may read the *Piccolomini* is very complete, and comprises an historical introduction of some sixty pages; critical and explanatory notes, covering thirty pages; and an Index in which an account is given of the persons and places which are referred to in the drama; and a map in which are represented the political divisions of Germany at the commencement of the thirty years war.

* *Two Lectures upon the Relations of Civil Law to Church Polity, Discipline, and Property.* By Hon. WILLIAM STRONG, LL.D., Justice of the Supreme Court, U. S. New York: Dodd & Mead. 12mo, pp. 141.

† *Schiller's Die Piccolomini*, edited with an Introduction, Commentary, Index of persons and places, and Map of Germany. By JAMES MORGAN HART. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 16mo, pp. 178.

DR. WILLIAM SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITIES.*
—The first volume of this important work, which is now published, professes to be a continuation of the editor's well known "Dictionary of the Bible." Dr. Smith says: "It elucidates and explains, in relation to the Christian Church, the same class of subjects that the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities does in reference to the public and private life of classical antiquity. It treats of the organization of the Church, its officers, legislation, discipline, and revenues; the social life of Christians; their worship and ceremonial, with the accompanying music, vestments, instruments, vessels, and insignia; their sacred places; their architecture and other forms of art; their symbolism; their sacred days and seasons; the graves or Catacombs in which they were laid to rest." It commences at the period at which the Dictionary of the Bible leaves off, and ceases at the age of Charlemagne; and is soon to be followed by a "Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, and Doctrine." The present work has been prepared with the assistance of a very large number of the first scholars of England, and in accordance with the general plan which was followed in the Dictionaries which have preceded it. The name of each contributor is attached to his work. Some of the subjects are very fully illustrated by wood cuts; as Church architecture, the Catacombs, and the article which treats of the rise and progress of pictorial decoration in the religious buildings of the early Christians. Among the "Festivals of the Church," of course, in this first volume, there is to be found a very elaborate discussion of the various historical questions which are connected with the origin of the celebration of the 25th of December as the birth day of our Lord; and the following statement of the writer of the Article may be of interest to some: "How far the church was led by the possession of actual historical evidence to assign, as it has done, Dec. 25, as the date of the Nativity, is a matter on which it is impossible to speak otherwise than most doubtfully." The experience of Dr. Smith as an editor, and the ability of his various collaborators, are a sufficient guarantee that this Dictionary will be of great and permanent value.

* *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities.* Being a continuation of the "Dictionary of the Bible." Edited by WILLIAM SMITH, D.C.L., LL.D.; and SAMUEL CHEETHAM, M.A. In two volumes. Vol. I. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 8vo, pp. 898.

KURTZ'S CHURCH HISTORY.*—A revised edition of this standard history has just been published. The principal feature in the new work is the introduction, in an Appendix of fourteen pages, of the most important part of the material which Dr. Kurtz has added to his seventh German edition. Some errors of translation, which have been found in the first American edition, have also been corrected. Prominent in the Appendix, is an account of the conflict with Ultramontaniam in the new German Empire; a criticism of the proceedings of the Vatican Council; and a statement of the position of the "Old Catholics."

THE STORY OF THE HYMNS.†—The press bears its part annually in the preparations for Christmas and New Year's day, by issuing new works and new editions of old works, with contents so solid or pleasing, and such external attractions as to entice buying, in order to giving. Religious themes and associations fitly predominate in the selections, and sacred poetry is duly honored. One of the most elegant and suitable of these volumes is this "Story of the Hymns," from the American Tract Society. It brings together more than one hundred of the best and most noted hymns, with brief accounts of their authors, and incidents of their origin and history. It is embellished with nine engraved portraits,—of Kenn, Luther, Doddridge, Heber, Lady Huntingdon, John and Charles Wesley, Watts and Montgomery. Our readers have only to look at it in their selection of gifts.

VEST-POCKET SERIES.—Messrs. James R. Osgood & Co., have commenced the publication of some of the choicest of the shorter publications of American writers, in volumes of so diminutive a size that they may be carried without inconvenience in the pocket. The type is of so legible a description that it will not injure the eyesight of the reader, and the volumes are beautifully illustrated. Longfellow's "Evangeline," and Whittier's "Snow-Bound," have already appeared.

* *Text-Book of Church History.* By Dr. JOHN HENRY KURTZ. Two volumes in one. Revised, with corrections and additions from the Seventh German edition. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 12mo.

† *The Story of the Hymns; or Hymns that have a History.* An account of the Origin of Hymns of Personal Religious Experience. By HEEZKIAH BUTTERWORTH. American Tract Society. pp. 256.

ENGLISH RADICAL LEADERS.*—The second volume of "Brief Biographies," which is devoted to the English "Radical Leaders" of the present day, is now published by Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons. It is even more valuable and interesting than the first, of which we have already given some account, for the reason that it takes up a class of men who are just now conspicuous for the influence which they are exerting, but about whom it is not so easy to obtain reliable information. In the first place, there are six "Biographies," grouped together, of well known Members of Parliament who are characterized as "Independent Members;" Professor Fawcett; Sir Charles W. Dilke; Peter A. Taylor; Sir John Lubbock; Joseph Cowan; and Robert Meek Carter. These are followed by five "Biographies" of men who have taken a lead in "Labor Agitation;" Thomas Hughes; Anthony J. Mundella; Alexander Macdonald; Thomas Brassey; and Samuel Morley. Then such "Parliamentary Agitators" are taken up, as Samuel Plimsoll; Sir Wilfred Lawson; Edward Miall; and Henry Richards. And the volume closes with an account of some of the "Popular Leaders;" George Jacob Holyoake; Joseph Arch; Charles Bradlaugh; George Odger; and Joseph Chamberlain. At the present moment, so soon after the horrible crime of Thomassen, at Bremerhafen, special interest will be felt in the account which is given of Mr. Plimsoll, who has devoted his life to the exposure of the men who make a regular business of sending overloaded and unseaworthy ships to sea which they have previously over-insured, and thus sacrifice the lives of the seamen on board, in order that they may get the insurance. Mr. Plimsoll is a wealthy coal-merchant, who once came near losing his life by shipwreck, and in gratitude for his escape undertook the present agitation. He accumulated an immense amount of evidence on the subject, which he published at his own expense, with the following Appeal to the reader. "Somebody shall read this book, if I have to give away the whole edition. Will you help me to put these things right?" Mr. Plimsoll went into Parliament for the express purpose of laboring to secure the legislation on the subject which was needed. In one of his speeches at Liverpool he said: "There are people who buy old ships, and only old ships,—who never had a good ship and never meant to have a good ship,—and send them to sea; and the public curiosity is excited to know what the government means to do to stop this kind of

* *English Radical Leaders.* By R. J. HINTON. New York: Geo. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876. 12mo, pp. 374.

thing ; and who the people are who can sleep in their beds, when their bread is, so to speak, made out of dead men's bones." The whole chapter deserves to be read, and in fact every page of the whole book, if for no other reason than to see how men thoroughly in earnest are taking up in England the great social questions of the day.

JOB'S COMFORTERS.—This is an amusing satire, of the nature of a *reductio ad absurdum*, on Prof. Huxley, Mr. Mill, and Prof. Tyndall, and is written in imitation of the language of the Bible. A follower of Jesus Christ, in these latter days, of the name of Job, is described as grievously afflicted. "Now when the new leaders of human thought heard of all the evil that was come upon Job, they came every one from his own place ; Huxley the Moleculite, John Stuart the Millite, and Tyndall the Sadducee. And when they lifted up their eyes afar off, and saw Job more a shadow than a man, they whispered to each other : 'This comes of religious faith,' and they hastened towards him with swift feet. So they set down beside the shattered man, and in less than seven seconds Stuart the Millite began metaphorically to throw stones at his bewildered head." He is followed by Huxley, and he by Tyndall, who says "Prayer is wasted breath. Let him read Fichte in the morning, and commit Emerson's poems to memory on Sundays, and always keep by him a good translation of Plato." Dr. Parker of London is the author ; and Mr. Randolph of New York the publisher. Price 25 cents.

NOTE.

PROF. ALEXANDER MACWHORTER requests that the readers of the Article upon "The Statue exhumed Oct. 16, 1869, near the Onondaga river, in the town of Lafayette, opposite the village of Cardiff, in the State of New York," which was published in the October No. of the *New Englander*, 1875, may be referred to a communication upon the subject of this Statue, by Dr. Constantin Schlottmann, Secretary of the German Oriental Society, to the Philological and Oriental Congress at Innsbruck, Oct., 1874—and published in the Official Report of the Transactions of that Congress, Leipsic, 1875:—also to some further remarks by Dr. Schlottmann upon the same subject, at the meeting of the Oriental Congress at Rostock, October, 1875, published in the Official Report of Transactions of that Congress, Leipsic, 1875.

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NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXXV.

APRIL, 1876.

ARTICLE I.—REASONED REALISM.

Problems of Life and Mind. By GEORGE HENRY LEWES.

"I WALKED down Regent Street some time ago," says Prof. Tyndall, in his *Fragments of Science*, "with a man of great gifts and acquirements, discussing with him various theological questions. I could not accept his views of the origin and destiny of the universe, nor was I prepared to enunciate any definite views of my own. He turned to me at length and said, 'You surely must have a theory of the universe.' That I should in one way or another have solved this mystery of mysteries seemed to my friend a matter of course. 'I have not even a theory of magnetism,' was my reply." It must be now some eight or ten years ago that the universe found Prof. Tyndall unprepared with a theory, on Regent Street. The President of the British Association, assembled at Belfast, in 1874, was better equipped. Whether he had solved the mystery of magnetism in the mean time we do not know, but he had discerned the promise and potency of all kinds of life in matter, and as to the mystery of mysteries this was what he said: "The inexpugnable position of Science may be stated in a few words. We claim, and we

shall wrest from Theology the entire domain of cosmological theory," which includes, we suppose, the origin and destiny as well as the constitution of the universe. We all know how much, not only the theologians, but a good many metaphysicians, psychologists, moralists and men of the world, were taken aback by this definition of the inexpugnable position of Science, and that a good deal of bad blood, theological and other, was the consequence, Prof. Tyndall himself developing an amount of susceptibility he would have been incapable of ten years before on Regent Street. Our sympathies are mostly with Prof. Tyndall in this affair, for his appropriation of the domain of cosmological theory is not, as it has been branded, a reckless speculation but a strategical necessity; to protect his frontiers he has been obliged to occupy the country beyond. We do not suppose that he really knows anything more of the relations of mind to body, of life to organization, or of the origin and destiny of the universe than in his days of happy ignorance and irresponsibility; but he has discovered, what indeed is manifest to everybody by this time, that the Rhine can't be held without the Rhine provinces, that no empirical theory of any the least thing can be kept from running incontinently into a cosmological theory. If all changes are modes of motion and all motions affections of matter, then all contemporary things are derivations from preceding things, and the theory of any one of them is the whole history of its derivation, which, in the end, involves the history of all the others. The theologians of Belfast and other towns are exempt from this necessity; not affirming the doctrine of universal derivation they can theorize about mind or life or affinity or gravitation without committing themselves anywhere else and so have no excuse for rash speculation or for losing their temper. But the empiricist carries this tremendous burden with him and faces this appalling danger wherever he goes; he cannot even pry into the mystery of magnetism without bringing out upon him the terrible Sphinx with her riddle of the universe. We cannot but think this a situation to be treated with all possible tenderness; that in the task of getting mind out of matter, life out of the not-living, elective affinities out of indiscriminating gravitation and so on, a large latitude should be granted in the use of

"scientific imagination," and the invention of "scientific hypotheses," while eccentricities of temper and of logic which would be insufferable in a Belfast theologian should be generously condoned. What surprises us is that Prof. Tyndall has not found out that his most formidable foes are they of his own household, that while he is wresting the domain of cosmological theory from the feeble talons of Theology another claimant is wheeling overhead like an eagle over an osprey. Prof. Tyndall's cosmological theory is an extension of the Atomic Theory. Matter is composed of an infinite or indefinite number of "ultimate units" which are endowed with "structural" or "formative" forces of attraction and repulsion, mechanical and chemical, molar and molecular, out of whose collisions and compositions have arisen the varied phenomena of animate and inanimate being. While we write* Prof. Tyndall is absorbed in entrenching this theory against the irritated theologians of Belfast, wholly unaware, so far as we can see, of what Mr. George Henry Lewes has taken two volumes octavo to tell him, that if the objective universe is constituted in the way he supposes, then all his subjective speculations about it are of the transcendental *à priori* kind; that a mind possessed of that sort of knowledge cannot have evolved out of a universe composed of that sort of matter, so that what he takes from Theology with one hand he is giving back to Metaphysics with the other; much as if Bismarck had turned over to the Republic what Moltke had wrested from the Empire.

This immediately transfers our sympathies to Mr. Lewes, who must now hold the domain of cosmological theory, not only against the theologians, but the Atomists too. There are no transcendent elements in consciousness. It has *à priori* cognitions, but they are the results of ancestral experience, and consciousness is simply the subjective aspect of changes in the organism, where the results have been registered. The antithesis between feeling and motion is consequently an ideal abstraction, and so are the antitheses between motion and matter, matter and force, attraction and repulsion, cause and effect. Contemporary things, therefore, are not derivations from preceding things; they

* *Fortnightly*, for Nov., 1875.

are only other aspects of the same things "successively viewed," and the outcome of the whole "Identität-Philosophie" is the doctrine of an infinite and indestructible Plenum, whose differentiated, but forever equivalent aspects are known to us as the universe of Mind and Matter. We say again of this doctrine what we said of the other, that it is not a needless audacity, but the sad manoeuvre of a theorist whose salvation lies in taking the offensive, whose position can be held only by wresting from all his predecessors the "whole domain of cosmological theory;" and any criticism is ungenerous which does not take into account the increasing straits and the diminishing resources of empiricism.

But if we mistake not there is one point upon which Mr. Lewes may reasonably be held to stricter account. We may consent to the Plenum as the only available hypothesis left him by the ingenuity of his predecessors to plant upon the domain of cosmological theory; taking for granted that successive differentiations have produced those "static aspects" of the Plenum known to us as the various forms of matter from the atom up to the human organism, and those "dynamic aspects" known as the various forms of force from attraction and repulsion up to vitality. But given that particular differentiation which is known as the Human Body, then there are good reasons for asking Mr. Lewes to explain to us the genesis of that other differentiation which is known as the Human Mind. For, in the first place, this is really the *fons et origo mali*. Mr. Lewes' psychology is what has determined his cosmology. It is not observation of the Cosmos outside which has committed him to the Plenum with its identical or equivalent manifestations, but interpretation of consciousness, and however considerate we may be of the Plenum itself, we ought to know all about that consciousness whose interpretation has made it unavoidable. In the second place, if we understand the English language, which sometimes we are by no means sure we do, then this is the very explanation which Mr. Lewes has undertaken to provide in the *Problems of Life and Mind*. It is well known that Mr. Lewes is one of the most laborious and learned physiologists of the time, and he informs us that since 1836 he has been trying to turn the lights of physiology upon the obscurities of consciousness. In 1860 his re-

searches into the nervous system gave him his first clue through the labyrinth of mental phenomena, and a systematic investigation, begun in 1862, into the mechanism of feeling and thought, brought him to the conclusion, which is the starting point of the *Problems of Life and Mind*, that Psychology as it has descended to us from the past, lacks the fundamental data necessary to its constitution as a science. These missing data then, we infer, are to be supplied by Physiology, and how Physiology supplies them is to be learned in *Problems of Life and Mind*.

Now, not forgetting that what Mr. Lewes has written so far is but the preface, or at most a first installment of the "creed" he proposes to "found," we grieve to have to say that the *Problems of Life and Mind* which is uncommonly rich in psychological speculation is uncommonly destitute of physiological data. *Lucus a non lucendo*. We hear next to nothing of researches into the nervous system, or of investigation of the mechanism of feeling and thought. There are sections entitled "Biostatics," "Biological Data" and "Sociological Data," but the reader is warned that they contain only provisional results for which the anatomical, physiological, and psychological evidence is to be produced by and by. He is to "accept what he can and to suspend his judgment on the rest."* In the meantime we are left to grope our own way in the light of Mr. Lewes's promises through what is certainly the darkest labyrinth in which human research has ever gone astray. The problem is to discover the missing data of Psychology among the physiological changes of the organism, that is, more simply, to construe consciousness as a function of the brain and the other nervous centres. By an ineptitude of Nature, which seems to us the more wonderful the more we ponder over it, the brain happens to be that particular differentiation of the Infinite Plenum of which we know, and are able to know, less perhaps than of any other in the range of our experience. (1) I cannot find that I have any direct consciousness of the brain at all, certainly none that gives me any insight into its workings. I have a very distinct consciousness of certain other parts of the organism; I do seem to see with my eyes and hear with my ears, and to be conscious that I do. The remote in-

* I, p. 146.

strumentation of the special senses at the surface of the body, and of the interior organs which yield those feelings which Mr. Lewes has called the "systemic sensations," such as hunger and thirst, has its records in consciousness, but the actions of the great central organ where peripheral and systemic sensations are gathered together and coördinated have vanished from consciousness and left no wrack behind.* This is very awkward. The area which contains the physiological data of psychology has sunk out of sight and no refinements of introspection avail to fill the abyss. (2) To aggravate the situation I am able to get no indirect intelligence of the subsided area. I can turn some of the special sense organs upon some of the others and upon the objects of them so making vision tell a little of touch, and touch a little of vision; but I can turn none of them upon the nervous centres within. I am completely excluded on both sides from the region where the mystery is transacted and where alone it can be solved. It follows that all I know of my brain is what physiology tells me of other men's brains. But here again nature is as obstinate as before, for I can't get at any man's brain without killing the man; and even were it settled that in this case vivisection is justifiable homicide I should be no better off than before, for a dead brain is an unconscious brain, and what I seek is the resolution of consciousness into cerebration. Finally, the complete exposure of the living brain to my senses and scientific tests could only tell me that certain physical changes go along with certain psychical changes, but of the transformation of the one into the other or of the identity of the two it could tell nothing at all. (3) Physiology, however, if reserved about function has something to say about structure, but nothing could be more embarrassing than a good deal of what it says. The nervous centres are that particular portion of the organism which shows (whatever it may have) a lower organization than any of the others. According to Mr. Spencer, a physiologist of credit and

* Physiologically, of course, the peripheral and systemic sensations all belong to the nervous centres, their localization in exterior organs taking place during growth as a result of the experiences which teach us that these organs are the parts directly affected. The effect of this distribution and localization is to mask completely the actions of the nervous centres and with them the evolution of consciousness.

renown, they have originated as amorphous masses of tissue piled up or thrown together in the collision of molecular motions arriving from different points at the surface of the organism. They are therefore admirably fitted for the interception, the storing up and the release of motion, and, consequently, as it would seem, for making themselves directly felt in consciousness. Yet this, as we saw, is the very function which the facts constrain us to deny to them for they are not directly felt in consciousness at all; while the function with which in our hypothesis we credit them is the very one for which they seem to be unfitted. Relatively structureless themselves they stand midway between the wonderful organization of the universe outside and the more wonderful organization of the mind within, the interpretation of the one to the other, or the unification of the two. In his *Physiology of Common Life*, Mr. Lewes has turned this difficulty by ascribing to the homogeneous ganglia a single common property which he calls "Sensibility," whose reactions on different stimuli produce different sensations, so that the complex organization of consciousness is due, not to complexity of the nerve-cells, but to complexity of their connections with other parts of the organism. The objection to this generalization is that reaction requires a structure no less complex than is required by action; as the whole organism is able to reply to the environment only in so far as it has been differentiated into adjustment thereto, so the nervous centres reply to the rest of the organism, which is their environment, only in so far as they have been adjusted to the rest of the organism.* This difficulty again has been met by multiplying the connections of the nerve-cells with one another. Prof. Bain has calculated that there are

* The American representative of the *Identität-Philosophie* is very severe on the "detached abstractions" with which Metaphysics has corrupted the simplicity of science and of life. (*Nation*, No. 532, on "German Darwinism.") There is no better sample of such wicked abstractions than the "Sensibility" and "Neurility" of the *Physiology of Common Life*. Mr. Lewes actually writes of the reactions of Sensibility on Neurility as if Sensibility were anything more than the sum of the reactions themselves, or Neurility more than the sum of the stimuli; and he defines sensibility the common property of the ganglionic substance as if "substance" were anything more than the sum of "properties." All this, however, was written years ago before Mr. Lewes had discovered the exact character of metaphysical method and detached abstractions.

molecules enough in the brain, and fibres enough running between them, to provide a concurrent action of two or more molecules for every change in the universe which is registered after any sort whatsoever in consciousness, and Mr. Spencer abounds in speculation of the same sort; the idea being that by blending together simple units of molecular motion in multiples of increasing complexity we get a physical basis for complex consciousness. This is more to the purpose, and it increases our regret that Mr. Lewes has not begun the foundations of his creed, by laying down the physiological data at once.

Accepting, however, the promises to pay as lawful tender we will suppose that the unproduced data are producible; that in spite of their surpassing sensitiveness to stimulus and their unstable equilibrium or liability to "explode" and decompose, the nervous ganglia have patiently taken on an enduring and intricate structure, have developed into a microcosm whose reverberations answer perfectly to the universe outside. These we take it and the like of these are the physiological data; high organization, the orderly reception of innumerable stimuli, the orderly liberation of innumerable motions; and the question is, do they supply the elements of a possible consciousness? Motions of inconceivable fineness, in incalculable numbers, in endless succession, in sustained order; can sensation be got out of them? can perception? or ideas? or pleasure and pain? or will? or personality? In a word can that sum-total of all these which we call consciousness be got out of them? or can it be identified with them?

If now Mr. Lewes is faithful to the principles and traditions of Empiricism this feat will be attempted in one way and no other. Thus, empirical science has got latent heat out of molar motion by the simple and beautiful process of declaring that latent heat is molecular motion; it has got radiant heat and light out of latent heat by declaring that they are undulatory motions; it has got, or means to get, polarity, affinity, cohesion, capillarity, by declaring them to be motion; and it means to get vitality and heredity out of lower modes of motion by declaring that they are motions too. In no one case has it ever actually witnessed the process of transmutation; in every case it has supplied the missing steps of the process by the

dogma that the so-called force in question is a redistribution of some antecedent motion or motions. This single generalization is the weapon with which Empiricism has won all its victories. We do not in the least question its validity here; we simply say that this is the principle and tradition of Empiricism, and that if Mr. Lewes is faithful, if he really means to constitute the Science of Psychology on physiological data he will get consciousness in the same way that Helmholtz gets heat or Spencer vitality by declaring that consciousness is motion. To swerve one hair's breadth from this line of demonstration is, we submit, to break with the philosophy we understand him to profess and the particular pledges we understand him to have given. He is under bonds to maintain as fact, theory, hypothesis or dogma, that the contents of consciousness are modes of motion.

(1) He begins, in thorough loyalty to the empirical methods, by casting out of consciousness all transcendental elements which by the very terms of their definition could never have been yielded by experience acquired or inherited; the intuitions of necessary universal truths, the *a priori* forms of thought, the original faculties of knowing, reasoning, willing, the whole of that antiquated lumber which Psychology has trusted to as proofs of the separateness, the independence, and the durability of the soul. Manifestly these are things which cannot come from the organism, which it is impossible to provide with physiological data or to construe as modes of motion. Mr. Lewes therefore suppresses them and along with them whatever may be supposed to answer to them in the objective universe, individuality, substance, universal necessity, the absolute. How this is done will be subject of future consideration; here we only note the fact. (2) What is left as the sum-total of consciousness are feelings and those segregations and integrations of feelings which have slowly arisen in the course of ages and which we may sum under the general term, ideas. This integrating process seems to have gone so far that no perfectly simple feelings can be discerned in consciousness standing uncompounded by themselves. The ultimate elements have all been worked up into multiples more or less complex exactly as the units of matter or motion in the external world have integrated into compound bodies or actions long before they

become decernible to the senses. We have those lowest compounds which we term nervous shocks or discharges; then those higher ones known as sensations of sound, warmth, brightness, color, odor, pressure, movement, each being a cluster of similar feelings abstracted from other differing ones and fused together; then those still higher abstracts and integers called perceptions of bodies; then conceptions of the common characters of bodies which we express in general terms; until at last we escape quite out of the concrete into the ideal world. Here reign the highest abstractions and syntheses of science and philosophy; here the superlative idealism of mathematics from which the concrete aspects of the Plenum have disappeared leaving only the purified conceptions of extension, duration, number, quantity. Probably no enumeration of mental phenomena has ever been contrived so inviting for the great empirical generalization which has wrought wonders elsewhere, that all changes are modes of motion.

However, the perplexing elements have not been all weeded out by the enumeration. To begin among the summits, as it were, of consciousness, the region of our most abstract feelings, what is meant by telling me that my idea of a perfect circle, or square, or triangle, is a motion, and how can it be shown that this is true? Figures are limitations of extension, and extension certainly is not motion, nor are its limitations motions, and how can our ideas of them be motions? If it be said that our ideas of abstract extension, or space, are derived from our experience of concrete extended things, then we are met by the difficulty that there are no perfect concrete figures anywhere in existence and so no experience of them. Perhaps we have no perfect ideas of perfect figures but reach our mathematical conclusions by comparing approximate ideas; but what sort of a motion is that which when given out by the molecules of the brain I call an approximate idea of a perfect circle? And how can any abstraction and fusion of such motions yield a mathematical certainty or even an identical proposition? * Imagine the Consciousness of Sir Isaac Newton

* Practically we identify a thing by the equivalence of our present and our past feelings of the thing. There being no motions in the brain exactly equal, how is experience to yield an equivalent proposition? If there are no equivalent propositions what becomes of Mathematics? and what of the *Identität-Philosophie*? This, however, properly belongs to the discussion of Necessary Truth.

when sitting down to review his Optics or his treatise on Fluxions, the world of abstract ideas of quantity and infinitesimals of quantity, with their innumerable equations and proportions, and then try to fathom what is meant by saying that these ideas were all motions, and what the static and dynamic conditions of his brain must have been if they were. Or coming down out of this abstract empyrean, picture the interior of the brain from which flowed the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, or that other brain which yielded the *Divine Comedy*. Indeed, the difficulties increase as we descend to the concrete, from the ideal to the practical life. I find myself completely befogged by being told that a pain is a motion or that any other feeling is. And the more carefully I ponder over it the more it seems to me that this incapacity is constitutional, however we suppose the mind to have been constituted, whether by evolution or by creation. If it is a fact that mind is redistributed motion, then I can only say that Persistent Force has been busy from immemorial time in preparing for me this most mortifying predicament of having my feelings so organized that it seems to be nonsense to say that they are what they are—motions, and mere matter of fact to say that they are what they are not—not motions. That this organic incapacity of mine is insuperable I do not like to say; remembering what has happened to affinity, vitality, and heredity, which have turned up modes of motion in the most surprising manner, it may be that this unthinkable proposition, "feeling is motion too" will turn up in Mr. Lewes's hands not only thinkable but palpably true. It would be inexcusable rashness to deny the possibility of the feat, although one which Empiricism, flushed with all its other victories, has so far declined. Mr. Mill says it is not in him to do it; Mr. Spencer says it is not in him; Prof. Tyndall says it is not in *him*. So we turn with exceeding curiosity to the *Problems of Life and Mind* to see if it is in Mr. Lewes. And this is what we find:

"Here at any rate, it is said, Science must acknowledge its impotence; . . . the transformation of a neural process into a sensation remains an impenetrable mystery. Mind we know, and Feeling we know; but we know them as utterly different, and know the one becomes changed into the other . . . is a question which can never be answered."

"To explain Feeling as a mode of Motion has generally been pronounced absurd. I am not aware that anyone has endeavored to explain Motion as a mode of Feeling; yet this is the conclusion which forces itself on my mind and which seems to reconcile all the difficulties which have been raised."

"We have good reason for asserting that the Motion which is contrasted with Feeling is, strictly speaking, only one mode of Feeling contrasted with all other modes and made to represent the objective or physical aspect of phenomena."

"While the logical disparity between Object and Subject, or Motion and Feeling, is wide and irremovable, the real parity lies in their both being modes of Feeling. . . . Does it not follow that Feeling is the much sought *Thing in itself*—the ultimate of search? All things can be reduced to it; but it can be reduced to nothing more general."*

To be sure. This is a contrivance for "reconciling the difficulties that have been raised" which never occurred to us. The obstacle which has stopped the triumphant hosts of Empiricism is turned by inverting an identical proposition. "Feeling is Motion:" that is an absurdity, and has generally been pronounced so, and is abandoned as absurd by Mr. Lewes. "Motion is Feeling:" *that* is a luminous truth dispelling the supreme mystery of Subject and Object, and with it all the minor mystifications of the universe; for Feeling is the Great *Dingansicht*, the ultimate of search whereinto all things are reducible, so that having got it we have got the Not-it too, the objective aspects of the Infinite and Indestructible Plenum.

But as we rub our bewildered eyes over the beautiful boon which Mr. Lewes has laid in our hand, lost in wonder for the efficacy of one small identical proposition, it occurs to us that this is not what was nominated in the bond, this is not the article which we expected to receive and which Mr. Lewes contracted to deliver. Not only is it not the great empirical generalization that all changes are modes of motion, but more particularly it is not the constitution of the science of Psychology on physiological data; on the contrary, it is the constitution of Physiology on psychological data; and of Biology, and

* Prob. VI. The Absolute in Feeling and Motion.

Physics, and Cosmology ; no longer the evolution of Consciousness out of the Plenum, but the evolution of the Plenum out of Consciousness. In other words this is Idealism, and Idealism of an aggravated type. The ultimate reality, the absolute being, is Feelings ; not Feelings inhering in a Substance which feels and elicited by substances which are felt, but simply Feelings themselves clinging and clustered together, whose aggregate constitutes the substance of Self, whose contrasted modes constitute the substances of the Not-self, so that it is the Feelings which feel and the Feelings which are felt. How this Idealism is converted into Reasoned Realism, how Mr. Lewes contrives to get an external Plenum out of the objective aspects of his consciousness the reader will find set forth in the *Problems of Life and Mind* ; suffice it to say here that the Demiurgus of this most extraordinary of all possible universes is our irrepressible old friend *Petito Principii* ; this time so perfectly naked as to have brought ingenuous blushes into the seasoned countenance of the *Westminster Review* itself ; whose *pudeur* no one ever had occasion to suspect before.

Philosophy began with Idealism. Certain of sensations but doubtful of their truthfulness it set itself to discover the reality and the causes of the phenomena given in sensation. Baffled in that search it turned to the observation of phenomena themselves. Observing them, it resolved that the reality and the cause are the phenomena ; then that the phenomena are the sensations ; ending where it began, by identifying the ultimate with the initial reality. From Feeling to the Absolute ; from the Absolute to the Phenomenal ; from Phenomena to Feeling. So Philosophy is the dove let loose upon the waste of waters to find no resting-place for its weary feet but the ark from whence it flew. This, and not its Reasoned Realism, is the significant thing in *Problems of Life and Mind*. To Mr. Lewes belongs the honor of completing an era and closing the circle of philosophic thought.

ARTICLE II.—THE VALUE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES.*

WE have met to-night to witness the award of two prizes offered by your liberal and learned townsman, Dr. Whitsitt, for excellence in Greek. This air is still and pure. No electric flashes of passion disturb it; no murky vapors of prejudice poison it. Only the chaste ardors of a few expectant youths give it a healthful warmth, while the serene and approving countenances of these friends and exemplars of learning fill it with the spirit of sweetness and repose. I rejoice to be here. With my first word, I welcome you all, the young and the old, the learned and the unlearned, to this restful scene, and this ennobling occasion. Sweet learning has here her hour; culture spreads these viands; the genius of aspiration for things pure and noble, a genius as ancient as man, as youthful as the child of to-day, a genius whose fires lighted up the Hellespont and the Ægean thirty centuries ago, and to-night, here in this secluded canton of a world not then dreamed of, burns with a warmth and radiance unsubdued, and

—"shall burn unquenchably,

Until the eternal doom shall be,"

presides over this banquet.

How thankful should we be that such an occasion, so rare and precious, is permitted to us from out the still almost open jaws of a destruction which wasted the fields, swept away the material riches, burned up the very implements and supplies of learning, and soaked the earth with the life-blood of the bravest and best of this generation! How does the story which Æneas,

"*Quanquam animus meminisse horret, luctuque refugit,*"

poured into the ear of the admiring Trojan queen, come mended and heightened in its thrill and pathos by this later story of scenes fresh in the memories of us all! How ought we to rejoice that our story may still be told around our own hearth-stones, in our own native land, and not like Virgil's immortal wanderer's tale, in a foreign realm, after cruel tossings by sea and land!

* An address delivered at Greenville, S. C., on the occasion of the award of the Whitsitt Greek Prizes, December 16, 1875.

This occasion speaks a voice and has a significance which must appeal to the sensibilities of all who love learning. It is a pure tribute to the worth of classical culture. It is the evidence of the value set by this people on things that seem remote from their daily material wants. It is an effort to rekindle the fires, the cheering, unconsuming, enlightening fires of learning, in the places where the baleful, devouring flames of war so lately burned. Heaven's benediction be upon such occasions, such efforts! They are worthy of any people. They are worthy of South Carolina, of her past, of her present. Let it be said now that our State has never wanted witnesses to the great truths of scholarship, exemplars of its spirit, patrons of its arts, representatives of its high attainments. Though the statement may be challenged beyond our borders, yet I speak my sincere conviction when I say that nowhere in America has there been shown a more sincere devotion to classical culture on the part of those whose opportunities have permitted its cultivation, than in this state. The familiar line of our statesmen, orators, and divines proves it. The observation of one who even now shall observe the professional mind of the state proves it. If less widely diffused, if possessed by fewer, it has votaries as sincere and its influence is as marked and constant in those who claim its companionship, as among any people to whom my acquaintance has extended.

I cannot forget too that on the soil of this state have been fought some of the most significant battles in the long contest between the advocates and detractors of classical studies. Whoever is familiar to any degree with the literature of his country will recall the fact that it was the Hon. Thomas S. Grimke of Charleston, himself an accomplished classical scholar, who in 1827 uttered these startling words:—"I desire to record here emphatically my opinion, founded on the history of my own mind, and the experience of twenty years, that I have derived no substantial improvement from the classics;" and who seven years later declared, "The whole system of education is destined to undergo an American Revolution in a higher and holier sense of the term than that of '76, by the substitution of a complete Christian American education for the strange and anomalous compound of the spirit of ancient, foreign, heathen states of society, with the genius of modern, American Christian institutions."

And whose was the voice that answered and silenced this ominous and powerful outburst? Who, of all the scholars of the land, may be said most effectually to have subdued this portentous rebellion against the authority of the Republic of letters? My heart swells with pride, though not native to this soil, as I speak the name of Hugh Swinton Legaré. In that memorable initial article in the "*Southern Review*," called forth by the philippic of Mr. Grimke, he pours forth the wealth of his learning, the splendor of his diction, and the fervid love of his heart, in glowing defence of classical education. "They who apply," says he, "this radical, levelling, *cui bono* test, who estimate genius and taste by their value in exchange, and weigh the results of science in the scales of the money-changer, may be wiser in their generation than the disinterested votaries of knowledge; but they have, assuredly, made no provision in their system for the noblest purposes of our being." "We refer," again he proudly exclaims, "to that education and to those improvements which draw the broad line between civilized and barbarous nations, which have crowned some chosen spots with glory and immortality, and covered them all over with a magnificence that even in its mutilated and mouldering remains, draws together pilgrims of every tongue and every clime, and which have caused their names to fall like a "breathed spell" upon the ear of the generations that come into existence, long after the tides of conquest and violence have swept over them, and left them desolate and fallen. It is such studies we mean, as make the vast difference in the eyes of a scholar between Athens, their seat and shrine, and even Sparta with all her civil wisdom and military renown, and have (hitherto at least) fixed the gaze and thoughts of all men with curiosity and wonder, upon the barren little peninsula between Mount Cithæron and Cape Sunium, and the islands and the shores around it, as they stand out in lonely brightness and dazzling relief, amidst the barbarism of the West on the one hand, and the dark and silent and lifeless wastes of Oriental despotism on the other. We are thus let into that great communion of scholars throughout all ages and all nations,—like that awful communion of saints in the holy church universal,—and feel a sympathy with departed genius and with the enlightened and the gifted minds of other

countries, as they appear before us in the transports of a sort of Beatific Vision, bowing down at the same shrines and glowing with the same holy love of whatever is most pure and fair and exalted and divine in human nature."

We meet, therefore, under the sanctions not only of our own convictions and experiences of the worth of classical studies, but of some of the purest examples in our local history of their power to inspire the human mind with sentiments which touch the chords of fraternal kinship throughout the world of genius and taste. How pleasant, too, to meet for once where harsh rivalries have no place! Strange, is it not? but true, that a more perfect peace reigns here than even in the assemblies where we meet to worship the Author of our being? The vaulted roofs of gorgeous cathedrals, and the unadorned churches which suit the severity of the Puritan's faith, echo, how often, with words of denunciation and controversy! The Senate and the Forum, the marts of business and the haunts of fashion, are filled with the din and jostling of the seekers of wealth or fame. Be it so. Life is a warfare. I do not arraign the Providence which has so ordered. I honor the stout fighter. I reverence him who keeps his faith with God and man, stern and true even to blood and death,—such men as "in the tapestried chambers of England's great sway, with stout sword on thigh and a stouter faith in the heart,

"Sat with Bibles open around the council board,
And answered a king's missive with a stern Thus saith the Lord!"*

But who does not know that strength must be nourished and renewed by repose, that the tension of controversy must be followed by the relaxation of harmony? Here, in the fellowship of learning, under the truce of scholarship, no hostile chiefs are seen; no fluttering pennons of opposing squadrons greet the eye. Gentle influences rule here; sentiments common to all who have once been admitted to such scenes; sympathies ardent, tender, far-reaching; generous aspirations; memories linking us to the pure and noble of earlier ages; hopes that run forward and paint the future with hues of millennial peace and glory:

* Palfrey.

—"the books, the arts, the Academies,
That show, contain and nourish all the world;"

these are the monitors and benedictions of this hour.

On such an occasion there is but one theme for discourse. Assembled, as we are, to witness the results and assign the rewards of youthful efforts in classical scholarship, it is becoming that we should recall and set forth some of the grounds of the estimation in which we hold classical learning and studies. The occasion calls not so much for defence as exposition. I purpose, then, to inquire, in the first place, what are the classics, in respect to their objective form and subjective matter; in the second place, in what does their value consist as a means of education; in the third place, how are they related to practical success in life; and in the last place, what are the peculiar claims of the Greek language and literature to a leading place in the attention and love of scholars.

It is familiar that the term classic, as applied to works of literature, or of art generally, is no longer restricted to its older signification. It has come by a natural expansion of meaning to embrace all works of supreme excellence in literature and art. Each nation now boasts its classic writers, its classic works, its classic age. The English classics, the French classics, the German classics, the Hebrew classics, the Persian classics, are all recognized phrases designating those works which have stood the test of time, of the criticism of successive generations, and have finally by the consenting voices of scholars been assigned to the highest rank among the literary products of their respective nations and languages. But however widely or naturally the signification of the term has been expanded, the older and, I venture to say, the true signification remains,—a signification approved by its etymology as well as its earlier use, and denoting the highest and choicest productions of the Greek and Latin literatures, those productions which have come safely down across the flood of time and along the highways of twenty and thirty centuries to kindle the admiration and delight the taste of every enlightened age and people.

Here again we may note another, if I may so say, lateral expansion of the use of the epithet, classic, by which it is applied not only to the literature, but to the art, the genius, the civili-

zation, and the modes of thought and life of the Greeks and Romans. The great classic age of Greece, however, embraces but a limited space of time, extending from the uncertain age of Homer, or about 900 B. C. to the death of Demosthenes, 322 B. C. Of the authors who flourished during this period; the number of those who have been admitted to the world's literary Pantheon is still more limited, embracing, I think, in the judgment of the most competent authorities, scarcely more than sixteen names. The great classical age of Rome may similarly be said to begin with Plautus, about 250 B. C., and to end with Tacitus, about 100 A. D., and embraces not more than fifteen unquestioned names. The age of Pericles, from 495 B. C. to 429 B. C., and the age of Augustus, from 63 B. C. to 14 A. D., are in a more limited and stricter sense the classical periods, respectively, of Greece and Rome. These periods embrace the names of hardly more than ten great classical authors. In the proper and more legitimate use, however, of our term, *classic*, as applied to Greek and Roman literature, it may be said to cover about six centuries of Greek, and about three and a half centuries of Roman life and history, and to include the names of about thirty authors. The entire works of these authors with which general classical scholarship interests itself, would be comprised, I think, within the compass of about fifty modern octavo volumes of three hundred pages each.

Consider these facts for one moment. How choice the products covered by the designation, *classic*! What winnowing of harvests! What purging of threshing floors! What burning up of chaff! How priceless the pure, selected grain! Twenty-eight full centuries have come and gone; more than eighty-five generations of men have passed from cradle to grave; countless millions of individuals have lived and died; epochs, eras, empires, dynasties, have marked and checkered the long course of human history; of making books there has been no end; the great libraries of the ancient world have yielded to the flames or the ravages of time; the public libraries of Europe and the United States alone contain to-day more than sixteen millions of volumes; and out of all this ceaseless flow of human activity and production, the world to-day holds but about fifty small volumes which refined scholarship stamps with the preëminent title of classical literature.

Let us pause for another moment over this result. Does it not suggest reflections worthy of a moment's heed? Consider, first, the endless, measureless power of Art, as shown in the survival and power of the classica. What marvel like this! If the material heavens that shone on Greece and Rome and met the gaze of Homer and Plato, of Cæsar and Tacitus, are unchanged, the earth, the solid globe itself, has changed its great natural features since these supreme artists wrought their unchanging works. The poems of Homer have immortalized Troy. Who that has read those poems, especially if in the slow and labored exercises of school and college, has not pictured the city, its wooded, many-fountained Ida, its brimming, silver-eddying Xanthus, its flowery plain, its lofty citadel Pergamos, the broad Hellespont rolling into the Aegean,—what youthful student, I say, has not imagined he could trace these physical features with easy certainty, as they presented themselves when Nestor harangued the long-haired, well-greaved Achæans close by the hollow, beaked ships? But the very site of Troy, I may still say, is in hopeless doubt. "A man may seek it," says Everett, "with Strabo in his hand and Homer in his heart, and he shall not find it." The pass of Thermopylæ, scene of a heroism which still warms the blood of every heart not insensible to fine emotions, who shall find it? It is gone. The narrow defile where Leonidas, with his three hundred, stayed for an hour the avalanche of Persian invasion, through which one hundred and fifty years later the gold of Philip, more persuasive than the voice of Demosthenes, pushed the Macedonian conqueror, is sought for to-day in vain. The field of Cannæ, the plain of Pharsalia, the battle ground of Philippi, bright, immortal spots in Roman history, can no longer be identified.

Behold, then, the marvel! All else is changed: but the art of Homer, the sweet strains which the blind bard "not far from thirty centuries ago poured forth in the delighted ears of heroic Greece,"* the glorious music and majestic power of Demosthenes' oratory, the martial lyrics of Pindar, the sweet morality of Socrates, the lofty philosophy of Plato, the gloomy tragedies of Aeschylus, the melodious cadences of Cicero's

* Everett.

charmed voice, the glowing narrative of Livy, the deep, even tragic earnestness of Tacitus; in a word, the thought, the spirit, the life of lives, the garnered riches, of Greece and Rome are ours to-night, unchanged, fresh with immortal beauty as when the light of Athens' power streamed across the ancient world from her Acropolis, and the eagles of Rome returned home from the conquest of all nations to the Capitoline hill.

Such, my friends, are the studies which we are forced so often to hear dismissed with the well-worn phrase, *dead languages*,—"so called, I suppose," says another, "by *antiphrasis*, because some of them have outlived ninety generations of our race, and in all human probability will outlive as many more."

Consider, next, in how small a compass the great classics lie. With the limitations which I have already pointed out, the chief works, those which are essential to a full familiarity with all the masterpieces of Greece and Rome, in their strictly classical ages, are within the easy reach of every lover of learning, however humble or poor. What a boon! The great classics are free to all! Of these the wealth of the world cannot purchase more than the mendicant monk, or the half-starved curate, the scholar of whatever condition of outward life, may possess. Nothing is requisite but the studious mind, the open sense, the earnest heart.

Such, in dim, imperfect outline, are the classics, considered in regard to their objective form—what I may call the *body* of the great classics. But what of the spirit there embodied? What of the vital soul?

"For of the soul the body form doth take,
For soul is form, and doth the body make."

In a word, what are the classics, considered in respect to their subject-matter? This is an inquiry not easily answered in the brief moments which I may give to it. This choice, selected product of art and genius has riches so various, qualities so wide in their range, the expression of sentiments and feelings so profound and universal, that it is difficult to characterize them in a few phrases or sentences. But it may perhaps be said with respect to their substance, that the classics are the best expression of the best thought of the two most cultivated nations of the

ancient world. I am sure this is a statement the truth of which those whom we call the enemies of classical studies, will not question. Think of this, then, for a moment. In the close compass of about fifty volumes of moderate size, we have a complete record at once of the highest art and the highest thought of Greece and Rome, the intellectual and political masters of the whole ancient world. Art, immortal art, which aims at expression; thought, immortal thought, which aims at knowledge; each find here the most perfect forms which man has yet contrived to set them forth. Glance with me along the line of these products. Poetry, first-born of the imperial arts, is here, in Homer's great epics,—the one singing the sovereign, deadly wrath of Peleus' son and the woes unnumbered which thence befell the Greeks,—the other telling the pathetic tale of the wanderings and adventures of "the man of many wiles;" in the lyrics of the Theban Pindar, celebrating the triumphs of the games, Olympian, Pythian, Nemean, or Isthmian, where the valor of Greece was trained, and where were gathered the pride and glory of her civilization; in the rugged but sonorous metres of *Æschylus* wherein hopeless necessity presses on through ever-thickening terrors and gloom to its tragic end; in the epic of *Virgil* which traces the fortunes of the Ilian race from the fall of Troy, celebrates the glories of the Julian line and paints the future splendor of the imperial city; in the sweet, familiar odes of *Horace*, the keen wit, the joyous companion, the faithful satirist of Roman follies and crimes, "the most read, best remembered, and most frequently quoted," of all the great classic writers.

History is here, "the Art," in a deep sense, "perservative of all Arts," and the great father of history, the Doric *Herodotus*, traces the growth of Persian power, weaving into his historical narrative the abundant wealth of mythological and geographical knowledge, and illustrating on every page under the personality of *Nemesis* the Christian thought of a Providence which shapes the ways of man; here *Thucydides*, the unrivalled master of historical perspective, crowds into his few pages the complete picture of that great central event of Greece, the Peloponesian war; here too is the light-flowing,

symmetrical narrative of Livy, and here Tacitus, most dignified of historians, presents his pious offering, *Vita Agricolaë*, or traces with sad earnestness the growing corruptions of the age of the Cæsars. The great persuasive art, Oratory, is here, and Demosthenes, prince of all orators, appeals in strains that take captive the ear and heart of all with whom love of country is a principle or sentiment; while Cicero pours forth his lavish periods weighted equally with pathos and philosophy. Here, finally, Philosophy, the absolute and universal Science, revealing or seeking to reveal the Infinite and Absolute, speaks by the voices of her earliest and greatest masters, Plato and Aristotle; and sweet Morality comes commended from the lips of Socrates and Seneca.

Such and so great, *tales tantique*, are the treasures which lie open to all enlightened communities of modern times, treasures often rejected and contemned, rarely explored or appropriated, almost never sounded to their full depths nor estimated at their full value.

But let me hasten rapidly to present the elements of value which the classics afford in the process which we call education. I need not premise here that I shall not expect nor attempt to present new truths or arguments. The field has already been swept by careful harvesters, and I can hardly hope to find the few grains which ancient custom left for the poor. But we can never too often on fit occasions repeat the reasons of that faith which makes us cling, as to an ark of safety, to the study of the classics in our schools. I do not now set myself to the task of vindicating the claim of the classics to an exclusive supremacy in our courses of study, though, if challenged, I should hope to be able to maintain that they should still constitute the central, distinctive feature in any well-planned curriculum of studies. At present I shall seek only to point out a few of their conspicuous merits in the practical process of education.

And first we must understand what is meant by education. I avoid all disputed points when I say that education consists, under any admissible view, in great part of the simple training of the faculties, of the intellect and soul. I do not refuse to

admit to the complete idea of education the acquisition of knowledge,—facts, truths,—apart from the disciplinary effect of the process of acquisition, or still further, the special preparation in some degree for the calling or occupation which is to succeed the schools. The just breadth of the conception of education as a process of development and discipline, in truth includes all else, for the means of discipline are at one and the same time the means of acquiring knowledge, and of some special preparation for any calling in life. Viewing education as in a comprehensive as well as preëminent sense, a disciplinary process, so far as schools are concerned, let us inquire what, by common consent, is the first means of education, first in order of fact and of importance?

It is language. And what is language? I was about to answer, language is a mystery; for so it is, the greatest of human mysteries. I can seem to conceive of the mind as a faculty or the source of faculties. I can likewise conceive of thought as the exercise of the mind; but what is language? It is not mind, nor thought; yet mind and thought find representation, activity, life, practical being, only in language, words written or spoken. This common air is stirred by a vocal undulation, the sign thereof is written on some visible, tangible surface, and the miracle is complete; the airy nothing takes local habitation and a name; mind and thought stand revealed; the more than electric bond of communication is completed between man and man, between age and age, on and on till the heavens be no more! Yet what is language? Can you tell me, men of science, votaries of learning, who honor this gathering with your approving presence? Among the things which we may call human, it is the mystery of mysteries. But the Sphinx will have its answer, and so we say that language is the representative, the medium, the embodiment, the revelation, of mind and thought. Poor, poor words, I know, to set forth and describe this first great organ of education.

But language is more than this. In a deeper sense, language is thought. Its very use involves thought, is a part of the thinking process. Our distinction is scarcely more than logical or formal, for language itself involves not only some knowledge of the mental processes but it is a part of those processes. The

reflex influence, the mutual interaction of thought and language, are constant and unquestionable, "the operations of the brain and heart, the articulation of the vocal organs, and the reception of sounds by the ear, being," to borrow the fine phrase of another, "an inseparable synergy." Language is, therefore, the very source of all culture of human faculties; it alone makes education possible. Grammar, called the science of language, is, as Mr. Mill acutely observes, the most elementary part of logic. "It is the beginning of the analysis of the thinking process. The principles and rules of grammar are the means by which the forms of language are made to correspond with the universal forms of thoughts." Parts of speech are, in sober truth, parts of thought. "The structure of every sentence is a lesson in logic."*

But consider also that language is not only objective thought, or the representative of thought, but that each year is now adding to the importance and value of its study, by tracing its relations to the general history of the race, and seeking to deduce therefrom some of the long-kept secrets which lie back of all human records. Comparative philology, and its outgrowth, linguistic philosophy, are yielding year by year the richest fruits now gathered in the whole world of study. The classics are no longer stereotyped studies. New lights stream upon them, and as Professor Masson quaintly says, "through this study (philology) scholars are already twining their hands in the mane of back-rushing Time, and compelling the monster to stand, and extracting from her some of her obscurest secrets." Professor Whitney, most judicious perhaps of all American or European writers on linguistic philosophy, declares "as the grand conclusion at which historical study has surely and incontrovertibly arrived," that "the historically traceable beginnings of speech were simple roots; not parts of speech even, and still less forms."

As the first organ or implement of education, therefore, the study of language is not only important and indispensable in the practical process of education, but with every advance of linguistic scholarship this importance increases.

The inquiry now meets us, how shall language, this expression and representative of thought and feeling, be best studied?

* J. S. Mill.

It does not admit of doubt that it must be done by a study of a language or languages, meaning now by this term some speech peculiar to a nation or people. All languages cannot be studied. A selection must be made; and thus we reach at once the inquiry,—what language or languages shall be selected for the purpose of acquiring familiarity with the principles of language, and skill in its use, or more comprehensively, for attaining the ends of education. The proper rule of selection is readily stated. I venture to present it thus: the language or languages should be chosen which combine in the highest relative degree, *first*, originality of form and structure; *second*, perfection of form with power of expression; *third*, compass of thought and feeling with value and variety of information.

Let us consider for a single moment each of these requisites. Is it not clear that for reaching the object now in view, that language is most valuable which while presenting other excellences in due degree, shall bring us nearest to the original forms in which language was moulded? Language is a development, a growth, traceable, according to the great authority just quoted, back to primitive roots which are something more elementary than parts or forms of speech. How can this development be deeply studied unless we go back near to the cradle of language and catch, so far as we may, its first faint lispsings? Here let me state one obvious limitation of this feature of our rule. There are members of the great family of languages, even of the Indo-European group, which doubtless in some features run back more nearly to the primitive roots of language than the Greek, or certainly than the Latin, but whose comparative poverty in other respects, renders them unsuitable as an ordinary means of studying language in our schools. This may, I think, be said of the Sanscrit, among the Indo-European, and of the Hebrew, among the Semitic tongues. Antiquity or primity alone, will not furnish a proper test of the value of a language for the general purpose now in view. But with this limitation a language will be valuable in direct ratio to its nearness to the earlier roots or forms of speech.

The second requisite needs little more than statement. Perfection of form, completeness of structure, will furnish not only the means of viewing language in its highest adaptation

to the purposes of language, but will add the utility and charm of high art; while the quality of power of expression is but the result of perfection of structure.

I have named compass of thought and feeling, with value and variety of information, as the third feature of the language which shall best minister to the great office of education. This is literature as distinguished from language, the substance which is borne in the vehicle of language.

Place now, my friends, the classical languages face to face with these requirements. Do they not respond to our demands? Do they not answer to our conditions, "as in water face answereth to face?" The hour will not permit me to carry into details this correspondence. As related to the archaic roots or forms of speech these languages are of high, if not preëminent, value. As related to our own language, or the languages of modern Europe, they are allied in a superior degree to their form, their structure, their strength, their wealth, their power, as languages. In form and structure the classical languages have an easy superiority over all other languages. How shall this be shown? The crucial test is of course familiar acquaintance, but I must not forget that I am now seeking to draw to classical studies those who have not yet advanced to a knowledge of their utilities and delights. Both form and substance are hidden from such behind the barriers of strange signs and sounds. Hence I must appeal to authority, to the accordant experiences and testimonies of the wise and learned of every age since those languages reached their full maturity of power and beauty. Upon this point I may say in sober truth, that dissent is drowned, made indistinguishable, in the vast acclaim of praise which comes up from the wide and swelling throng of scholars in all ages:—

"The dead, but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns."

But I must not omit here to listen to the voice of the skeptic or objector. In these latter days not a few have broadly challenged the claims not only of language as the central study and instrument of education, but the preëminence of the classical over other languages in the choice to be made.

Let us notice, first, the familiar claim that the study of the great models and masters of the English tongue will secure to us all, and more than all, the good results claimed for a study of the classics. I grant that modern thought, the thought embodied in English literature, is truer, perhaps in most respects better than the thought of the ancient world. I grant even that modern poetry is deeper, for the most part purer in sentiment than ancient poetry. More than this will not be claimed. The candid and well-informed objector will grant with equal readiness that in form, in artistic conception and execution, classic literature must bear an undisputed palm.

But when because of deeper, truer thought, higher, nobler sentiment we are asked to substitute the English or any modern language for the classical, we answer, Nay, we moderns are still but the literary children of the Greeks and Romans. Our language is a patrimony, an inherited estate. The titles, the sources and very substance of our wealth, are from our Greek and Latin ancestors.

Κάδμον τοῦ πάλαι νέα τροφή,

Half the formal substance, the words, a vast preponderance of the grace and beauty of English prose and poetry, is the direct gift of Greece and Rome. Can we hope to sound the depths of English prose or verse while we are strangers to the old inspirations that breathe so sweetly, like—

"Sabeian odors from the spicy shore
Of Arabia, the blest,"

through all their most triumphant strains? Our words, the very counters of our thought, the great canons of taste, the lofty rules which universal genius gives itself, are the enduring contributions of Greek and Roman thought and culture. We do not hesitate to tell the ingenuous youth standing on the threshold of his literary life, that he must go back for his highest English models to Chaucer and Spenser, those "wells of English undefiled." Every reason which supports this customary injunction, save only the accident of tongue, should teach us to bid him, with greater earnestness, go drink at the fountains where Chaucer and Spenser drank; where Milton "mewed his mighty youth and kindled his undazzled eyes;" where Addison caught the liquid smoothness of his prose, or

Wordsworth the exquisite grace and tenderness of his poetic numbers; where Burke fed his philosophic, wide-discerning spirit and learned the flow and cadence of his lofty periods; or where Chatham and Pitt and Fox were trained to wield the thunderbolts of their great oratory. It is a truth, quite beyond intelligent dispute, that no preëminent English writer, in prose or poetry, can be read with fully adequate appreciation by one who has not been a student of the classics.

What has now been said of the study of the English language as a substitute for the classics may be said of the other leading modern languages, the French and German. They run back in direct line to common ancestors. They themselves cannot be studied properly except under the light of those languages and literatures from which they have sprung. As studies merely, as means of discipline, they cannot ask to be ranked with the ancient classical languages. This might be made apparent at every point of comparison, but notice but one test of comparative value. Consider the grammatical structure of the Greek and Roman languages; the simplicity and precision growing out of their inflection, and in Greek the constant use of particles. Observe the results of simple inflection; how a terseness and force is given to style; how words and sentences can be marshalled in an order and array in which every shade of thought, shall be expressed, and the exact relative importance of each word, phrase and sentence preserved, while the whole thought and idea stands forth with a chiselled, faultless precision which can never be attained by any modern language. Logical accuracy in expression, logical accuracy in structure, are accompanied in inevitable companionship by logical accuracy of conception. The difficulties encountered in mastering these details, these structural niceties, the intricacies of inflections and arrangement, the subtle shades of meaning communicated only by the position of a single word, or the dropping in of a simple particle,—these furnish the best, because the most varied and complete, mental discipline which the experience of educators has discovered or devised.

And now shall we listen to the voice which cries in the market-place, "This is a mere puppet-show, a toying with forms, words; let us have done with it and summon to our service the rigid, immutable laws of mathematics, or the observation and

discovery of the great modes and facts of visible, external nature?" If language is mere form, let us answer, tell us what is substance. Is form fleeting, and substance enduring? Of a truth, then, language is substance and outward nature is form. The hills and plains of Greece and Rome have already yielded to the ceaseless pressure of Time, but their language and literature are unchanged. Shall we seek in familiarity with the mathematics, for the orderly and right development of our powers? Can number, or quantity, or form, time and space, those fixed, necessary ideas, develop an immortal spirit, surcharged with passions, emotions, hopes, fears, surrounded with conditions which can be but dimly known, by influences and tendencies never reducible to fixed categories? What pabulum is this upon which to nourish a soul whose possibilities, whose future condition, whose eternal salvation, are matters of philosophic speculation or mystic religious faith? Let man's immortal spirit be strengthened by a knowledge of the science which draws necessary conclusions, as Professor Pierce has so finely defined mathematics; let his faltering steps be steadied by familiarity with the laws and facts which illustrate so much of the Divine mystery of the Universe, but let no wretched cry of modern empiricism and materialism entice us from the paths which lead to where, as Milton says, we may "behold the bright countenance of Truth herself, in the quiet and still air of delightful studies."

I am now to consider in what ways classical studies are related to practical success in life. The argument for the utility of these studies is complete without entering upon this inquiry. If classical studies conduce in a high or the highest degree to the complete, symmetrical discipline of the mind, if they strengthen the memory, cultivate the judgment, develop the reason, educate the taste, refine the imagination; if they warm the sympathies, stir the emotions, and stimulate the ambition, the conclusion is irresistible that they are great sources of practical success in life. Mind and soul control all other forces. This is as true of one stage of human progress as another, of one age as another. In a broad sense, mind triumphs over matter, skill over brute force, in barbarous as in enlightened

communities. Education, mental and moral forces, must underlie practical success universally. But there are pursuits, fields of action, lines of influence, where superior mental discipline operates with most apparent power, and in which success is scarcely possible without it. I refer now to those activities which are exercised in professional life, in general literary pursuits, or in those occupations which are in general connected with our public duties or the public service. If we look for the characteristic most nearly common to all such pursuits and most essential to success therein, I think we shall find it to be the power and faculty of expression, the art or capacity of representing thought and feeling in forms intelligible to the senses of man. This is true of most departments of professional skill, of all departments of literary art, of nearly all modes of influence by which man acts upon his fellow men. Whether it be by written discourse or spoken word, by essay or oration, by poem or song, by silent laws, by the arts of statesmanship and government, everywhere it is the power of representing and expressing thought that secures practical success. The lawyer, the theologian, the poet, the literary artist, the statesman, the law-giver, the ruler, are witnesses of this truth. Language, the great instrument of thought,—the study of language which develops and trains all the mental faculties,—these are the first and constant sources of power and success.

But there is even a broader sense in which classical studies are connected with practical success. I refer now to the fact that they represent a store of acquired knowledge that is absolutely indispensable to the highest success in any liberal or elevated pursuit of modern life. I confess I see no exception to this remark. I cannot recall one liberal occupation which does not demand for its most successful pursuit, a degree of familiarity with the results and experiences which are recorded in the languages of Greece and Rome. If our pursuit is connected with the science of law, or jurisprudence, we are carried back by a necessity as irresistible as fate, to the systems which the Grecian law-givers devised, to the great magistracies which equally with their arms and arts upheld the power of Athens and Sparta; especially are we at once borne

back to the vast treasures of Roman law, the proudest and most enduring monument of the Roman mind, a system of judicature and jurisprudence which maintains the empire of Roman thought over the continent of Europe to-day, though full fourteen centuries have passed since the imperial throne was finally subverted. From this treasury we draw, I might say, half the wealth of our own law. The English canon law is largely the product of the civil law; the whole system of admiralty or maritime law as developed in England and the United States, is drawn directly from Roman law; our modern commercial law, it is not too much to say, has derived much of its symmetry as well as many of its best principles from the same abundant source, while the law of nations, *jus inter gentes*, now expanded into the modern science of international jurisprudence, had its historical origin in the Amphictyonic Council and other Hellenic usages, its more complete development in the feacial rules of the Roman State, and finally has received its systematic and scientific development at the hands of a line of scholars deeply imbued with the spirit and learning of the civil law,—Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, Bynkerhoeck, De Martens, Bentham, Twiss, and Woolsey. Roman law has even higher claims than its scattered contributions to modern law and jurisprudence. It is incomparably the most systematic and scientific development of a great system of law which the world has ever seen,—the most splendid achievement of a nation characterized above all by the spirit of conquest and command.

The sources of medical learning are in Greece and Rome. The terms of medical art, as well as the works of its earliest masters, Hippocrates, Celsus, and Galen, are Greek. The proper study of theology is bound up with a knowledge of the classical languages. The original language of the New Testament, the works of the great Fathers of the Church, the speculations of the mediæval theologians, the great original sources of theological learning, are treasured up in the languages of Greece and Rome.

But not to confine our view to the three learned professions, the necessity of familiarity with the classical languages is greater with the student of general literature and literary art. There is absolutely no success worthy the name in these depart-

ments which is attainable except through the portals which a knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages can alone unlock. The great literary models are there; classical allusions are in the warp and woof of all polite literature; terms of art explicable only by reference to the languages, the life and customs of Greece and Rome, fill every literary work which to-day commands the praise and study of the literary world.

Or turn to single branches of study or activity. How shall history be studied, except at second hand, if we cannot trace it back in the full light which is shed on its beginnings by the master historians who wrote the classic languages? How shall the deep foundation of statesmanship be laid except by tracing the growth of the institutions, the political changes, the elemental forces of national life which illustrated and developed the splendid careers of the classic nations? How shall the Republican statesman of America, with wise and prudent skill, restrain the constant vagaries, direct the bounding energies, and mould the ardent life of our modern democracy, while the great examples of the classic ages are half-hidden from him in the unfamiliar guise of languages which he has not learned?

I know the protest which will rise in the minds of many who hear me, against this asserted necessity of classical training. We shall be told of those who have risen high in fame and usefulness without a knowledge of the classics, even without any systematic training such as is now claimed as the basis of high practical success,—that class commonly called “self-made” men. I desire to meet this argument in its fulness. Words are sometimes things. Luther’s words have been said to be half-battles. I know no more perfect example of this fact than the use and effect of the term “self-made” as applied to those who have risen from low to high conditions of life. Half the battle has been won by the advantage derived from this term. Yet look at it! It embodies a fallacy and gives credence to an untruth, and I might add, it implies an impiety. Self-made! In what sense, either actual or theoretical? Were their faculties, their native endowments, selected or made by themselves? To say this would shock the most self-sufficient representative of this class. Were the sources of their training, were their acquirements, such as they were, products or inventions of

their own? Not one of them. If history, if mathematics, if literature in any of its forms, has lifted them above their first condition, they owe these aids and instruments of their advancement to the same minds and works of past ages, aye, above all, to the minds and works of the classic ages. Only one difference exists, and that a pure misfortune,—they have been forced by stress of early poverty or other necessity, to study the past at second hand, to slake their thirst, if I may use a homely figure, at the common town pump, instead of ascending to the pure and sacred springs which supply waters for the whole educated world. The so-called self-made man is really just as much indebted to Greece and Rome as the classical scholar. His debt is as great, while it represents to him far less of value because circumstances have not enabled him to go back and stand close by the original fountains of his knowledge. As well might the poor man who earns his scanty living by hard toil of the hands, say that money is of less value to him than to the rich man to whom it flows in abundant streams from investments which represent none of his labor. The poor man's misfortune is that he has so little, not that his dollar is different in kind or value from the dollar of the rich man. The world long ago admitted to its commonplaces the saying, there is no royal road to learning. Opportunities are the only points of difference here between rich and poor. The self-made man and the child of colleges and universities share of the same estate, though in widely-varying proportions.

But again, it is said that the self-made man, by the peculiar discipline which his necessities force upon him, becomes possessed of practical qualities which the study of the classics does not give. The claim is sometimes advanced that these qualities are not promoted by the study of the classics. Let us examine this position. What are the peculiar qualities which self-made men are said to exhibit? I suppose they must be self-reliance, energy, force of will, ready command of their faculties and knowledge, skill in conducting practical affairs. Now will any one tell me that these qualities are the results or are in any degree promoted by the fact that their possessor has read or studied only the works of his own language? Are

they in any possible view the result of avoiding the classics? His acquired knowledge is the power of the self-made man as well as of the classically educated man. Whence, then, do these qualities come? They come, not from the fact that the knowledge of the self-made man has been drawn solely from the works of his own language, but from the fact that his circumstances, his lack of opportunity, of adventitious aids of all kinds, have forced him to a desperate exercise of certain of his faculties in the battle of life. He thus acquires readiness and skill in adapting his knowledge to immediate wants and occasions. He is better prepared than many of higher education to deal with some practical questions and to effect some immediate results. This, however, is not due to his want of classical training, but rather to the discipline of his outward faculties which his necessities have enforced. If the want of classical training has tended to increase the power of self-made men, then a new truth has been discovered,—that knowledge is power only within certain narrow limitations,—that education must not be carried too far, lest man's efficient powers become thereby impaired.

But let us try this theory of self-made men by another test. Can one such man be named who from his experience has not deplored his want of a complete education? I challenge one such name. Can one self-made man be found who has not, with a fidelity surpassing that of others, insisted that his child should enjoy to the fullest degree the blessings of education denied to him? I challenge one such name. They have all, without exception, vindicated their own true knowledge of the value of education, education in all its length, and breadth, and depth, by placing in the reach of their sons, and all whom they could influence or assist, the precise means of education the want of which others have so mistakenly imagined was the source of their power. I honor self-made men. It is a noble sight to see an aspiring mind rising by force of aspiration and will above all adverse conditions of birth, poverty, or misfortune. No such man ever imagines that his lack of the best opportunities for early training was less than an irreparable misfortune. In the height of his hard-earned fame and power, with the laurels of statesmanship, or war, or litera-

ture, pressing his brow, he has rarely, if ever, forgotten to testify his high appreciation of all the liberal arts and methods of education. I know few more touching incidents in literary history than that recorded by Lockhart in his life of Walter Scott, when the great poet and novelist, whose productions have a charm as imperishable as the love of heroic and noble things in the heart of man, declared with tearful earnestness, "I have been a successful man in many ways, but now I would give one-half of all my reputation, if I could rest the remaining half on a basis of sound learning."

My friends, one truth is, there are no self-made, self-taught men. The most unfortunate of the class so named, has in fact been made and taught by the same influences which have made and taught other men. Though at a further remove, the self-made orator has been instructed by Demosthenes and Tully though his eye never rested on Greek or Latin page. The self-made historian or student of history has drawn from Thucydides and Tacitus though he has been denied the highest privilege of reading their works in the language which reveals their full power. And another truth is, that the men whom we call self-made, self-taught, have been, by force of their own bitter experiences of its want, the most faithful friends of liberal and classical learning.

It only remains, in the proposed development of my theme, to speak of the peculiar claims of the Greek language and literature in the broad field of education. Upon this subject I must not permit myself to employ the language of eulogy only. I desire to state with a due degree of specification the grounds of the special and superior claims of this language to the foremost rank so generally accorded to it by scholars.

As compared with the Latin language, the Greek, as a literary language, is first in order of time. Its traces are everywhere seen in the structure and thought of the Latin language and literature. To present these relations with any approach to completeness would far exceed the bounds of this occasion. Both are members of what has sometimes been called the Thraco-Pelasgian family. The two peninsulas which pierce the eastern half of the Mediterranean have much of resem-

blance in geographical form and place, but these resemblances are slight compared with the ethnic and linguistic ties which unite them. An eminent authority has recently styled the Latin the sister rather than the daughter of the Greek. No doubt common roots appear in both languages, some of which could not have been derived by Italy from Greece. Still the broad statement, I think, may be made that the Latin language is as a learned or literary language historically the descendant of the Greek. However much recent linguistic study may have modified the absolute accuracy of this statement, I judge that its substantial accuracy may still be affirmed, while the great fact of the precedence of the literary development of the Greek is undisputed. These facts establish at once the basis of one great claim of Greek upon our supreme attention as students of language. Here are found more nearly in their primitive forms, and still more nearly in their actual primitive uses, the great constituent elements of the classical languages. The value of this fact in determining the relative place of the Greek language as an instrument of language, does not require further discussion. The actual bodily presence of Greek words and phrases in the Latin, and the all-pervading literary influence exerted by that language over the Latin in all the later stages of its development, and especially in the great days of its highest perfection and renown, is known and unquestioned. Indeed, the golden age of the Latin language, the whole period from Cicero to Tiberius, was synchronous with what may be called its great Hellenistic transformation.

But to the more general scholar and to the interests of education, the second great claim of the Greek language rests on the perfection of its structural development and the incomparable value of the knowledge it embodies. To trace the causes of this perfection of form and matter, especially to exhibit it by examples, is impossible here except in general outline. The part which climate and geographic relations perform in the development of national character was never more prominently exhibited than in Greece. The local scene of classic Greek life was the diminutive, triangular peninsula, which occupied nearly the exact geographical center of the world according to the conception of the Homeric age, extending

through only four degrees of latitude, from the peak of Olympus on the north to Cape Tænarus on the south, and through scarcely three degrees of longitude, from Actium on the west to the plain of Marathon on the east. To this must be added, by linguistic as well as ethnic affinity, the islands which dot the southern half of the *Ægean* Sea;

"The isles of Greece, the isles of Greece!
Where burning Sappho loved and sung,
Where grew the arts of war and peace,
Where Delos rose and Phoebus sprung!"

The face of this narrow region was broken and irregular in the extreme; chains of mountains separated by narrow, rocky plains, the coast line fretted by numberless bays and harbors. The soil was in general hard and at best but moderately productive, but the glorious climate covered this rugged face with an atmosphere of indescribable loveliness. If ever we may read the designs of Providence in outward nature, here we might say God had prepared the home of a people who should be separated by natural barriers into distinct communities, never to be permanently united for great schemes of physical empire or external conquest, and yet predestined to be frugal, aspiring, warlike, freedom-loving, adventurous. The poverty of the soil and the all-surrounding Mediterranean and *Ægean* forced and tempted the Greeks to traffic and adventure by sea. Here we find one of the most active and distinct influences in forming the typical Greek character. Commerce widened the little peninsular world of physical Greece till it took in by acquaintance and appropriation of arts and knowledge, nearly all the known world. The adventurous prow of the early Greek had become familiar with Phenicia and Egypt on the east, and had caught sight, even while Herodotus lived, of the pillars of Hercules on the west; while within the great encircling Oceanic stream the world of Strabo swept from Thule and the frozen wastes of Scythia on the north, to Ethiopia, Arabia, and India on the south.

And now mark how this influence was tempered and controlled by another. The topography of Greece proper, and the individual isolation of her islands, had sundered her people into separate communities, so marked and distinct, that no thirst for

common conquest or martial glory was ever able for a long period to fuse them into one mass. The idea of Greek autonomy, self-government for each State, became as fixed as the forms of external nature. Except for this fact, it might now be said, I think, that Greece would have preceded Rome in her great career of physical power and dominion. *Dis aliter visum.* Nature decreed better things for Greece, and Ulysses, type of his race,—

“That sagacious man
Who, having overthrown the sacred town
Of Ilium, wandered far and visited
The capitals of many nations, learned
The customs of their dwellers, and endured
Great suffering on the deep,”—

returned to enrich his little, barren, much-loved Ithaca with the spoils of the world, leaving to his son a kingdom no greater in extent than he himself had inherited.

Thus it happened that while Greek valor became and now is the highest type of the martial virtues, and the little peninsula and the surrounding seas are sown thick with names at mention of which the martial and patriotic blood of every man to-day thrills with delight, the Greek mind was never possessed or absorbed with the idea and dream of martial prowess conquering the world. The subtle influences of a delicious climate leading largely to an out-door, free, simple, home-life, were another great contribution to Greek character. The physical heavens seem indeed to have bent low with all gracious influences over this marvelous people.

Thus, by influences which I must not longer pause to state, classical Greece has developed. And what a development! The free, simple, youthful, eager, art-loving spirit of the Greek covered that land with an atmosphere of taste and culture more indescribable in its loveliness than the physical atmosphere which enveloped it,—trophies and monuments of art in all its forms. The Greek in truth touched nothing which he did not adorn. Besides literature, he carried architecture to a degree of perfection which has never been equalled, either in its great conceptions and combinations or the beauty and finish of its details,—temples alike majestic in monumental

proportions, and rich in minute tracery of frieze and cornice. In painting and sculpture the Greek is still, as in the days of Apelles and Phidias, the arbiter of form.

But it is with his language and literature that we are chiefly concerned to-night. Here the power of the Greek mind developed itself alike in form and thought. In form the Greek language became the embodiment of strength and beauty which no other language can describe. Its words became, now pictures, now thunderbolts; liquid with music, resounding with joy, harsh with terrors. Its structure became at once exact and flexible. The highest results of the inflectional characteristic were reached, and in addition to this the use of intensive particles to add emphasis to words or force to whole sentences, gave it a peculiar power of expression nowhere else attained. With Homer words are instinct with life, ἔπεα πτερόεντα, *winged*, with passion, with terror, with pathos, with description. Demosthenes by single phrases exhausts the power of invective; in one sentence of less than seventy words paints the long roll of Athens' glories, or with incomparable art of words and grammatical construction summons before his hearers the vast array of Grecian patriots to blast with eternal shame the suggestions of Æschines. The capacity of single words and phrases to paint a scene or present a figure, to swell the soul with lofty and resistless emotion, or to give power and pathos to a narrative, can never be known, in my judgment, till one has read in the original Greek, passages of the sixth and eighteenth books of the Iliad, of Demosthenes' Oration on the Crown, or the account of the Sicilian Catastrophe in the seventh book of Thucydides.

But still it was by the rigid, complete dominion of taste to which the Greek subjected himself, that his language and literature reached their most conspicuous excellence. Consider this. The Greek had an exuberant, passionate nature, a flowing fancy, a boundless imagination. Place him to-day with such a nature, in Germany, in England, or even in France, and his rich, picturesque vocabulary, his ardent temperament would run riot with graces of style, with delicacies and conceits of language and thought, the *curiosa felicitas* of Horace. Look now at the supreme example of Demosthenes. Grace is there,

fancy is there, emotion is there, but never for an instant allowed to hinder the steady, increasing volume of his argument,—nothing, absolutely nothing for mere beauty's sake: all, all, every embellishment of word or figure tested with remorseless severity by its capacity to give strength, and sweep, and momentum to the great current of his triumphant thought. In the height and passion of his greatest effort, he recalls and sketches his Theban policy, and having read his famous decree, he pauses only by one mighty sentence, every word of mingled power and beauty, at once a picture, a simile, an argument, a demonstration, an appeal, to enforce the great lesson. Or when in the celebrated Oath he has called up the heroes of Marathon, of Plataea, of Salamis, of Artemisium, one word, *ἀγασθὺς*, is the limit of his eulogy.

But finally when we look at what this vehicle of thought contains, we find Greek literature touching the utmost limit of ancient knowledge. In each department of literary art Rome was a conscious borrower from the Greek. In poetry, history, and oratory, hardly any one will dispute the preëminence of the Greek masters, while in pure philosophy Plato and Aristotle occupy places for which Roman literature offers no rivals,—heights and depths of speculation and analysis which the modern world has never exceeded,—methods of thought and reason of which the great advances of modern science are, I think, but revealing the perfection and power.

My friends, the field which I sketched at the outset of this address has been traversed. By your most kind patience, my humble contribution to the interest of this occasion has now been presented. It has been wrought from opening to close amidst the unremitted pressure of labors and cares and anxieties, little suited, as I need not remind you, to the contemplative and studious mood which classical studies suggest. But the subject is one filled with so many delights of sentiment and memory that I rejoice to have been called to this service. My feelings for the classics are tinged, I know, by sweet and tender memories of youth and its struggles. As I look again on the pages of the old, worn books of school and college, by a kind of palimpsestic process the forms of the

mother who guided me to the portals of the temple whose treasures I have sought to set before you to-night, of the brother whose swifter and stronger, though more youthful feet, first followed, then accompanied, then outran mine; of the teachers whose instructions, more precious than refined gold, were less precious than the examples of their character and life, all rise before me, and affection towards the studies of Greece and Rome rises into reverence, and "reverence melts back again into childish, tearful love." It is a subject, I confess, in which, like Macaulay, "I love to forget the accuracy of a judge, in the veneration of a worshipper and the gratitude of a child."

But on this occasion I have hoped to present some of the elements of value for the purposes of education, which these studies offer to all. The review has impressed upon me not only the constant utility of classical studies in every age and under all conditions of life, but the permanence which belongs to the work of scholars. My closing words shall, therefore, be words of cheer to those whose liberal minds have devised the incentive of this occasion to good learning in our State. The torch of Athens and Rome, the torch whose light has never been quenched even in the midnights of ignorance and superstition which have sometimes overspread the world, is in your hands. O bear it aloft,—for light in darkness, for hope in discouragements, for courage in defeat, for wisdom in difficulties, for protection in dangers, for beauty and glory in every hour of success and victory. It is the torch of learning, of principle, of morality. Beneath its illumination walk religion, law, and Christian civilization, while ignorance, and violence, and corruption glide away to haunts unvisited by its pure rays.

ARTICLE III.—INTERCOLLEGIATE REGATTAS, HURDLERACES AND PRIZE-CONTESTS.

It has been often said and truly, that our country is greatly different, in almost every respect, from what it was fifty years ago. The wholesale immigration of the lower orders of European society upon our shores has spread like a deluge over all the land, and swept away from the present generation, as from those that shall succeed it, many of the dearest traditions and treasures of our original and unique home-history. The final result of the experiment of universal franchise, and the question of the possible preservation in permanence of our democratic institutions under its existence, are regarded by thoughtful minds throughout the country, as not yet determined or determinable. So cosmopolitan have we now become, under the combined action of many European influences upon us, both at home and abroad, that we have quite lost, in many directions, that clear sense of our distinctive nationality, which would be, if rightly cherished and vindicated, one of our highest ornaments alike, and one of our chief means of influence for good upon other nations, disposed to look admiringly upon our physical prosperity.

Was ever a nation so easily enchanted with something new, whether in Church or State, as ours? Or, was there ever an age in which there was so much combined, with what is precious and enduring, of what is pitifully superficial, and no better than mere dross, in the grand composite of our social condition?

Our day is specially conspicuous, among other things, for great and increasing zeal for physical development and prowess, among the candidates for professional life. And indeed of the varied preparatives for efficient work in subsequent years, nothing, next to a true and noble character, deserves to be more earnestly sought, during the academic and collegiate courses of study, than permanent bodily vigor. The idea once strangely prevalent, that the robust son in a family was, by the very firmness of his bodily fibre, foreordained to active

life, and his more weakly brother was with equal certainty adapted specially for quiet in-door occupation, has been well nigh universally scouted in our day, as unworthy of any other notice than ridicule. It is manifest enough to all eyes, that physical vigor wonderfully decides the battle of life. The necessary curtailments of mental application are continual, and severe indeed, to the wearied and worried consciousness of the physical weaklings, who are engaged in intellectual pursuits. And they are all the more so, to such of them as are endowed with superior energy of thought, and especially if accompanied with a high degree of personal culture, already obtained by themselves, and against many, and sore difficulties. A wise parent and a skillful educator will ever remember, that the young minds committed to their care should be trained, both for their own sakes and as active producers of good to others in future years, in such a way, as to be at all times elate and alert with the sense of abounding vitality. All hail to every earnest attempt made anywhere to deepen in the minds of the young the conviction of the untold value to them of high health, from the beginning to the end of their days of earthly toil and trial. Let all wise prescriptions and precepts be employed, by way of stimulation or of repression, to found such a true and active sentiment in their hearts. Let them be taught to take manly exercise often and much; let them learn to regulate, by right rules, their diet and their hours of action and of repose; let an effectual bar of moral thoughtfulness, and of moral principle, be set up, in their ideas of duty and of self-interest, against any and all temptations to wastefulness of physical vitality, by the use of tobacco or of liquor; let them be told, as they may well be by those who know it to be true, that continuous industry, and especially for high intellectual and moral ends, is one of the greatest possible promotives of health, that regularity of bodily habit in every form and mode is of like hygienic value, and that there is no such inspiration to sustained energy, and no such recuperative influence from any source for its ever new re-animation, as the setting up before the mind, in fixed determinateness, of the highest and noblest ends of action in all things, or the supreme and prayerful consecration of one's whole conscious self to God and duty.

The religious inspiration, when strong and true, is the highest inspiration of the human heart, at any time, to the pursuit of whatever is good in itself. And its exalting influence upon the elements of physical elasticity and vigor is no less positive and beneficial, than in every other part of our compound nature.

The tendency of human ideas is ever active, in things moral and social, to vibrate from one extreme to another. The mass are slow to feel the need of change; but when they move they go with a momentum equal to their numbers. Have we not plunged of late, and with moral heedlessness at least, into an opposite habit of social feeling respecting muscular exercise, to that which really belongs to our Christian civilization—to the higher moods of sentiment which it engenders, and the logical demands which it makes for continued progress onwards and upwards. The way had been steadily and rapidly prepared, during several years past, by the leading secular presses in our large cities, for a general and simultaneous movement in this new direction. Advertisements, editorial notices, and special characterizations, of not only operas and theatres, but also of horse-races, and prize-walkings, liftings and strainings of all sorts, have been scattered all over the land. The discussions of scientific men, exhibitions of art, and religious gatherings have had no more or better attention bestowed upon them. Long and wide and deep have the seeds of the new ideas so prevalent now been sown, from north to south and from east to west. And what a harvest of gross and grotesque usages is at length cropping forth to view in all parts of the land!

A brief account of the history of college regattas, and especially of the last and leading one of them all, will aid one to no small degree, who had not thought of them carefully before, in comprehending the real nature and drift of their influence upon our system of higher education. The first regatta between Harvard and Yale, and very quiet was it in all its dimensions and demonstrations, occurred November 3, 1852, on Lake Winnipiseogee, N. H. In 1859, the first of the regular national series of intercollegiate boat-races took place at Worcester, Mass.; in which Harvard won the day, as in ten succeeding years she won also eight others (1859-70)—

Yale having been twice victor in these violent physical struggles (1864-5). Since 1870 Yale has also once borne off the palm (1873); Amherst, twice (1871-2); Columbia, once (1874); and finally Cornell University (1875) with the highest applause of all.

The last and greatest of these regattas occurred last summer (July 14, 1875) at Saratoga, N. Y., before immense crowds of eager witnesses. The crews of thirteen colleges, long and carefully trained for the approaching struggle, wrestled together there and then, as if for life or for death, for the recognized mastery of the oar, in that one supreme moment of decision. They were arranged, each with their particular decorative color, facing northwards, at the hour of starting, and in the following order from left to right: Williams (royal purple), Cornell (carnelian and white), Amherst (purple and white), Bowdoin (white), Brown (brown), Columbia (blue and white), Wesleyan (lavender), Princeton (orange and black), Dartmouth (green), Yale (blue), Hamilton (rose), Harvard (crimson), and Union (garnet). The race was for a length of two miles; and their order of arrival at the appointed goal was, Cornell first (16' 53½''), and, in succession, Columbia, Harvard, Dartmouth, Wesleyan, Yale, Amherst, Brown, Williams (17' 50½''). Hamilton, Union, and Princeton. The average age of the Cornell crew was twenty-two and one-half years, and they were mature in physical vigor: that of the Columbia crew was twenty-one and one-sixth years, and that of the Harvard, twenty and one-half. Age told powerfully for Cornell as did also the early habits, doubtless, of manual labor to which its representatives had been addicted at their previous homes. Those who go from the ordinary experiences of city life to college, carry with them far less vigor of muscle and strength of nerve, than they who turn their steps thitherward from the plough or the anvil. Princeton fell fatally back in the struggle at an early period, because of the sudden prostration of one of its crew. The day was one of the hottest of the season, and it was noted by a reporter of the incidents of the hour to a leading newspaper, that, "two superior horses fell dead" in their harnesses from the over-heating of their blood, in the short carriage-drive from the lake to the town.

The Saratoga regatta had a long and wide heralding of its approaching demonstrations; and immense crowds, from fifteen to twenty thousand it was said, gathered from all parts of the land, to witness the grand exhibition. Graduates of each of the different colleges represented were there in great numbers, and in some instances, their presidents and professors, to see and cheer their favorites, and, as some vainly anticipated, to welcome them to public honor and praise for their wonderful achievements. The one common hope that animated each separate representative circle of contestants or spectators, was for victory, simple and complete victory. The universal thought seemed to be, that the college, which should gain that prize, would be honored and aided beyond any other in the land by the high event.

And what of the final result, when it really came? What outwardly? It was telegraphed at once all over the land, as if of great social significance, and even sent over the Atlantic to European eyes and ears. Guns were fired in many places in honor of the event; and at Saratoga flags and banners and silver cups were given, with formal addresses full of praise and flattery, to the winners, and balls and festive entertainments prepared for them on an expensive scale. Ex-Governor Hoffman of New York awarded the prizes to the victors, on the evening of the 14th; and when they left for their home at Ithaca, a special drawing-room car for their separate use and particular honor, was provided for them by a N. Y. State Senator, and the car was expressly decorated for the occasion by the managers of the U. S. Hotel at Saratoga. In front of this palace of ease was another drawing-room car, provided for them by Com. Vanderbilt of the N. Y. Central Railroad, and containing three of their boats. Free passes to the end of the route were presented to them by Railroad Superintendents. And what a continuous show of triumph was their passage homeward! Not the President of the nation or any guest from abroad, however distinguished, could expect greater demonstrations of honor. Guns were fired and church-bells rung in various towns and cities on the way, as they passed through them; bands of music greeted them; festive dinners were offered; flags were displayed, as on a national holiday; the

Cornell college-colors were hung out to view, and bouquets of flowers were thrown admiringly at their feet. On the day of "the great victory," as it was deemed, President White of Cornell had telegraphed to Saratoga: "The University-chimes are ringing, flags flying and cannons firing. Present hearty congratulations to both the victorious crews"—there having been on the day previous, a Freshman boat-race, in which Cornell also won the day. On the arrival of the already greatly be-praised crew, at Ithaca, in the early evening, bonfires, and torch-lights, and fire-works, and processions, and speeches awaited them: the bells of churches, factories, and fire-engine houses were rung; and pealing above all sounded forth the great bell of the University. The windows everywhere in the town were illuminated in carnelian and blue; floral arches spanned the streets; and the people seemed full of uncontrollable joy. "Never was there such a hubbub in Ithaca since the surrender of Lee."

All over the land, the newspapers in city and country were full of the details of the great effort for victory with the oar. In one of the leading journals, such words as these occurred: "Though such a public furor over the triumphs of scholastic muscle may puzzle the student, who sees hardly a ripple of excitement created by the triumph of some scholastic mind, the crew and the college that it represents do well to rejoice." "The press of New England," it was said again, "unites with that of New York in praise of the admirable manner in which the sturdy crew of Cornell won the greatest college boat-race in history." The whole secular press of the land, and well nigh the whole religious press also, seemed to be practically subsidized by the spirit of the hour. The office that they served was of the two-fold kind—to concentrate the public eye upon Saratoga and the college boat-clubs that had mustered together there, as if surpassing all other places and sources of special interest at the time, and to intensify, by multiplied echoes of praise, the already inordinate estimate had of the importance of what was there transpiring.

But other violent kinds of muscular rivalry have of late claimed the public attention, to a large degree, in connection with intercollegiate and other regattas. Scarcely any influen-

tial newspaper could be opened at any time during the late midsummer, that was not full of animated descriptions, in detail, of "The American Rifle Team," at Wimbledon, England; or of "The Long Branch Races," in New Jersey; or, of Captain Matthew Webb's "great swim" on July 20th, from Dover to Ramsgate, England, (twenty miles in eight and three-quarter hours), and afterwards (August 25), of his most hazardous but successful venture to swim across the Straits of Dover (twenty-five miles) to Calais, which he accomplished in twenty-two hours—although often "thoroughly fagged," and "pale and haggard," and "ready to faint" yet holding on to the fearful end, and all for a little fleeting breath of human praise or wonder. Continually recurring notices of prize-contests, widely diffused over all the land, abounded also in the daily press, contests in walking, running, boating and swimming. In quite a noticeable number of instances the contestants have been in both England and America, young women. A Miss Emily Parker, "a professional swimmer," swam, on September 4th last, from London Bridge to Blackwall, seven miles, in sixty-eight minutes. Pistols, guns and small cannons were fired from various points as she passed by them; and sailors on all sorts of crafts, saluted her with their cheers. A fortnight afterwards she swam, on exhibition, ten miles and more, from London Bridge to N. Woolwich gardens, the wind being high and the water rough, in two hours and twenty-three minutes, under the eyes of thousands of admiring spectators. On July 16th, last, there was a contest at rowing by three prominent young ladies at Trenton, N. J., one of whom was a daughter of a distinguished judge, who himself acted as one of the umpires of this novel exhibition of feminine muscle. The strife took place on the feeder of the Delaware and Raritan canal, and the course, which extended a quarter of a mile, was regularly flagged at the start, one-eighth mile and home. The several colors worn by the fair rivals were red, blue and green. "The boat, which they rowed in succession, was of red cedar, and sat upon the water like a swan." The first one of the three and the winner over the others came back to the starting point in 2' 07", the next one in 2' 11", and the third in 2' 10½". These and other like facts of multiplied recurrence, show how thoroughly the

public attention has been awakened in both hemispheres, to all sorts of demonstrations of muscular endeavor and endurance. The new style of general interest in such ventures of muscular strength, while indeed of sudden growth, is of a kind that is sure to expand, for a season at least, in a land so open as ours to the influence of the daily press, to very wide dimensions.

In classes of a common sort, like fervor of feeling is manifested, in many ways, in the desire to excel in various forms of physical chieftainship. In October last, a man named R. A. Ford rode at the Waco fair in Texas, sixty miles in two hours and forty-nine minutes, "the fastest time on record by five minutes." And how was such equestrian, or rather equine, glory obtained. He rode in swift succession forty-two different horses, "common Texan horses," each for a short space; and these he must of course have whipped up violently, with blows and words if not perchance also with oaths, to bring out such a result in the end. The last mile he made in two minutes and seven seconds, thoroughly jolted, one would think, out of his ordinary consciousness of himself, if not also of his knowledge of everything around him. What fearful chances he ventured of being fatally thrown from the backs of the poor animals, which he succeeded in maddening successively with the rage of his own impetuous feelings. But "anything and everything to excite wonderment"—this is the spirit of the hour! "Nothing is too precious to be given in order to catch the bawble of public notoriety." As burlesque a picture of the prevailing zeal to parade muscularity, as the writer remembers to have noticed among "the varieties" of such a sort, was that of a colored man named "Bob Blackhawk," of whom the *Detroit Post* said last summer: "That he attempted the difficult feat of standing on the head of a common barrel and constantly rotating there for twenty-four hours. This he accomplished fairly and squarely, to the entire satisfaction of two men appointed to watch him, at intervals of six hours, and who made formal affidavit to the fact. He complained of slight soreness in his lower limbs and his back at the end of his long course of muscular gyrations, but was otherwise sound in wind and limb, although he went all this time without food or drink."

The few instances here noted of ostentatious, or at least con-

spicuous, zeal in behalf of various forms of physical prowess, are proofs and specimens of a deep and broadly existing interest in them throughout Christendom, and strong enough to leap, at any moment, into any conceivable forms of demonstration. They are quoted to show the fact and the strength, in as clear and brief a way as possible, of the manifest drift of the times. It was curious indeed to an observing eye to compare the great social excitements that prevailed, at one and the same time, in the leading nations of Christendom. In London and the larger cities of England and Scotland, the whole community was moved by the power of two earnest American laymen, preaching and singing of the great things of God's kingdom, on earth and in heaven. In Germany the tidal wave of public interest was in full swell upon the question, whether the final authority in matters of state, lies at any time in the hands of the Catholic clergy, or, always and only, in the hands of the civil government. In France every heart was charged to the full, with the thought that Alsace and Lorraine must be recovered from Germany again. But in America, republican, Christian America, where every man may aspire as a man, if he will, to any place of power or pleasure that is reached by any other man, the land of liberty and of human hope and progress beyond any other land, all eyes were turned, as if by some general magnetic influence, to the struggles for victory of a few amateur contestants in boat-racing, horse-racing and rifle-shooting.

The special advocates of the new forms and degrees of muscular exercise by young men, in the higher courses of study, claim that great advantages can be thereby secured, which are much needed, and can be obtained so well in no other way. As they will be more obvious if distinctly enumerated, they are such as these :

1. They procure to their devotees real and permanent bodily strength. College students are killing themselves, they tell us by severe overwork. Heaven save the mark! Pray, when and where, is there any such sacrifice of youthful health to the genius of intellectual industry? Our eyes cannot behold it. We were made to work, and to work vigorously, and with our brains. The world needs the fullest and most productive exercise of our highest faculties, for its greatest progress and our

highest good. Let all kinds of earnest mental effort abound everywhere. Life and light for all mankind are centered in it, as their source.

Why does not some one talk complainingly and clamorously of college students, about their irregular hours of eating and sleeping, their continual closeting of themselves in ill-ventilated rooms, their almost universal use of narcotics, their very frequent want of any high inspiring aim, and their abounding mental slothfulness. Surely the causes of serious injury to their health are many, and unceasingly operative. With what fearful risks of permanent damage to life or limb the new order of physical exercises for the renovation or confirmation of student-energy is attended, will be shown at a subsequent point in this article.

2. The methodical and rigid training, necessary for success in these muscular contests, promotes bodily self-control, and a spirit of obedience to law and order. Such results are surely attainable to some degree in such a way, but at a great cost of time and effort. They could be obtained in higher forms and larger degrees, at a much more rapid rate, and in a way more ministrant to other and better ends of pursuit. And who can adequately measure the moral risks that have been already encountered and are likely to be increasingly encountered in the future, in associations of such a sort. Combined together on no principle, but that of like physical energy, and aiming at no higher end than that of muscular superiority, thrown often into strange places and conditions, away from their usual habitats and employments, subject sometimes to great exposures of their health, from the weather and from excessive exhaustion of their strength, how easy may they find it to learn, in their periods of isolation from home and from the refinements of cultivated society, to indulge in convivial pleasures, and in the excitement of betting and gambling with others of like aims with themselves concerning their anticipated successes. And how greatly may any such rising tendencies at any time be aggravated into special activity and force, by the suggestive influence of those representatives of the sporting class, that often hover sympathetically around them. What Christian father, solicitous for the highest future of his son,

would not shrink with instinctive earnestness from exposing him, in the dawn of his opening manhood, to such untoward moral liabilities!

3. They serve to exclude in some directions, or at least in a certain class of cases, the temptation to fall into habits of dissipation, while within the walls of college-life. All, who, from little zeal for progress in study and improvement in knowledge, sink into a wearisome sense of the slow passage of time, become thereby the ready prey of any tempter who thinks it worth his while to lead them captive to his will. Alas that there are so many such, to whom the chance is offered, in vain, in all our higher institutions of learning, to make themselves princely leaders in the land! Some such may find in the practical experiences of bodily exercise, a stimulation to effort and industry, which higher things failed unfortunately to supply. But the many and great evils, accruing to the members of the college community generally, from the new system of violent muscular strifes, are not at all counterbalanced by any incidental good accomplished for a few intellectual unfortunates, who fail to find anything in heaven or earth that can rouse their sluggish natures to thought and aspiration.

4. They give eclat to college-life, and to those institutions especially whose representatives are victorious. What kind of eclat and with whom? Is it of any higher quality than that which prize-fighters gain who win the day. The kind of eclat that any American college may well aspire to secure for itself, is that of high and strong intellectual and moral discipline, with its attendant blessings, in many varied and satisfying forms of precious personal self-culture, procured for themselves by the individuals who enjoy its ministrations of good, and diffused afterwards by them, throughout the whole community and from one generation to another.

With the brief notice here given to the points of advantage claimed by the advocates of the new order of physical exercise for collegians to inhere in it, we turn to the consideration of the real and fatal objections to its permanent adoption. These are manifold, and, when united in one view, form an unanswerable argument against its further continuance. They should be clearly enumerated and carefully pondered. They are these:

L. The new forms of violent exercise for undergraduates subject those who participate in them to dangerous physical strains, either in the way of immediate endeavor, or of protracted endurance.

Not a few of those who, in previous years, had been most active in such contests of muscular rivalry, have acknowledged in entering the professional schools, that they had been damaged, to their life-long regret, by the great ventures of physical strength, which they had been required to make. The newspaper accounts of the recent prize-races at Saratoga, made at the time, and by those who looked with favor upon them and their accompaniments, testify abundantly to the same fact. The successful contestant in a one mile walk there, on Thursday of the regatta week, Green, of Harvard, is thus described, in the moment of his hard earned victory (*New York Times*, July 16th): "He hurried down the lane to the string which he reached, pale and exhausted, unable to stand still and finally staggered into friendly arms outstretched to receive him." Pitiful! very pitiful! What father who has a son at college did not shudder as he read it to think that his son might perchance be tempted successfully, some day, by the false honors of the hour, to make such a hare-brained adventure, and encounter in it such a hazardous shock to his nervous system? Could any surer mode be invented of making a youth inevitably second rate in mental, not to say also moral, force, all the rest of his life! Who that remembers the tendency to periodicity and permanence, in shocks given to the nervous system, would heedlessly expose a child, or a pupil to their occurrence. The competitors afterwards for the prize in a seven miles walk (fourteen times around a circuit of half a mile in length), Taylor of Harvard, Driscoll of Williams, and Francis of Columbia were thus described: "Driscoll began to look pale and weak, before half the distance had been accomplished. He entered on his seventh mile like a man who had made up his mind to do or die; and there seemed to be a very fair chance of his dying. Pale, with wrinkled brow and parched lips he strode blindly along, preserving his speed mechanically, and accompanied by different friends who ran alongside of him, breathing excitedly words of encouragement in his ears, and at

the same time ready to pick him up should he fall." The "walk," so called, which wins in any such contest, is of *the professional kind*, and must be specially learned, and differs only from a brisk run, for a long one, in the fact that the racing walker comes down, at every step, on his heel, instead of, as in ordinary running, upon his toes. It is painful, if also exciting, to witness such a vehement style of energetic walking, or subdued running, accompanied by much alternate vibration of the arms in a vigorous way, especially when maintained through a long period of strained efforts, and to remember that all this outlay of exhausting toil is made to gain a momentary puff of applause for having outstripped a fellow mortal, by a few seconds of time, in agonized endurance of muscle and of will. With bare legs, and perchance in stocking-feet, and with clothing slight enough to be devoid of all beauty, not to say decency also, one, who has the privilege and the honor of preparing himself to be a leader in the land, in everything great and good, is made to stalk before a gaping and hooting crowd, so as to make those, who do not stare at him with stupid wonder, pity him as the poor victim of a new and dangerous social conceit. A sad spectacle surely, to eyes unaccustomed to such grotesque exhibitions in public of those belonging to the higher order of humanity in their universally recognized position, is the young aspirant for life's higher prizes, when seen so unlike in aspect to the refined mien and manners of a scholar. The gentleman is all put off in outward appearance, and the rowdy thoroughly put on. Prize-fighters and bullies recognize, at first sight, with joy, the manifest approach made, with so much apparent pleasure to themselves, by the future leaders of society to their own rude ideas and noisy demonstrations of brute force. But what of Driscoll and his companions at last, on the seven miles walk? The record given at the time by a newspaper reporter, who seemed to be in full sympathy with the wretched show, as something novel and fine, and who breathed in his account of it not a syllable of anything condemnatory, was this: "At last, Taylor struck the string, and tottered into the arms of his Harvard chums, and was borne away beneath the trees; but there was no time to follow him, for all eyes were fixed on Driscoll and Francis. The former

would faint, I thought; but his fading senses were aroused again and again, by the imploring voices of his friends now thronging the track. Ah! he staggers! he must fall! whispered the interested judges. But that wailing shout of Williams! Williams! once more aroused him; and he touched the string with outstretched hands, and, swaying from side to side, dropped into the arms of his friends, to be carried away, unconscious of the mad cheers that hailed him, as second in the chase—surpassing four strong men pursuing hotly after him. Francis came in immediately, touched the string, smiled and walked away to his quarters, only a little heated. He had been splendidly trained. Under the trees, on the grass, near the grand stand, lay Driscoll, surrounded by his friends and sorely afflicted. The time of the race was a little over sixty-five minutes.” Had Driscoll died then and there, how would the sad event have differed from the death, which has sometimes occurred in a menagerie, of a foolhardy keeper of a lion or tiger, who has put his head into the mouth of the beast, and never opened his eyes again upon the outer world! If Driscoll had, then and there, passed away from earth, would not each and all, who encouraged him to tempt God’s providence, have been the guilty abettors of his suicidal end? The whole influence of such a spectacle, if occurring among the lower ranks in society, would be fearfully demoralizing on all who witnessed the scene without an energetic protest in their hearts, if not also with open voice, against it. And it is not of feeble force for evil, but far stronger, when those, who prepare so sad a show, belong to the most forward class in the community.

On the same day with the seven miles walk, there was a call for a three miles walk; and this is the description that was given of what occurred, by an eye-witness: “The sun’s rays were scorching. Fairbanks (Brown) was overcome about the middle of the race, and was taken off the track, and driven to his quarters in a buggy, deplorably oppressed and a victim to overstrained efforts.” Behold too what is said to have occurred, in “a three miles run,” among the varied exhibitions of college pluck and prowess at Saratoga: “After the first mile and a half, Goodwin (Columbia) gave out. At two and a half miles,

poor Rodgers (Wesleyan), who had been sorely worried by swarthy Morell (Amherst), could go no farther, and rolled over on the grassy wayside, inanimate, and was carried to his quarters by his friends."

These scenes were a part of "The Third Annual Exhibition of Athletic College sports" in connection with the seventeenth of the "Intercollegiate Regattas," and were pronounced by the general press of the country as "ending with great eclat." But how much more appropriate were they to barbaric Ashantee life, than to the civilization of Christian America in the nineteenth century!

The hazards of breakage to the vital organs, or of stoppage, perhaps fatally, to the nervous influence that governs their functions, are an essential feature of the new style of physical exercise for collegians. The spirit of the times requires of those, who undertake to answer to its demands, in the way of muscular exercise, great ventures of life and limb. Compare with the scenes at Saratoga, so briefly portrayed, other like demonstrations of personal recklessness in prize-adventures. In a swimming-match, that occurred at Gloucester, N. J., on July 22, last summer, between Johnson and Coyle, the latter was ahead of his rival for a full half mile, in a continuous course of swimming for nine miles. He was then opposite "Red Bank" wharf, when "he began to breathe hard, and called for help, and was taken out of the water apparently lifeless. In the evening he was very low, his pulse beating at 28; and grave fears for his life were entertained by the doctors." So also Capt. Webb, who swam across the English Channel, in twenty-two hours, "making twenty-six strokes to the minute, was accompanied by a lugger and two rowboats. From these he was supplied, from time to time, while in the water, with ale, brandy, beef-tea and coffee. Once he was stung on the shoulder by a jelly-fish, and felt weak, and it was feared that he would give out, but he rallied under frequent potations of brandy, then, as afterwards when faint. After having been eighteen hours and more in the water, he was much distressed, and a diver jumped into the water, and swam for a while, side by side, with him." Of the last two hours, it was said: "It is hardly possible to describe how they were

spent. They were two hours of perfect torture to him. His pale and haggard face told of thorough exhaustion. When he was within two hundred yards of the shore it was feared that his strength would not hold to reach it. All possible means were used to give him heart. English and French cheered him almost constantly. When at last he did touch ground, the men accompanying him in the boats jumped into the water and hugged him with delight. He was enveloped, on landing, in wraps, and driven to the Hotel de Paris, where, after being well rubbed down, he drank three or four glasses of old port wine, and went to bed immediately. Several medical men were in waiting at the hotel, to volunteer their services if needed."

II. The new modes of training collegians for prize-contests absorb altogether too much of their time and thought and zeal.

The proper aims of each and every student at college are of a special and commanding kind, and not of a general and miscellaneous nature, allowing of all sorts of diversion from their one grand end and object. Whatever really ministers to the actual progress of a collegian, as a man of trained powers of mind, and of high moral culture, and so of well-prepared resources for a princely life of active usefulness in his day and generation, is to be uniformly accepted if offered to view, or diligently sought for if still in requisition, as of priceless value, by his educators. Immense indeed is their responsibility for the right management of his interests, in these high directions. Let them heed well what they do, alike, and what they leave undone, in forming the mould and model of his future personality.

In this day of large progress in literature, philosophy, science and art, the difficulty is never to find, how to employ wisely the energies of one in training for a noble future, but where and how to find the time needful for carrying out, with any adequacy, the broad plans of study that seem, not only desirable, but really necessary, for the accomplishment of the right result in the end.

The design of the new exercises is not simply to maintain health and strength already in possession, or to increase and confirm them to a higher degree. Their function and issue lie, in real fact, beyond the bounds and the needs of college life,

as such. Among sailors and mechanics, they would be appropriate enough, and seemly; but to the demands of educated manhood they are altogether extraneous.

But what an amount of time and thought do they exact of those who undergo the long and hard drill needful for successful competition with other well-trained contestants, in the hour of final decision. All that time and thought, so far as they are drawn out of college hours, from which the major part of them are most thoughtlessly taken, are needful, to the full, for any high success in these preparatory processes of intellectual and literary culture. It is work, thorough and patient, long-continued work, that carries the day in intellectual attainments, as everywhere else. Hours that should be spent eagerly in college, in elaborate investigation and in careful self-drill, cannot, when once diverted to other and inferior ends, ever be recovered, by any subsequent attention, however earnest, to the higher wants of one's being. Nor will any regrets, however sincere, for the great waste, be able to mitigate, in future years, the deep sense of self-inflicted damage. The far too scanty opportunities presented in the four short years of college study, for procuring the elements of a deep and broad style of liberal culture, are directly invaded and displaced by the new order of drill for competitive muscular contests. Intellectual matters are made decidedly second to physical: and bodily training is brought forward out of its true place, as a mere means to a far higher end, into a false and destructive precedence, beyond things of far higher moment.

III. The new forms of physical exercise for collegians serve powerfully to set up false ideas and ideals in their minds, and to stir them to action by altogether unworthy motives.

The great motor-impulse, in the old heathen civilization of classic Greece and Rome, was the love of fame. All the selfish principles of worldly ambition were addressed to their full height of power and action. To gain a crown, at first of mere olive-leaves, and afterwards of shining gold, in the furious combats, or rather "agonies," of the hour, was worth, in the thoughts of those who struggled in the arena before all eyes for the petty prize of victory, any and every possible venture of limb and of life. Nothing was so precious as admiration and applause.

Immediate human estimates of things, and visible results ruled all thoughts and aims. "The praise of men" was the one acme of earthly hope, and the one and only form of immortality which aroused the heart to aspiration and effort.

And has the world made no advance, in the long course of two thousand years, under all the illuminating and quickening influences of historical and practical Christianity, that the intellectual and moral educators of society should voluntarily come down, and with quite indecent haste, from the high ground which the religious sentiment of American feeling, in other days, had framed for itself, to the lower position, as false as it was feeble, that the morally unenlightened minds of older days carved out for themselves. "How can ye believe," said man's great divine teacher, "who seek honor one from another." The love of applause is, like the love of money, demoralizing to the character of him, who is swayed by its influence. The genius of Christianity makes the spirit of duty the law of true action, at all times. What of nobleness in human purpose, or of persevering effort in the pursuit of great or worthy ends, the spirit of duty to God and man will not continually and powerfully evoke, is not of the least moral value to society, or to any individual within its bounds. The same shining elements of high self-respect, of public spirit, of patriotism, of general philanthropy, and of Christian usefulness, that ennoble and beautify mature manhood, when they appear in it, are equally in themselves matters of high adornment to the character of a collegian. Their absence can not be compensated, to any degree, by the institution of any inferior forms of aspiration, or of any other sources of inspiration to manly conduct, so called, by any convenient shuffling of moral ideas for the purpose. The highest reason for physical culture, as such, lies not in itself as a good. It is only as a means to higher ends that it has any real significance; and it loses its value when forced by false associations or issues out of that relation, becoming a bane instead of a blessing, and corrupting the moral tastes and habits of those who accept it for such ends and uses.

No one mould or model of our social life ought to exhibit, so characteristically and definitively, what Christianity can and does do for man's higher wants, and his advancement in every

way, as our system of higher education in all its plans and processes and its various collateral appliances and promotives. China and Japan should of course be seen, whether at a hasty glance, or at the end of a long and careful survey, to be far behind Christian America, in their system of ways and means for securing high educational preparation for life. So should also ancient Greece and Rome, though furnishing us in their elaborate compositions of thought and style the best objective resources obtainable for much of the intellectual culture that we seek to accomplish, be found, with equal readiness and certainty to represent but a rude barbaric style of ideas long since passed by, and worthy only to be forgotten in the world's far greater progress in modern times.

We have had a special type of civilization of our own, formed out of ancestral traditions and influences altogether peculiar to ourselves, and we should not be afraid to hold it up in its grand moral aspects before all eyes. The less Anglican, continental, or cosmopolitan, that we are in the spirit of our higher forms of liberal culture, and the more distinctively and persistently American, the more shall we honor ourselves and bless the other nations of the world by our influence. A precious birthright indeed has been given of God to us, as the inheritors of the ideas and institutions of our pilgrim fathers who came hither to set up better standards of state-life and of church-life and energy than the world had ever before seen. It never has been our glory, and it is not now, to imitate what is old in Europe, and to overlay our progressive experience with the false or weak conceptions of inferior forms of civilization to our own.

IV. The new physical exercises for undergraduates are by the very definition of their appointment for them, designed, though so severe, to be soon intermitted by those who are engaged in them at any time. They are not therefore intended to meet, as it were in a short-hand way, some great want in our system of higher education that could not be supplied in any other way so well. They are in fact, and are designed to be, but an appendage to college-life, and they are altogether abnormal to it as such, and only a moral excrescence upon its true form and growth.

In the subsequent years of professional study and effort, time will be altogether too precious to be squandered on anything which does not directly minister to the needful ends of personal endeavor. The new exercises are not only therefore harmful from their violence in their inception and progress, but also, at their very conclusion, from the great contrasts of bodily effort and condition occasioned by their complete and sudden stoppage. The quiet of sedentary life, with books and paper and pen, will poorly supervene all at once and in steady continuity upon a four years' course of constant habituation to what is in itself an altogether unusual and undesirable amount of physical exercise. Neither body nor mind have been adapted by their Maker to encounter without great harm such sudden change. The bodily faculties are made to act in the line of definite expectancies, and to incline to periodicities of experience, and to subside into uniformly recurring conditions. The great law of habit nowhere shows the strength of its iron grasp more conclusively than here. Many a young man in passing from some vigorous occupation belonging to out-of-door-life into the tranquil scenes of college experience, has ere long lost his health, and that permanently, from the mere effects of the great change in his bodily condition.

It is a fact well understood by scientific physiologists, and ought to be made familiar to those not realizing its truth as a guiding principle of action to them, that a medium style of exercise is always more favorable to the health of the student-classes of society, than any other form of it, as a rule. Any departure in practice from such a fundamental idea of what is physically best for them will be sure to bring sooner or later in some form essential damage. The processes of thought and study are in themselves quiet, and are not helped at all, but thoroughly disturbed, by turbulent pulses, and the voracious appetites that they generate, and the sensuous tastes and impulses which they foster.

The animal grossness of habits and of manners which characterizes so greatly university-life in Europe and England, and which shows itself strikingly among other modes of special manifestation, in a coarse tone of feeling towards woman, is no ornament to the trans-atlantic systems of education, and no

recommendation of the ideas of which it is the natural outgrowth. No lover of his country can look with pleasure on any apparent tendency among American collegians to imitate the university-students of other lands in their habits of boastful skepticism, of noisy physicality, of bacchanalian revelry, and of free-thinking towards woman.

So absolutely necessary is the regular daily practice of vigorous, physical exercise, while one is passing through the academy, the college, and the professional school, that it may justly be called an essential part of any true ideal of a proper preparation for the duties of life, by any and every student. But the daily quota of needful muscular exercise must be obtained by each and all, and therefore in some way not limited to a few, as in boating or foot-races, or to fair weather, when only efficient training in them can be taken or given, or to those of ample means who can easily to themselves meet any special expenditures. In summer months there are various ways in which collegians may obtain hilarious exercise in the sunshine, and in forms full of social enjoyment. In bad weather and in winter, a well-appointed gymnasium under the active headship of one who is an enthusiastic expert in its varied round of exercises, among which should be those of archery, of bowling, and of the health-lift, will furnish every needed facility for maintaining health already acquired, and for increasing its vigor.

V. The new physical exercises for collegians involve large expenditures.

The higher education is fast becoming so costly, as to be obtainable only by the wealthy. But, next to making religion the monopoly of a few, nothing is more destructive to the higher interests of society, than to make education the privilege of a monied aristocracy. Many a parent in moderate circumstances, who yet feels that he would much rather give his son the chance of obtaining a liberal education than any amount of money without it, grieves greatly in spirit, under the heavy drafts that are made upon his slender means in sending him through college. The great increase of expenses now, beyond those of days that are gone forever by, arises from incidentals, self-imposed indeed by the students themselves, but made absolutely prescriptive by

the force of precedent, and by the unyielding demands of class feeling and class pride. Society expenses of all sorts, (for badges, suppers, pictures of one another, and for the hire or purchase or beautification of rooms, etc.) more than equal, often, all other demands combined that are made upon the student's pocket. To this already large amount of incidental expenses, often very large, must be added, to those engaged in preparing for prize contests, and especially for the annual regattas, a large cost for boats and boat houses and special dresses and skilled trainers and traveling expenses and board for weeks preceding the appointed day of trial, at the point of general rendezvous. These it is the fashion to make matters of pride to the different colleges to meet, not only for graduates by voluntary subscriptions, but also for undergraduates, by what are really forced contributions from them, class by class.

No college can afford to lose from its quota of students that class of young men who represent plain homes and narrow circumstances, in which, fortunately for them and for all around them, they learned to make the most of the few advantages that they had, and to aspire eagerly to those higher ones that lay, then and there, beyond their easy reach.

VI. The new exercises for undergraduates serve to increase their natural centrifugal tendency to fly away from college authority, and also to barbarize their tastes and habits.

College-rows, and hazing experiences, and ribald and even obscene pasquinades, and burlesques, and personalities in prose and verse, continually defile the pure waters of what should be the sweetest time in the earthly experience of the young aspirant for professional life, the time when he is gathering his stores of knowledge and power for life-long use afterwards, and when the all-animating thought of his heart should be, in doing it, that he would be so much the more able to serve God with acceptance and bless his fellows.

Our fathers felt that, next to personal religion, there was no such powerful help to ministers and teachers of all kinds, in their work as trainers of character, as the refining influence of good manners. In all schools and colleges these were held in high account, as a living force for good beyond all price. To be a scholar great or small, seemed to them, to be, by necessity

to the same degree, a gentleman. But how fearfully now are the simplest maxims and ideals of good manners ignored, or rather ruthlessly battered down, as if beneath contempt, in those places of highest education over all the land, which should be, as such, the centers and ever new sources of supply of all the best sentiments, habits and influences produced by our modern Christian civilization.

The centrifugal tendency is strong and ever-active, at any rate, in college-life, for many reasons, to rid one's self, at every point possible, of the directive and restrictive requisitions of college authority and to assert, at every new step and turn, one's own personal irresponsible individuality. The history of our colleges generally has been, for several years increasingly, a history of turbulent conditions, of one kind and another. Especially have instances of such a sort been multiplied and aggravated, during the present year. The powerful impulse towards wanton self-directiveness, so prevalent among collegians, is greatly augmented by their recent devotion to regattas and athletic sports, for the public eye to gaze upon and the public ear to hear. Just so far as the student's unripe ideas are magnified in importance, and his crude wishes are gratified, and his boisterous self-satisfaction indulged, all guiding influences that his teachers ought to be qualified to exert and earnestly on the watch to employ for his good, are alienated from their true end and function, at the very sources of their presence and power. Nothing is so needful for the future prosperity and progress of our country as the right condition and action of our educated young men; and what in them is most worth the having, as well as what is most worth the seeking for them and for all who shall be most swayed and moulded by them in future years, is a spirit of obedience to law, of steadfast adherence to what is right and true, of fidelity to all trusts, of conscientious earnestness to pursue at all times the pathway of personal improvement, and of reverence for whatever is exalted in excellence of any kind.

One of the chief wants of college life everywhere in our country is want of intellectual aspiration and eagerness in study, which is itself but one manifestation of a more generic deficiency still, want of moral earnestness. How few collegians any-

where show any enthusiasm in their work, or have any strong and flaming sense of the benefits of abounding knowledge, as such, or of the sacredness of time and talent, and of each and every opportunity of personal self-culture, and of the greatness of their obligations to God and their fellows for the best possible improvement of their great and peculiar privileges! Where any energetic stir of thought and effort appears, how commonly is it found to have been awakened by the charms of some petty prize, or honor, that glitters with a false misleading lustre, only because the moral vision of him who gazes entranced at it is weak, and perverted by inferior views of life and duty. How carefully should any little moral momentum, that already exists in any of the higher educational institutions of the land, be treasured and augmented! And how jealously should all extraneous influences of a strongly diverting kind be excluded from an atmosphere, in which interests of so much preciousness in themselves are to be nourished to enduring greatness.

In the minds of those who adjust, from time to time, the college curriculum, there is a strong sense of the need of new and larger courses of study than are yet pursued, even to the feeling of positive constriction, in the narrow bounds now appointed for the accomplishment of their work. When in positive distress of soul for more time and chance for securing results, greatly to be desired, but, now unattainable in this age of such great progress and of such vast hopes for the future, they feel that they encounter a fearfully backward eddy in the fulfilment of their fondest wishes, as they witness the new and intemperate devotion of undergraduates to the violent muscular contests of the day. The *contentio animi*, which they would fain behold in full blaze in the heart of every collegian, and which is only exalting in its influence upon every soul where it reigns, they see with sadness displaced by a mere *contentio corporis*, in which prize-fighters, who do not know enough to read their own names when in print, can show their hand for might or skill far better than those belonging to the intellectual noblesse of the land.

And will that evil attendant of horse-races and prize fights, the spirit of betting and gambling, be long absent from the regatta contests of the collegians? The fair fame of their

promised or supposed purity has been already sullied, by reports said, alas, to be too well founded, of such an addition to the many false excitements that they produce.

VII. The intercollegiate regattas and foot races exert an evil influence upon society, by giving umbrage and increase to similar tastes and habits in the commoner classes of the community.

The regulating influences of society never work from below upwards, but from above downwards and outwards. Laws, fashions, customs and prevailing manners, are but other names for the ideas and ideals of thought, feeling, and conduct cherished by the cultivated classes of society, and presented continually as examples of right action before the eyes of the lower classes. Can any Christian patriot figure, with contentment of mind to himself, the future of his dear native land, as one, in which sporting characters are to win all eyes and rule all hearts? And is the civilization of the world, wrought out with the slow agony of so many long ages, to find, at last, its completion in such a general moral catastrophe? Forbid it all earnest lovers of human progress, and of God's great kingdom upon earth.

That very few of our religious presses, and none of the secular, have made any strong protest hitherto against the recent introduction of muscular prize contests into college life, is no morally favorable symptom of the times. In these days of general self-indulgence in so many forms, which any wide-spread state of public religious interest would instinctively and vigorously at once condemn, it is no pleasant sight, to see abundant apathy everywhere concerning the evil influences now setting in a strong tide upon our higher institutions of learning. But to many a looker-on, it has seemed a far sadder spectacle to see those, who should, from their proximity to the places and persons most injuriously affected, have felt at once the charm of their position and power for good, actually abet, in every favoring way the false ideas which are of late overbearing, in a direct and organized form, in so many younger minds, the truest and best conceptions of personal advancement in knowledge and excellence.

There is a weak love of exhibitions of physical strength,

not to say of ostentatiousness generally, in the average American mind. Processions, and anniversaries, and public shows, and ceremonies, and matters of newspaper notoriety, and regalia, and uniforms, and parades are all accordant with the general taste, down to the marvelous performances of the little infant gymnasts on the trapeze, who are whipped hard for the purpose behind the scenes by their trainers but kissed by them on the stage, when clapped by the spectators.

If students and their teachers, ignoring all principles of health and all the precepts of physiology, will persist in sitting three hours daily, for an hour each time, forty or fifty of them together in a room twenty feet square, never aerated when any one is in it, and with no escape anywhere for vitiated air, they must by necessity become sickly, and exhausted, and nervous. They must be expected, in such a case, to talk much of the wearing effects upon health and strength of intellectual labor, and to imagine themselves the victims of overwork. The depressing influence of such large inhalations of corrupt air every day in recitation rooms, beside the addition of like evil results from similar mistreatment of themselves continually in their own rooms for study, seems to suggest and confirm all the time the depraved sense of the need of stimulants and the habit of using them, either narcotic or alcoholic, and often both. Let students come better fitted from the preparatory schools for their work in college; let them, when there, be enlivened during all their hours of indoor experience by day and by night, with an abundance of pure vital air; let them maintain regular habits of eating, and exercise, and of studying, and sleeping; let their physical exercise be moderate in its type, instead of violent, social, instead of solitary, full of gleeful cheerfulness, instead of being sober and dull; and let their teachers, instead of relying in any case on routine or mere college machinery of any kind, or petty honors and prizes, seek earnestly to bring their own cultivated energies into warm magnetic contact with the feeble aspirations of those, who, under various influences, have gathered around them for their own greater enlightenment of mind, and quickening of spirit towards all things great and good, and the evils of college life, as now administered or experienced, would one and all disappear in sudden haste.

Who that has any strong mastering sense of the tremendous alternatives at stake in the type of liberal culture, so-called, which a son or a ward obtains in fact, will not feel justly saddened, or rather maddened, to find that his fellow students can have had either the power, or the opportunity, to have induced him, during any part of the college course, to risk, like a gambler staking his all on a single throw, his supreme chance in life for obtaining personal culture, and with it his preparation for the highest possible usefulness, on any exhibition, under whatever factitious excitement, of mere animal strength. And how would such an one dread, as next in terror to him, if not in some respects even worse, to find one, on whose highest and best education his heart was fully set, led on by untoward influence of any kind to dawdle away his precious hours, so precious for high and protracted intellectual toil, in careless indifference to all the higher ends and aims of life, because drawn aside by organized college influences, working naturally in such a way, to very inferior objects of pursuit. If extraordinary strength of muscle or of nerve ought to be deemed to be great and indispensable treasures to society, and to be sought therefore on a large scale, and with special zeal, there are myriads of vulgar souls all over the face of the world, possessing already a superior stock of such material in body and limb, and who can aspire to nothing higher than the sphere of mere material things affords them scope to perform. Let such as these be offered up, if need be, to the new Moloch of false public excitement in our country. But let not the choicest specimens of American life and hope be borne, with spontaneous satisfaction or forced consent, to the altar of sacrifice. There was an age once, lying far back from ours in the dim twilight of the dark past, when the world was so full of admiration for mere physical speed and strength that God thought it best to tell men that "the Lord delighteth not (Ps. 147 : 10) in the strength of the horse, and taketh not pleasure in the legs of a man." And has it, alas! come to this, that the wheel of history must revolve backwards for us, and we must revert to the dark days again, out of which, in tardy successions of advancement, one beyond another, the different generations of mankind have toiled up to our present height of social privileges!

Has Cornell University risen, in the thoughts of any honest thinker, to any higher position than it had before, because of the recent success of a small boating crew among its members in their long-trained efforts to win a prize and the praises that went with it. And have Yale, Harvard and Columbia any diminished excellence, because a little handful of their separate hundreds of students happened to be a few seconds behind the stronger and better practiced crew of Cornell, in reaching the appointed goal, at the end of a two-mile course of rowing.

And how excessive is the conceit likely to be of the few inordinately flattered lucklings of an hour, on a single day in July last, in Saratoga! A long and abounding life of earnest service to God and man would not suffice to bring to any one of them, while living, one note of that long anthem of praise which filled all the air for them as they passed from Saratoga to Ithaca. If the height of modern sensationalism has not been reached now, once for all, serving to cast all other sensation-mongers forever into the shade, where can one conceive of any stronger form of public folly as possible to occur.

Each college-student is the centre of the fondest wishes and expectations of many loving hearts, not a few of which look far beyond the realization of any plans of mere earthly success, as the acme of their desires for them, striving, praying, and hoping unceasingly for their highest possible intellectual and religious improvement. In what deep and tender tones of parental earnestness, would they love to voice, in many a still hour, to the inner ear of their child's heart, such thoughts of wisdom as these: My son, remember always, that the true end of each and every part of your college training is to train you so that you can make a broad and full outlay of your time and strength in some worthy calling, in all your subsequent life. Whatever therefore will best fit you for the highest and most enduring application of your personal faculties and resources of all kinds to the proper work of life, that be sure to seek and to gain; and whatever serves, at any time, to divert to any degree your zeal from the pursuit of knowledge, and of power of thought, and from habits of broad and thorough research in all matters of personal investigation, and from the attainment of the most varied forms of self-culture within reach, that carefully

avoid as so far destructive in itself to all your highest hopes and prospects. Make with all diligence all that you are, and have, and do, directly tributary to the one idea, purpose, and effort to become the noblest specimen, possible to you, of your own divinely endowed self-hood.

Can anyone rightly think that filial responsiveness of feeling to such earnest parental solicitations would allow any collegian to waste his hours and energies on mere collateral objects of interest of any sort? Proper student-work, as such, demands the time and strength of every one engaged in it, for its own highest ends and results.

Greatly indeed is it to be regretted, that, in the arrangements made for our first centennial presentation of the nature and influence of our republican ideas and institutions, on a broad scale, before the world, an international regatta should be already provided for, as if one of the indispensable features of the grand occasion.

ARTICLE IV.—JOHN DWIGHT OF DEDHAM, AND HIS DESCENDANTS.

It is a most fortunate thing for the world at large, that a few men have such natural or acquired tastes for certain kinds of literary work, that they will do it, regardless of trouble or expense. The man who can write such a sensational novel, that, in all circulating libraries it will stand pledged ahead to six young lady readers, for the space of six months, may expect to make a little money out of the operation. But the man who writes a good history of his native town, or the genealogy of his family, must commonly expect to give months and years of his time, and help pay for the book out of his own pocket, when it is done. But he has his revenge, if he lives long enough to enjoy it. By and by, when the aforesaid novel has faded into the shadowy past and been forgotten, many an individual, and many a library will buy that Town History, or that Book of Genealogy, at almost any price, rather than be without it. But even this is not ordinarily a money revenge to the writer. Men who do this kind of work ought to be credited with a large share of "love to being in general."

Few people ever take the trouble even to think what an enormous work it is, to collect and arrange the facts down to the present time, showing the descendants of an average married pair, starting in life, we will say, in the year 1630. Let us suppose a case, which may be beyond the average, but not equal to many actual cases, as they are found in the early New England generations. A young man is united to a young woman in marriage in the above named year, 1630. They have five children, sons and daughters, who live to grow up, and to become heads of families. When those five children have taken to themselves husbands and wives, there are twelve persons to be counted as belonging to this little tribe. We will give again five children to each of these couples, who in their turn shall live to mature age, and become heads of families. That adds fifty more persons to the stock, and our little tribe

has now grown to be sixty-two. Now we will give to our twenty-five couples, five children each, who shall live to the estate of manhood and womanhood, and take to themselves partners, and become in like manner heads of households. Here is an addition to our reckoning, of one hundred and twenty-five children, and when they are married, of one hundred and twenty-five persons more, who, though not of the blood, must of course come into the genealogical enumeration, and our tribe has now swollen to three hundred and twelve. But we have as yet reached only to the end of the fourth generation, and have traveled over a period of something more than a century. Yet we have already so broadened out our work that it begins to look appalling. And now we have at least five generations more, on this enlarged and rapidly enlarging scale, to enumerate, before we reach these passing years in which we are living. The young children and youths of this day, springing from the old New England families planted here from 1630 to 1640, will generally be found in the ninth or tenth generation from the first founders. Generations will of course move along somewhat more rapidly, when reckoned in the line of the older children of households than of the younger; yea, these generations will often overlap each other. This was much more common in the former days than now, when marriages took place earlier in life. Esther Edwards, oldest child of Jonathan Edwards, had three uncles and one aunt (children of Richard Edwards), who were younger than she, and this was no very uncommon circumstance in the ancient days of early marriages.

With these general facts and considerations before us, we cannot but have a sense of overwhelming labor, when we look upon two bulky volumes, numbering together 1144 pages, in which Dr. Benjamin W. Dwight has enrolled the "Descendants of John Dwight of Dedham." From the author's "General Summary," we learn, that about eight thousand persons appear in these volumes, as belonging to the family of the said John Dwight. But the author's mother was a Strong, and the Stronges were far more numerous than the Dwights. These two volumes are only a kind of companion work of two larger volumes, embodying the Strong lineage, and the author tells us: "In the

two family histories investigated in union with each other by the writer, the lineage of some forty thousand persons has been presented more or less fully to view, with brief outlines besides of the history of two hundred or more collateral families, with other thousands of names."

It makes one weary even to copy that sentence. There is so much labor involved in it that the mind tires at the very portals of the gateway.

The author tells us how he was led into this labor. We cannot copy the whole passage, but the story is instructive, as illustrating the little turning points, on which the course of our lives so often hinges. "It was in the most casual way possible that the idea of the great endeavor, whose results are here brought to view, came in the first place to possess the author's thoughts. Twelve years ago in the fall of 1861, Augustus W. Dwight, Esq., a lawyer at Syracuse, then wholly unknown to the writer—who became afterwards Colonel of the 122d New York Regiment, and fell at the head of his troops in the attack on Fort Stedman—wrote to the author that 'he had learned that he was about to prepare a history of the Dwight Family; and that, if it were so, he could render some valuable aid in the premises.' Answer was returned at once, that 'no such thought had been entertained for a moment, or was likely to be in the future.' This ended all farther correspondence between the two parties." We will not copy more, but that was the way the original seed was planted, which various influences fostered and caused to germinate and grow. And many a man will find in his experience, that he has been turned aside from plans which he had marked out and fondly contemplated, and been led into other fields of activity, by causes, seemingly as slight as this.

John Dwight* came to this country in 1634, or early part of 1635, and soon established himself at Dedham, Massachusetts. There came with him a John Rogers,—son of a Puritan Lecturer, who had exercised his gifts in Dedham, England, but had been silenced by the government. This John Rogers, the immigrant

* There was also a Timothy Dwight among the freemen of Dedham, and afterwards of Medfield, who is believed to have been a brother of John, coming over with him, or following soon after. Of him we shall speak hereafter.

companion of John Dwight, may or may not, have been a grandson of one of those nine children of the Martyr, whose faces we used devoutly to study in the New England Primer. The name of the town itself was doubtless given by the General Court, out of regard to these people, who had come from Dedham, England, and from under the instructions of John Rogers, the Lecturer.

John Dwight (or Dwite) was of the twelve men, who took part in the first town meeting in Dedham, in 1635. He brought with him from England a wife and three children,—two sons, Timothy and John, and one daughter, Hannah. Two daughters were born on these shores, Mary and Sarah. Mary Dwight was the "first child born in Dedham," as appears by the old records. But the boy John, when six years of age, three years after the family reached these shores, was lost in the woods, and perished. The forests which our fathers first encountered in New England, were awful in their reach, and in the many dangers and terrors that lurked about them. For a little child to go astray in those pathless solitudes, and never return, would make a subject, over which the thoughts of parents and of brothers and sisters would brood for months and years in painful agony.

The death of this boy leaves us alone with Timothy the other son, for the perpetuation of the male line. But as he is to live to the great age of eighty-eight; is to be six times married; is to have fourteen children, eleven of whom are to be sons—we can reasonably look to him to give the family name a good firm start in the new world. But of these eleven sons, four die in early life; two are married, but leave no issue; one had sons that died young; and so the Dwight name is still left dependent upon four boys—Nathaniel, Josiah, Michael, and Henry.

The six wives of Timothy Dwight were Sarah Sibley, Sarah Powell, Anna Flint, Mrs. Mary Edwind, Esther Fisher, and Bethiah Moss. By the three last he had no children. Anna Flint, his third wife, was the daughter of Rev. Henry Flint of Braintree. Ten of the fourteen children of this Timothy were hers, and she was the mother of the four boys above mentioned, who helped to spread the Dwight name. Nine of her ten

children were boys. Her father, Rev. Henry Flint, was a choice spirit, as we may gather from some items of his will, made in 1652. He died in 1668. In this will he says: "Until my wife or any of the children marry, I leave all my estate in the power, and to the wisdom and discretion, of my wife, for her comfort and bringing up of the children. . . . For the present, I know not what portion of my estate to assign to my wife, in case God call her to marriage, otherwise than as the law of the country does provide in that case,—accounting all that I have too little for her, if I had something else to bestow upon my children." There is not much of the sour and surly Puritan in the composition of such a man. This Anna Flint, his daughter, in becoming the third wife of Timothy Dwight, became also, as it proved, the ancestress, in her generation, of all who bear the name of Dwight in this country.

But let us now turn for a moment into another field. To show that we did not, in our imaginary case, overstate the labor which the early generations of a family often furnish for its genealogist, take the following sentence from the preface to Mr. Dwight's work on the Strong's. "In his history of the former family (the Dwights) there were even in the third generation but three founders of families; but with the Strong's how different! Elder John Strong began the family history with eighteen children, fifteen of whom had families, and eighty-eight of their children are on record in this book as heads of families. There were doubtless a dozen more. From the third generation downwards, the author's task was nearly thirty times greater, therefore, in tracing his maternal ancestry and kindred, than his paternal." This is, of course, a very unusual and remarkable disparity. But whoever looks into the early New England history, as pertaining to the growth of families, will find many strange variations from the general rule. The Dwights were as much below the ordinary rule, in respect to rapidity of increase, as the Strong's were above.

Elder John Strong, the patriarch of his race, came over with Rev. John Warham's church in 1630. This company, with all its goods and cattle, was rudely set on shore down at rocky Nantasket, by the captain of the vessel that brought them (Captain Squeb—his name is against him) because, contrary to

his express agreement, he did not like to navigate the bay, up to the settlement at Charlestown. Five years later, this church removed from Dorchester to Windsor, Connecticut, and John Strong went with it. He remained at Windsor about twenty-five years, and then (in 1659 or 1660), removed to Northampton where he died in 1699, at the great age of ninety-four. He was the first Ruling Elder in the Northampton Church. In the early New England churches, the Ruling Elder stood very near to the Ministers. But the office of Ruling Elder ceased for the most part, among us, before the end of the first century of our history. Scattered cases, rare and curious, continued even down to the early part of the present century. But these early Ruling Elders were so closely associated with the Ministers, that they were sometimes addressed with the prefix *Rev.* So it is stated. But the only instance of the kind which we have ever happened to discover, is in the case of this Elder John Strong. When Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Boston, in the year 1672 sent his letter of acceptance to the call which the Northampton church had given him, he addressed it to "Rev. John Strong." We notice among the Stronges, that the name of a child is recorded of the *eleventh generation* from John Strong.

But to return again to the Dwights. These four boys, to whom we are to look for the perpetuation of the Dwight name, become—Justice Nathaniel Dwight, first of Hatfield (1666), and then of Northampton (1695); Rev. Josiah Dwight of Woodstock, Connecticut, (first minister of that place and continuing in office from 1686–1726); Capt. Henry Dwight of Hatfield, and Michael Dwight who stays in Dedham.

We cannot, of course, reproduce these two bulky volumes in this article, and so we must be allowed, from this point, to ramble freely, to pick and choose according to our pleasure.

This Nathaniel Dwight, who first goes to Hatfield, has a son born there in 1694, who the next year is taken to Northampton with the family, and becomes in due time Colonel Timothy Dwight, one of the most energetic and valuable citizens of the place, both in matters of church and state. He is there, a man thirty-three years old, when Jonathan Edwards comes thither to be colleague pastor with his father-in-law, Rev. Solomon Stoddard. He is a faithful attendant upon Mr. Edwards'

preaching, all through the twenty-three years of his ministry, and is a firm friend of his to the last. When that violent storm arose which drove Edwards from Northampton, Colonel Dwight remained his steadfast supporter; so that Edwards, writing in 1750 to his friend Erskine across the water, says: "There is a number, whose hearts are broken by what has come to pass, and I believe are more deeply affected than ever they were at any temporal bereavement. It is thus with one of the principal men of the parish, Colonel Dwight." He was called "Colonel," "Surveyor," or "Esquire," according to circumstances. He was not a large man, but of great muscular strength.

But he had a son, Major Timothy Dwight, born in 1726, who became a giant in strength. He is described as of "large bodily frame, six feet and four inches high and of fine proportions." He graduated at Yale College at the age of eighteen, in 1744. His father meant that he should be a lawyer, but some pen has recorded the following statement on this matter. "He had such extreme sensibility to the beauty and sweetness of always doing right, and such a love of peace, and regarded the legal profession as so full of temptations to doing wrong, in great degrees or small," that he preferred to follow some other occupation.

But nothing was more natural, as this world goes, with its strange contrasts and laws of compensation, than that this large-framed great-hearted young man should fall most earnestly in love with the *petite*, graceful, delicate, beautiful Mary Edwards, fourth daughter and fourth child of Jonathan Edwards and Sarah Pierrepont. The year 1750, fatal to the peace of the Edwards household had come. Here were nine children to be provided for, the eldest eighteen, and the youngest a little babe. Three weeks before Mr. Edwards preached his farewell sermon, (which was given on the first Sabbath of July,) there had been a wedding in the family, and Sarah, the eldest daughter, then twenty-two, had been united in marriage to Mr. Elihu Parsons. Jerusha, his second daughter, had been taken away from the evil to come, three years before, dying at the age of seventeen. But here was his beloved wife and nine children to be taken care of, and what the Lord would next open before him was locked in the clouds of the future.

At length came the call to go to Stockbridge and instruct the

Housatonic Indians, and the few white families resident there. The call was accepted. But Stockbridge was then far away over the Berkshire hills, through a rough wilderness, and the little Mary Edwards, then sixteen years old, was heartily in love with Timothy Dwight, and engaged to him, though not yet expecting to be married. But it seemed hardly advisable that she should make this toilsome journey to Stockbridge and back, or that Mr. Dwight should be compelled to do the same; for when they should be married, Northampton was to be their home. In view of these facts it was thought best that the marriage should take place before the Edwards family left for their new home in the wilderness. Accordingly, on the 8th of Nov., 1750, Timothy Dwight and Mary Edwards were married,—he being twenty-four and she sixteen. Mary Edwards was a pattern of elegance and refinement, with a bright, winsome, beautiful face. Her picture, which we have seen, shows a head shaped somewhat like her father's, and a face radiant with life and thought. But the remarkable disparity between the husband and wife is briefly and clearly shown in this book of genealogy. "Mary Edwards was as much below medium size as Timothy Dwight was above it. * * * She herself was so small, that her husband would sometimes carry her around the room on his open palm, held out at arms length." Yet this little woman became the "mother of thirteen children, eight [nine]* of them sons, and all large and strong men—the smallest of them, Cecil, having been 5 feet 8½ inches high and weighing 200 pounds." Into this newly-formed household, on the 14th of May, 1752 a Timothy Dwight was born, destined to be President of Yale College and to move among the men most widely known and honored in all the land. He was Mary (Edwards) Dwight's first born. His birth occurred before she was eighteen. Our narrative has already brought to view five Timothy Dwights, in five different generations, and the stock seems to be all the while rising. With regard to the thirteen children of this household, the genealogy says,—“Her children were widely noted for their fine physical forms and features. The tradition is, that the special beauty of this generation came from their Edwards line-

* The author, by a slip of the pen probably, says *eight*, when he should have said *nine*.

age, as a similar characteristic of that family in the preceding generation had descended upon them, it is said, from the Stoddards. Their large and commanding forms they inherited from their father, but their fine, clear, expressive features from their mother."

The reference in this sentence to the preceding generation, and to the Stoddards will be entirely plain to many readers, but some may be assisted by a word of explanation. Timothy Edwards (father of Jonathan)—minister for 64 years at East Windsor, Connecticut—married Esther Stoddard, daughter of Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton. She was the mother of his eleven children, and was a woman of great natural and acquired superiority. She lived to the remarkable age of 99, and for the last few years of her life was like a saint of the heavenly mansions, making her abode still upon the earth. Her children were ten daughters and one son, the celebrated Jonathan Edwards. They were children taking their physical, and to a considerable degree, their mental proportions from her. Her only son was more than six feet high, and of her daughters, it will be remembered that they used sometimes to be described as "Mr. Timothy Edwards' sixty feet of daughters." This is doubtless a bold exaggeration of a striking fact. Without question Mr. Edwards' daughters were remarkably tall. But a woman actually six feet high is a rarity. Such women are to be found, but one may walk the streets of a crowded city for a long time before he meets with a woman of such proportions. It is not to be believed that one household should furnish ten women of this stature, and we therefore take the above quotation as only one of those exaggerated forms of speech, in which the human fancy delights to express itself.

But to return now to our married Hercules and his charming little wife. The volumes before us tell some remarkably good stories of both of them, and we cannot interest the reader in any better way than by repeating some of them. "Two stories are told of him (Major Timothy Dwight) in the family, illustrative of his great muscular strength, and quite characteristic of the humorous spirit of the times. He saw a farmer once driving his oxen through the town in an absent-minded mood, saying monotonously, 'Whoa! haw! gee!' as he swung his goad in-

differently from one side to the other. Stepping quickly up behind the cart, he caught hold of the end of it, and bracing himself against the wheels, held the oxen still. The farmer kept trudging moodily on as before, still saying 'Whoa! haw! geel' until he had gone far enough on alone to make the joke not endurable any longer, when a by-stander bawled out, to the great merriment of those who had witnessed the scene, 'Halloo! countryman! where are your oxen?'"

"A man from a neighboring town having heard often of Major Dwight's great muscular strength, came to Northampton one day to see him, and try his hand upon him, boasting that no one whom he had ever seen had proved to be a match for him. He found the Major hoeing an alley in his garden, and coming up to the picket fence near him, said, 'Major Dwight, they say that you are the strongest man in Northampton. I have come here on purpose to try my hand with you.' Casting but a glance at him, and working quietly on with his hoe. Major Dwight replied that 'he would not like to hurt him.' The Worthington braggart then stepped inside the fence and they kept bantering with each other, forwards and backwards, until the Major had hoed out the alley to the end, when, dropping his hoe, he suddenly caught up the ranter, and whirling him horizontally several times over his head, pitched him out over the fence, and with such a sense of complete discomfiture on his part that he was glad to skulk away as fast as he could from his presence."

Having repeated these two stories about the *physical* man, it would not be fair not to tell another about the *moral* man. "A lottery had been given to Princeton College by the colony of New Jersey, as was afterwards done by the Legislature of New York to Union, Hamilton, and other colleges. Pres. Burr, his brother-in-law, (he married Esther Edwards) forwarded to him twenty tickets for sale. The Council of Massachusetts colony meantime passed a law, prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets from any other colony. He accordingly put them one side, intending to return them to the source whence they came, which, however, he failed to do in season, as opportunities of transmission between points so distant were then very infrequent. All unsold tickets were required by the Lottery Company to be

returned by a given date, or kept by the holder at his own risk and charges. In laying the tickets by, he selected one in his own mind that he meant to keep himself when returning the rest. That ticket drew a blank; but one of the remaining nineteen drew the highest prize of all, amounting to £4,000 (\$20,000), while several of the others also drew prizes of some magnitude. According to the rules of the company, clearly stated and everywhere published, those twenty tickets were all his to be paid for, and his also, for any profit that might perchance accrue from them; but in settling with them in the end, he paid for the ticket that drew the blank, and resigned the nineteen others with their large pecuniary advantages to the company."

Such a man practically knew "the beauty and sweetness of always doing right."

Twenty-seven years after his marriage (in 1777) he died in Natchez, whither he had gone to look after certain landed interests, embraced in a crown grant of lands made to General Lyman and others for their services in the French and Indian war. By his death he left his wife, now forty-three years old, with thirteen children on her hands, the youngest a babe of a year old. His real estate was prized at £4,433, and his personal £134. No break had occurred in this family circle before. Those thirteen children were all alive. And now came a time when the care of this large household, with largely diminished means of support, devolved solely upon her; but she rose grandly to the occasion. She was a woman of immense energy and force in practical matters, and at the same time, she is estimated as fully equal to any other child of her father, in intellectual acumen and force of argument. And when we remember that she was sister of the younger Edwards, that is saying much. Madam Dwight was a power in the Northampton society that was not to be overlooked, though she was somewhat persecuted on her father's account.

There are several characteristic anecdotes of her in these volumes, but we must content ourselves with one, and that is one that the venerable John Tappan, Esq., of Boston, who died a few years since nearly ninety years old, used to tell of his infancy. He told the story, of course, as it was told to him.

He was born in Northampton, and his home was near the house of Madam Dwight.

"Once on hearing me cry for a long time with all my might, when an infant of less than two years old, she ran over from her house which was directly opposite my father's, and, going up to my chamber, took me out of bed and carrying me down to my mother, said to her: 'Mrs. Tappan, what in the world is the matter with this child?' 'Nothing, Madam,' she quietly replied. 'I am only weaning him, and he is resisting my authority.' My fright, in being thus hurried out of bed by a stranger, was an effectual cure of my crying. In after years, I made her home my frequent resort, where she beguiled me many an hour in telling me stories from her well-furnished mind, and inexhaustible powers of imagination and memory."

One who has ever known the physical energies and resolute force of mind and will in the Tappans, can well believe that this crying, under the circumstances, amounted to something considerable.

If the reader will glance back now for a moment, he will perceive, that since John Dwight came to Dedham, we have never been without a Timothy Dwight on these shores. It might seem, on a hasty review, that there had been a break in the succession, but it is not so. That Timothy Dwight who came over with his father, and who after being six times married, lived to be 88, was alive 22 years after Colonel Timothy Dwight was born. And now having reached that illustrious Timothy Dwight, the eldest child of Mary Edwards, we shall be quite sure, for the rest of the way, to have a full supply of Timothies constantly on hand.

Looking back from the point where the Edwards and Dwight streams came together, in Northampton in 1750, these two families had been quite unlike in their law of development. We deem it one of the most remarkable facts in our New England genealogical history, that at the time when Mary Edwards was married, she being in the fifth generation from William Edwards of Hartford, the founder, there had actually been in those five generations, but fifteen males of the Edwards name, in that branch of the Edwards family, and some four or five of those died in early life; while at this same point of time the descend-

ants of William Edwards through the female lines, were to be reckoned by hundreds.

But the Dwight family, though, as we have seen, not one of rapid early development, had been more equally enlarged through both the male and female lines, and had produced at the time above mentioned (1750), not far from seventy males, bearing the Dwight name.

We cannot venture far into that great wilderness of the female branches of this family, as they have spread themselves out now for the space of 240 years. It is a forest with many stately trees, but if we were to attempt to traverse it, we might share the fate of that little Dwight boy of Dedham, "who was lost in the woods." But we cannot avoid making some references to these families allied by marriage. In the early generation, the daughters of John Dwight, the founder, brought in some excellent character by their marriages. Hannah Dwight married Nathaniel Whiting, and was the mother of fourteen children, eight sons and six daughters. Mary Dwight married Henry Phillips, and was the mother of twelve children, nine sons and three daughters. Sarah Dwight married Nathaniel Reynolds, and bore him three children, one son and two daughters. These families are not traced in these volumes.

But leaving all the intermediate branches and generations, let us come down and look once more at this family of Madame Dwight of Northampton, left a widow in 1777 with her thirteen children. There are four daughters only among these children, but they were all married, and it is worth our while to take note of these marriages. Sarah Dwight married Nathan Storrs. Mary Dwight was twice married, to General Lewis R. Morris and to William Hall. Fidelia Dwight married Jonathan E. Porter; and Elizabeth Dwight, the youngest daughter, married William W. Woolsey of New York. Into this Woolsey family were born seven children, of whom the late President of Yale College, Dr. T. D. Woolsey, was the youngest but one.

Among the family names, in addition to those mentioned, allied by marriage to the Dwights, are to be reckoned the Bradfords, the Danas, the DeForests, the Hillhouses, the Hookers, the Lathrops, the Lymans, the Olmsteads, the Pierponts, the Ripleys, the Sedgwicks, the Shepards, the Shermans, the Silli-

mans, the Smythes, the Tallmadges, the Wadsworths, the Williamses, the Woodbridges, the Wyllyses, and a host of others.

But we must leave ourselves space for some general facts and statistics, which are among the most interesting items pertaining to this whole matter. In a certain proclivity toward collegiate and professional education, probably no family in the land can equal the Dwights, (we mean both of the male and female lines). And this is the more remarkable because this tendency did not set in with strength in the early generations. There were eight Mathers, that had been through Harvard College, before ever a Dwight went there. But the Mathers only give us eleven graduates at Harvard, while the Dwights give us twenty-two. The Mathers give us twenty graduates at Yale and the Dwights twenty-eight, (the genealogy says, but we make twenty-nine.)

In mere numbers of graduates, in our old colleges, the name Williams will gain an easy triumph over all others, except that ubiquitous and cosmopolitan name of Smith. But the Williamses in this country, having descended from many distinct early progenitors, are very numerous. It is not to be supposed that the Williams tribe can show as many college graduates in proportion to their numbers, as the Dwights, though we have always taken pleasure in noticing how this family rolls up the names on the Harvard and Yale Triennials. There are more than seventy of them on the Yale Catalogue, besides the honoraries and the professionals; and there is about the same showing, for numbers, on the Harvard.

The earliest publicly educated man of the name of Dwight in this country, was that Josiah, (son of Capt. Timothy of Dedham,) who afterwards became the minister of Woodstock, Connecticut. He graduated not until 1687, after the family had been in the country more than fifty years.

We well remember a remark which we once heard Professor Kingsley, of Yale College, make. He had for a long course of years the care of the annual and triennial catalogues at Yale. He said that he took great pleasure as he enrolled the names of the new students coming in year by year, in tracing their connections with the generations gone before, through their given names. And so on the Harvard catalogue, it is pleasant to observe that the third Dwight that graduates there is Flynt Dwight. That Rev. Henry Flint (or Flynt) of Braintree, whose

daughter, Anna, married Captain Timothy Dwight, has his name put on to the Harvard Catalogue nearly sixty years after his own death, by a son of Rev. Josiah Dwight, already noticed. This good minister of Braintree had one son, Rev. Josiah Flynt, that graduated at Harvard as early as 1664, and he had a grandson, Rev. Henry Flynt, (son of this Josiah,) who was instructor at Harvard for the long term of fifty-five years, and for fifty-three years was a member of the corporation. He never married, and so they named him "Father Flynt," after the manner pertaining to the Catholic priests, who are not supposed to be fathers at all. But this Henry Flynt of Braintree loved learning, and wanted his other son (the only other one living at the time he made his will) to follow in the same path, for he says in that loving will from which we have already made some extracts: "I give to my son Seth my great lot and half my books, if it please God to make him a scholar." But Seth did not incline to be a scholar, and Josiah got all the books. It would have rejoiced the good man's heart, if he could have lived to see the name of Flynt Dwight recorded on the Harvard catalogue. But in reference to the connection which this Dwight family has had with the colleges and literary institutions of the country, we will copy some short passages from Dr. Dwight's "General Summary of Results." He says, "The whole number here enumerated of graduates of colleges and universities, and of institutions of like grade is 409. Of these the number connected with the family by marriage is 148. [This last number does not refer to those of Dwight blood in the female lines, but to such educated men, not of the blood, as have married into the family.] The number of those liberally educated in the family itself as such, [in both the male and female lines] has been therefore at least 365." "Of the 8,000 members of the family, somewhat more than half have been females. Of the less than 4,000 males of all names in the family, it would be quite safe to assume that 1,500 died before coming to maturity. On such an estimate, and it must be short of the truth, there would be found to be an average of one in seven among the adult males of the Dwight family, liberally educated. * * * The number of college graduates enumerated in the two families, Dwight and Strong, is 921, or deducting those repeated in either work, 900 and over. * *

The relative proportion of educated men in the Dwight family is much larger than in the Strong, being in the former a seventh of its adult males, and in the latter a twentieth."

This is certainly a very remarkable record. But we are not sure that it will not be more impressive to the average reader, if we drop out, (for the purpose of some comparisons) all the graduates of Dwight blood, who bear other names, and confine ourselves to the graduates of the name Dwight. If we have made the count correctly, they are not far from 70 [72, the author makes them] in number. We have spoken before of the Williamseas. If their record could be brought down fully to the present time, we judge that not far from 300 men of the name Williams, have graduated in such American colleges as are north of Mason and Dixon's line. To the Southern colleges we have not given attention, in respect to this item. But if any one will take the trouble to look into our early colonial populations, (say from 1630-1650) he will find men of the name Williams, at almost every point. And one need only look into a Directory of any of our large cities to see how this name abounds. But the Dwights, it must be remembered, all come from that one John Dwight of Dedham, and that too, without rapid increase in the early generations.

The name Edwards stands conspicuous among us for culture. But like the name Williams, the name Edwards, (both of them Welsh) was very frequent in the early generations. The Edwards name will show about the same number of graduates in the northern colleges as the Dwight. But there were certainly a dozen men of the name Edwards, who came out of England and settled on these shores before the year 1650. And this last comparison, in which we use a name known for culture, will show very well the remarkable course of the Dwights in respect to collegiate education. Among the men of the Edwards name, who trace their origin to William Edwards of Hartford, [and this section of the Edwards race has been altogether the most prolific in college graduates], it will be impossible to find more than 27 or 28, who have been publicly educated. It ought indeed to be said, and the author of these two volumes would probably admit the truth of the remark, that the great force impelling the Dwights to this col-

legiate career came largely from the Edwards blood and spirit. Up to the day when Timothy Dwight married Mary Edwards, in 1750, there had been but seven Dwights graduated from our two New England colleges, and we then had but two.

In this immediate connection, there is a very noticeable feature about this Dwight culture. In the branch of the family where it first began, it did not flourish to any considerable degree. Josiah, son of Capt. Timothy, of Dedham, was the first graduate of the name, and his son followed in his footsteps. But if we have studied the record correctly, the descendants of Josiah Dwight (and they were considerably numerous) give us only *five* college graduates, while among the descendants of his brother Nathaniel we find *thirty-two*, and among those of his brother Henry *twenty-nine*. Michael's descendants give us but *one*, and there are four or five scattering. The culture was chiefly in those two families at Northampton and Hatfield. They were near together, and influences easily caught from one to the other; and as already suggested, the early stimulus in this direction, came largely from the intermarriage of the Dwight family with the Edwards. It is only one illustration, among a very great many, of the power and influence of Jonathan Edwards, in his generation. Only a few, comparatively, of the people of the present day, have any just conception of the sweep and force of that man's thought and activity—how many minds he set thinking,—how many new currents of influence were put in motion, and how many old barriers were broken down by him. His defeats turned into after triumphs. The obscurity into which he was driven became the very passage-way to a world-wide fame. From that seeming solitude and isolation at Stockbridge, he spoke to the most cultivated and philosophical minds of the Old World, and they heard his words with eagerness and astonishment.

Still, we would not unduly magnify him as the source and inspiring influence of this wide culture among the Dwights; because it is to be noticed, as we have already suggested, that the college graduates of the Dwight name, are almost as numerous among the descendants of Henry at Hatfield as of Nathaniel at Northampton, but we attach considerable importance to the nearness of those branches to each other, and to

the influences, which, starting in Northampton, flowed easily to Hatfield. And it is a confirmation of this view, that this Hatfield stock gives us but two graduates before that date, (1750), when Major Timothy Dwight marries Mary Edwards. In some way, an immense stimulus was supplied about this time, and we attribute it largely, to the moral and intellectual influence of Edwards, and to his blood passing at this point into the Dwight family.

There are a few scattered and outlying families by the name of Dwight in this country, that the author has not been able clearly and distinctly to trace to John Dwight of Dedham. There was a Timothy Dwight at Medfield, a few years after John Dwight was in Dedham, and, as already said in a note, he is believed to have been a brother of John, coming over with him or soon after. He had three sons, and there were children in the next generation. But the author concludes, from all the information he can gain, that this family ran out in its male lines, and that the name was not perpetuated by it. The "Shirley Dwights," so called, are an unresolved *nebula*, and it is possible that the Medford family did live on in one of its male lines, and that the Shirley Dwights are the consequence. But for the most part, the author claims to have compassed the Dwight family on these shores; and it is apparent that he has performed an enormous amount of work in so doing, and has conferred upon the family a most valuable possession. He ought certainly to have his reward for it. One hundred years hence these volumes will be of priceless value. They have been prepared with great care. No one can closely examine them without seeing an almost infinite attention to little details. Over and above the dry lists of names and dates, they abound in pertinent anecdotes and historical illustrations—snatches of old records, rare and curious, carrying the reader back to the ancient days. In this miscellaneous reading, one may find entertainment and instruction for a long time.

The volumes are printed on paper of a most superior quality, with choice type, and with valuable portraits of many distinguished members of the family. Thirty-three pages near the opening of the work are given to the "History of the English

Dwight Family," which section, of itself, must have cost no little research.

In the preparation of this Article, there are obvious reasons, which have restrained us from any large mention of the living members of the family, nor have we sought, to any extent, to bring the men of the departed generations, individually to view. We have been concerned chiefly with the family as a whole—the law of its development and progress—and the remarkable results reached in the direction of literary culture. In this respect, probably no family in the land, of equal numbers, can surpass it. It occupies a rare position among the old New England households, many of which can present most honorable records.

ARTICLE V.—SONS OF LIBERTY IN 1755.

IN a letter to Governor Fitch of Connecticut, February 11th, 1765, Jared Ingersoll, the colony's agent in London, sent a report—or as he terms it, a sketch—of Colonel Barré's rejoinder to Charles Townshend, in the first debate on the American Stamp Bill, in the House of Commons. Mr. Ingersoll probably furnished other copies of this sketch, from one of which it was published in the *New London Gazette* of May 10, and reprinted in many of the newspapers friendly to the American cause.

In this speech, Barré had designated the colonists as "sons of liberty," and this name was soon adopted by associations formed throughout the country to oppose the execution of the Stamp Act. "The friends to the claims of the colonies," says Gordon (i. 167), "pleased with Colonel Barré's speech and what he had pronounced the Americans, assumed the title of SONS OF LIBERTY." So, Mr. Bancroft: "May had not shed its blossoms, before the words of Barré were as household words in every New England town. Midsummer saw it distributed through Canada in French; and the continent rung from end to end with the cheering name of the SONS OF LIBERTY." (*Hist. of the U. S.*, v. 241.)

Mr. Ingersoll himself, when he published, in 1776, all his "Letters relating to the Stamp Act," remarked, in a note to his report of Barré's speech,—

"I believe I may claim the Honour of having been the Author of this Title (Sons of Liberty), however little personal good I have got by it, having been the only Person, by what I can discover, who transmitted Mr. Barré's Speech to America."

That the name was first suggested by the speech, no one seems to have doubted. Few, probably, of the numerous associations that assumed it knew or suspected its earlier origin. Yet—as it is the purpose of this paper to show—one or more political clubs, called "Sons of Liberty," had been formed in Connecticut *more than ten years before the passage of the Stamp Act*, and it is nearly certain that Jared Ingersoll, when he was

writing out for publication his notes of Barré's speech, knew of the existence of such a club, *if he had not himself been enrolled as a "Son of Liberty."*

The evidence, as respects the *name*, is found in an obscure pamphlet, printed anonymously in New Haven, in 1755. Before quoting this pamphlet, something must be said of the controversy which called it forth.

Thomas Clap became president of Yale College in 1740, and, the next year, Jonathan Law succeeded Joseph Talcott as governor of Connecticut. In the ensuing decade, opposition to the ecclesiastical constitution of the colony became strong enough to threaten the disruption of church-establishment. This was the era of revivals, but it was also the era of declension, separations, and the incoming of heresies, of wild fanaticism, and of intolerance and persecution in the name of "the liberties of the churches,"—soon to evoke bold assertion of liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment. 'Old Light' and 'New Light,' Arminianism and Antinomianism, Arianism, and Taylorism were by-words of party. "A day of trouble, and of treading down, and of perplexity in the valley of vision,"* it seemed to those who, content with the Old Light, strove to maintain the unity of the church and its alliance with the state. "God has given us to see our churches *in a ruffle*,"—said the Rev. Mr. Worthington in his sermon before the General Assembly in 1744: "strangers taking them by the hands, and they wandering into enthusiasm, anabaptism, and antinomianism." Students at the college not only dared to read books dangerous to the peace of the church, but, at the hazard of losing their degrees, actually ventured to set on foot a subscription for reprinting Locke's "Letters on Toleration."† Some of them did worse; they caught the license of the times, sat in judgment on their instructors, and pronounced some of them "unconverted and unskillful guides in matters of religion." To the Revivalists and New Lights, the aspect of affairs was even darker than it seemed to their persecutors. "Numbers of the clergy," says one

* Is. xxii, 5. The Rev. Isaac Stiles, an *anti-signatus* of the Old Lights, makes the quotation in his Election Sermon, May, 1742.

† Trumbull's History of Connecticut, ii. 183, note. Locke's Letters were reprinted in Boston, in 1743.

"were Arminians, preachers of a dead, cold morality, without any distinction of it from heathen morality, by the principles of evangelical love and faith Some of the leading ministers of the colony were most bitter enemies to the revival and to their brethren who were instrumental in promoting it. *This was the case in general with the magistrates and principal gentlemen of the colony.*"* Nor was this the worst. Corruptions in doctrine in the Protestant church of England had crossed the Atlantic, "and too many in our churches, and even among our ministers, had fallen in with them." "The writings of Chubb, Taylor, Foster, Hutcheson, Campbell, and Ramsey, began to be highly extolled and assiduously spread about the country."†

At this period, there was much talk of *Liberty*, though none yet dreamed of political independence. It was as loyal subjects of England that the colonists demanded the rights and privileges of freemen. They were proud of their English birthright. Their public speakers loved to boast, with Paul, that theirs was not a purchased freedom, but that they were "free born"—true sons of liberty.

Connecticut, especially, was without temptation to disloyalty. Not subjected—like her neighbors of Massachusetts and New York—to governors appointed by the crown, she had seldom been called to defend constitutional rights against the exercise of royal prerogative.

"A little model of that excellent and great form *at home*, we enjoy"—said the Rev. Jared Eliot, in 1738,—"*the same Liberties, and additional hereto.* We have liberty to choose from among ourselves, of our Fathers and Brethren, to rule over us; and these to be continued but just so long as we think fit. We have neither Strangers nor children to rule over us. We have our 'judges as at the first, and our rulers as at the beginning.' Are not these advantages great as human prudence could contrive, and even *extensive to the utmost bounds of a rational wish*?"‡

The liberty about which parties in Connecticut were contending between 1740 and 1750 was that of separation from church establishment, of "strict congregationalism," against consociation, of the exercise of private judgment in matters of

* Trumbull's History of Connecticut, ii. 162, 176.

† Ibid. (from N. Hobart,) 518; President Clap's Defence of the Doctrines of the N. E. Churches, p. 19.

‡ Election Sermon, 1738, p. 37.

religion. Governor Talcott had been friendly to the New Light movement and discountenanced all persecution of either dissenters or 'separates.' Governor Law was (says Dr. Trumbull) "a gentleman of a different character." His accession prepared the way for the adoption of more vigorous measures for the repression of disorders and to prevent further divisions in the churches. The Arminian or Old Light party was in a large majority in the general assembly. In May, 1742, they enacted "an Act for regulating Abuses and correcting Disorders in Ecclesiastical Affairs,"—which for bigotry, intolerance, and disregard of the rights of conscience is without parallel in the legislation of Connecticut. It is unnecessary to give even an abstract of it, here.* There are but two facts we can wish to remember about it, first, that its severities were directed, not against dissenters from a creed, but against seceders from an establishment, and those who promoted separations of established churches; it did not abridge the liberties of episcopalians, baptists, or other denominations "having any distinguishing character by which they may be known from the presbyterians or congregationalists;" and secondly, that, less than ten years after its enactment, it was wiped from the statute book without the ceremony even of a formal repeal.

In May, 1743, the legislature, by repealing the act of 1708, "for the ease of such as soberly dissent," made separation from any established church unlawful, except by special license of the general assembly, and such license, it was plainly intimated, presbyterians or congregationalists must not expect.

These extraordinary measures for the repression of irregularities and enthusiasm were cordially seconded by President Clap and the trustees of the college. The expulsion of David Brainerd in the winter of 1741–42, and of the two Clevelands in 1745, and the public testimony borne by the rector and tutors against Whitefield, were pledges of the sympathy of the college authorities with the Arminian majority in the legislature; and the legislature manifested its confidence by increasing the annual appropriation to the college, and by granting it, in 1745, a new and larger charter, which laid a broad foundation for its future advancement.

* It is printed in the Col. Records, viii. 454, ff., and in Trumbull's *History of Connecticut*, ii. 165, ff.

But before the death of Governor Law, in 1750, the persecution of New Lights and Separates had produced the result that might have been anticipated. Instead of crushing opposition, it had strengthened it and cemented its discordant elements. "The majority, by overstraining their power," says Backus,* "had weakened it, and it now began to decline." The party of "political New Lights—as they were nicknamed by their opponents—comprised numbers in all parts of the colony who had opposed separations and the excesses of the revivalists, but who denounced the laws of 1742 and 1743, and the prosecutions instituted under them, as violations of the liberties assured to British subjects by the Act of Toleration.

In the spring of 1744, a pamphlet was printed in Boston, entitled—

"The essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants. A seasonable Plea for *The Liberty of Conscience*, and *The Right of Private Judgment*, in matters of Religion, without any Controul from *human Authority*. Being a Letter, from a gentleman in the Massachusetts-Bay to his Friend in Connecticut. Wherein Some Thoughts on the Origin, End, and Extent of the *Civil Power* with brief considerations on several late Laws in Connecticut, are humbly offered. By a Lover of Truth and Liberty."

The writer subscribes himself *Philalethes*, and dates from *Eleutheropolis*, March 30, 1744. The internal evidence is sufficient to prove its Connecticut origin. "Colonel Elisha Williams, the best president they ever had at Yale College, was the author of it," says Backus, the baptist historian,†—who was not likely to be misinformed on this point. After resigning the presidency of the college, Mr. Williams was appointed (in May, 1740) a judge of the Superior Court, and held that office till the spring of 1753, when the general assembly left him off—probably because of his known opposition to the course of the dominant

* Church History of New England, ii. 177.

† Church History of New England, ii. 157. Sprague, Congr. Annals, i. 284, names it among Rector Williams's publications. It is assigned to him in the library catalogue of the American Antiquarian Society—whose copy of the pamphlet (acquired by its former owner in 1792) has written on the title page the name of "the Hon. Elisha Williams, late Rector of Yale College," as the author. The Rev. J. S. Clark, in a Historical Sketch of Congr. Churches in Massachusetts, (Boston, 1858; p. 177,) stated that this work had "been attributed" to the Hon. Thomas Cushing of Boston. With whom the attribution originated, does not appear. It is, intrinsically, highly improbable, and does not appear to be sustained by any evidence—except the fact that Mr. Cushing was Rector Williams's class-mate at Harvard.

party. Released from all official responsibility, he was at liberty to express his sentiments concerning the act of 1742, and to urge the rights of conscience. It is strange that a work in which the great principles of both civil and religious freedom are so clearly defined and so ably discussed, has been lost sight of, or barely mentioned, by writers on this period of colonial history.

The author avows himself a follower of Locke, in his views of the origin and end of civil government. He adopts the positions, that "all men are *naturally equal* in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another," that "we are *born free*, as we are born *rational*," and that "the fountain and original of all civil power is from *the people*, and is certainly instituted for their sakes." He proceeds to show that "the members of a civil state do *retain* their natural liberty or right of judging for themselves in matters of religion," and that the rights of conscience, "sacred and equal in all, are strictly speaking *unalienable*." He denies the power of the civil authority "to make or ordain articles of faith, creeds, forms of worship or church-government, to establish any religion, of a human form and composition, as a *rule* binding to Christians, much less to do this on any *penalties* whatsoever;" and asserts the right of every Christian "to determine for himself what church to join himself to," and of every church "to judge in what manner God is to be worshipped by them and what form of discipline ought to be observed by them," etc. He examines, section by section, the Connecticut laws of 1742 and 1743, and shows their injustice and that they abridge that Christian liberty to which all British subjects are entitled by the Act of Toleration. In conclusion, he makes this pregnant suggestion :

"It has commonly been the case, that Christian Liberty, as well as Civil, has been lost by little and little; and experience has taught, that it is not easy to recover it, when once lost. So precious a Jewel is always to be watched with a careful eye; for no people are likely to enjoy Liberty long, that are not *zealous to preserve it*."

So seasonable a plea cannot have been without influence on popular sentiment in Connecticut. Its bold denial of the power of the civil government "to make any penal laws in matters of religion" or for the maintenance of church-establishment, its vindication of 'strict congregationalism,' and of the right of in-

dividual dissent, broadened the platform of opposition to Governor Law's administration. It demonstrated the community of interests of all friends of liberty, political and religious. Parties in Connecticut were hereafter to contend on a more comprehensive issue than that of Calvinism against Arminianism, or the New Light against the Old.

When Roger Wolcott became governor in 1750, the "political New Lights" had already obtained a majority in the general assembly; and two or three years later President Clap himself was coöperating with them against his old friends, the Arminians. The election of two or three new members into the corporation of Yale had given the New Lights a majority of the board, and the President was not a whit behind the very chiefest in his zeal for orthodoxy.*

The students had been accustomed to attend worship with the first church in New Haven, of which the Rev. Joseph Noyes (a fellow of the college) was pastor. As a preacher, Mr. Noyes is said to have "had little animation, and not to have given satisfaction, as to his language or doctrines." In the judgment of the New Lights, he was an Arminian, and suspected of Arianism. President Clap resolved that the college should have a professor of divinity and a church of its own, so that the students might be withdrawn from the "danger of being infected with errors" at the New Haven church. Bent upon purging Yale of every taint of heresy and to guard against corruption of doctrine in the future, he determined to subject the Fellows and instructors to such a test of orthodoxy as might satisfy even the most exacting of Calvinists. In 1753, an act was adopted by the corporation, requiring every Fellow, professor, and tutor, to publicly declare his assent to the Assembly's Catechism and Confession of Faith, and to denounce as wrong and erroneous "*all* expositions of Scripture contrary to the doctrines laid down in *these compositions*." In 1754, the President published a pamphlet on *The*

* The change was rather in the President's *relations* to the two great parties, than in his individual *position*. He had coöperated with the Arminians, against separation and for the maintenance of church establishment; he now coöperated with the New Lights, in defence of orthodoxy. For an explanation of his course, in the different periods of his presidency, see Professor Fisher's *Commemorative Discourse*, Appendix, No. viii.

Religious Constitution of Colleges, in which he maintained the position, that colleges, being "superior societies for religious purposes," were entitled to carry on distinct and separate worship within their own jurisdiction.

The withdrawal of the students from the church of New Haven, the proposed organization of a separate church for the college, and the imposition of a religious test, roused violent opposition, of which New Haven was the centre. "There were at that time," says Dr. Trumbull (*Hist. of Conn.*, ii. 332), "numbers of *leading men in New Haven*, and in other parts of the colony, who were strongly opposed to the doctrines contained in the Confession of Faith and in the Catechism They were opposed to *all* confessions of faith, and some of them wrote against them. Two or more of the corporation were supposed to be of this number."

The President was charged with doing himself, by "separation" of the college from an established church, what he had condemned in others. "The pranks that have been played in the government by the scheming and political New Lights are now a going to be acted over again (and possibly with this difference only, that there are some new actors), under the more sacred name of orthodoxy"—wrote one of the President's assailants. "Orthodoxy is going to be made the *stirrup*, for some men to mount the saddle by," said another. It was now the turn of the Arminians—and those who made a common cause with them—to talk about *liberty* and the rights of conscience.

"One of the writers who employed his pen and talents against the college, was Dr. Gale of Killingworth, a gentleman well known," says Dr. Trumbull, "to be opposed to the doctrines contained in the Assembly's Catechism and in the Westminster and Savoy Confessions of Faith." Benjamin Gale graduated from Yale in 1733, studied medicine with the Rev. Jared Eliot (one of whose daughters he married), and practiced his profession—and much else—in Killingworth, for fifty years and more, till his death in 1790. He wrote, and wrote well, on a great variety of topics—the Saybrook platform, inoculation for the small pox, finance, the interpretation of prophecy, the reduction of town representation, and the millennium;

and he received a medal from the Society of Arts, for the invention of an improved drill-plough. Like his father-in-law, Jared Eliot, he disliked confessions of faith, and advocated the largest religious liberty. In politics, he went with the Arminians—but even the Arminians * questioned his orthodoxy. He complained that his opponents instead of disproving his statements tried to discredit them by calling him “an Arminian, Arian, Taylorist, Infidel.” He was bitterly opposed to the “Eastern faction”—as it began to be called—which threatened to transfer to the counties of New London and Windham a controlling influence in public affairs.

In April, 1755, a pamphlet appeared, without name of author or printer, entitled: “*The Present State of the Colony of Connecticut Considered.*† In a Letter from a Gentleman in the Eastern Part of said Colony to his Friend in the Western Part of the same.” In this pamphlet, of which Dr. Gale was understood to be the author, President Clap’s administration was sharply criticised, objections were urged to the establishment of a professorship of divinity and a separate church, and the Assembly was advised to withhold the annual grant of £100 to the college. Two answers to this attack were made: the first, by President Clap (anonymously), as “*The Answer of the Friend in the West to a Letter,*” &c.; the other, printed early in August, entitled, “*Congratulatory Letter from a Gentleman in the West, to his Friend in the East,*” &c. The latter, like the two preceding, was anonymous. A copy in Yale College library is ascribed—seemingly by the hand of President Stiles—to the Rev. Noah Hobart, of Fairfield. Mr. Hobart, already distinguished by his writings in defence of the validity of Presbyterian ordination, against the Episcopalians, had been chosen a Fellow of the College in 1752.

The “Congratulatory Letter” purports to be written by the Friend and correspondent of A. Z. (the initials subscribed to Dr. Gale’s pamphlet), and makes frequent reference to a secret *political club*, to which they both belong. General meetings of

* “Hart [Rev. William, of Saybrook], Gale, &c., are followers of Taylor, Foster, &c., and I doubt Socinianism is at the bottom.”—Rev. Dr. Samuel Johnson, to Archbishop Secker, 1760 (in N. Y. Colon. Docs., vii. 439.)

† It was printed at New London, by T. Green.

this club or "fraternity" are mentioned, and allusion is made to the correspondence carried on between its members in different parts of the colony :

"We have succeeded, beyond imagination, in practising upon the conclusions of our general meetings in October last." (p. 2.) "This brings to mind the observation made in our aforesaid meeting, by our worthy Friend, and the Patron of our Club or Fraternity," etc. (p. 3.) "By intelligence from our Brethren of other parts of the colony, about the Representatives, I learned what sort of men our Lower House of Assembly was like to consist of." (p. 1.) "If you'll wait till we meet at the next general Annual Meeting of the Brethren, I will bring it with me," etc. (p. 14.)

The defence of civil and religious *Liberty* was the professed object of this association :

"A good cause may sometimes warrant a seeming falsehood ; and this Article so advantageous to our cause, could not otherwise have been made use of. Freedom, Sir, and Liberty, are noble things, and what you know we profess to aim at ; and since our designs are so sublime, its warrantable in some instances to be boundless in our pursuits." (p. 4.)

"Why, our very Profession is *Liberty*, and it is the glory of our Religion, to be freed from all Forms, and all stingy notions ; and indeed, from any set of Principles at all," etc. (p. 10.)

"May we not, my Friend, fairly conclude, that we are the true *Sons of righteous Liberty*, and that our cause is right?" (p. 2).

Once, towards the close of the Letter (p. 11), the name of the club is introduced, emphasized by capitals :

"Some of the Friends are mightily pleased with observing the *two letters* [A. Z.] with which you signed your Letter ; supposing that you acted the prophet, in using the first and last letters of the alphabet ; and that they were emblematical of what we should ere long accomplish ; that we should, by-and-by, scoop all into our scheme, and all become *SONS OF LIBERTY*."

It was the interest and the manifest purpose of the author of the "Congratulatory Letter" to present this association and its members in the worst possible light. What he says of its aims and proceedings, must be taken with large allowance. There seems, however, no reason for rejecting his testimony on two points : the existence of a political club, of some sort, in Connecticut before 1755 ; and the fact that its members were called "Sons of Liberty." It is not necessary to believe that they were all Infidels, Socinians, or Taylorists—though the majority perhaps agreed with "numbers of leading men in New Haven and in other parts of the colony," in "opposition to the doc-

trines contained in the Confession of Faith and the Catechism." Its *theological* position was perhaps as undefined as that of Franklin's club in Philadelphia, "The Junto," or as that of the "Caucus Club," which, some years later, began to be heard of in Boston. Resistance to real or apprehended encroachments on the liberties of the people, appears to have been their bond of union, rather than community of belief, or disbelief, in the doctrines of the Westminster Catechism.

We do not find the "Sons of Liberty" again mentioned *by name*, in the course of the controversy concerning the college, but the schemes and operations of Dr. Gale's "accomplices" are often alluded to. One of President Clap's defenders (the Rev. John Graham) writes:* "Mr. Gale and *his accomplices* bitterly inveighed against [the college law of 1753], calling it, by way of banter, the *Test Act*" "It is known to many that he has made a practice of treating orthodoxy with ridicule and banter": and, observes Mr. Graham, in a foot-note, "I have heard of a *club* where they drank confusion or damnation to orthodoxy. And of another who drank destruction to all calvinistical doctrines and ministers."

Something of a political revolution had been effected in 1754, by the election of Thomas Fitch as governor, in the place of Roger Wolcott. The change was unfavorable to the New Lights and the "Eastern faction." The author of the "Congratulatory Letter" charges Dr. Gale and his club with having been the principal agents in defeating Wolcott: "a little insinuation, prudently scattered, easily jostled him out of the chair" (p. 3); and the charge is reiterated by Mr. Graham, in the pamphlet above mentioned.

It is not probable that any list of the members of this club is preserved; but, knowing who were Dr. Gale's principal "accomplices," in his controversy with President Clap's friends, and who agreed with him in opposing confessions of faith and political New Lightism—we may guess who were some of the "Sons of Liberty" of 1755.

The first rejoinder to the President's "Answer of the Friend in the West" appears to have come (through the columns of the *Connecticut Gazette*) from Jared Ingersoll. Dr. Gale, in his

* An Answer to Mr. Gale's Pamphlet, p. 25.

reply to the same pamphlet, says : "How much you have misrepresented and abused the gentlemen of New Haven, Mr. J. I. has informed the world," &c. The initials are Mr. Ingersoll's. He was a member of Mr. Noyes's church and—if not a *Son of Liberty*—an "accomplice" in the opposition to President Clap. A few years afterwards (1768), when a memorial was brought to the General Assembly asking a commission of visitation, to inquire into the affairs of the college and rectify abuses, Mr. Ingersoll and Wm. Samuel Johnson appeared as counsel for the memorialists.

Another prominent citizen of New Haven, Thomas Darling, Esq., afterwards judge of the county court, took sides with Dr. Gale in the controversy. He graduated at Yale two years before Jared Ingersoll, and was a tutor from 1743 to 1745—when President Clap and the college were coöperating with the Arminians. He was a son-in-law of the Rev. Mr. Noyes, and belonged to his church. In 1756, he published (without his name) "Some Remarks on President Clap's History, &c., of the Doctrines of the N. E. Churches." In this pamphlet he refers to the statements respecting the affairs of the college, made by "the learned and ingenious author A. Z." (Dr. Gale), and to the methods which were taken to discredit them : "they were ridiculed," he says, "in a way of drollery, and endeavored to be laughed out of doors, as proceeding from a club of *Hercuticks*." (p. 44).

In the course of his Remarks, Mr. Darling alludes to a project of forming a General Association and constituting it a "supreme ecclesiastical court:" but he says—

"These things will never go down, in a free State, whose people are bred in and breathe a free air, and are formed upon principles of Liberty As to us in this country, we are *Free-born*, and have the keenest sense of Liberty, and haven't the least notion of pampering and making a *Few* great, at the expense of our own Liberty and Property." (pp. 109, 110).

Mr. Darling had been the tutor and became the intimate friend of Ezra Stiles—who, between 1752 and 1755, was studying law and practising it, in New Haven. Mr. Stiles's relations to the college were such as to forbid his taking an open stand in opposition; but those who are familiar with his personal history at this period,* and who know his aversion to

* Holmes's *Life of Stiles*, 31-54; Prof. Fisher's *Commem. Discourse*, 73-80.

creeds and tests, would not be surprised to learn that he was at some time associated with the "Sons of Liberty." For many years—during his residence in Newport, and after he became president of Yale—he maintained a friendly correspondence with Dr. Gale. The latter never overcame his antipathy to political New Lights and "the Eastern faction," and expressed his opinions of both, very freely, in his letters to President Stiles.

Colonel John Hubbard was one of "the leading men of New Haven" and perhaps one of those to whom Dr. Trumbull particularly alluded, as being opposed to the college and to all confessions of faith. President Stiles married one of his daughters, in 1757. In politics, Colonel Hubbard cordially agreed with Dr. Gale.

Mr. Ingersoll claimed "the honor of having been *the author* of the title of *Sons of Liberty* in 1765"—since he was the sole reporter of Barré's speech. His report was, professedly, only a "sketch." That it was *verbatim* is highly improbable, to say the least. The title, which was to him a familiar one, *may* have found its way into the speech when he was writing out his notes so as to do the best justice possible to the eloquence of the speaker. Or—Mr. Ingersoll may have been mistaken in believing himself "the author," in any sense, of this title. The Connecticut association of Sons of Liberty in 1765 may have been—it is indeed highly probable that it *was*—only the revival, under new leaders and with changed plans, of the association known by the same name ten years before.

The earlier Sons of Liberty—the men who acted in concert with Dr. Gale in 1765—were conservatives and loyalists. 56 They contended for those rights and liberties, only, to which they were entitled as free-born British subjects. They protested against the imposition by parliament of stamp duties, or other internal taxes, on the colonies, because such taxation was an infringement of "the essential rights and privileges of the British constitution" to which "the King's subjects in the Plantations claim a general right, as their birthright and inheritance;" of even "that fundamental privilege of English-

men, whereby, in special, they are denominated a free people."* They were ready to use all *lawful* means to prevent such an infringement. But if Parliament should insist, they saw nothing else to do, than to submit. Forcible resistance was not to be thought of—and they had learned to abhor the very name of "separation." Governor Fitch and Jared Ingersoll did all that was in their power to defeat the Stamp Bill: but when the bill had passed into an act of parliament, the former swore to maintain and the latter accepted office under it. And each acted, no doubt, "from principles of loyalty to the King and from a serious and tender concern for the privileges of the Colony," as well as "from a just regard for his own interest, reputation, and usefulness in life."†

"The Respectable Populace" took a different view of the matter. "The people's spirits took fire, and burst into a blaze"—wrote Mr. Ingersoll: "They increased in opposition to the act, and seemed *determined, at all events, not to submit to it*." Foremost in opposition, were the representatives of the "Eastern Faction." Stephen Johnson of Lyme and William Williams of Lebanon spoke for them through the New London press. In the Council chamber they had Trumbull of Lebanon, the two Huntingtons, of Norwich and Windham, Griswold of Lyme, Dyer of Windham, and Conant of Mansfield, not one of whom consented to take the stamp-act oath, or even to be present when it was administered to the governor. Putnam and Durkee and Hugh Ledlie were among the leaders of the men of the eastern counties, who marched, in organized bands, in open defiance of law, to New Haven and Hartford to demand the stamp-master's resignation. "But," asked Mr. Ingersoll, by way of remonstrance, "do you think it is fair that the *counties of New London and Windham* should dictate to all the rest of the colony?" "It doesn't signify to parley," he was told; "here is a great many people waiting, and you *must* resign."

* "Reasons why the Br. Colonies in America should not be charged with Internal Taxes, etc. Offered in behalf of the Colony of Connecticut" (1764). This pamphlet was written (chiefly) by Gov. Fitch.

† "Some reasons which influenced the Governor to take the Oath," &c. (Written by Gov. Fitch.) 1766.

In the spring of 1766, Governor Fitch was displaced, and the four councillors who had taken, with him, the oath to enforce the stamp-act, were left out of office. His friends tried in vain to effect a counter-revolution, after the repeal of the act in 1766. Dr. Gale still hoped "to baffle the Eastern faction," but the new Sons of Liberty were too strong for him, and he began to realize that conservatism and loyalty were becoming unpopular. "I expect nothing less than the greater sentence of excommunication pronounced against me"—he wrote in August, 1766, to Dr. Stiles: "but I have been so often damned in this world, I have great hopes of rewards in the next." Even New Haven failed him, and in the spring of 1767 sent Roger Sherman to the General Assembly again. "Col. Hubbard wanted but *two votes* of a choice; but," wrote Dr. Gale, "*New Light, St—Acts, and Satan* hindered. Strange that such a town as New Haven should be infatuated when *Col. Hubbard, Darling, Ingersoll*, and a number of others are among the living." Six months later, he seems to have been convinced that further effort to stem the popular current would be hopeless. His loyalty to the Crown was shaken, and he foresaw what must be the issue of the contest into which Great Britain was driving her American colonies. In a letter to Dr. Stiles, Oct. 15th, 1767, he thus expresses his convictions:

"You seem to think Imperial Wisdom will not espouse measures that will produce *alienation or relaxation* of affection of the Colonies to the Parent State. I think, Sir, it is already done, and we shall forever hereafter maintain a jealousy of them. . . . *Power* is an alluring bait, be sure, to little minds and those who don't thoroughly understand Human Nature. Wisdom and a Diadem are not always connected. *The Stamp Act has laid the foundation for America's being an Independent State.*"

ARTICLE VI.—THE RECENT TROUBLES AT ETON COLLEGE.

THE controversy which has lately broken out at Eton, and which has ended in the dismissal, by Dr. Hornby, the head master, of Mr. Oscar Browning, an assistant master of fifteen years standing, has a more than local interest.

It brings into strong relief some peculiar features which characterize the school; it shows us the efforts which are being made for progress and improvement, and the obstacles to their success; and, by the correspondence and comments which it has called forth, it furnishes an interesting picture of English public feeling respecting the education of boys.

Our distance from the scene of controversy, so far from being a disadvantage, may aid us in detecting the causes of the difficulty, and in estimating its real significance. At the outset, however, it seems necessary to recall in a few words the characteristic features of Eton school.

Eton is the largest, the richest, and the most conservative of the great English public schools. It numbers from eight hundred to nine hundred scholars, of whom seventy, the "Foundationers," who are required to be *pauperes et indigentes*, receive their support from the funds of the school; while the remainder, the "Oppidans" or *filiæ nobilium*, pay for instruction and board, dues which do not fall far short of £200 per annum.

Zeal for athletic sports, which have an important and recognized place, so that a valuable member of the "school eleven" or of the "eight-oar" may expect exemption from the consequences of neglected school work or even from the penalties of serious misdemeanor; the traditions of the school, which favor truthfulness and manliness; and the relation of the Tutor to the boys of his House, are the three most important formative influences of Eton life.

The classical masters, in number somewhat less than twenty, have the privilege of keeping, on their own account, Boarding Houses for the boys of the upper school. They receive these houses free of rent, and derive from them a large part of their

income. The number of pupils allotted to each house, has, until lately, not been definitely fixed, or rather the regulation prescribing the number has been systematically disregarded (as has been the case with other regulations at Eton), but in 1871 the rule was reaffirmed, that forty paying boarders and no more should be allowed, at one time, to each classical master.

Parents select for their sons, on their entrance to the school, that house which seems to them the preferable one; and the pupils ordinarily remain in the same house from the commencement to the close of their school-days. There will be, it is obvious, in every house, boys of all ages and of every class in the school.

The head of the house is Tutor to the boys who dwell there. He construes with them their lessons, corrects their classical exercises and verses, and bestows a considerable part of his time, in the form of what is called "private business," in directing and aiding the older boys in their private classical reading.

The head of each house is, however, also a master in the school, and has under his charge a Division of manageable size (a part of one of the great Forms,) which he instructs in most of its studies. In this division, the master meets, it will be seen, but few of his own boys, and such a system, which makes the school work very easy (the more so because the requirements of the course have hitherto been extremely light) might be satirically described as a plan under which one master prepares the lessons for examination by another master, the lessons to be recited however by a boy as a mouth-piece. Yet it is easy to see that, although the idle and aimless may take advantage of this system to work scarcely at all, the nobler natures, if they fall to the care of a wise Tutor, will find in his intimate acquaintance and friendship, in his culture and scholarship, the most potent stimulus and aid.

Mr. Browning's House has been, for many years, the most popular one at Eton. Applications for admittance there have been constantly in advance of his ability to fill them, and he has been allowed by the Governing Body of the school to have a larger number of boarders than the regulation permitted. Thus, early in the present year, he had forty-two boarders and six pupils out of his House (the last Foundationers, and as such non-paying pupils.) The subject was taken into consideration by

the Governing Body of the school, last summer, and it was decided that, for that session, he should have forty boarders and three Foundationers; but that, in the future, he should strictly limit himself to the prescribed number, *unless the permission to have more should be renewed.*

In consequence of this regulation, Mr. Browning so ordered his House that, at the beginning of the last term, in September, his roll showed thirty-seven boarders and three Foundationers, and fulfilled the letter of the requirement.

The pressure of parents desirous for the admission of their sons, and his own wish to increase his income, led him to seek to secure the transfer of two of the three Foundationers to another House, and on his return to Eton, at the close of the holidays, he called upon Dr. Hornby, and made this request.

He received no encouragement that it would be granted, but, on the contrary, as he proceeded to explain how he had been able by transferring one of his boarders to another master, to make room for the son of a friend (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugesson), and to disclaim any intention, in having done so, to act independently of Dr. Hornby, the latter broke out upon him with violent language, of which the following is a sample.

"You are the greatest shuffler I have ever met; you shuffle in every thing you do; why don't you read (study) Madvig's Grammar? You lecture to ladies; you examine here and there; you give musical parties Saturday-evenings: why don't you stick to your work? No one ever treated me in a straight-forward manner who did not find me straight-forward."

Mr. Browning interrupted that he had always been straight-forward, when the Head-Master continued: "Why, you told me a lie two years ago; I wish I had dismissed you then!"

On the following day, Dr. Hornby wrote to Mr. Browning, notifying him that his Mastership would terminate with the close of the current term.

Mr. Browning now appeals to the Governing Body, enclosing the correspondence which had passed between himself and Dr. Hornby, completely disproving the single charge of untruthfulness which the latter had made against him; denying (on legal advice) Dr. Hornby's right to dismiss him, on the ground that the statute under which the former acted was passed subsequently to his (Browning's) appointment, and closing with

two requests, namely: that the Governing Body sustain his position by reinstating him; or, if they are not prepared to deny to Dr. Hornby the legal right of dismissal, that they interfere, on the ground that, the ultimate power resting with them, they are morally bound to see that Dr. Hornby does not exercise his authority oppressively.

The Governing Body, in feeling apparently not unfriendly to Mr. Browning, reply to his appeal, that they have met and have decided that they are not competent to interfere in Dr. Hornby's act of dismissal, but have ordered him (Dr. H.) to appear before them at a subsequent meeting. The result of this meeting is not reported.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the expressions of public opinion which the affair has called forth, is the correspondence of Mr. Knatchbull-Hugesson, M. P., with Dr. Hornby. Mr. Hugesson is, if we may judge from the internal evidence furnished by his letters, an Etonian, and his attachment and affectionate concern for the school, and his regard for Dr. Hornby, are as apparent, throughout the correspondence, as his solicitude for his own son (the pupil, whose admission by transfer to Browning's house, seems to have provoked from Dr. Hornby the charge of shuffling), and his interest and confidence in Mr. Browning.

The drift of his long and earnest letters, written in the midst of pressing occupations, is to urge Dr. Hornby to put into definite form the vague charges of negligence and lack of morals which he makes against Browning. He suggests arbitration, cautions Dr. Hornby against the danger of seeing all Browning's acts through the medium of an unfriendly estimate of his character; reminds him of the injury to Eton which the thorough investigation of the school—which will be the certain result of the quarrel—will be likely to cause; proposes to come himself to Eton, go straight to Dr. Hornby, hear his version of the case, and seek by conversation to allay his excited feeling.

Dr. Hornby's answers are all to one purport. He declines to specify charges, and in a way which savors of the despotic pedant, stiffly refuses to listen to suggestions.

There follows this correspondence a request, through Mr. Ainger, one of the Assistant Masters, also addressed to Dr. Hornby, that he would so exonerate Mr. Browning from impu-

tations against his moral character that, failing in other attempts to right himself, he might, at least, secure the pension to which the length of his service in the school and his success there would entitle him. Dr. Hornby's answer is as follows:

"I am sorry for Browning, but I could not possibly say that I do not think ill of his character.

I have not charged him with *immorality* in the ordinary sense of that word.

His own admissions have proved evidence enough against him as regards want of truthfulness, and this though his statement omits and distorts things in his favor as far as possible.

Public opinion is clearly dead against him already. What would it be if the whole truth were known?

A pension is utterly out of the question.

I do not want to press hard upon a man in trouble, but I cannot help Browning in the way you suggest.

The more I say, I am afraid, the worse his case would be. I have said as little as I could help saying, and nothing of any doubtful kind of which I had not full proof."

Mr. Browning, making the intimations at the close of this letter his occasion, writes to Dr. Hornby proposing to call that day with Mr. Ainger, to learn what these intimations mean. Dr. Hornby declines to receive him.

Mr. Browning then makes a last effort, and passionately appeals to Dr. Hornby to specify the charges against him. His appeal is denied.

Mr. Browning has published a collection of letters received since the notice of his dismissal, from colleagues at Eton, and from distinguished teachers in different parts of England. His object is to show what have been his aims, and his success, in teaching; and, to prove that the insinuations against his thoroughness and truthfulness can have no foundation. The testimony of his colleagues not only shows their esteem for him—forty-six out of forty-eight signed a petition to the Head Master against his removal,—but it establishes that, whether judged by their performance of school tasks, or, by the subsequent success of his pupils at the University, his House was the best at Eton.

At the close of this collection there are several letters from

old scholars, from one of which, written last summer, with no inkling of the events which were to follow, we quote.

"I have something else to thank you for besides the book, and for which I can never be sufficiently grateful. Before I joined your History Class last year, I confess my life was somewhat idle and aimless, and what few aims I had were none of the highest, as then my wish was only to get into the Guards; but that half, chiefly through your influence, a change came over me; I have given up all thoughts of the army, and intend to do my best to spend my time at Cambridge profitably, and trying to acquire as much knowledge as I can.

I see now that there are other ends in life than pleasing yourself, and that the best way of leading a happy life is by doing your duty.

And you have also given me an interest in my work, which I have never felt before, and which makes me look at things in a different light."

Mr. Browning has recently presented himself as candidate for the vacant Head-mastership of the London University College School.

His testimonials were all sought and obtained in the months of December and January just passed, and were given in full knowledge of the events at Eton.

They come from members of the Governing Body of Eton; from Mr. Browning's late colleagues; and from many of the ablest educators and literary men in England, such as Butler, Head-master of Harrow; Farrar, Head-master of Marlborough School; Profs. Jebb, Munro, Blaikie, Tulloch, Bryce, Sir E. A. Creasy, &c., &c. That the claims of a man must be strong when, in spite of conservative feeling in England, members of the Governing Body recommend the promotion of one who has been dismissed from the school which they govern, and Head-masters of sister schools take sides against a fellow Head-master, is very clear. The character of the testimony may be fairly judged by the following extract from the letter of Mr. Arthur Sidgwick, Assistant master in Rugby School, and a singularly accurate and accomplished classical scholar.

"But far the most remarkable thing about Mr. Browning is his stimulating influence on the growing minds of boys. Mr. Browning is eminently qualified in many ways for a Head-

mastership ; but, in this, the most important merit of a teacher, his qualifications are unique. He has long had a great reputation in this matter among the members of his profession, but recently I have received evidence of it which may be safely called overwhelming. I have seen a large number of letters to him from old pupils, in which they describe, with the most profound gratitude, the entire change in their interests and views of life which Mr. Browning's teaching (both in school and out) has produced. The combined quantity and quality of this testimony is such, as I doubt if any other teacher in England could produce ; and the stimulus is not only intellectual, it is also moral and religious. Deep interest in the progress of each boy ; unwearied kindness ; a happy gentleness in pointing out faults ; a prompt sympathy with all the various difficulties of boys ; all these things, combined with his own great mental gifts, with wide-mindedness—with great knowledge—with rare culture—with a copious, an ever-fresh, and ever-growing personal enthusiastic interest in classics, in English, in history, in French, German, and Italian literature, in poetry, and all departments of art—are the main elements, for even these are not the only elements, which have concurred to bring about Mr. Browning's signal successes as a teacher. Putting the case shortly, I may say that he has been proved capable, in an extraordinary degree, to inspire three things, often in the most unpromising material : high principle ; genuine love of thought and knowledge ; and last, but not least, real affection, and confidence, and gratitude towards himself."

If we endeavor to realize the nature and the cause of the conflict between Mr. Browning and Dr. Hornby, we shall conclude, I think, that it is due to the opposition between progress and conservatism. Dr. Hornby's hostility is honest, but, as the hostility of a conservative toward a reformer always must be, it is an irreconcilable hostility. Mr. Browning can coöperate with Dr. Hornby, declares his willingness and his desire to do so, but Dr. Hornby cannot coöperate with Mr. Browning.

The personality of the latter is clearly defined : He comes before us as a man of an exceedingly active mind, open to new impressions, disposed to recognize in everything the possibility of improvement. He is interested in men as well as in things, has made frequent vacation journeys to the conti-

ment, and has improved them to add to his knowledge of the literatures of the chief modern languages, the ability to use them colloquially. His study of foreign, especially of German educational institutions, and his conviction that the German Gymnasium yields as the fruit of its training, far greater results than the great schools of England, especially Eton, secure, have led him to look with a feeling mixed with contempt upon the mechanical study of a few pages of Latin and Greek; the memorizing of a Latin grammar in Latin; and the writing of Latin verses, which, until recently, made up the sum of the knowledge which Eton gave. He has accordingly lent his influence constantly toward widening the course, is stated to have been the first to introduce science teaching in the school, has voluntarily given instruction in modern languages, and established, a few years ago, a history class, for which study no provision was made. This class has become a favorite one, and Mr. Browning's instruction there has been pronounced, by the most competent judges, to be exceedingly stimulating and effective. He has sought to make his house attractive by furnishing it with such models, casts, and photographs as give to his pupils, at no expense of their time, more correct and vivid ideas of many things in classical antiquity than could the study of many a volume without them.

There seems to have gradually grown up in the mind of Dr. Hornby a distrust of this energetic young man, so fond of innovations, and whose innovations were the more dangerous because they were so popular. The free, informal relations which he chose to hold to his boys, his low estimate of the average result of Eton training, his advocacy and introduction of German ideas as to classical instruction, contributed to deepen this distrust.

As Mr. Browning's house became the favorite house, his boys the élite of the school, and himself a person of more and more consideration, the fear of the pernicious influence which he must have in the school became more and more decided.

Dr. Hornby became convinced that Browning was an unsound man, that amid the multitude of interests which engaged him he must neglect his daily work. He could not, he felt, be doing his duty to the school. He could not be "thorough." Where dislike or even distrust exists on one side it is

quickly felt on the other. Thus Mr. Browning seems to have fallen into the habit of having as few direct dealings as possible with the Head-master, and this it was easy for the latter to interpret as a disposition to evade his authority, as "shuffling."

The power of dismissal though not of appointment of Assistant-masters, is vested in the Head-master, and Dr. Hornby was right in supposing that the strength of the traditional, conservative feeling in favor of non-interference as dangerous to discipline, coupled with the dread of the injury which might be done to Eton by a searching investigation, would lead the Governing Body to shrink from calling him to account for his action. Yet his act was a despotic one. It was, in effect, saying, either Browning or I must leave. The highest devotion to the school, supposing him to have said this honestly, would hardly have allowed such a resolution, but would rather have led him, as Browning was willing to do, to coöperate honestly even with one whom he could not like, while greater distrust of his own judgment, shall we say less obstinacy, would surely have induced him to hesitate long, before, without the advice and approval of others, he decided to dismiss, without appeal, one who, judged by every test of success, was perhaps the most successful master in the school.

As it is, he must have compromised seriously his own character for magnanimity in the estimation of his colleagues; he has drawn down upon himself the severe condemnation of journals like the *London Spectator*; he has estranged the parents of pupils whose good-will is the strength of such a school; and upon the school itself he has inflicted a serious and lasting injury.

Meanwhile Mr. Browning, relinquishing a position which has yielded him an income of £2000 per year, and which, last summer, he would have been justified in regarding as secure beyond contingency, has gone quietly to Leipsic, to hear the lectures of George Curtius, Ritschl, and Overbeck; to write the articles on "Cæsar" and "Carthage" which he had been engaged to prepare for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and to await the result of his candidature for the Head-Mastership of the London University College School. We hope that a wider field of usefulness lies before him than he has yet occupied.

ARTICLE VII.—ARE ALL CRIMINALS INSANE?

It is now some years since the people of Boston and its neighborhood were first agitated by the doings of "the boy-murderer." This youth, called Jesse Pomeroy, took the first steps toward acquiring a name for himself by torturing and mutilating two small boys, whom he caught in a boat that was lying on the shore, far enough away from human abodes to prevent the screams of the little victims from attracting attention. He was sent to the reform-school, but was not long after released. For some time he did not manifest himself, except that, by way of keeping his hand in, he made some attempts on boys that from various causes did not result seriously. He then advanced to the murder of a small boy, and after adding to it the murder of a young girl was finally detected, tried and convicted of murder, and sentenced to be hanged. While in jail he was frustrated in a very ingenious attempt at escape; so ingenious that he himself, the hero of so much greater exploits, did not disdain to boast of it. He has not yet been hanged, and strange as it may seem the recent election in Massachusetts derived its chief interest to many persons from the hope that another governor would see that the sentence of death was executed.

The mere atrocity of these bloody deeds formed but a small part of their excellence; the terror that they occasioned in the minds of thousands of mothers, and the fierce wrath mingled with terror felt by as many fathers, when added to the fearful effect produced on the imaginations of children by the narration of such horrors, made up a sum of mental suffering, that if estimated in time and intensity would be almost inconceivable. Naturally, there arose a fierce outcry for the instant punishment of this monster in human form; nor were threats wanting from men who would not threaten lightly, that if the boy were again set free they would themselves execute justice, looking only to the interests of society and regardless of the consequences to themselves. Column after column in the journals was filled with letters from excited and indignant

parents, the "Pomeroy case" was talked of in the cars, in the streets, in the stores and at home. So many murders had passed unpunished that the possibility of the escape of this criminal roused the people to fury. But on the other hand the demand for justice was heard above the cry for vengeance. While one letter called for the immediate death of the wretch, the next urged a calm consideration of the question whether the boy was responsible for his acts. If he were insane, it was argued, it would be unjust to punish him. So the controversy hotly raged, nor is it even yet extinct, and it will doubtless be rekindled by either the execution or the pardon of the miserable cause.

There seems however to be nothing new in this case. The records of crime show that a taste for murdering children is not uncommon, and that this taste has been often gratified in as fearful a manner as it was by Jesse Pomeroy. In the work by Dr. Maudsley, entitled *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, (to which frequent reference will be made) we find the story of a young clerk, who had given little ground for suspicion beyond the not very alarming fact that he was subject to occasional outbursts of tears, but who started out one fine morning and enticing a little girl into a hop-garden, murdered and dismembered her. He washed his hands and returned to his desk, only indulging himself with the laconic entry in his diary:—"Killed a little girl: it was fine and hot." How De Quincey would have described this affair! But we are not concerned with the æsthetic side of murder, and these cases are only mentioned as examples of crimes that are not uncommon. The curious in such matters will find abundant satisfaction in the works of Ray, Esquirol, Morel, and Despine.

Now the controversy in Boston really involved only one question, and that too one that could only be decided by medical experts. One side insisted that the boy was insane and it would be wrong to hang him; the other that he was not insane and should be hanged. The difference of opinion was plainly as to what constitutes insanity, or what amounts to the same thing, what constitutes responsibility. Connected with this is the important question as to the treatment of insane criminals, and to the different views on these two questions the remainder of this paper will be devoted.

It would, however, be superficial to pass over the fact that there is in many minds a deeper feeling, which is the real cause of the interest excited by these questions,—a certain nameless terror at the advances of science into the province of law as well as religion. Modern discoveries have so constantly and progressively narrowed the boundaries between mind and matter that there is a sort of dread that those boundaries may altogether disappear. Step by step science has encroached on the ground once occupied by faith until it almost seems that the last stronghold must yield. There is no more striking description of this feeling than that of Prof. Huxley in his address on the physical basis of life. He says: "And as surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action. The consciousness of this great truth weighs like a nightmare, I believe, upon many of the best minds of these days. They watch what they conceive to be the progress of materialism in such fear and powerless anger as a savage feels, when, during an eclipse, the great shadow creeps over the face of the sun. The advancing tide of matter threatens to drown their souls; the tightening grasp of law impedes their freedom; they are alarmed lest man's moral nature be debased by the increase of his wisdom."

It is plain that Prof. Huxley does not intend to respect this dread that he has so vividly described. We find in his address at Belfast, where he and Tyndall seemed disposed to fling firebrands abroad, an account of the extraordinary effects produced in the character of a French soldier by a wound received during the late war. From being amiable and honest, he became thievish and irritable, alternating these diverse dispositions at regular intervals. The obvious tendency of such tales is to unsettle the minds of common people as to all responsibility; and probably this was the intention of Prof. Huxley, for although eminent in science he is a metaphysician of no ordinary ability. So far as appears to an American reader he is almost the only legitimate descendant of Hume; although the great Scotchman has left an extraordinarily numerous bastard progeny.

Now whatever may be the result of the conflict between science and faith, we may assert with confidence that there is no ground for apprehension that any materialistic theory of mind will have any permanent effect in freeing from punishment those whom mankind have always held punishable. A careful study of the necessary implications of such theories will show the grounds of this confidence. Let us begin therefore by examining the meaning of the term responsibility.

It is plain that the signification of this word will vary according to the different theories of the will. But although there are only two possible theories on this subject, nothing is more common than to find men professing one theory and holding and advocating views inconsistent with it. Now it cannot be denied that every materialist is logically a necessarian. If there is no such substance as spirit, if the mind is only a function of the brain, and thought only a form of matter, then clearly all mental phenomena must be controlled by laws similar to those that control matter; especially the law of causation—the great god or fetich of the scientists—must contain in its resistless grasp all the operations of the mind. As the doctrine of free-will is that every human being has a self-determining power, that the acts of the will are uncaused by anything except the will itself, it is clear that nothing could be more suicidal, logically, than for a materialist to believe in the freedom of the will. We may, therefore, disregard entirely any materialist that is not a consistent necessarian.

The theory of free-will, more explicitly stated, is that every one has the power of choosing what acts he will perform, the power of choice between good and evil. If he does wrong it is because he chooses to do wrong when he could have chosen to do right. As he does wrong voluntarily and under no compulsion he is responsible for his acts; that is, he may be justly held to answer for them; he may be punished, and punishment or pain is the deserved, natural, or fit reward for his deeds. Motives are but the occasions of his acts; the cause is the will itself. It is not denied that acts may be predicted with some degree of accuracy from a knowledge of the motives that affect the agent, but in every case there is the power of contrary choice which may be exercised. Certain motives *may*

be always followed by certain acts; but they *might* be followed by different acts. Responsibility, then, means nothing more than that every moral agent that knowingly does wrong may justly be made to suffer punishment. The theory of necessity or determinism is nothing more than the rigorous application of the law of causation to the human will. This theory regards every human being as a complex substance. If the component elements in two human beings are the same in nature and proportion, these human beings will act in precisely the same way, so far as internal motives are concerned; if the same external motives are supplied the resulting acts will be the same. If one human being acts differently from another, it is because there is a difference in the elements of his composition or in the external circumstances that affect him, or in both. The law of causation is necessary and therefore universal. The reasoning of natural science is strictly applied to mental phenomena. If one complex body is treated with a certain acid and yields certain results, then if another body apparently similar, treated in a like way, yields different results the conclusion is that there is a difference in the constitution of the bodies. Now as all human beings from the fact of their being classed together are in the main alike, the results of a certain mode of treating them may be approximately predicted; as all differ from one another in minor particulars, the results of such treatment can be *only* approximately predicted.

The treatment of criminals, or at least the feeling toward them, must vary materially under two such different theories. There is no question that from the earliest times down to the present day, the belief in the freedom of the will has been the popular belief, and has been applied in criminal jurisprudence as well as in all other departments of social life. Yet with the extension of the domain of law by the increase of knowledge, the applications of this belief have been greatly modified. None of the researches into the early history of our race have been more striking or better established than those that exhibit to us the intense force once possessed by the idea of personality. Mythology is in great part the personification of the powers of nature; all motion is referred to a personal cause. Hence not only beasts, but even inanimate objects, that occa-

sioned suffering to human beings were conceived as moral agents and therefore punishable. The story of the great athlete Theagenes, of Thasos, illustrates the varied forms of this belief in so remarkable a manner that it deserves to be quoted. After his death a statue was erected to his memory, and one of his enemies, perhaps one of the fourteen hundred competitors that he was said to have vanquished, made it a practice to come by night and inflict a beating on the statue. At last the statue fell down on the man while he was in the act of gratifying his revenge, and killed him. For this offense the statue was indicted for murder by the relatives of the slain ; the Thasians pronounced it guilty and it was thrown into the sea. But as the citizens were soon after visited by a famine, it was determined that the statue, which was opportunely dragged up by a fisherman, should be replaced. When the anger of the gods or the statue was appeased doubtless the famine disappeared.

It is only recently that the provision in English law concerning deodands has been repealed. According to this custom any chattel that occasioned the death of a rational creature was condemned. Thus if a man was killed by a cart-wheel, the cart-wheel was *deodand*, to be given to God, that is forfeited to the crown or burned. Every child knows (or should know under a rational system of Biblical teaching), that the Mosaic law provided for the punishment of beasts, and similar references might be made to Roman law. Consistently with this idea the shedder of blood was regarded as contracting a stain, that of blood-guiltiness, which could only be washed out by the shedding of blood. Gradually, as men were enlightened, distinctions were made. It was felt that the accidental murderer was not the real cause and that the stain on him was not so deep ; he was provided with cities of refuge ; he was allowed to wash out the stain by the shedding the blood of a beast instead of his own. The tendency has steadily been toward the obliteration of the idea of guilt as anything but an abstraction, toward removing the responsibility back of the immediate agent. First the punishment of material objects, then that of animals was abandoned. The belief that they are personal agents to whom guilt can be imputed has lost its force

except in the minds of children and savages. This tendency is strongly manifested by modern materialists. Where others see guilt and responsibility they suggest peculiarities of brain-structure, disease of the nerve-centres, hereditary predisposition—but not guilt. They are not ready to maintain that no criminal is guilty, but logically they are obliged to maintain this startling proposition. It is a plain corollary to the theory of necessity that no human being can in any case act otherwise than precisely as he does act. If all the circumstances are the same, the law of causation requires that the result shall always be the same. Hence the criminal could not act otherwise than as he did. Every act is the result of a long chain of antecedent causes; the volition is merely the last link. There is no free-will, no power of choice; the will is determined by motives; where then is guilt, and what is responsibility?

But the believer in free-will can never abandon the doctrine of guilt and sin. A human being is a will, a power, a first cause. On this belief hang all the law and all the dogmas and sanctions of religion. The believer in free-will would say to the criminal: "You had the power to choose to act otherwise; you knew that you ought to exercise that power; you did not exercise it—therefore you deserve to suffer." The necessarian would say: "Your act was the result of certain motives. While those motives remained the same the results must have remained the same. You could not do otherwise than as you did, nor could you have chosen to act otherwise, for your choice was the result of antecedent motives and unless they changed, your choice could not have changed. The belief in the uniformity of natural laws requires me to hold that if all the circumstances in a given case are precisely the same as those in another case, the results in both cases will invariably be the same. If you say you could have acted differently, I say that you could have if other motives had been present; but as it was you *could* not have done otherwise—or you *would* have done otherwise."

It is clear enough from this that only one theory of punishment is possible to the necessarian. The criminal is to him not a sin-stained, guilty soul, but simply a being whose acts are injurious to his fellow beings. He may be put to death if

he has caused the death of another, because experience shows that he will be likely to cause other deaths, or because it has been found that the death of such offenders supplies motives to other men sufficient to deter them from like offences; and it has been found that unless such beings are put to death by due process of law the instinct of self-preservation will lead mankind to inflict death without law. Guilt then to the necessarian is merely the condition of him who has injured his fellows, and responsibility means simply that suffering may be inflicted on such a man if it appears that the security of society will be thereby promoted. Punishment in this theory is solely preventive or deterrent. As the English judge said to the sheep stealer: "I do not hang you for stealing sheep, but in order that sheep may not be stolen."

On the other hand, although the believer in free-will may hold this view of punishment which regards the interest of society, he may and generally does look more to the depravity of the individual, to punishment as the just and due reward of sin, to justice and guilt as realities and not abstractions. Hence we often find men urging the pardon of a criminal because he has repented; the stain of guilt has been washed away, and the remote consequences of punishment to mankind are but faintly seen. To the necessarian it makes no difference whether a criminal is repentant or not, unless it appear that the repression of crime is not promoted by punishing penitent offenders. He believes in responsibility and punishment; but the responsibility is without the stain of guilt and the punishment is simply exemplary.

Let us now consider the status of the insane under these two theories. To the believer in free-will the insane man is a diseased will. He has no longer the power of distinguishing between right and wrong, or if he has, he is without the power to control his impulses. He may be imbecile, acting as a brute without notion of right and wrong, or with but a confused notion, or he may have clear and correct moral ideas, but be subject to sudden and uncontrollable evil impulses; for it is not uncommon for those affected with homicidal mania to foreknow their attacks and beg their friends to put them under restraint until their fearful craving is past. The well-known case of

Charles Lamb's sister is an instance of this. It cannot be said that such beings deserve punishment. They are not free moral agents and therefore, according to the definition given above, they are not responsible. But as it is generally admitted that they must be put under restraint, which is to them a dreaded fate, it would appear that the believers in free-will adopt the interests of society as the ground of punishment. They may avoid this, however, by denying that the insane are, strictly speaking, human beings,—the essential element, free-will, is lacking. They may if they choose decline to call the restraint of the insane punishment.

But to the necessarian the insane person is nothing but a human being that is more or less different from the average. The madman does not experience the ordinary sentiments of repulsion at those acts called by mankind wrong, or the feelings of pleasure or approbation commonly felt at right acts. Or if he have these feelings he is not affected by equally powerful motives in favor of right. All impulses that are obeyed are irresistible; if they were not, they would not be obeyed. The impulses of the madman are no more irresistible than those of the sane, but they are different, and as they happen to be prejudicial to society, society must in some way check them. A person that is a little different from ordinary people may be called a genius or simply odd; if he is very different he is called insane. The necessarian may therefore call every criminal more or less insane, for no person of entirely sound mind would commit a crime. The mere fact of violating the laws which are recognized as wise by the generality of mankind, shows that the violator is not like the ordinary man, and is therefore insane. Now as materialistic scientists would be necessarians if they knew anything about metaphysics, it is not surprising that they manifest this tendency, already spoken of as exciting alarm, to regard criminals generally as insane, for it is a logical necessity that they should hold this view. The only cause for alarm, however, is their inconsistency. They adopt material views of mind and then talk like believers in free-will about responsibility and punishment. But they can be compelled to admit that all criminals are responsible in the sense of being amenable to punishment, whether insane or not; pro-

vided that the interests of society will be subserved by the punishment of those commonly called insane.

The works in the department of medical jurisprudence relating to insanity are many and interesting, but the general conclusions are not very different and the examination of one of them; that of Dr. Maudsley, together with a reference to an article by Professor Holmes, (in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April 1875), will be sufficient for our purpose. As Dr. Maudsley's book has been published in the International Scientific Series, and has received the applause of the journals devoted to science, it may fairly be taken to represent the views of scientists. When so fair and lucid a treatise as that of Dr. Ray, is extant in English there hardly seems *raison d'être* for a book that adds so little to our knowledge as this *Responsibility in Mental Disease*. In spite of the title we look in vain for any definition of responsibility, and it is only by implication that we can discover the author's view. The first part of the book is occupied with a series of reflections unfavorable to metaphysicians, theologians, and lawyers. The first two classes are ridiculed because they have not regarded the mind as materialists do, the latter because their dicta concerning the insane do not agree with the experience of the medical profession. The remainder of the book is taken up with a series of descriptions of the various forms of insanity, abundantly illustrated by anecdotes from the works of other writers as well as from the author's own experience. There is a lack of unity about the book; there is no definite plan, no clear and accurate definition; and though the book is interesting, yet it is vague. The ideas remaining in the mind after perusal, are three;—that metaphysicians are to be despised, lawyers to be distrusted, and many criminals that are now punished to be acquitted on the ground of insanity. It was not necessary for the author to proclaim his contempt for philosophers; his book betrays an absence of philosophical training that is unfortunately characteristic of too much of the so-called scientific literature of the day. In the continual analysis of natural phenomena the mind seems to lose its synthetic faculty; the union of parts in many treatises is not chemical, but simply mechanical. It may well be doubted whether the influence of modern science on education is not prejudicial; whether we are not reversing the old maxim, to learn *haud multa sed multum*.

Dr. Maudsley defines mind, physiologically, as—"a general term, denoting the sum total of those functions of the brain which are known as thought, feeling, and will. Disorder of mind is disorder of these functions." "Insanity is a disorder of the supreme nerve-centres of the brain—the special organs of the mind,—producing derangement of thought, feeling, and action, together or separately, of such degree or kind as to incapacitate the individual for the relations of life." He further says,—“Crime is not then in all cases a simple affair of yielding to an evil impulse or a vicious passion which might be checked were ordinary control exercised; it is clearly sometimes the result of an actual neurosis which has close relations of nature and descent to other neuroses, especially the epileptic and the insane neuroses; and this neurosis is the physical result of physiological laws of production and evolution.” Now it is all nonsense for anyone who gives this definition of mind to talk about “will-power,” and guilt, and responsibility, in the language of a believer in free-will, as Dr. Maudsley does. His physiology proves, if it proves anything, that not only criminal acts and the acts of the insane, but all other acts by whomsoever performed, are the results of states of the nerves that are “the physical results of physiological laws of production and evolution.” The law of causation cannot be applicable to unsound minds and inapplicable to sound minds. If the act of the insane man is nothing but the termination of a series of chemical reactions, Dr. Maudsley must hold that the act of the sane man is just as much and no more the result of physiological changes. Or else he must (as he really does) admit that the sane man “is endowed with a fixed moral potentiality to do the right and eschew the wrong;” to the ridicule of which proposition and its supporters he devotes many pages.

Dr. Maudsley has evidently been badgered in the witness-box, and outraged by the punishment of those who he was convinced did not deserve it. This leads him to make some severe reflections on English law and judges. But if we are to be angry at what are now seen to be the mistakes of the past, the medical profession would suffer no less than the law. The gradual correction of earlier dicta by succeeding judges is the well-known mode of growth of the English law, dependent

on the legal fiction of precedent, but not at all to be condemned as barbarous. The fact that the views of earlier judges seem nowadays narrow and cruel should only make us thankful that our own times are more full of light and humanity.

Dr. Holmes' reasoning, though entertaining, as usual, is extremely vague. He states in the beginning of his article, after mentioning the establishment of meteorological laws, that "the will, like the wind, is anything but free." At the close, however, he makes these confusing remarks: "Even if the destructive analysis of our new schoolmen threatens to distil away all we once called self-determination and free-will, leaving only a *caput mortuum* of animal substance and 'strongest motive,' we need not be generally alarmed. For the *belief* in a power of self-determination, and the idea of possible future remorse connected with it, will still remain with all but the moral incapables, and the metaphysicians." But as Dr. Holmes has stated his belief that the will is anything but free, he cannot also believe in a power of self-determination, and as he is certainly not a metaphysician, his own words would rank him, where surely no one else would, among the moral incapables. In one part of his paper he seems to regard criminals as unaffected by the ordinary motives to right conduct, while another part is devoted to the praise of those reformatory institutions whose principle is to treat criminals as susceptible of the same influences for right as ordinary mortals. Since a large portion of this article is devoted to a review of Despine, we may here glance at the theory presented by the French author, as it is not an uncommon one. M. Despine declares that though free-will plays a very small part in human actions, yet he has himself proved that this power exists. His test of free-will is the sense of effort by which a desire is overcome and the self-approval or self-reproach which follows right or wrong action. But desire is only overcome by sense of duty. This being a necessary condition for the exercise of free-will, it becomes evident that one who does not possess the moral sense or who has lost it for a moment in a state of passion, is deprived of free-will, of moral liberty, and is not morally responsible for his wrong doings. Now this doctrine is not only morally pernicious, but is rejected by those who, like Dr. Maudsley, have

the most thorough acquaintance with the insane. This theory would make three classes of human beings:—those who have the sense of duty and obey it; those who have this sense and disobey it, and those who have not this sense and can therefore feel no remorse at a wrong act. It is plain that the first class can never become criminals. As to the second class the testimony of medical experts forbids us to doubt that those affected with suicidal or homicidal mania often feel acutely the sense of duty and suffer all the agonies of remorse; they make most earnest efforts to restrain their evil impulses, and yet these impulses cannot be restrained. Now M. Despine's theory would make this second class free and responsible moral agents, while the authority of the medical profession favors the opposite view. If it be said that at the moment of committing a criminal act there is no feeling of right or wrong, this may be applied to all criminal acts. Responsibility is to be sought in the previous state of the mind. It may be doubted whether there is ever any criminal impulse without some previous opposing desire, which in lower natures takes the place of the more highly developed sense of duty. Many of those criminals that are commonly regarded as insane show by their denials and concealment that they have some idea that their deeds will bring unpleasant consequences on their heads. As to sudden passion or intoxication, it is the principle of English law that these states cannot be pleaded in excuse of crime, although they reduce the punishment. (In Roman law they were admitted as extenuating circumstances.) The law looks back to the question whether the impulse to drink or to get into a passion might have been prevented. If it find that the criminal is in an insane condition produced by excessive and long continued indulgence in alcohol, it sometimes regards him as irresponsible; but if the fury is a short and sudden one punishment is inflicted. Men know well enough that when drunk they cannot control their passions—therefore if they get drunk it is at their own risk. It is in their power not to drink; though they lose control of themselves after drinking. The exceptions are in the cases where the impulse to drink is held to amount to insanity. M. Despine's theory errs in not looking

back far enough. The law must inquire not simply whether the criminal disregarded a sense of duty at the moment of his criminal act, but whether in any of the acts that preceded he had disregarded such warnings. If his conscience has at any time reproached him for indulging in passion or in drink, then he cannot evade responsibility if he has continued his indulgence until he has in a fit of madness become a murderer. Of course this reasoning applies only to those who like M. Despine believe in free-will; the necessarian finds no moment in the life of any man when he could have done otherwise than as he did. As to the third class under this theory, those who have never felt the sense of duty or of remorse, we must postpone our judgment until we have considered the principles of jurisprudence that apply to the treatment of the insane.

The aim of punishment is two-fold;—to prevent the individual criminal from repeating his offence, and to deter others from following his example. The former of these aims could be very easily attained if it stood by itself; but, unfortunately, the means that would be most effective in the case of the individual have the very opposite result on society at large. The reason of this is plain enough. The law stands to mankind as the concrete expression of their ideas of justice. Whenever, then, the laws are regarded as unjust, their influence is greatly impaired, their execution is in every way hindered, and a dangerous spirit of lawlessness is produced. Any point in the laws that is opposed to ordinary morality operates as an incentive or an excuse on those who are tempted to commit a crime. The first word that leaps to the lips of a child in justification of injury to another is the plea of previous injustice on the other's part. The last word that falls from the hardened murderer is the complaint that he has been unjustly condemned. Every one, even the criminal, claims to desire justice; but as opinions differ, that of the majority must, in practice, be adopted; and where the people make their own laws, it, of course, will be adopted. Hence the impossibility of devising a theoretical code of laws that will practically operate. Laws are enforced by their sanctions; their sanctions appeal to the desires of men; but how those desires will be affected can only be known by experience. So that, in order to know what penalty to attach to any crime, we

must know the popular estimate of that crime; for this will indicate the penalty that will most certainly be enforced.

Now, there is no doubt that popular opinion would favor the proposition: insane persons shall not be punished. This feeling finds expression in the code of France,—“There can be no crime nor offense if the accused was in a state of madness at the time of the act.” So in the German penal code,—“An act is not punishable when the person at the time of doing it was in a state of unconsciousness or of disease of mind by which a free determination of the will was excluded.” And in New York law,—“No act done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an offense.” But in reality this feeling is directed not against punishment in general, but against capital punishment. In spite of the celebrated and often reiterated opinion of Cæsar, the common sense of mankind has ever regarded death as a more severe penalty than imprisonment for life. The late Mr. Seward early distinguished himself by the most strenuous and impassioned efforts, attended with the greatest odium, to save the life of a brutal murderer, on the ground of insanity, and under the conviction that the capital punishment of an insane person was a crime of the blackest dye. And doubtless the hanging of a criminal who was generally admitted to be insane, would provoke the most violent outcry.

And yet the severest penalty, next to death, is often inflicted on the insane without the least opposition from any quarter. They are silently condemned to imprisonment, it may be for life. This deprivation of liberty is to them the severest of all punishments, more dreadful than death. The buildings that contain them are indeed called asylums and not prisons; but there the difference ends. In our modern prisons, the life of the inmates is (in theory) made as wholesome, as regular, and indeed, as pleasant as possible. Nothing more can be done in an asylum. The occupations may be different, the life in the asylum may be in appearance freer, but the unfortunate inmate of either abode must cry, like the starling in Sterne's tale, “I can't get out, I can't get out.” From occasional revelations, it appears that the treatment of the inmates of asylums is often more severe than that of convicts; the only difference between the two institutions is that one has a worse name than the

other. The inmates of the jail are regarded with hatred or horror; those of the asylum with pity or terror. And if, as Dr. Maudsley says, we should look on criminals with compassion and not wrath, every difference would disappear—except one, and a most important one. The convict is committed to prison for a definite term; the madman is sent to the asylum to remain until he gets out.

It thus appears that the popular prejudice as well as the law forbids only the capital punishment of the insane, and demands their imprisonment. As there is no obstacle from popular feeling it becomes the duty of the law to define clearly the term of imprisonment. Now the plight of the insane man is so much worse than that of the ordinary criminal that the term of his imprisonment must be for life unless he is pronounced cured. All sentences are life-sentences—with the possibility of a pardon or a new trial. Here now is the proper field of medical jurisprudence so far as it relates to the criminally insane. The doctors must tell the lawyers whether their experience allows the hope that a madman may be cured, and cured beyond the possibility of a relapse—for a sane man that may at any time lapse into madness is too dangerous a member of society to be permitted to remain at large. The tests of permanent cure must be clearly stated and supported by numerous and well-established instances. Then it will become the duty of the lawyers to see that it is provided by statute that every prisoner acquitted of a criminal charge on the ground of insanity shall be sentenced for life to a prison, or asylum for the criminal insane; provided that if such evidence of permanent cure as is described above be produced in open court with due form of law, the court shall order his release.

The practice of dismissing insane persons as cured, by the mere fiat of the chief of the asylum, must of course be abolished. With such legislation it is reasonable to suppose that the temptation to commit crime with the expectation of securing immunity on the ground of insanity would be removed. If it were generally understood that the penalty for criminal insanity was imprisonment for life, the plea of affective or emotional insanity might not be so often heard.

We have still to consider one class of the insane, in many respects a very peculiar class. The most atrocious and revolt-

ing murders are committed by those who are most clearly unlike other men, most decidedly insane, most certainly irresponsible. Their acts are without comprehensible motive to the ordinary mind, they are often attended with mutilation of the victim, and quite often the victim is some member of the family of the murderer, some child or other defenceless person. These acts, shocking enough in any case, are rendered still more ghastly from the fact that we cannot conceive any possible object or gratification. Murder from anger, murder for revenge, murder for money;—all these we can understand because we can suppose ourselves in circumstances where we might commit them. But murder for itself, accompanied with the torture and dismemberment of the victim—there is a grisly horror about it that curdles the blood.

It is the capital punishment of such murderers as these, the Pomeroy's and Le Pages, that excites the indignation of Dr. Maudsley and roused the eloquence of Seward. And yet strong reasons may be advanced to show that death is the proper fate of these wretched creatures, and that justice is not violated but defended by their extermination. It seems unfortunate that the barbarous method of hanging should still be retained when so many painless ways of extinguishing life are known. A great share of the opposition to capital punishment probably arises from the odium of this particular mode of inflicting the death penalty. It is hard to see why it is unjust to deprive such a murderer as Le Page of life while it is just to deprive him permanently of liberty. If several innocent persons will lose their lives by allowing one irresponsible murderer to retain his, it is strange justice that spares the murderer. The insane that are afflicted with homicidal mania are regarded by experts as in most cases incurable. Yet they will act in such a way as to impose on the most experienced, and secure their own discharge from custody; and then will commit another atrocity. If retained in confinement they will contrive with apparently devilish malignity to throw their keepers off their guard in order to gratify their terrible craving for blood. Their lives are a burden to themselves and still more to their friends. Their death from natural causes does not excite mourning, but is felt as a relief. In some cases their avowed motive in murder is to be hanged—and it is hard

to see why they should not be gratified. Their imprisonment—necessarily of the closest kind—is a prolonged torture to themselves, their escape or release is a frightful danger to society. The necessarian cannot regard their death as an injustice, for they are to him nothing but most pernicious elements in society that should, if it is in any way expedient, be eliminated. The believer in free-will need not look on them as human beings at all—for they have no free-will. They have the form and semblance of men, but they are not men, for the essential quality, the power of choice, has disappeared. They are as irresponsible as the mad-dog or the rattle-snake, for they can not and never will reason; and they are far more dangerous. Their deeds are so frightful that popular feeling illogically refuses to admit their insanity, so that the obstacle spoken of above as preventing the capital punishment of the insane does not in their case exist. Their death can, it is true, have no deterrent effect, for similar unfortunates would take no warning from their fate, and sane men would feel no temptation to their crimes. But on the other hand the respect for the laws would not suffer, for the vast majority would look on their death with relief and satisfaction. No other punishment but death can prevent their repetition of their cruelties.

These remarks are not intended to urge the punishment of these wretched mortals; their object is simply to show that such punishment is not necessarily unjust. We need not be disquieted by the outcries of the scientists; when they have convinced mankind that mind is a function of matter, we may cheerfully admit their other proposition that all criminals are insane; for then punishment will become by the extinction of free-will nothing but a matter of the prevention of crime, and if crime will be prevented by the imprisonment of criminals more effectively than by their death then let the death-penalty be abolished. Meanwhile let us say to these gentlemen—"Reason consistently. Either admit free-will and its corollary that men are to be punished because they are bad; or if you deny free-will and make the mind only a function of the brain, then admit that all human acts are necessary, and all punishment depends on the sole criterion of fitness to check crime. Until you decide on your course do not interfere with the course of the law?"

O

ARTICLE VII.—THEORY AND METHOD OF PREACHING.

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PREACHING has always been recognized, since the days of the
 apostles, as a power in the spiritual world, which creates the
 movement of new life and produces change in the relations of
 rational existence; so that if it become unspiritual, dead, with-
 out energy, without causative force that is productive of actual

results in life and character, it is worse than useless. It is a profanation of the noblest gift of power God ever vouchsafed to man. Instead of being "a fire and a hammer" to break in pieces the flinty rock, it is piping on a reed to promote the sleep of drowsy souls. An occupation that embrowns the hands by hardy toil, and makes two blades of grass grow where one grew before, is, we dare say, more acceptable in the eye of God than a preacher who does not know how to preach, and seeks not earnestly to learn. Men are restless under preaching which is devoid of life and of proof of its right to be, and they will banish the preacher who no longer works miracles of goodness and healing. What authority has a man to stand up in a pulpit and dictate to others in religious matters, to declare what is right and what is wrong, to charge his fellow-men with sin, and lay down the conditions of their salvation—unless God commissions him so to do, unless God gives him unanswerable tokens of approval, unless he speaks out from the center of God's authority, revelation and power! As old traditions pass away, as the prescriptive and artificial sacredness of the preacher's office disappears, as the leveling process is brought to bear upon it, the question becomes one of increasing interest—what is true preaching?

We would consider the whole subject of Preaching—upon which there is awakened discussion among earnest men, as if it were undergoing a new sifting process—in three aspects, viz: the object and scope of preaching, the proper treatment of divine truth in forms of sermonizing, and the best methods of pulpit delivery.

I. In discussing the true object and scope of preaching, we need not stop to show that this term "Preaching," as employed in our English Bible, or as used to translate several familiar New Testament Greek words, of nearly similar import, (such as "*κηρύσσω*," "*διαλεγόμενος*," "*εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*,") is a generic term denoting the various modes of publishing the message of the Gospel, no matter how, whether by open speech or private conversation; by word, precept, or example. Preaching is the making known to men, in all possible ways, of the life-giving truth of Christ. The missionary may do this as truly, if not as successfully, through the family, the school, the talk at eve in some rude kraal with one or two dusky hearers, as if he

lifted up his voice to a crowd at the corner of the street, or in his accustomed place of worship to a regular congregation. But for the present purpose we use the term "preaching" in its commonly accepted sense of oral address, of speaking to men gathered in some organized assembly for religious worship, and as a general rule, on the Lord's day. This, undoubtedly, was an apostolic custom derived from the form of the ancient Jewish synagogue worship, although the apostles did not confine their preaching to this method or to this day ;—a strange thing in fact would be our modern Sunday "sermon" in its peculiar conception and formal type to the original apostles of the Lord Jesus !

In regard to the object of preaching, it might be said summarily that, Christian preachers are not set in the community to teach theology and metaphysics ; to cultivate eloquence and literature ; to conduct a splendid ritual ; to build up, financially, strong and paying churches ; but the preacher has another sphere and work, which, though it may not be considered real by some, yet, whatever it is, it is separable from every other. While it is a work in the realm of spirit ; while it takes hold of everlasting interests ; it is a definite work. It is not the work of the scholar, or the philosopher, or the historian, or the scientist, or the advocate, or the soldier, or the business man, or the man of affairs in the state, though it partakes somewhat of all these—witness, for example, some of the preachers of the Reformed church of France, in the seventeenth century, who were genuine statesmen of the first order. It has no place, properly, among the common occupations of men (though classified as one of the three learned professions), yet it is, and men still recognize it to be, the "divine office."

The Gospel, or God's message of grace and life, being a gift divinely suited to its object, which comprehends the whole being, and is fitted to secure the complete restoration of humanity, is addressed to man in relations strikingly corresponding to the great divisions of his rational, moral, and spiritual nature, or, in other words, as a doctrine, as a motive, and as a life ; and these relations, in turn, correspond markedly to the three essential properties of Christian preaching, which three-fold design we proceed to notice. All indeed might be expressed in the familiar phrase, "to save souls." There can be no truer and

nobler answer than this to the question, "What is the object of preaching." The object of Christ is the object of his preachers. But such a phrase is easily spoken and becomes stereotyped. The preacher's responsibility is great, but let us endeavor to see just what it is. He is not to do things beyond his power. He is one in a series of agencies prepared by divine wisdom for the accomplishment of an infinite end, and he should know his work. He is not the head-spring of salvation: he is but a means to an end. Christ is the life: he is to proclaim this life. Christ is the light of men: he is to diffuse this light.

The first object of preaching, which goes also to determine its scope, is: (1) Illumination. It has reference to truth, which makes its primary appeal to the intellect, or knowing faculty; and, above all, that absolute truth which is the knowledge of God, and which forms the basis of all other truth and being. This knowledge of God has relation to the manifestation of himself in nature and revelation. It lies in its elemental relations, in nature, and the moral universe; but in its more perfect manifestation in the Scriptures. In this light we see light, and this light penetrating the world of corrupt mind, awakens new moral life. It is the duty of his church on earth to diffuse this light of the knowledge of God. The Church is divinely endowed, not only with the *charisma* of faith to receive the truth, but the *charisma* of preaching to give the truth to others. It is to light up a blaze of truth in the world. Its messengers are to make known the truth to all men and to all the successive generations of men, in its length, breadth, and fulness; in the fulness of the love of God in Christ; of the last, and largest, and most perfect manifestation of God as a Saviour, sending his Son into the world to redeem the world, so that there can be no possible misapprehension about it. "Preach the Gospel to every creature." Let all men see in clear light what are the facts and contents of God's revealed truth, in order that they may understand and believe.

This, historically, was the first object of the early preachers: they were "heralds," to announce the things belonging to the kingdom of God, whether men would hear or forbear. The apostles were sent everywhere, to manifest "the truth as it is in Jesus," to indoctrinate men in the knowledge of God as made

known in his Son. This, in the apostolic logic, was essential to faith and salvation. (Rom. x, 17), "So then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." (John xvii, 8), "And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." (2 Pet. i, 2, 3), "Grace and peace be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God, and of Jesus our Lord, according as his divine power hath given unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue." This same element of light, of knowledge, remains in preaching. Christ said, "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth." As Christ was "the light," as he was "a teacher come from God," so that deserves not to be called Christian preaching which does not shine within and without with the light of the knowledge of God, which does not contain the prime quality of instruction; for the Gospel is a 'word' as well as a 'message.' The 'Word' is addressed to men's reason. In classic literature, as well as in the original Scriptures, it is well known that the term 'Logos' was used in a two-fold sense; one, as signifying 'reason' or the 'immanent word,' [*λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*]; the other as 'expression,' or the 'enunciative word,' [*λόγος προφορικὸς*]. In the Christian economy, it might be said that the 'immanent word,' or 'reason,' was a preparation in the human soul for the announcement of Christ, or a divinely given capacity in the higher rational nature of man, when appealed to by the divine reason, to receive Christ; while the 'enunciative word' was the actual 'gospel.' It is the true announcement of God in Christ. It is the manifestation of the nature, will, and grace of God, as represented in the new revelation of the Son of God, the 'Word' that was in the beginning, and that was with God, and that was God. That 'Word of God' is ever to be announced. It is itself the supreme reason and speaks to the highest reason in man. It is the voice of God speaking to man's higher nature and conscience as it spoke to him in the garden of Eden. The preacher must be a voice, to give utterance to this will and grace of God in his Gospel. He is "the voice of one crying in the wilderness" of sinful and desolate souls. He is a "servant of

the Word." He is not responsible for originating truth, but his business is, to announce and interpret truth already originated and that was from the beginning. He is to rise above the mere ecclesiastical conception of the preacher, as, for example, the Roman Catholic orator who speaks what is given him by the Church, so much so that in earlier times, set homilies, prepared beforehand by the bishops, were publicly read by the priests. In the Episcopal church the clergyman could hardly presume to go beyond, or aside from, the authoritative prescriptions of the church creeds and *agenda*: the Baptist preacher must maintain the Baptist view; and the Presbyterian, the Presbyterian: the Congregational minister must preach so as to please the people, or some of the people. We refer now to the extreme tendencies of the denominational idea in its practical influence upon the preacher; but he is the interpreter of a higher gospel. His duty is plain. The truth is given him, and he is to make it clear to the reasons and hearts of men. He is always making advance in this knowledge of God. He publishes to men discoveries of truth, as the star-sown spaces of the sky were the same in the time of Adam as they were in the time of Kepler and as they are now, but the eye of the true interpreter sees ever deeper and clearer into their abysses.

In its ordinary meaning, as applied to uninspired writings, interpretation refers to the philological, and historical, and perhaps rational, sense of any given passage or book; but there is a new factor that enters into the problem of the Scriptures, viz: inspiration (*ὑπόνοια*), which brings in a supernatural element; and the interpretation of this underlying spiritual sense of Scripture, makes the office of the preacher one of such great responsibility. Spiritual things are discerned through the teachings of the Spirit to faith, love, and obedience. "He that doeth (or is willing to do, loves to do) the will, shall know of the doctrine;" so that he who "loveth is born of God and knoweth God." The inner door of interpretation is unlocked by this key. The outer door opens to patient scholarship. We are to come at the precise meaning of the words of Scripture just as we come at the meaning of any other book written in a foreign language, by the help of grammar, dictionary, and commentary, and of that cultured literary sense of which Matthew Arnold

in his *Literature and Dogma* speaks so well did he not overstate and thus falsify it. Let the tendency of public opinion be what it may, the preacher should hold to sound learning, that he may be able to form his own judgment, since no commentator is infallible. The jealousies and bickerings of great scholars in the matter of interpretation should be a serious lesson. A wrong theory to start with, a mental twist, a temporary failure of critical acumen, or common sense, upon a given text among hundreds and thousands of passages, sometimes invalidates the authority of the most acute scholar, be he English or German. The conflict of the age is waging about archaic portions of the Old Testament concerning the creation of matter and origin of man, and a scholarly acquaintance with Hebrew would seem to be indispensable, if one would stand on the primitive rock of the original text. There should be renewed enthusiasm in the study of this grand old language. A writer in the *Edinburgh Review* (June, 1868) says: "A knowledge of Greek is considered absolutely necessary for the clergy; but in the present state of theological controversy, a thorough knowledge of Hebrew is even more necessary. On almost every disputed point of Biblical criticism, the man who is not a Hebrew scholar is entirely at the mercy of the man who is." But while he should be able to know the Scriptures in their original tongues, and for this purpose must and should freely call to his assistance all scholarly helps; while, as an scholar, a historian, and a poet, he should enter into the deepest soul of these old languages he must at the same time be himself in inner harmony with the truth, and be brought by the Spirit of God in sympathy with that Word which he interprets, as well as with those hearts to whom he interprets it. So he stands between the two.

"How deep you were within the books of God?
To us, the speaker in His parliament;
To us, the imagin'd voice of God himself,
The very opener and intelligencer,
Between the grace, the sanctities of heaven,
And our dull workings."*

He is not to use the Bible merely as a treasury of texts for sermons, but as the nourishment of his thought, the constant

* Shakspeare's 2, Henry IV, iv, 2.

source of that divine knowledge which he imparts to his people. He is not a brazen trumpet for the breath of God to blow through, but his own mind is to work upon the revealed truth, to translate, to judge, to verify, to combine; to bring to bear upon it his best critical and philosophical powers. He is boldly to employ the tests of his most searching analysis and his widest generalization, since a narrow and rigid theory of interpretation is oftentimes more destructive than the broadest.* He is, above all, prayerfully to draw forth the riches of the Word as it speaks to him in a religious point of view, as a sinful man needing Christ, being willing to be himself taught of God, and having the passive as well as active, the receptive as well as seeking mind. In this way the humble interpreter becomes the wise teacher (*διδάσκαλος*) and imbibes a portion of that divine wisdom which he dispenses to others. He catches the prophetic spirit of inspiration, and he is imperceptibly clothed with its authority and speaks as from out the "lively oracles." He is a genuine voice of God for instruction, consolation, reproof, above the voice of the sky, or sea, or mountains, or thunder. He speaks to what is more profound and enduring than nature.

Thus the young preacher may look forward to no feeble and superficial, but to a wide and deep ministry of the infinite Word. He should settle it in his mind that by severe as well as generous scholarship, by a life-long and systematic study of the Bible, by the consecration of his powers to this holy work, by humble waiting on God for light, he is to make himself a true interpreter. This is his prime business, to understand the Scriptures,—to give days and nights, strength and life, to this work. His prayer—oftentimes agonizing prayer like that of Ajax—is for light. He is the prophet of God as the poet is the prophet of nature. He is not a preacher if this is not his first work. He is a false prophet. He is a disloyal messenger. He speaks his own word, not God's. He does not seek to know, and think over again, the thoughts of the Eternal Mind. His little ministry soon runs out. Do we not, indeed, discover here the secret of the oftentimes superficial character and results of the ministry; of the small fruit of preaching and pastoral labor; of the

* Stanley's *Life of Dr. Arnold*, p. 195. Field & Osgood.

almost total absence of the primitive quickening element in preaching; of the ambitious, low, and secular view of the divine office; of the work of lay-preachers to fill out (as some genuine "evangelists" of this day, though not theologically and artistically models of preachers, nobly and wonderfully are doing) the glaring deficiencies of formal, unsympathetic, unpopular, and unbiblical preaching.

The primary sphere of the preacher is, therefore, we conclude, to teach, or interpret, God's word purely—to teach it wherever he can find it in nature as in revelation, for there is, as Lord Bacon says, "A voice of God revealed in things." He is God's mouth-piece. He is to let God speak through him. That is his office, and to this work the best powers of mind, the finest culture, the most profound spiritual insight imparted by the anointing of the Holy Ghost, may be employed. But great as this office is, this does not set forth the whole object of preaching: nor, though in point of time it necessarily comes first, does it, perhaps, in point of fact, express the highest aim of preaching. For the discovery of this we will have to consider the moral design and the true results of preaching in those to whom it is addressed. The object of preaching, we would say again, is (2) Persuasion. It is to bring men into harmony with divine truth so that it shall be to them the word of life. It is more than illumination. It is beyond knowledge; it is repentance, faith, conversion. It is, "speaking the truth in love." It is the truth persuasively uttered. It is swaying the will and turning the affections so that men shall not only hear and understand, but yield and obey. Augustine's great precept in the fourth chapter of his "*De Doctrinâ Christianâ*" is, that the preacher should seek "to bend men to action." He is to use the truth of God with the whole momentum of his strength to move men off their bases of sinful repose and save their souls. Nothing short of this can satisfy the preacher of Christ; therefore it has been said by Vinet that the pastoral work is a finer test of the Christian ministry than preaching; because it is the unambitious and unselfish seeking for lost souls and bearing them back to the fold of Christ. Here the preacher's personality comes in. The Word of God forms the divine circle in which preaching, or the human ele-

ment, freely moves and operates. Men themselves come to have power. "Filled with the Holy Ghost" they speak with the Spirit's potency. They become charged with a life-giving power though of an instrumental nature and degree. Through their preaching souls are begotten unto eternal life. The apostle says (1 Tim. i, 12), "and I thank Jesus Christ our Lord, who hath enabled (enlightened, energized, empowered) me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me in the ministry." The Scotch preacher McCheyne said, "I had rather beg my bread than preach without success."

Christ draws through the preacher. Truth becomes personal. It is a personal application of divine truth to the needs, sorrows, and doubts of sinful souls that they shall be led to the source of life. It is sympathy with men. "Some preachers have only sympathy with ideas, with organized thought, with religious system-making and philosophy—so that men have felt the strength of their preaching, but have not been moved by it."* What is that even which we call human eloquence that does not move—that does not really persuade men? "*Quid aliud est eloquentia nisi motus animæ continuus?*"† The French Roman Catholic preacher of Notre Dame, De Ravignan, said to his theological students: "What is pulpit eloquence? It is the power of spoken words to draw souls to their Creator? This is the highest of ministries, the most difficult and full of danger. We must then highly value it, and bring to it a pious union with God, joined with deep humility. He that would speak merely as a man wastes his strength on human passion; but to speak as an apostle, we must go to those holy passions which I will call supernatural: love of God, determination to save souls, the strong, all-pervading zeal which springs from love of poor sinners; in one word God, God alone, sought and gained through courageous and enduring labor, through ardent and painful prayer. Here you see the whole secret of an apostolic man. There are many who will preach from what they carry in their heads; few, very few, speak from their heart, from their bowels of charity. The truth soon becomes known; even the people of the world are not mistaken about it. Listen to the judgment of a woman passed on the discourse

* *Yale Lectures on Preaching.* H. W. Beecher.

† Cicero de Oratore.

of some man of God: *It smells of his room.* In subordination to this interior principle, the source of sacred eloquence is always the Holy Scriptures. You know them well; what you mean to preach is the word of God. To produce emotion is to feel it. This true emotion is gained first in prayer, then in the perusal of some favorite author, then in a strong will to attain a proposed end. Do not hesitate to give yourselves full vent; speak direct to the passions, in every tone by turn; by unlooked-for strokes, move the depths of your hearers' hearts. True eloquence is a drama. Look at Bourdaloue himself, how his logic carries us away; how earnest he is while he seems so calm. Look above all at the matchless Paul; he throws himself into the scene, he interrupts himself, he apostrophizes his audience, he prays, he weeps, he loves."*

But the preacher, it is said, must appeal to the passion of Fear as well as of Love; he must preach the Law as well as the Gospel. The sentiment of Fear is implanted in our nature for a good purpose; and the Law with its tremendous penalties appeals to this sentiment; but the law should be preached intelligently as the apostle Paul preached it, not merely as a system of condemnation for sin, but in its true relations to the mind and the principle of conscience; in order to show men how the Law may be disobeyed, how sin may arise, how the law is a schoolmaster to bring the soul to Christ. Thus the law becomes a means of the conviction of sin, the sharpest and deadliest instrument, and the sinner dies. He loses his self-confidence. He is irresistibly drawn to God for pardon and life. There must be law in our gospel. We do not believe in the all-forgiving lawless gospel of the day. There must be repentance of sin, springing from a clear view of the violation of the righteousness of the law. But for this purpose the law must be preached with discrimination, and must make its appeal to the sense of innate righteousness, to reason and conscience, and not merely to the fears and passions of men. It must be preached so that men may see clearly what is their duty and how they have violated it; and in this way the threats and penalties of the law have there proper effect.

* De Pontlevoy's *Life of De Ravignan*, p. 261.

The law itself becomes a powerful agent of persuasion. You may thunder at the sinner with the law forever, but if you do not show him, by means of the law, that he is a sinner—that he is selfish, untrue, impure, unholy—then you will never make him holy, then you threaten him with hell-fire in vain. But presented aright there will be gospel in the law as well as law in the gospel; and if Christ is not thus preached, the preaching of the penalties and curses of the law scares perchance, but embitters, blasts, petrifies. Many sermons have been uttered, it may be conscientiously, by which the heart of the sinner has been hardened to adamant by the fires of truth. There has been no intelligent application of the principle of law to the moral sense, no setting forth of the true and merciful nature of God, no Christlike unction and sweet heavenly persuasion, no moving influence brought to bear upon the obdurate will of the sinner.

The radical difficulty with men is not so much a perversion of the reason as of the will. Here the preacher is to direct his chief assault, to pour in his mightiest forces of persuasion and carry the citadel by the violence of a divine love. He is to aim at immediate results. Life is not long enough to preach proprieties and semblances. He is to persuade men to be reconciled to God, not next year, nor to-morrow, but to-day. A living, successful preacher says: "Preaching is the art of producing religious convictions and emotions in an audience. Its effect must be immediate, or it fails in preaching. It must be understood at once. Every thought must be clear before another is presented. Thus repetitions are often necessary, the expressions of the same idea in various forms, and occasionally the repetition of the very same words. Whatever interferes with earnestness of manner should be disregarded. The whole mind should be bent on the special work to be done, and that work is immediate impression. Just so far as the preacher's mind is diverted from this object by his anxiety in respect to the grammatical accuracy of his words, and the perfect taste of every expression, just so far will the sermon fail in impressiveness." John Foster, it is said, grieved in spirit because he had never, to his knowledge, been the means of the conversion of one soul, but who can doubt who knows aught of his life

that John Foster had the spirit of a true preacher—and any theory of preaching which leaves out of view this self-forgetting earnestness of the orator for God, this deathless resolve to pluck men from the destruction of sin, to break the chains of death and bring them at once into the liberty of Christ, is a false theory. Dr. Finney was as sure of his success in regard to hundreds of souls as John Foster was doubtful about one, but whichever was right, without this devoted aim, preaching is emasculated. It becomes a feeble thing far below the manlier purpose of the reformer, the earnest author or journalist, the poet even, if he be such a consecrated nature's priest as was William Wordsworth. The scholarly culture and attainments of such a brilliant young man as John Coleridge Patteson, missionary-bishop of the Melanesian Islands, were nothing compared with his Christian manhood, his single-eyed zeal which made him to be simple as a child in his instruction of those brutified savages far off in the lonely isles of the Pacific, which led him to self-denying labors for their salvation and at last to death from their hands. This "one thing" a minister of Christ must do. The preaching that does not actually convert men from the love of sin to the love of God, nor aims to do so, is a religious play-acting and an ecclesiastical sham. Surely the most respectable preaching in our churches which has dropped out of it the element of persuasion has lost that which gives edge to "the sword of the Spirit," making it powerful to search the thoughts and intents of the heart that sin shall be disclosed, that the love of Christ shall be borne in to its secret depths, that the way of eternal life shall be opened. But as the word of God is addressed to the whole of the man and not to the moral nature only, so we have not attained to the most comprehensive and apostolic idea of preaching in that which ends simply in conversion; since it must go on into something higher still in the establishing and perfecting of a holy life in the soul; and how broad is the scope of preaching in this regard. The final object of preaching is (3) Edification. It is to build up the soul (a slower process) in righteousness. It is the work of soul-culture. It is rooting out the spirit of selfishness, malice and duplicity, and training up just, upright, single-minded, merciful, honorable, chaste, kindly, lov-

ing, self-denying, heroic, and Christlike men. It is to educate and lead souls into the great benevolent life of God, until they shall come in the fullness of their faith into the perfection of the Gospel. This is real salvation. What is salvation that does not save from the power of all sin and bring into perfection of moral purity? The immediate aim of preaching is soul-enlightening and soul-conversion, but the final object of preaching is soul-edification—the formation of a perfect manhood in Christ Jesus. It brings men in the entirety of their powers—will, imagination, reason, the affections—into the spirit of that “charity” which is the bond of perfection. Thus the meaning and end of preaching is Christ—Christ, the ideal as well as source of spiritual life. The perfect manifestation of Christ to men, to trust, love, and obey, is the Gospel. This Christlike ideal of something spiritually apprehended, but yet practically unattained is the inspiring object of Christian preaching, which, since Christianity is a life in contrast to a system of philosophy, does not end in the bare enunciation of dogma, but in the real implantation and nourishing of a higher life. This also is the way to teach Christian morality, since the dogmatic element—though it forms the basis—without the ethical, in preaching, is the body, as it were, without any blood in it. If much of the sublimated preaching of the day which beats the air should be used to turn men into the current of doing good, of destroying the works of the devil, of laying hands on the sick and healing them, of comforting those in sorrow, of aiding the poor, of promoting honesty in business, of reconstructing the criminal classes, of cleansing the corruption of great cities, of staying the tides of intemperance and prostitution, of carrying light and health into the vast unreclaimed wastes of the vicious paganism in the midst of us, of lighting up the hope of immortality in dark minds, it would be in its spirit more like the Gospel as first proclaimed—the evangel of good will to men. Revivals would result in the real reformation of society—lifting it to higher planes of living. The Gospel in its inmost essence is ethical. It is divinely practical and that is its theory. The scope of Christian preaching may be described as sweeping the whole circumference of humanity of which God himself is the centre. For this, Christ is to be

preached not only in his divine, but in his human nature, who was our human example in goodness. The roots of Christian ethics are in Christ's life. He taught us self-sacrifice by his cross. He taught us a self-denying enthusiasm for humanity. He taught us that God had come to live with us on our own level of being, not scorning us in our despicable sins and selfishness, but casting his lot in with us and striking a blood-bond of everlasting kinship with the race. He has eaten salt with us under our tent and he is our brother evermore. We can go to God as to a man. We have not yet begun to understand the depth and mystery of the Gospel; for how can we understand human love, much more, divine? We all must continue to be scholars, very babes, in the comprehension of this stupendous problem of God in human flesh. It cannot be formulated in our feeble theologies, and the inspired words of Holy Writ, such as that wonderful passage in 1 Timothy iii, 16, can alone present it to the perception of our outward mind. The Spirit of God must give us an inward apprehension of this truth. But until we begin to know something of the reality of this divine love in a human person, dwelling with us, giving himself—who had power to give and to take—a true sacrifice for our sins, the Bread that came down from heaven to be our spiritual food, the Vine whose blood we are all to drink, the nearest of all, intertwined in the deepest currents of our nature, the express soul and image of our humanity even as he was also the express image of God, the man who could stand for us all, the divine Man, the crucified Son of God and Son of Mary—we are hardly fit to preach the Gospel. A preacher who has not heard in his own heart the "good news" of "God manifest in the flesh" may be a speaker in a pulpit, but he is not an apostle of Jesus Christ. Dry as "the dust of the summer threshing-floor" is some men's gospel. It is a bundle of theological formulas, which has no more life in it than a fagot of sticks. The blessed secret of power and of hope lies in a faith inwrought by the Holy Spirit not in a human creed, but in a divine person. The actual union of the divine with the human in the person of Christ has made all things possible for us in the realm of moral and spiritual life. It makes the dogma of justification by faith a glorious

reality, and not only so, but it opens to the soul the abounding currents of a purer and manlier life. Christ was "the manliest man who ever lived." He taught us how to live by living it himself, and "when we live the Gospel so, and preach the Gospel so, sinners will be brought to God. We know not yet the Gospel's power; for who trusts as Jesus did, all to that? Who ventures, as he did, upon the powers of Love, in sanguine hopefulness of the most irreclaimable?"* Preaching the Cross is the preaching of a love that was willing to suffer, and did suffer for our sake who are unholy and unclean. We believe that the Atonement met the inexorable demands of the law, without which there could be no forgiveness of sin; but it was, above all,—and here is its great moral impression upon our hearts,—it was the manifestation of a love—of a genuinely human love, but also perfectly divine—which was stronger than sin, stronger than death. It swept away every obstacle. In its super-abounding and infinite graciousness, taking upon itself death to give its life to men, it cleansed, justified, reconciled, and raised to a divine life the sinner that believeth in Jesus. What is the Cross itself but the love of Jesus to man; of one dying for us who while sinless and divine could represent us because he was human. He could "suffer in our stead." In this vicarious and omnipotently efficacious death of Jesus Christ, of Love incarnate, there is power to purify and redeem the whole human race. While we despair, at least in this life, of searching to the bottom of this mystery, of defining or explaining it by any theory of the schools; yet the divine mystery of Love working out the salvation of sinful men by its own utmost sacrifice, is there; and, in this love divine must not the preacher be first baptized by the Holy Ghost, who is the "Spirit of Christ," before he can preach "Christ and him crucified?" How else can he have the hope of redeeming the world, of redeeming a single soul? With it he can hope for the realization of a full salvation in preaching the Gospel to sinful men, of a redemption of their whole nature from the utmost power of sin, and can labor for that end, so that these souls shall grow up into Christ who is the head, and bring forth all the beautiful fruits of holy living; and thus, gathering together regenerated minds into the unity of Christ,

* F. W. Robertson.

he may hopefully labor to build up also a Christian State, and a Christian civilization, that shall comprehend all that is true, pure, great, and divine in the world, and shall be a synonym for the kingdom of God on earth.

II. Having thus attempted to define the object of preaching, we come now to the proper treatment of divine truth in its actual forms of presentation to the human mind, or of sermonizing. These forms are, of necessity, varied.

There is no book excepting nature, which is another of God's books, that is so multiform in its aspects and scenery as the book which the preacher is to interpret; having been made in different stages of human development and much of it being of peculiar and supernatural import, where inspiration struggles to express itself through the imperfect forms of language. How large a part, for example, of the Bible, is pure poetry, in which the truth is veiled in type and figure, in a word, in emotional language; and also prophecy, where, in addition to the vagueness of poetic symbolism, the uncertain element of futurity comes in! Another great portion of the Bible is the narrative of actual events, to be judged by the application of historic criticism; and, after all, how small a department of revealed truth, in form at least, is simply didactic. One can see at a glance that there are at least half a score of broad types or classes of texts, such as—the narrative and historic; the figurative and parabolic; the prophetic, the meditative and subjective; the doctrinal, the ethical, and the spiritual,—which it would be foolish to treat all in a precisely similar way. In handling the sacred text for the purposes of instruction a fine discrimination is demanded,—the spirit of the Antiochan exegesis, applying sober and truthful interpretation and taking things as they are really meant, instead of the wilder speculative method of the Alexandrian school. To catch the spirit of the text, and to bring home its individual lesson with power to the heart, there must be the constant effort of invention. Preachers should have no cast-iron plan of making sermons. They should introduce novelty into their methods of presenting truth, not recurring constantly to the same themes, not adopting an invariable form of persuasion, not going over and over the same beaten path, but opening the infinite fields of

truth ever fresh and green; and, above all, preaching with adaptation to men's actual wants, and consulting all kinds and capacities of minds. The main part of a miscellaneous congregation, composed of men, women, and children, of many who are ignorant and illiterate, are not metaphysicians, know naught of logic, and must be addressed through the common understanding, sensibility, and imagination, by plain reasons, facts, pictures, illustrations, and a style of address that touches and fires the popular mind. If preaching is indeed rooted in the Word of God it will tend to have this originality; all the plants of the Lord's garden will appear by turns in their manifold beauty, wet with morning dew, and there will be eternal freshness in preaching.

A theory of sermonizing which has been and is still held by able men, and which deserves a respectful consideration, demands attention here, viz: that preaching consists preëminently and exclusively in the argumentative discussion of theology; and, that the great results of preaching are to be obtained, and obtained only in this way. Dr. Emmons, Dr. Eleazer T. Fitch, and many others of our eminent New England preachers, both dead and living, have been and are advocates of this theory. Dr. Lyman Beecher's quaint prescription for a sermon was that it should be "heavy and hot." The style of his preaching has been characterized in the familiar phrase of "logic on fire." Those preachers who were mostly of a revival order (or that was their theory) like Nettleton and the late President Finney of Oberlin, a man of logical mind and bred a lawyer, had a predominance of the argumentative element in their sermonizing; and they introduced the ratiocinative method with a deliberate purpose to reach the conscience through the reasoning faculty, and thus to enhance the impression of divine truth. The sermon was set whirling with the momentum of a constantly revolving argumentation and powerfully increasing reasoning, that it might strike an indelible die on the heart. Dr. Alexander, of Princeton, in his very suggestive work entitled "*Thoughts on Preaching*," has argued also in favor of this style of sermonizing, which in the past has been the method of American and, especially, New England preaching. Dr. Fitch's fundamental conception of good preaching was to make truth stand in a clear

light to the reason, by addressing the understanding with those irrefutable proofs and logical arguments that are drawn from a consistent system of doctrinal theology, appealing to those laws and principles of the mind which are cognate to the truths of revelation. "The Gospel," he said, "should be preached as a system of consistent truths, bearing with one harmonious design on the great object of repentance and salvation. Now if a preacher of the Gospel would hope to bring its salutary power on the hearts of men, he should enter into the design of God in this very respect, and set forth the various doctrines and precepts of the Gospel as one harmonious system, having in all its parts one salutary and practical bearing on man. The harmony of which we speak is the agreement of the truths of the Scriptures in their practical bearing; the harmony not only of the doctrines with one another, but of the doctrines with the precepts. It is obvious that a system of doctrinal representation agreeing with itself in all its parts might be made out, and yet the various parts in themselves be erroneous and aside from the practical intent of the Gospel. But we refer to that system and harmony which exist in doctrines; their agreeing with each other not merely in abstract speculation, but, above all, in this respect, that they have all one practical tendency, lending their united power to the one object of promoting faith and salvation. One will be sustained in its practical bearing with the whole force of all the others. And if there is any way of making bare the sword of the Spirit and presenting it to the heart in all its sharpness; if there is any way of presenting the full power of the Gospel before the minds of hearers, this is the way." This mode of argumentative theological preaching he himself followed almost exclusively as, *par excellence*, the art of moral persuasion bearing upon the reason and conscience. In the hands of such a man, and of such men as Nathaniel Taylor, Lyman Beecher, Dr. Emmons, Jonathan Edwards, this kind of preaching was a consistent, powerful, and successful method, for it had strength in itself and strong good men were behind it; but even with such examples we venture to say that this is not the only method, nor the oldest method, nor perhaps, in the main, the best conceivable method of preaching Christ. Although the presentation of theology in its systematic form is one great

and legitimate department of preaching, as much so as the ethical, or the psychological; and although Christian "doctrine," in the right view of it, is the staple of preaching. yet, unless we consider theology to be a precise synonym for scriptural teaching, or divine truth, which it certainly is not—since our most orthodox creeds are, as their technical name is, only "symbols" of the faith—we can but consider theological preaching, scientifically such, though true and fit in its order, to be partial rather than universal. It has its proper place. Theology is quite indispensable in the preacher, if not always, or too much of it, in the sermon. A preacher should be ashamed not to have some thorough knowledge of the literature of his profession—of its philosophy and metaphysics—even as any well-educated lawyer, or physician, has of his. Scientific theology is a department of learning than which there is none higher, for it comprehends the history of the struggles of the best and purest minds the world has seen to reduce to principles the verities of religion, although theology is not coextensive with religion. The Bible and the phenomena of spiritual experience given, men have attempted to bring them to the purely propositional statement and combine them in a logical system, harmonious in its parts—a praiseworthy effort and one absolutely inevitable, since the reason seeks unity. In one sense a doctrine which has no idea in it that reason can grasp is no proper object of faith, as well as of knowledge, especially if we view reason not merely as the faculty of judging, but as "the organ of spiritual truth," the eye of the mind "which perceives the substantial in the phenomenal." Theology is also a progressive science. "Theology is at once an inductive and a deductive science; it has its analytic as well as its synthetic side. It is inductive and depends upon observation and experiment, in all matters which touch its practical application to social or individual needs, in its faculty of constructing new tools to achieve new tasks, in its tentative essay of hypothesis in matters of speculative doctrine, until that tenet finally prevails which complements and harmonizes with the body of dogmatic belief already accepted. The moment a clergyman descends from the pulpit where he has been engaged in the deductive task of teaching certain received doctrines, and that he has to deal with

any scheme of social improvement, sanitary, educational, or social—the moment he attempts to influence the feelings and conduct of any one single person, then the necessity for induction makes itself at once apparent.”* One may thus be ever perfecting his theological system. The theological discussions of such an independent and vigorous metaphysician as Mark Hopkins—himself a humble and spiritual Christian—are among the most elevating exercises that the mind can subject itself to, and the closer they are, and the more concentrated the attention they demand, the more ennobling is their influence, carrying the mind into the pure world of divine ideas and near to God, the Supreme Reason. We confess that there is to our mind an austere charm in the picture of such a primitive New England theologian as Nathaniel Emmons, sitting in his unadorned study—where he had thought and worked for fifty years—ever ready to converse with his parishioners and students on high subjects of God, the divine purposes, fore-knowledge, the human will, sin, faith, and redemption, as if these things were the only real things, the only things worth thinking upon or living for. It does not present to us, it is true, the picture of the nearest resemblance to Christ as a teacher and pastor of souls, but it has its own high import and worth. But we ought not to forget that it is the Holy Ghost, not man’s thinking, that makes the strong preacher; that enables him to say, “He teacheth my hands to war, so that a bow of steel is broken by mine arms.” This is because the renewing power is divine, and the mightiest preaching is that which is “with the demonstration of the Spirit and with power.” Men are gifted with freedom—they are to choose God freely—that is their noblest prerogative and highest obligation; but in the death of sin in which they lie the Holy Spirit must awaken the native energy of soul to love and obey God, “for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do.” They are not compelled, nor forced, to act, having the power to act and to resist; but only as they are acted upon will they act, as they are moved they move, as they are called they obey, and by a free and consentaneous movement of the human will with the divine, they are borne on into the kingdom of God.

* *The Contemporary Review*, Dec., 1870.

The mighty impulse of a new life is from above, and without it preaching is powerless. "It is not of man that willeth but of God that showeth mercy." Philosophical thinking has, however, its uses on the human side of the preacher's work. It is seen especially in the well-constructed and thoughtful mechanism of his sermons. Without a philosophy of religion preaching would run the risk of being of a boneless sort. It would fail in the quality of intellectual solidity. It would also lack depth, which is the power to arrive at principles through a great number of individual objects and circumstances, and that presupposes a penetrative force of mind. It would be a sad day for preaching when the intellectual element was left out of it. It must not lose its hold upon thinking minds. He who views truth in its broadest generalization, can bring to bear with immense force his whole compact system upon one point, like the complicated machinery of a factory that all comes down in one trip-hammer blow. The decline of interest in theology in our seminaries and pulpits, if not compensated by something higher and better, is a disastrous blow to preaching; and it is a disastrous blow in any event. The influence of our great modern realistic and practical preachers on the sermons of young men in respect to vagueness and obscurity in the expression of doctrinal views is lamentably noticeable. While we thus hold to theology as the "*scientia scientiarum*," and to its true place in preaching, yet divine truth is not always to be presented in a philosophical form—as is never done in the Bible, since "there is not a single abstraction in the Scriptures,"* but also in concrete and vital methods. Theologians forget that revelation is mainly in the sphere of being, and that it is not so much a revelation of doctrine as of fact—of the most significant and world-renovating facts of Christ's life, death, resurrection, ascension, and gift of his Spirit to men, that by a corresponding act of faith on their part there is a spiritual reception of him—the revealed Word—the personal Christ—in the heart and the actual realization of an eternal life; it is a matter of historic fact and of spiritual experience, sometimes totally inarticulated by the breath of a new-born life in the soul of the believer. We do not absolutely need a philosophy of religion, but we need re-

* Shedd's *Homiletics and Pastoral Theology*, p. 78.

ligion. Scientific theology brings unrest but faith brings peace. The time will come, doubtless, when faith and knowledge shall be perfectly correlated, and when that which is objective shall be one with what is subjective in religion, but that time is distant. The preacher, as has been said, is, first of all, an interpreter—he is a pure medium. He is not to bring the human thought, the human philosophy, between the heart and the divine word. His own mind is to work upon the original truth, to mould it into teaching forms, to methodize its matter into abstract principles of thought, it may be, but, mainly, he is to interpret it simply and spiritually to men, to give it pure to the people, that they may feed upon the bread of life; so that to preach primarily from a system of theology, instead of primarily from the Word and Spirit of God, is, we cannot but think, a one-sided view. In regard to the introduction of the argumentative element in preaching, none but a man who is totally ignorant of the philosophy of mind would deny its claims. There can be no possible presentation of truth to the reason which is not itself psychologically rational, or is not based upon a true philosophy. A sermon should have logical in opposition to inconsequential thinking, and requires reasoning or the giving of reasons, otherwise it would go forth unbalanced on the rough and stormy sea of human opinion. Logic, regarded in its highest sense as the science of the process of thought, and as the necessary evolution of reason, cannot and should not be excluded from the pulpit any more than it should be from education. The study of the classics in this connection, even of Greek particles, commonly held to be dry and unpractical, as showing the connection of thought and how the ancients syllogized, as illustrating the science of reasoning and the art, or philosophy, of thought—this is by no means without its value in training the mind of the preacher to think and reason; but formal logic, which treats of the act of thinking totally aside from any relation to real existence, though it has its uses in philosophy, is out of place in a field of truth where the laws of the forms of knowledge are of little importance compared with the substance and contents of knowledge itself, or the objective reality of divine things; it seems mockery to bring the barren methods of the schools, the endless and enfeebling analysis of

scientific theology into the pulpit where Christ is preached to simple men—it is feeding them with husks.

Religion is love, not logic. Religion is the rebinding of man in his affections and purposes to the life of God. It comprehends the intellect and the will, but we come to the real possession of great truths of God, Christ, Eternal Life, not through the mere judgments of the logical understanding but chiefly through the soul's apprehension of them by faith and love, through the teaching of the Holy Spirit, through the intuitions of the consciousness, of the higher reason and spirit in man. "Every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God." Even the poetic insight of such a mind as Schiller enabled him to see this when he writes:

"Allen gehört was du denkst; dein eigen ist nur was du fühltest.
Soll er dein Eigenthum sein, fühle den Gott, den du denkst."

Men are often most illogically saved. Dr. Emmons, who preached with a purpose, force, and perspicacity that makes him the model of a sermonizer in these respects, was often borne on by his untempered reasoning into positions and statements from which his better intuition, if he had allowed it to speak, must have revolted. He shunned no statement that his syllogism forced him into. In seeking the logical he forgot the higher rational and synthetic relations of truth; so that he ran the risk of crushing souls whose moral nature was at all sensitive and just. In this way one may destroy souls logically. In this way logic is weak and superficial. The higher truths of faith cannot be philosophically formulated and then forced upon the soul with the hydrostatic pressure of bare argument. The argument or the soul is shattered by the impact. The postulates of mathematics, so beautiful in their completeness, do not fit the freely undulating surface of spiritual truth. You might as well screw down the Atlantic ocean with a copper cover. But moral and spiritual truths are nevertheless the proper subject of right reasoning; Robert South, a highly intellectual though not spiritual preacher, shows us how we may reason with interest and success upon moral subjects, because he did not run into sheer abstractions, but kept his feet on the facts of human nature and experience. He did not strive to go beyond what nature and the Scriptures taught; he was a sound and robust reasoner;

and yet he is a very poor illustration of what we mean compared with some other greater preachers, and with Emmons himself, when he forgot to be the mere dialectician and became the practical reasoner of the gospel with sinful men.

In all proper discourse there are two main methods of development, the logical and the oratorical, the first being more the method of art and the second of nature; and in the reasoning of the pulpit the method of art, the formal logic of the schools, is not so fruitful, nor is it always to be preferred to the living modes of persuasion that the higher reason, the imagination, and the heart, and above all, the Spirit of God, teach. The sermon should be dynamic rather than scientific or artistic. It should be a living growth rather than a dead work. The apostle Paul's reasoning (which is often held up as the grand model of argumentative theological preaching) was natural, spiritual, inspirational. It was rhetorical, too, in the best sense of the word. He was an analogical rather than strictly logical reasoner. He never uses the syllogistic weapon that Aristotle had already shaped and sharpened to his hand, since he was doubtless more or less conversant with the forms of Greek dialectics. He was too rapid a reasoner and too much in earnest to play with a method which is often but a *petitio principii*. His mind was synthetic rather than analytic. He dealt in concrete forms of truth presented in all their vividness. The "Cross of Christ," as he commonly used the phrase, stood to him for all that Christ was, and did, and suffered for man. The "blood of Christ" was the life of such universal and representative value which was poured forth for the sins of the world. There is a train of most powerful and magnificent reasoning in Paul's epistles and addresses, but often it is as artless, or inartificial, as if he loved the truth—which he did—more than the argument. He seizes upon an analogy almost as readily as upon a reason, to bring out his thought. He seems sometimes to despise rigid reasoning. He scatters its serried links to the winds. He is readily taken by the parallelisms of words, by associations of ideas, by swiftly glancing aspects and resemblances of thought that come up in succession from a mightily working intellect and glowing imagination, and that sees spiritual truth in all things. Thus while in II Cor. ix, he is discoursing in an unusually simple and sys-

tematic way of the duty of the church in the matter of giving to the necessity of saints, he suddenly ends the chapter by turning the attention of those whom he addresses to the free and unspeakable gift of God to man—Jesus Christ. The connection of thought in this passage is entirely natural and oratorical, rather than logical. In the second chapter of the epistle to the Colossians he meets the objections of false teachers by proving the great fact of the resurrection of Christ from the dead—his actual ascension from the tomb—and then he goes on at once to show by a kind of inspired figure, though full of substance and living truth, that the purely *spiritual* resurrection of Christ from the power of sin and death, draws up also his believing followers along with him into his risen life of holiness at the right hand of God. There is in this far more of what old Thomas Fuller calls “the oratory of God, which converts souls,” than of rigid logic. In this living way which reached the conscience,—the “man of the heart”—making Felix tremble, he “reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come.” Paul’s preaching was successful because it had the very power and voice of God in it to the soul; it was apodictic and did not stand in the wisdom of man. He preached Christ as a living power and by the “Spirit of Christ.” Chrysostom said, “He converted the world not only by miracles, but by his continual preaching.” It was, in a true sense, doctrinal preaching; and doctrinal preaching, like that of Paul, in which is the kernel of the nut, the marrow of the bone, in which is the essence of the wisdom of Christ, the life of the Spirit, is true preaching. The truths of God the Creator, creation, the law, sin, repentance, the incarnation, the atonement, faith, the new birth, eternal life, the resurrection, immortality, the judgment and the awards of eternity—these, with their mystery and solemn depth, mingling hope and fear, joy and awe, will always be the themes of Christian preaching, because these truths satisfy the soul. They reach the deepest hunger and trouble of sin. They pacify and cleanse the conscience. They open vistas of light and hope to the higher spirit in man. Natural truths cannot do this; they go no further than nature goes with the apology that what is higher is unknowable. But Christ makes the supernatural truth both knowable and known;

he brings the hidden things of God to light. "Christ and him crucified" is the sum of Pauline preaching which imparts light, heat, and movement to all. God's love is here focalized. There can be nothing higher, nothing deeper. Faith in the Crucified is the way to pardon, purity, and eternal life; and it is well that this central truth of the Atonement as the way of righteousness is again becoming the theme of the deepest interest and most intense study, and that new light is streaming in upon what might be called the human-divine side of the nature of Christ, opening new and attractive views of this vital doctrine.

Yet what, after all, is "doctrine," but simply that which is "taught" by God's Word and Spirit—its speculative sense is an entirely secondary one? Therefore, we aver that it is better and more natural to find that "doctrine," that "teaching," in the Scriptures themselves—to press out the contents of inspiration and present them in their original power and spiritual pungency to the mind, than to dilute them too much by the artificial processes of human philosophy.

Yet, let us not be understood as arguing against logic. President Finney says in his autobiography that a certain district in England where he was laboring at the time needed more logical preaching—we do not doubt it. The popular religious intellect had been enfeebled by everlasting hortatory platitudes, or ecclesiastical sentimentalisms from the pulpit, that touched no living interest, and aroused no profound thought in men's minds. The logical element in American preaching has imparted to it a certain strength and firm consistency, that, however it may be lacking in other qualities perhaps still more important, has, in these respects, made it superior to the English, French, and German pulpits. The logical faculty is needed to try, judge, and establish positive truth. It tests, and squares, and lays the stones furnished at its hand. Every mind upon whom the burden of instructing others is laid, should have the discipline which a sound and severe course of logic affords. The sermons of preachers, especially of beginners, are often woefully deficient in this quality. They could not stand by themselves. They would topple over with an adverse breath. Some subjects also absolutely demand logi-

cal treatment; and every genuine "discourse" which is carefully arranged according to the rules of art, and with a view of producing a particular impression upon the minds of hearers, gains force from a clear plan. Bourdaloue said he could forgive anything but a poor method. We argue only against the claim sometimes made with dogmatic positiveness that the rigid logical method is the only productive method in the search and treatment of spiritual truth, and that it is the exclusive mode of reasoning, of persuasion, of converting men to God. Even in the field of revival preaching do we not have a logical Finney and an illogical Moody? We contend for spiritual freedom, for nature, for God's teachings of individual genius, for rhetorical and scriptural variety, for the inspirations and illuminations of the Holy Spirit, for feeling as well as argument, for that love which every great preacher must have in his heart which stamps him as a true successor of the apostles, and without which the cold splendors of the intellect play and shine in vain. There is too little of this Pauline sensibility, or, as the French call it, *onction*, in our American preaching, and before we shall see more of it there must be a total revolution wrought in our whole theory of preaching. It must become more truly *spiritual*; Christ must have a thorough control of the being, mind, and spirit of the preacher. Christ must be his inner life prompting to utterance. He must draw from those divine fountains of Christ's heart, those hidden inspirational springs that issue from the Holy Spirit through a living faith in that great union of the divine with the human, which was brought about in the incarnation and work of the Son of God, vivifying, deepening, spiritualizing, making divine the affections, and energies, and all the outflowings and expressions of the human spirit.

The earliest preachers were spiritual, prophetic, and expository preachers. Chrysostom preached ethical and expository rather than theological discourses. Augustine, though intensely theological in his other writings, is extremely simple and practical in his sermons. Bernard of Clairvaux was almost altogether an exegetical sermonizer. Luther, though his pulpit addresses were full of polemic theology, had also, besides this, a great human heart, nature, wit, sarcasm, anecdote, allegory, passionate eloquence, and the widest and most intimate use of the Scriptures.

This leads us to speak, finally, under this head, more particularly than we have done, of the actual form of the sermon. While the classification of sermons in this respect has been with all homiletical writers a fruitful one, perhaps the simplest method of classification would be, first, into the textual; second, the topical, sometimes called "subject sermons;" third, the textual-topical. A more elaborate classification would regard the form of the sermon as depending upon the manner of treating the text, the manner of treating the subject, and the general rhetorical treatment, and would bring into view the various kinds of textual, topical, expository, doctrinal, ethical, historical, argumentative, meditative, and hortatory sermons; but we can not enter into this wide field and will notice only, for a moment, the two grand divisions of the textual and the topical forms of sermon.*

If it should be asked what style of sermonizing we would mainly recommend, not by any means as the exclusive one, but as the most ordinary method of preaching, year in and year out, for a pastor's regular work of instruction from the pulpit, we should answer, without making it a dry excogitation of the Scriptures, and without a narrow bibliolatry, the *expository*, or, rather, what might be called the "textual" as contrasted with the "topical" style of discourse. We use textual here not precisely in its technical sense. A "textual" sermon, technically, is one that follows in its treatment closely the words of the text—clause by clause and word by word—winding and turning with all the convolutions of the text. We would employ "textual" rather in the sense of "text-preaching;" that is, making the text the absolute subject of the sermon, and not an abstract subject evolved from the text; holding firmly to the text, drawing the real material, the real thought, and the real inspiration from the Scriptures. It is, in fact, "Biblical preaching," instead of "theme-preaching." It takes a long time

* In the *Presbyterian Review* of October, 1875, the subject of "Textual and Topical Preaching" is discussed in a brief article. Lest the writer of the present article might seem to have derived his view from this or any other source, he would simply say that what follows on this particular point is that which he has been in the habit of presenting to his classes in the seminary for many years—a view to which he has been independently led by the study of the history of preaching, especially in its Scriptural head-springs.

to be emancipated from the the tyranny of the topical, or theme-sermon, which has domineered over our pulpits. This, we grant, has done a noble work, and will continue to do so—the most cultivated audiences are best pleased with it, and also profited by it—but its exclusive use has engendered many errors of preaching, and has sometimes led astray from the true object of preaching. It has, above all, spoiled variety and freedom. Topical preaching, as has been hinted, draws from the text a particular theme, or, what is often the case, takes a topic before taking a text, and makes that topic the subject of the sermon. Here is its unity. It requires an artistic handling like an oration, or a piece of sculpture. It is a perfect discourse formed upon the rules of art. It is something, after all, outside of the text, though it should be in strict accordance with it. It requires brief texts containing complete themes, and themes capable of didactic development. But this style of sermonizing is very apt to lead to a neglect of the Word of God. The sermon, in fact, hangs on the proposition, or topic, instead of the text; and many wrong topics, such as the text never taught, have been drawn out to serve as themes of this kind of sermon—e. g., by a German preacher who made the subject of Acts xxvi, 24: "Festus said, with a loud voice, 'Paul, thou art beside thyself; much learning hath made the mad,'"—"The doubtful and perilous character of religious enthusiasm." A sermon should spring up from the word of God within the circle of pastoral studies, needs, and requirements, and sometimes the topic will be suggested before the text (though we think this is not a good rule), and there should be all proper freedom here since the pastor has two books to study, his Bible and his people; but when the text is once chosen, however, and whenever done, then it should be treated with honor and thoughtful attention, as the utterance of God upon the specific duty, or subject in hand. Topical preaching is needed for the wants and emergencies of the pulpit, and will continue in vogue, and all will follow it who aim at a high standard of scientific excellence in sermonizing, but uniformly pursued it will present the human side of preaching, predominantly, will hide Christ and injure the cause of Christian truth, and a return to nature, to Biblical preaching, to the teachings of the "Spirit of Christ," will constitute a real reform.

Textual preaching, in the sense in which we have explained it, where the text forms the actual basis of discourse and is immediately and mainly treated of, enables the preacher to interpret the word of God more closely, which course is in harmony with the main theory already advanced that preaching is primarily interpretation—interpretation not of a dead but living sort, adapted to spiritual awakening and persuasion. It also enables the preacher to employ texts that comprise longer or shorter portions of Scripture, and this is the beauty of this method that the texts may be longer, and thus embrace a wider range of truth, like the parables of our Lord, or like the extended figures in the 15th chapter of Luke, 1 Cor. ix, 24–27, Eph. vi, 15–17; or narrative and historical texts; or texts containing some important subject fully treated as 1 Cor. 13, in Mark x, 33–50, where humility is the underlying lesson of the whole passage; or meditative texts, as many of the Psalms, in which the inmost religious life of the writer is set forth. The textual discourse honors the word of God by thus keeping near to it and dwelling ever upon it. It gradually develops the riches of the text, following it out in its details, not perhaps running into a formal proposition and argument, but at the same time not disregarding the ground-truth of the passage (*das inneres Factum*) the essential unity of the thought, the broad generalization which comprehends the whole. It has a true subject which may be usually defined by some general title, such as "The Centurion's Faith," "The Healing of the Blind Man," "The Golden Rule," "The New Commandment." Thus the teaching is brought directly out of the Scriptures in a fresh original way, in all its spiritual power, with nothing as it were of human invention intervening between the living word and the living hearts of men. This is apt to be edifying preaching, feeding souls upon the bread of life.

This kind of preaching mixing in with it the topical element, so that the sermon shall partake of the synthetic as well as analytic character, is a profitable form of sermonizing. This was very much F. W. Robertson's way of preaching. While we would thus strongly urge a return to Biblical preaching as coming back again to the living springs of power, as being the most spiritual as well as the most ancient form of pulpit address, con-

tinuing until, in the fourth and fifth centuries, Greek speculation and rhetoric began to destroy the free exposition of Scripture and the inartificial style of interlocutory address or homily, and to mould the discourse upon the formal principles of Greek art, yet we would not be understood as denying art and philosophy their proper place in the sermon. Thought implies art. Emerson says, "The conscious utterance of thought by speech or action, to any end, is art." As Christian truth meets the advance of civilization and the needs of occidental scientific thought, it assumes, doubtless, to a certain extent, the forms of scientific thought. It may do this if it does not depend upon this method for success. A mind of severe culture like that of F. W. Robertson is apt to get at the heart of a subject and the heart of a hearer more readily than a half-educated man can do. Perhaps also, as a matter of secondary moment, there is greatly needed in our modern sermons the interest of *fresh thought*. Originality, Goethe says, is clothing old truths in new garb. Beauty is ever new while truth is old. Nature may sometimes be ugly, but she has infinite variety, and the desert itself to a scientific or æsthetic eye is never utterly uninteresting or unprofitable. The pulpit of the present day has more formidable rivals than perhaps it ever had. The book, the review, the scientific lecture, even the daily newspaper, constantly dazzle by their bright discoveries and new ideas. If preachers cannot learn to write in the same vigorous and idiomatic English style teeming with fresh thoughts—the food of the intellectual hunger of this active-minded age—that Tyndal, and Huxley, and, in a modified degree, Herbert Spencer employ, how can they compete with these men? Not, assuredly, by repeating and endorsing their philosophy, as some, calling themselves Christian preachers who are the advocates of the broadest infidelity, do; but that preachers can compete even with such brilliant men upon their own ground, considering the subject solely on this literary plane, our own New England prince of preachers, Dr. Bushnell, is a most striking example. Power despises criticism, and there was certainly native as well as spiritual power in this man beyond his art. His "faith-talent" alone (to use his own phrase) surpassed his literary and intellectual gifts brilliant as they were; and in fact it is a question whether so

strong and original a genius as his could have developed to its full perfection unless it had burst its way through the rigid conditions of a particular school of religious thought. But he took old, Biblical, common truth, and made it luminous in his intense realization of it.

He spoke to earnest, honest minds, whether educated or illiterate, because he pierced beneath the surface of the accidental and touched the real man, the common reason, conscience, and heart. He was great enough to be popular with all, and yet, like Robertson, he despised popularity and restrained himself from saying anything because it was popular, breasting the tide of public opinion like a strong and joyous swimmer. His child-like delight in God's works and his susceptibility to the poetry of the natural world into whose deep spiritual symbolism his prophetic insight penetrated, took whatever he said out of common place and stamped it with fresh beauty. He helped to unbind the imagination and to give freedom and play to the æsthetic faculty in the Puritan pulpit. One spark of God and nature is enough to give the preacher power. Dr. Bushnell had broad views of his great office as an interpreter of the "Word." The whole world was to him a thought of God, was full of God and of his ideas, so that he could not close his eyes to anything that was divine in the world, or in man, or in literature (which is the soul of man embodied in thought), or in art which is the study of the beauty and harmony of God's mind. Should not every man, he held, be a Milton if he could be one? Should not every man be a Michael Angelo if he could be one? Should not every man be a Paul, or a John, if he could be one? He had no petty views of the preacher's work. He set to it no narrow and conventional metes and bounds, but regarded it as the highest and most comprehensive calling of the world—the work of reading the mind and love of the infinite "Word," and teaching these to men, so that they should love, obey, and grow themselves Christlike. His creative imagination that made all things new, his knowledge of living facts and of men, his mastery of the hidden sources of language wherein it is tropical, emotional, original, were brought to bear vividly in the pulpit. He discomfited as by a stroke of lightning the demon of sermonic dullness. How could he be dull with such bold origin-

ality, such scope of illustration, such "sweetness and light" springing from his inner spiritual life, such a hearty and manful sympathy with truth and with other minds in their struggles after truth? He confessedly sought truth before orthodoxy, preferring the unfading crown of God to the withering crowns made by men's hands. Thus while he preached on the most lofty and supernatural themes he brought to his feet unbelievers, doubters, humanitarians, nothingarians, hard intellects, worldly and wicked men as well as holy men and believers. He convinced them that there was something divine in this gospel that he preached. His large liberality, caught from communion with the Spirit of Christ, took away the arguments of sceptics, and the minds of men were astonished, and overwhelmed, and borne down with the resistless force, the gracious magnanimity, and the celestial majesty of the truth he uttered. Who can say that the pulpit has lost power with thoughtful men, let them be of what cast of opinion they may, when such preachers as Bushnell, and Robertson, and Van der Palm, and Lacordaire, have lived and spoken and the air is still vibrant with their nervous and eloquent words? Yet these men did not speak, we believe, merely to be eloquent—*ad complendas aures*. They obeyed the impulse of a deeper inspiration.

Some of the best models of sermons in a purely literary point of view, that combine this fresh thinking with a free, strong, natural, and at the same time exquisitely molded style—satisfying the highest taste and yet open as the day to the uncultured mind—are those of J. H. Newman before they became darkened and their true light quenched by the somber and unprogressive ecclesiasticism of the Romish Church.

In this connection we would remark that the development of *science* adds an element of power to the enlightened pulpit of this day, because the knowledge of the laws and facts of the natural world increases our knowledge of God. The preacher should gladly welcome every opening of the great volume of facts which God has written in the physical universe. The relation of the pulpit to science is to our mind a theme promising much of novel interest and profound value. The preacher should rejoice in this revival and mighty stir of scientific thought in whose troubled waters he can cast his line—since

the most violent disturbance is better than total stagnation in regard to knowledge, whether spiritual or material. He should prove to the world that the Christian church possesses an intellectual vigor equal to all demands made upon it, and that it is able to cope with the living problems of the day. He, the follower of truth, ought to cultivate a catholic mind which is hospitable to new ideas, nor should he look with a narrow jealousy upon the advance of science, for science is but the formal recognition of thoroughly proven knowledge. That is true science which presents to us facts which are the genuine fruits of induction, and that are capable of proof and logical classification in whatever field of knowledge the pursuit may be. The truth of revelation cannot be imperiled by the progress of true science; and, moreover, as the two do not move in the same plane, it is lost time spent in trying to reconcile science and the Bible. At the same time the spirit of inquiry which developes the laws of the natural universe while it narrows the domain of superstition, facilitates the interpretation of God's moral and spiritual manifestation of himself in his word and in human consciousness: not willingly always, for the labors of some modern scientists are like the strokes of giants guided by a higher intelligence than their own and building better than they know. But in spite of the atheistic intent impelling their activity, and in spite of their stopping in the material world which furnishes no explanation of force, mind, spirit, they are none the less the authors of spiritual blessing and light. They are men of bright intelligence, essentially of the light. They should be regarded with gratitude and with patient hope as co-laborers in the field of truth. Take the Darwinian theory, for example, has it not already widened our vision of physical knowledge? It is but one phase of the problem of creation, which has regard mainly to the mode of divine causation, and is consistent with a divine theory of the universe. It denies, it is true, the necessity of a new creative act in the production of new species, but relegates all to an original power impressed upon nature, which, through the working of certain change-producing laws, is sufficient to account for the formation of species and the progress of the race without further intervention of creative power. It thus denies the

action of blind unintelligent force and asserts the uniform reign of law. It has seized upon a certain grand truth of cosmic development, of the existence of the working influence of law, of the evolution of higher out of lower forms, of the principle of orderly progress in creation which has long ago been observed but never before so clearly emphasized and reduced to scientific analysis. We believe that the Darwinian theory, technically speaking, has as yet utterly failed to establish its proofs. The missing links have not been found. The fathomless gaps which separate lower from higher life, which separate life from no-life, have not been bridged over; but the arguments against Darwin's view sometimes exhibit an inexcusable want of thorough appreciation of what his theory of ontology is; and many of the replies made to scientific doubt by theologians and preachers are injudicious, often weak. They evince timidity as well as ignorance. Scientific infidelity should be met by scientific knowledge, not only knowledge of the facts of the natural universe but of archæology and of a true historic criticism. Is not everything aiding the elucidation of truth, from the revelations of the highest physical science, the remarkable facts of ethnological research, and the new and brilliant era in philological investigation, to the last broken fragment of cuneiform inscription from resurrected Chaldea and Assyria? The battle may be hard, but there is no doubt of the result where the gospel of hope contends against the gospel of despair. Protestantism and true science are one.

The pulpit of this age, in order to meet its wants, must be as has already been said, to a certain extent scientific, and the inductive and scientific is healthfully corrective of the ultra tendencies of the metaphysic and deductive method. Science and religion may be of mutual help to each other, for the one searches the causes of natural phenomena, the other the cause of causes. "Science is nature revealed, while religion is nature's God revealed." The Christian pulpit has always claimed the liberty to discuss scientific questions where they cross the lines of revelation, having an example in the apostle Paul, who suggests in his discourse at Athens the necessity and the mode of meeting philosophic denial, as he met the atomic theory of the Epicureans, which has rolled around again in our day,

by kindness, wise firmness, and an intellectual presentation of the truth so congenial to human reason, of a personal Creator. The preacher must be willing to come down from the region of abstractions to meet error in the concrete forms of a materialistic philosophy, which is the present phase of denial. Pure theism is a proposition which can be defended scientifically as well as metaphysically, without dogmatism and unchristian bitterness, and with the very weapons that science herself so liberally furnishes. Already those who have lived a quarter of a century in the thinking world have seen great scientific names—even such a name as that of John Stuart Mill—waning with the theories belonging to them, which theories, though now subsided, we are willing thankfully to confess have left behind them much good and enrichment with the devastation they have occasioned.

The extreme limits of atheistic principles, which have been already attained, indicate a reaction to a sounder philosophy, a more rational and truly scientific theory of being. This the pulpit, with a divinely nurtured intelligence, should aid, as something correlated to its higher aim and work; since, in one sense, the kingdom of spirit is built up from beneath by such means; and we have been of the opinion that Christian thought has heretofore ignored too much the importance of those lower physical and material facts, which have their influence upon the gradual improvement of the race by the harmonious working of physical and moral laws; but we would in no sense depend upon scientific culture any more than upon philosophical and literary culture for the power of the pulpit—if we do, God sends his prophets in the guise of herdsmen and coal-miners to break the illusion—but at the same time, Luther himself did not despise the aids of learning, art, and eloquence, and if he had lived in these days he would joyfully have hailed science also as a handmaid of Christian persuasion, while he would have despised it as compared with the power of a spiritual faith in a living Christ. In the forms of the sermon, in the modes of presenting divine truth to the people, we therefore contend for a generous and wholesome breadth of treatment, taking in the whole nature of man; for absolute freedom within the true sphere of the Christian preacher; for the use of every genuine method of persuasion and every species of effective address that nature and the Spirit of God teach.

III. The best methods of pulpit delivery. Although this special topic would seem to pertain more particularly to the practice than to the theory of preaching, yet from the fact that the manner of delivery shapes the conception and plan of the sermon, and bears directly upon the object and design of preaching, it thus tends to modify our ideas of what preaching is, and we cannot discuss this whole subject without giving our thoughtful attention to this point. It is a theme which has been treated by able writers. Yet the subject is not exhausted, as may be seen from the multitude of books that have been of late years written upon it, a few of whose titles, especially those of our own American authors, we have placed at the head of this article. Germany—should we enter that field—would present a literature by itself, and, we must add, of a far more thorough and scientific kind, on this subject; but our present object is to give a broad glance at the whole field rather than to treat it minutely.

We have listened to thoughtless flings against theological seminaries that the art of oratory is not cultivated at the present day in them; it would be more proper to charge modern civilization with a neglect of the rhetorical art which was once considered to be, as in the Greek state, the crown and consummation of a liberal education. Many causes might be adduced for this, but the charge against seminaries is not an entirely just one. We venture to say, that at this moment, more attention is paid in our best theological schools, to oratory, than in the colleges, law schools, or other educational and professional institutions of the land. But much more should be done. The Christian orator in the pulpit, as he has the noblest field, so he should have the loftiest ideal of the orator—the “great orator,” who, Quintilian said, “had not yet appeared, but who would appear hereafter, and who would be as consummate in goodness as in eloquence.” The age of the Reformation was a period of marked eloquence in the pulpit. Concerning the eloquence of Calvin, Farel and Viret, an epigram of Theodore de Beza is recorded to this effect, that “never one showed more learning than Calvin; never one thundered with more force than Farel; never one spake with more honied sweetness than Viret.” Luther and Zwingli laid the foundation of the Reformation in the

eloquence as well as spiritual fire, and faith of their preaching. The Protestant Church has always cultivated the oratorical art, and in France especially, it has rivalled the senate and the bar, as well as the academic chair, in the purity, grace and finished elegance of its oratory. Coquerel says that "Religion imposes this upon itself because truth, even the highest truth, is not self-evident to the beclouded and corrupt mind, but needs to be explained, proved and established. It must be recommended to men with all the energies of the soul, all the faculties of the intellect, all the resources of oratory. One can never plead for religion with too much eloquence, and no preacher is excused, if he has received from God any good gift, any quality that belongs to the orator, such as memory, voice, facile elocution, presence of mind, easy and natural gesticulation, an expressive countenance, and a piercing glance, above all power of thought and forceful expression—he is culpable in not training these powers to the highest perfection in the service of his Master."* Coquerel regrets that preaching has been excluded from the domain of literature. He points to Massillon, who worked over his sermons ten years before publishing them; and he recommends the establishment of institutions like that at Augsburg, called a "Prediger-Seminar," where the sole aim is to fit young men to be preachers.

The modes of delivery have greatly influenced the oratorical power of the pulpit. There can be no doubt of the fact that the comparatively modern method of *reading written sermons* has greatly diminished the fire and eloquence of the pulpit. Yet this method is not without its advantages. Who would find fault with the preaching of one to whom our thoughts are at this time drawn because Death has, as it were, raised him to a loftier level of contemplation, and we see his greatness in a new light—of such a man as Horace Bushnell in his prime (sad is it that his voice is heard no more in the pulpit of the land), when the manuscript before him seemed to vanish, and he soared above it and above all art, by the force of his strong thinking and the inspiration of a divine and expanding theme.

Dr. Chalmers, that pulpit monarch, was also a preacher of written sermons. Van der Palm, the most eloquent preacher

* *Observations Pratiques sur la Predication*, p. 264.

of modern times in Holland, pursued this plan. This method, we conclude, must still continue to be practiced by those who, if they should die for it, can neither speak from memory nor off hand. The preaching of written sermons will not be abandoned in haste. But this was not the method of the first preachers. They were free men in speech if but children often in knowledge. "All the examples of Christian antiquity and of the beginnings of the Reformation are against the practice of the reading of written sermons. Neither the Basils, nor Chrysostom, neither Augustine, nor Luther, nor Calvin, nor their contemporaries, read their discourses, and later down this method never prevailed in French churches, and is now renounced almost entirely."* In Germany the use of written sermons has never prevailed. In Holland, about fifty years since, it was the custom, but it is now given up, and this is true to a great extent in Scotland. Its introduction into England, where, together with New England and America, it has most prevailed, has been sometimes ascribed to Archbishop Tillotson; but Bishop Burnet gives a more reliable account of the manner in which it came into vogue in England. He says, in substance, speaking of mediæval times, that preaching had been restricted to Lent, at other seasons only to festival days, panegyrics of martyrs, etc. The friars seeing danger ahead, felt that they must use the instrumentality of preaching to ward off the influences of advancing reformed ideas. Thus "by passionate and affecting discourse," they directed the devotion of the people towards shrines and pilgrimages, and in this way filled their coffers. The reformers on the other hand saw the value of this instrumentality, but they at first used it indiscreetly. They indulged in highly controversial and acrimonious preaching, which, responded to in the same vein, produced complaints to the king, and after that preaching was confined to the reading of written discourses.† But this practice was not adopted by the latest reformers of the English church, and was really revived by the Puritans, so much so that it was considered a Puritan innovation, and hence the proclamation of Charles II, October 8, 1674, to the University of Cambridge, forbidding on pain of his

* Coquerel's *Observations pratiques*, p. 175.

† Burnet's *Hist. of the Reformation*, vol. i, p. 1, and vol. iii, p. 510.

majesty's displeasure (the dissolute king certainly did worse things than this) the practice of reading sermons, as one "which took its beginning from the disorders of the times," and which was characterized as a "supine and slothful" method. But the practice had gained too strong a foothold and has maintained its ground in England ever since, where, at the present time, not one preacher in ten extemporizes, perhaps not one in twelve; very few memorize; but the preaching is from pretty full notes, or entirely written sermons. Thus this mode did not come in until after the Reformation, and has led, as we have said, to the decline of pulpit eloquence. Sydney Smith's witty gibes were directed especially against this method of preaching. "Pulpit discourses," he says, "have insensibly dwindled from speaking to reading; a practice, of itself, sufficient to stifle every germ of eloquence. It is only by the fresh feelings of the heart that mankind can be profitably affected. What can be more ludicrous, than an orator delivering stale indignation, and fervor of a week old; turning over whole pages of violent passion written out in fair text; reading the tropes and apostrophes into which he is hurried by the ardor of his mind; and so affected at a preconcerted line and page, that he is unable to proceed any further. The great object of modern sermons is to hazard nothing; their characteristic is, decent delivery; which alike guards their authors from ludicrous errors, and precludes them from striking beauties. Why this holo-plexia on sacred occasions alone? Why call in the aid of paralysis to piety? Is it a rule of oratory to balance the style against the subject, and to handle the most sublime truths in the dullest language and the driest manner? Is sin to be taken from man, as Eve was from Adam, by casting them into a deep sleep? Or from what possible perversion of common sense are we all to look like field-preachers in Nova Zembla, holy lumps of ice, numbed into quiescence, and stagnation, and mumbling?" But it cannot be denied that written sermons are apt to secure a careful treatment of the subject. Thoughts are shaded in more elaborately and the picture is deepened by every touch. Greater scientific precision of statement is attained, especially where needed in a sceptical community. The main difficulty is to guard against the idea of writing and de-

livering the written discourse as if it were a literary production to be read, instead of an address to be spoken. Many contend that writing must be read and not spoken—that it is a virtual deception to attempt to speak it. Thus Coquerel says, "If one reads in the pulpit, it is better to read openly and boldly, taking no other pains than to have the manuscript easily legible and properly smoothed down on the front of the pulpit; then to turn the leaves without affecting a disguise, which is useless and unbecoming. We may be certain that the hearers are not deceived in this respect; they always know when the orator is reading." Dr. Chalmers also warned his pulpits against the custom of mingling reading with free speaking, but recommends that preaching should be either one or the other. Nevertheless, if there is an earnest man in the pulpit, who is resolved that his audience shall be affected by the truth, and whose own mind is possessed by the truth, we believe there is a possibility, even with a written discourse, of the preacher's rising above mere reading into something like genuine address, suffering the manuscript to lie before him rather as a guide than a restraint. This depends upon the preacher's theory of the sermon, whether he regards it as a means to an end or a means in itself; whether it is a living word or a written composition; whether his preaching is to end in pen, ink, and paper, or in the hearts, souls and lives of men. But we are assuredly less robust than our ancestors; and the young clergyman who goes forth on Sunday morning armed with his written discourse in black sermon-case lined with silk and tied with blue ribbons, is about as near to John Knox and old Hugh Latimer, who charged Henry VIII. to his face with adultery, as a child's caracoling on a stick in playing soldier compared to a long-sworded moss-trooper, the hero of a hundred fights. One cannot strike hard who is encumbered with this paper armor. Some of us who are older and cannot readily learn new ways, may find it difficult to free ourselves from the bondage to written sermons, but young men should take heed in time. Even *memoriter preaching*, when rightly employed, may be more effective. This second method of preaching has in its favor the example of the ancient orators, and in all probability of Demosthenes, who did not trust himself without a careful and

even verbal preparation. The memory was regarded as almost the greatest of intellectual gifts for the orator, as Quintilian says:—"It is not without reason that the memory has been called the treasury of eloquence." This style has also in its favor the example of a few distinguished English preachers, and of the German and French pulpit as a body. A French writer says. "By memorization one escapes from the sudden imprudences, the irreparable mistakes and failures of a juvenile extemporization. As to the objection that memorization gives to the delivery something of constraint, of formality, of overstrained emphasis, an affected gesture, a redundant accent, and that extemporization on the contrary draws with it a delivery more natural, fervent and sympathetic; but examples militate against the justice of these alternatives; if the memory is only sure of itself, the elocution does not incur these reproaches, while the delivery of an extemporaneous discourse may be as confused as the discourse itself." De Ravignan, before quoted, recommends it as the only proper method, and he repeats a saying of Massillon, "my best sermon is the one I know best." He drew from this the conclusion that we ought to know some sermons by heart, and added:—"I know very well the trouble of learning by heart; but the more trouble the better—trouble is just what we ought to have. This wretched fear of taking trouble it is that does all the harm. Would you like me to tell you something of the truth of which I am deeply concerned? Sloth is what chiefly palsies talent and hinders success. I remember a very sensible remark made to me by a speaker of experience; he said that we must let a speech *rot*—yes, rot in the memory. Beware of losing the power of learning by heart, nothing can supply that want." Such preachers as De Ravignan, Lacordaire and Pêre Hyacinthe, who, whatever their errors, were great orators, and made the old Gothic pulpit of Notre Dame resplendent in these modern days, were memoriter preachers; but it must be said that this was a metropolitan show-pulpit, where a display of eloquence was expected: yet, as a general rule, French and German preachers, both Catholic and Protestant, among them Adolphe Monod, Athanase Coquerel, Vinet, and, above all, Reinhard in the last century, held that any other kind of

preaching was inefficient, indolent, and unworthy of the occasion and the truth. By this method, the sermon being written out is apt to be carefully composed; the written style thus intended for delivery, is better adapted to speaking, and whatever is stiff is taken out of it; and if one can overcome the nervous fear of breaking down much is gained in accuracy of language and deliberation of thought. The memory, it is admitted, is capable of immense cultivation. Dr. Immanuel Christlieb, of Bonn, stated to the writer that in his own case while it took him at first four days to commit a sermon to memory, he soon reduced to two days, and that now it is only necessary to read it over twice, once Saturday night, and once Sunday morning. He did not state how soon he forgot it again! The testimony also of the late Dr. Thomas Guthrie, who is commonly supposed to have been an extemporaneous speaker, is very interesting, as given in his own autobiography (vol. i, p. 191.) Speaking of his manner of preparing for the pulpit, he says: "Thus the only time left me for preparation for the pulpit, composing my sermons and so thoroughly committing them that they rose without an effort to my memory (and therefore appeared as if they were born on the spur and stimulus of the moment) was to be found in the morning." The examples of such men and of nearly all the Continental preachers of Europe cannot be entirely disregarded. Have we not possibly erred in America in holding this method in especial disesteem, and may not its confessed disadvantages of confinement, task-work and want of freedom, entirely vanish in particular cases, and great relief and power be obtained from it when successfully mastered? But we cannot stop until the true ideal of preaching is reached, and the preacher stands forth a free man, the master of all his resources of mind and body, to speak his message directly to the soul as if it were a "word of life," (and all preaching should be revival preaching) just as it is given him to speak, with no painful thought as to the words, but these are truly "winged words," flying forth as on the very breath of the soul.

Extemporaneous preaching has been defined to be that in which the speaker "knows what he has to say but does not know how he is to say it." Its chief force and inspiration are

in the thought, or the idea, not in the words. It is sometimes imagined that this method is a new thing, a new discovery of these latter days, and a great and wonderful reformation of the pulpit. If it be a reform of the pulpit it will only be traveling back to the earliest times, to the apostolic age, and to the way that nature, the free spirit of man, and the Spirit of God, dictate. Among the classic orators a modified species of improvisation was doubtless in vogue. The practice of writing out the discourse beforehand commenced, it is said, among the Greeks in the time of Pericles, and was in some degree a sign of the decadence of Greek eloquence, though Demosthenes himself in a former age, was, as has been said, not wholly an extempore speaker. From the *Gorgias* of Plato it is easy to deduce the proof that the extemporaneous method was frequently resorted to. Cicero says:—"Is orator erit, hoc tam gravi nomine dignus qui, quaecumque res inciderit, quæ sit dictione explicanda, prudenter, et composite, et ornate, et *memoriter* dicat, cum quadam etiam actionis dignitate." (*De orat.*, 1:15). This memorization here spoken of was evidently the recalling of ideas instead of words, and described doubtless in general terms the orator's facility of clothing his remembered ideas in fit language—in fact the power of accurate and forceful extemporization. This, as we have said, was the method of the earliest preachers—and can there be any doubt that it was the apostolic method? Did the apostle Paul need to have his manuscript sermon before him when he "stretched forth his hand" and said "men and brethren?" Neander, speaking of the first centuries, says:—"The sermons were sometimes, though rarely, read from notes; sometimes freely delivered; and sometimes they were altogether extemporary." This statement of Neander's, that in the early ages sermons were sometimes read, has been controverted, and the evidence against this is pretty strong; doubtless there was preparation in thought and composition, and in set orations, or occasional sermons, like panegyrics, there was actual writing, but that the early patristic preachers were in the habit of using written notes there is no proof that we have seen. A writer in *Blackwood* (Feb., 1869) generalizing upon this point, says:—"The ancient mode of preaching was of course extempore, with what amount of pre-

vious preparation would depend on the powers or habits of the preacher. The sermons of Origen are the first which are recorded as having been taken down by short-hand writers; and it was probably not until a date comparatively recent that any preacher thought of actually writing out his sermon at any length beforehand, with the view of delivering it from memory as has been the habit of some of the most successful preachers. The practice of reading from a manuscript seems only to have come in after the Reformation, and even then to have been a long time exceptional and unpopular." It is said that Archbishop Tillotson, after a most conclusive failure, declared he never would attempt extemporaneous speaking again, and his influence was so great that he has been sometimes called, as was mentioned, the originator of reading written sermons. It is also related that Dr. South broke down on one occasion at the very opening of an essay at extemporaneous preaching, and with the exclamation 'Lord be merciful to our infirmities,' descended rapidly from the pulpit. Dr. Chalmers might also be mentioned as another instance of failure; but many instances might be adduced on the other hand of preachers, who, not succeeding at first, have in the end become powerful off-hand speakers. Shakespeare says he has seen "great clerks"

" Shiver and look pale;
Make periods in the midst of sentences;
Throttle their practis'd accents in their fear;
And, in conclusion, doubly have broke off."

But the preachers who have produced the most impression in ancient and modern times, especially the great revival preachers, have, as a general rule, been extempore speakers; for this method comes nearest to the true idea of preaching, which is bringing to bear a personal influence upon men, and is a kind of prophesying, in which a sanctified personality, cleansed and prepared by the Holy Ghost, becomes the direct medium of divine impartations of truth. The Holy Spirit more readily speaks to the personality of him who yields himself at the moment, body and soul, to be played upon, filled, and voiced by this higher personality and power of God. This is the testimony of Dr. Finney, who, whatever his faults may have been, was confessedly a powerful and successful revival preacher. He

claimed a prophetic gift, and, however he may have erred in the opinion of some on the side of fanaticism in this, we believe he was a sincere and holy man. Dr. George Winfred Hervey, in his recent homiletical work entitled "*Christian Rhetoric*," has made everything of this idea, and, following the lead of Rudolf Stier in his "*Keryktik*," and Sikel in his "*Halieutik*," has attempted to build up a system of sacred rhetoric entirely on the inspirational and divine side—disregarding, to a great degree, the rules and principles of human rhetoric, and seeking for power to work upon the souls of men, exclusively in the divine oracles, and in pursuing the lead, and studying the methods, of the prophetic and apostolic preachers. It is an interesting work—not entirely original in its inception, but as an attempt at the complete systemization of the idea it merits claim to originality, and though too elaborate for practical use, it is noble in its aims and worthy of any preacher's study. Its main idea of inspirational rhetoric was a favorite one of Origen's, and of other great preachers of past ages, who, however, did not call it (as this author does) by the awkward name of "sub-inspiration," but claimed for it a direct and essentially prophetic character. Whether or not this apostolic inspiration is still vouchsafed to the true preachers of Christ, and how far it may accompany his earnest studies and efforts to interpret the word of God to men, are open questions, but there can be no question that he who has achieved the ability of speaking freely as God moves him, of uttering the thoughts and emotions that sway his mind with ease and power, is more apt to be God's effective mouth-piece. Then there is the awakening of speech to a new life. Then speech is electric, is like lightning from the skies. Then there can be eloquence, and something higher, convicting and converting power. Not that men have not been converted by written sermons, and great revivals of religion been forwarded by written sermons, but this has been, so to speak, in spite of them, and over them, as a torrent rolls over obstructing obstacles and sweeps all before it. But extemporaneous preaching with the uninspired successors of the apostles rarely can mean unpremeditated preaching, though often, in respect to the immediate preparation of the discourse in hand, it does amount to that. The great preachers of the

Reformation, and since their day, such men as Wesley, Robert Hall, Jonathan Edwards, who lived in the sphere of divine contemplation and whose meat and drink it was to think upon the things of the kingdom of God, were ready to preach at any time, on any occasion, to any length, for it was but starting a spring whose sources had become exhaustless, opening into the infinite thoughts of God. Calvin in ten years preached four thousand and thirty-four sermons, and John Wesley a far greater proportion than this for fifty years. But it is evident that a great deal has to be done in the case of ordinary men before extemporaneous address is possible. Coquerel lays down three inextinguishable prerequisites of successful extemporaneous preaching: 1. That the preacher should have an abundant supply of ideas—of religious ideas—without which all the advantages of facile delivery amounts to nothing; for a lack of ideas leads to the barren repetition of thoughts to words. 2. There is also needed a rich knowledge of the Scriptures, and especially of the New Testament—though, we venture to add a full knowledge also of the Old Testament gives a devotional flavor to the preacher's imagination that hardly nothing else can; it smells as of Carmel and Lebanon and the gardens of spices. But a familiarity with, and facility in repeating texts, analogues, proofs, allusions, figures, promises, threatenings, proverbs, precepts, reasonings from the Bible, are of inestimable aid. If the Bible is not a perfectly well-known book to the preacher his improvisations are apt to become mere moral declamations, philosophic sentimentalities, vague platitudes. 3. A fluent and idiomatic use of his mother tongue. Otherwise there will be stiffness and mannerism, hiatuses, strained inverted sentences, confused parentheses, and absolute blunders in the construction of sentences, which will take away one of the great charms and powers of extemporaneous speech, its easy, natural flow. It is not so difficult to commence a sentence, but the difficulty is to end it. Unless with prompt and practiced speakers, the decisive word—the key-word of the sentence—which binds it together, is wanting, and the sentence is nought but a jumbled ineffective mass. We might add to these three prerequisites, a severely disciplined process of thought that is able to look a subject clear through to the end before speaking. So

it may be seen that while extemporization is, in one sense, the easiest, because inspirational method of speaking, yet in fact it is the most difficult; it is the ideal and therefore the hardest to reach; and to extemporize successfully before one has anything to say, and knows how to say it, is not to be thought of. There must be methodised thought before there can be forcible speech. Thinking—the trained power to think clearly and steadily, keeping the main idea in view as the Olympic racer keeps his goal in sight—this is the golden secret of extemporaneous address. Quintilian in a very striking passage says, "*Extemporalis oratio nec alio mihi videtur mentis vigore constare.*"

In regard to the actual amount of preparation needed for the act of extemporaneous preaching, McIlvaine, excellent in his work on elocution (p. 119), remarks: "The extent or thoroughness of the preparation required for extempore speaking, is greater or less, according as the mind of the speaker, acts with more or less precision and rapidity. Too minute preparation resolves extempore into memoriter speaking, and instead of relieving the mind from the burden of sub-processes, only exchanges one class of them for another. The principle which will enable each one to decide this point for himself, turns upon the question, how far he can relieve himself from the labors of invention and style without loading his memory. As a general rule, however, the speaker, whenever it is possible, ought to prepare before hand, either mentally or with the aid of the pen, a complete analysis of his discourse, including the distinct statement of the proposition, the arrangement by co-ordination of the general heads, and by subordination of the secondary topics, together with a general statement of the thought contained in each paragraph. Such an analysis, which Rhetoric teaches us to prepare, may either be carried in the memory without loading it, or it may be committed to paper and referred to when speaking, without serious disadvantage. With a fine memory the former method is to be preferred; with a poor memory, the latter." The process of learning to extemporize will naturally differ with different characters of mind. Some men—we believe most men—will succeed better by writing a great deal. They must use written and memoriter crutches, perhaps for a long time, until they can fling them away. This is Zincke's

method. He says, "Nor will the practice of extemporary preaching deprive a man of the advantage of attaining to that accuracy which is a result of written composition. I am addressing myself to those who have energy enough to persevere for some years, or for whatever time may be required, in the practice of carefully compiling their sermons during the week, and then preaching them extemporarily on Sunday. The time will come when full notes, containing only the more important parts *in extenso*, will be sufficient, and at last nothing more, in most cases, be needed than such a sketch as may be written on one side of half a sheet of note paper, the rest of the study being carried on mentally, or without the aid of writing. I suppose that for several years more or less of writing will be necessary, because that alone will demonstrate to the preacher that he has mastered the subject and properly arranged his materials, and so will enable his mind to rest on the fact that it has already produced what it now has only produced in the pulpit. And I can imagine persons preferring to the last to write very full abstracts of what they intend to say, and doing this from a religious regard for their work. A sermon, such persons will feel, is too important a work, too much depends upon it to justify the preacher in leaving anything to the chances of the moment. This must be done to some extent in a debate, and it may be done generally in secular oratory, when the main object is to please; but it is irreverent and unwise to trust in this way to the moment for the matter or arrangement of a sermon. It will, therefore, I think, be better that the preacher, however practiced, should never wholly lay aside the pen."* Notwithstanding the wisdom of this, we are convinced that some men—they are exceptions—do better by bold effort, forcing themselves at once to hardy thinking and free expression, and so by daring, winning. If they stand shivering on the brink in their half resolve and caution betokened by their keeping up the writing process, they will never plunge in. These bolder men, if they succeed, will make the best extempore preachers, because they trust themselves wholly, and lay their power of speaking in thinking, in the inward energy of the mind, rather than in rhetoric or the outward expression. But all would agree who know any-

* *The Duty and Discipline of Extemporary Preaching*, p. 33.

thing about the subject, or have any personal experience in regard to it, that there must be a severe preparation, that there must be intensely hard thinking, planning, even composition of the discourse—it may be wholly mentally—before coming up to the act of speaking. Thought and method, like a strong engine and snow-plough, should clear the tract for the trains to thunder smoothly and swiftly over. Dr. Richard S. Storrs, in his admirable lectures on this subject, gives essentially the same advice. He says, "It is indispensable, therefore, that the main plan of the sermon be from the start so plainly in view that it comes up of itself as it is needed, and does not require to be pulled into sight at any effort. To this end it must be simple, obvious, natural, so that it fixes itself in the mind; it must be clearly articulated in its parts. If possible, let it be so arranged that one point naturally leads to another, and, when the treatment of it is finished, leaves you in front of that which comes next. Then take up that, and treat it in its order, until through that treatment you reach the third, and find it inevitable to proceed to consider that. By such a progressive arrangement of thought you are yourself carried forward; your faculties have continual liberty; you are not forced to pause in the work of addressing yourself directly to the people. There must be connection as well as succession in the thought which one would express without notes; and the more fully and deeply the plan of the discourse is imbedded in the mind, and made self-suggestive, the more elastic and buoyant is the tread of the mind in all the discussion. If needful to this result, I would write the plan of the sermon over twenty times before preaching it; not copying, merely, from one piece of paper upon another, but writing it out carefully and fully, each time independently, till I perfectly knew it; till it was fixed absolutely in the mind."* The late Rev. Henry Ware, of Cambridge, Mass., author of a most valuable essay upon *Ex-temporaneous Preaching*, though a retiring and modest man, was really the pioneer of this great reformation in pulpit delivery in this country—which reform has been so exceedingly slow in its progress that it seems even now to halt as if uncertain of future success. In the recent biography of Mr. Ware, the

* *Conditions of success in Preaching without Notes*, p. 109.

difficulties he encountered in taking this bold step are graphically told. He was not naturally fluent and was constitutionally diffident. His first attempts were in his weekly prayer-meetings, and perhaps but one to six or seven of his sermons followed this method; and he put so much labor into these efforts, that his regular extempore sermons gained for him very little time or study. But when his eyesight became impaired he realized the benefit of this method, and his extempore speaking was distinguished for its simplicity, gravity, and impressiveness. He says in a letter to his brother: "Don't give up the ship for one unfortunate fire. Why, I have suffered more than Indian torture fifty times; but then I had Indian perseverance, and it is only by not flinching that we can gain the end at last. You must expect, as a matter of course, sometimes to do ill. The state of the mind, state of health, stomach and bowels, nature of the dinner you have just eaten, &c., &c., all these unaccountably affect the powers of the mind. And then, sometimes you will make too much preparation, that is, trying to arrange the words, and sometimes make too little, that is by arranging no *thoughts*, and in either case you will flounder. But after beginning it were wicked to be disheartened."

We conclude the discussion of this specific topic and of the whole theme with three practical suggestions, as summing up the results of what we have been able to arrive at on this very important point.

1. Let the preacher who, before God, earnestly desires to be effective in the pulpit and is determined to conquer indolence and native imperfections, but to whom has been denied the extemporaneous gift, make a brave attempt to secure and combine the advantages of the three methods that have been mentioned, since, as has been seen, there is good in them all. Let him write out his sermon carefully and fully. Let him commit it to memory, or, at least, make himself perfectly familiar with it; and then let him preach it as a free discourse, without a scrap of writing before him, and without great care to adhere strictly to the preconceived and precomposed language. This, if we mistake not, judging from what he says in his Yale Lectures,* and also from his practice, is essentially the method of Rev.

* *God's Word through Preaching*, C. vi, p. 131, *seq.*

John Hall, the eminent and earnest Presbyterian minister of New York. If one will only take the pains—the unwearied pains—to follow out this plan, or something like it, he can secure the benefits of the written method with its thoughtful composition and precision of style; of the memoriter method with its ease and sense of confidence which it brings; and of the extemporaneous method with its freshness, naturalness, *vivida vis animi*, and freedom of attitude and spirit. This is doing in the way of preparation all that one, humanly speaking, can do. It is the employment of all his powers, the very utmost of his effort and care.

2. Let one who is learning to preach and who finds himself tempted to facile methods of preparation, for a time at least—and perhaps to the end of his life—mingle the two styles, viz: that of preaching from written notes and that of preaching extemporaneously. Let him speak half of the day in one and the other half in the other method. This is strongly recommended by Dr. Shedd.* In this way the valuable exercise of the pen will not be lost. The clear arrangement, the accuracy of style, the literary and artistic elaboration in the shading of thought, and the elegant finish and brevity which the constant use of the pen is fitted to secure, will be maintained, while at the same time the extemporaneous method will be restrained from its extreme and loose tendencies, and will gain also real strength. This is the method which, we sincerely believe, most preachers could, with the best success, follow.

3. Let him, who is strong enough, and has the apostolic faith (for preaching is faith), dare to make use of a more excellent way. We speak especially now to the young preacher. The all-absorbing desire to save men's souls—the working, and thinking, and living for that purpose—being taken for granted, let him cut loose entirely from the trammels of writing. Let him beautify and deepen his own mind and character. Let him dwell in communion with the Spirit of truth. Let him train himself and trust to hardy thinking. Let him forget himself. Let him purify himself to become the true exponent of God—not aiming to be eloquent, but to speak only what God gives him to speak, what is simple, what is the exact fact, what is the

* *Homiletics and Pastoral Theology*, p. 242.

real verity respecting God, nature, the soul, the law of God, Christ and his cross, repentance, faith, the experience of the heart—its real trial, anguish, doubt, sin, fear, hope, joy, love—in a word, living truth, and the plain, earnest thought and feeling which correlate this truth and which the Holy Ghost teaches, and thus by despising eloquence, by not meaning to be eloquent—to be eloquent. Let him rise above the fear of man and yield himself boldly and wholly into the hands of God to guide, to teach, to inspire, to use. Let him abjure the slavery of the writing-desk—though not the severe labor of study, and, having given all his powers to the interpretation of the Word, and having his mind filled with the truth, and his heart with the love of his flock,* let him stand up in his simple manhood on a level with those he addresses, and speak like a prophet, like a messenger of the love of God in Jesus Christ to men. Should this become the method of preaching for the next hundred years of our American Christianity, as it was of the apostles and earliest preachers of the faith, then will a great light spring up, and it will be recorded in this New World what it was written aforetime in old Judea: "So mightily grew the Word of God and prevailed."

* We soon learn to speak what we love; the heart supplies us much better than the memory, and has also a language which the memory does not know. A holy pastor, moved by God, and by regard for the salvation of souls which are confided to him, finds, in the liveliness of his zeal, and the fulness of his heart, expressions having the impress of the Holy Spirit, the spirit of love and of light, a thousand times more powerful to move, to reclaim sinners, than all those who are furnished by labor and the vain artifice of human eloquence. The talent of an orator is not what is required; it is the talent of a father; and what other talent does a father need in speaking to his children but affection for them, and a desire for their welfare.—*Massillon: Dix-septième Discours Synodal.*

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND RELIGIOUS.

THE CHALDEAN ACCOUNT OF GENESIS* is another volume from Mr. George Smith of the British Museum, "the greatest of Assyrian scholars." It illustrates, in connection with his last preceding volume, the extent to which the cuneiform inscriptions have been unburied and deciphered, and the possibilities of future discovery. At the risk of repeating what is familiar to many readers, we may briefly describe the store-house of materials on which Mr. Smith is expending his learned ingenuity, and his marvellous industry.

Assurbanipal, (the Sardanapalus of the Greeks) son of Esarhaddon, and grandson of Sennacherib, was the greatest, as he was the last, of the *great* Assyrian monarchs. In his reign (about 670 B. C.) Nineveh was the capital of an empire extending "from Egypt and Lydia on the west to Media and Persia on the east." He renewed the palaces and temples which his father and grandfather had built; and the mound of Kouyunjik is filled with the ruins of his magnificence. The great palace of Sennacherib, in the southern portion of that mound, appears to have been the greatest of the Assyrian palaces. It contained, among other riches, the royal library, consisting of books (if they may be so-called) written not with pen and ink on parchment or papyrus, but, with such an instrument as the Roman *stilus*, on tablets of clay afterwards hardened. Large additions to the library were made by Assurbanipal, the great patron of Assyrian literature, and indeed it was in his reign that most of those *terra-cotta* books were manufactured. When, in the reign of a later Sardanapulus, the Assyrian empire was overthrown by the Medes and Babylonians, and when Nineveh after a long seige, was taken, its king, unwilling to survive his empire, "made a pile of all his valuables in the palace, and setting fire to it perished himself in the flames." In that

* *The Chaldean Account of Genesis*, containing the Description of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the Deluge, the Tower of Babel, the Times of the Patriarchs and Nimrod: Babylonian Fables, and Legends of the Gods; from the Cuneiform Inscriptions. By GEORGE SMITH, of the Department of Oriental Antiquities, British Museum, &c. With illustrations. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1876.

conflagration, the royal library, instead of being dissolved into ashes, like the more famous one of Alexandria, fell from its place in the upper story of the palace into the apartments below and was buried in the ruins.

The excavations of Mr. Layard at Kouyunjik, not many years ago, opened one of the rooms in which the royal library of Nineveh had been buried for more than twenty centuries. Mr. Layard sent home to the British Museum many boxes full of the broken tablets; and large quantities were afterwards gathered up and sent. The fragments were of all sizes from half an inch to a foot in length; and the task of clearing each fragment from its coating of dirt, and of joining fragment to fragment as children put together the pieces of a dissected map, till one tablet and another, and then another should begin to be intelligible—a task at which patience herself might fold her hands in despair—was that to which Mr. George Smith addressed himself. Nor has his labor been in vain. His success in reconstructing tablets from the mass of *debris* in the Museum, and in deciphering the fragmentary inscriptions, was such that he longed for more material to work upon, and was sure that the pieces he wanted could yet be found in the ruined palace of Sennacherib. Twice he has traveled from London to Nineveh—once in 1873, and again in 1874, and twice has he brought home a new supply of materials for his work. The result is that already the Assyrian literature, buried 2,200 years ago, has been in a large measure recovered, and the history of those primeval monarchies on the Euphrates and the Tigris, from a date almost two thousand years before the Christian era, is better ascertained than the early history of Rome—as well perhaps as the early history of Rome might have been if its records had not perished in the destruction of the city by the Gauls.

Among the facts that seem to be established concerning that great mass of Assyrian literature which Mr. Smith is piecing out and deciphering, some may be mentioned as interesting to the general reader.

First, Though most of the tablets in the royal library of Nineveh were inscribed in the reign of Assurbanipal the munificent patron of learning, very many of the inscriptions are copies of much older records,—as an edition of Chaucer's poems printed in the reign of Victoria gives us poems that were actually written five hundred years earlier; or as the Sinaitic manuscript of the New Testament, though made in the fourth century, was copied from

other manuscripts which had been made in the second century and which were themselves copies, directly or indirectly, from the originals written in the first century.

Secondly, Assyria received its civilization and its cuneiform alphabet from Babylonia; and the fact has become "evident that the Assyrians copied their literature largely from Babylonian sources." The history, the poetry, and the mythological legends of "Babylon, the glory of kingdoms and the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency," were laid up by Sennacherib and Assurbanipal, as the history and the literature of ancient Rome and earlier Greece are found to-day in the libraries of Britain and America.

Thirdly. A fact of much significance may be given in Mr. Smith's own words: "At an early period in Babylonian history, a great literary development took place, and numerous works were produced which embodied the prevailing myths, religion, and science, of that day. Written, many of them, in a noble style of poetry, and appealing to the strongest feelings of the people on one side, or registering the highest efforts of their science on the other, these texts became the standards for Babylonian literature, and later generations were content to copy these writings instead of making new works for themselves." "By the veneration in which they were held these texts fixed and stereotyped the style of Babylonian literature, and the language in which they were written remained the classical style in the country down to the Persian conquest. Thus it happens that texts of Rimagu, Sargon, and Hammurabi, who were one thousand years before Nebuchadnezzar and Nabonidus, show the same language as the texts of these later kings, there being no sensible difference in style to match the long intervals between them. There is, however, reason to believe that although the language of devotion and literature remained fixed the speech of the bulk of the people was gradually modified, and in the time of Assurbanipal when the Assyrians copied the Genesis legends, the common speech of the day was in very different style. The private letters and despatches of this age which have been discovered differ widely from the language of the contemporary public documents and religious writings, showing the change the language had undergone since the style of these was fixed." We may suggest, as parallel with this, the fact that the Latin continued to be, throughout Europe, the language of religion, of learning, and of diplomacy, long after it had ceased to be spoken by the people.

This last fact has some bearing on a difficulty which some have found concerning the antiquity of what we receive as the books of Moses. It has seemed to some impossible that the Hebrew of those books, if they were written in or near the time of Moses, should be so nearly identical with the Hebrew of Samuel, of the Psalms, and of Isaiah, written so many centuries later. But is the difficulty any greater than that which we encounter and overcome when Assyrian scholars tell us that texts of Babylonian kings who reigned a thousand years before Nebuchadnezzar and Nabonidus, "show the same language as the texts of these later kings, there being no sensible difference in style to match the long interval between them?"

The discovered coincidences between certain Chaldean legends and the book of Genesis have a charm of their own, and may contribute somewhat to a reconsideration of the method in which that book is to be interpreted for the use of Christian theology. But if any have assumed that the authority of Moses is to be either confirmed or weakened by any such discovery, they must be disappointed. According to Mr. Smith those Chaldean legends are some of them older than the time of Abraham. Traditions concerning the world's beginning, and concerning a great deluge, are found in almost every country; and from long ago it has been known that the Babylonian story of the flood was strikingly similar to the narrative given by Moses. That story has now been recovered in the form in which it existed before Abraham emigrated westward from Ur of the Chaldees. We have no room to draw out the comparison here, but any reader of the volume now under notice, and of its predecessor, (*"Assyrian Discoveries"*) can at his leisure compare the Chaldean traditions with the Mosaic story. The contrast between the two is more wonderful than the resemblance. Let it be supposed that Moses gives the story as Abraham, having received it from his fathers, brought it with him into Mesopotamia and thence into Palestine; and how shall we explain the difference between the Abrahamic tradition and the Babylonian legends which existed before Abraham? The difference that stands out in the comparison is just the difference between a religion which knows and worships ONE God and a religion with "lords many and gods many;" on one side a God whose creative word called nature into being,—on the other side gods evolved from chaos and the abyss; on one side the religion which knows an only God terribly abhorrent of evil, yet merci-

fully calling his elect out of the world's ignorance and wickedness to live in friendship and intercourse with him,—on the other side a superstition which personifies the heavens, the earth, the elements and forces of nature, and pays to them its homage; on one side a religion holding the mysterious promise of a deliverer in whom "all families of the earth shall be blessed,"—on the other side a religion without hope. Whence the difference? Did Abraham inherit a simpler and purer tradition? Or was Abraham an inspired reformer of religion, a prophet, to whom as a forerunner and progenitor of the world's Redeemer and for the sake of the world to be redeemed, God had revealed himself?

When Mr. Layard's Arab workmen, digging in one of the Assyrian mounds, had suddenly uncovered, to their surprise and awe, the majestic human head of a figure whose body was still buried beneath them, the messengers who met him with the tidings shouted, "Hasten, O Bey, hasten to the diggings, for they have found Nimrod himself! Wallah! it is wonderful, but it is true! We have seen him with our own eyes!" The most interesting, historically, of Mr. Smith's "discoveries" is his discovery and identification of that "mighty hunter before the Lord," the Cushite who "began to be a mighty one in the earth," of whom it is written that "the beginning of his kingdom was Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh, in the land of Shinar;" and that "out of that land he went forth into Assyria, and builded Nineveh, and the city Rehoboth, and Calah, and Resen between Nineveh and Calah." All these particulars Mr. Smith has identified and explained; and what is more, he "has found Nimrod himself!" Our own eyes have seen the sculptured form of the mighty hunter, whose Cushite head and face are so utterly unlike those of all other Assyrian kings and heroes. Transported by Botta from Khorsabad to Paris, he stands now in the Louvre, holding a huge serpent by the neck in his right hand and crushing a young lion under his left arm. The reader can see for himself the portrait of that Nimrod, facing p. 174 of the volume here noticed.

"FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT"* is clearly written, closely argued, and puts such sharp points to adverse opinions that a constant interest is excited, and the discussion is made so profound

* *Faith and Modern Thought*. By RANSOM B. WELCH, D.D., LL.D., Union College, with Introduction by TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 4th Avenue and 23d Street. 1876.

and logical, that the honest mind is forced to feel itself urged onward to safe and sound conclusions. Dr. Welch finds the way to the bottom falsehoods in modern scepticism.

Modern thought is kept confessedly, and somewhat boastingly, within the limit of human experience. The myriad appearances, of which we are conscious through our senses, together make up the elements of our knowledge, and such as are together in place become the things, and, those that pass in sequence become the events, of our experience. Invariable likeness of appearances in place, and of their order in sequence, make the law for substance and attributes, and that for cause and effect, and the law found as fact in a large experience is taken as law universal throughout nature. Particulars analyzed and compared, and the numbers that are like abstracted, give the species, and higher abstractions the genus; and so in rising genera till we reach a conception that is universal, and known as the absolute. The general conceptions occasion syllogistic propositions, and therein we deduce conclusions, and the judgments formed are strictly determined by the facts of experience. We begin and keep our knowing within human observation, and outside of all experience there is naught but the inconceivable and unknowable, and no ground is left for faith. So modern thinking limits itself. But, when this mode of sense-knowing is scanned clearly, the whole rests on the appearance as shine only, with nothing in it standing sure; and however common and familiar may be the notions of substances and causes, they are still just like the laws we assume to think, mere facts as appearance, and neither substance nor cause nor law can determine anything, or connect any appearances. The thinking is empty of all inner connectives.

On the other hand, with Dr. Welch, faith is belief founded on evidence. Beyond animal sense, man has reason, whose insight is sure to get valid substance, and cause determining, and giving controlling law to, the appearances; he trusts the insight, and his faith is vision for him, and he knows the real connectives underlying the appearances, and can clearly think out the natural as it existeth in time, and the comprehending supernatural that inhabiteth eternity.

By such spiritual philosophy it is, that Dr. Welch overlooks empirical logic and detects its emptiness, and exposes its partialities and contradictions, disclosing thereby how utterly untrustworthy as a basis it is for any philosophic system of physics, morals, or religion. The exposure and refutation is carried through six chapters,

into which he has divided his work, viz: I, *Modern Theory of Forces*; as incompetent to evolve the facts of mind and life from an absolute force, and that any conception of such evolution is an absurdity. II, *Faith and Positivism*; proving the futility of all attempts to exclude the former by the latter from the facts of intelligence, conscience, and volition also. III, *From the field of Religion and the Infinite*; and then IV, *from the written and living Word*, as a divine revelation. Following this is V, *Admissions of Philosophical Scepticism*, that abundantly evince its helplessness. Closing with VI, *Modern Thought* as incompetent to satisfy itself by the attainment in any way of an ultimate, either a beginner or finisher.

The book has high value in the attainment of its direct design. While fair to science, it refutes the mode of speculative thought, leading to materialism or scepticism, as some eminent modern physicists are teaching. It is more valuable still, in its teaching a better philosophy, and accustoming its readers to a higher spiritual sphere of thinking.

THE ADVENTURES OF A PROTESTANT IN SEARCH OF A RELIGION.*
—This is a fictitious story of the conversion of an English Baptist to Romanism, and is designed to present in this form a defense of the Roman Catholic faith. The representation of the religious life of the English dissenters is the broadest caricature, of the type familiar in some novels; and even the facts, which may be at the basis of the caricature, are exceptional. The following are examples: "It is not to be denied . . . that the children of parents who are followers of Calvinism pure and unadulterated, generally turn out either infidels or persons of notoriously bad character." (p. 32.) "No self-examination, no watchfulness over the hidden springs of the heart, no contesting the every step of the way against the world, the flesh and the devil; 'only believe' and the thing was settled." (p. 35.) "Provided the children (at Sunday School) are kept quietly sitting on their forms spelling out 'Zorobabel begat Abiud, and Abiud begat Eliakim,' from half past nine to eleven

* *The Adventures of a Protestant in search of a Religion.* By IOTA.

"Silvis, ubi passim

Palantes error certo de tramite pellit,

Ille sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum abit; unus utrique

Error, sed variis illudit partibus."—*Horace Sat. II, 3.*

New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 31 Barclay Street. Montreal: 275 Notre Dame Street. 1874. 16mo, pp. 352.

on Sunday morning . . . every purpose, it is considered, is served." (p. 46.) "Conviction (of sin,) he was told, ought properly to come from hearing a startling sermon . . . and if he felt very wretched and miserable after it, . . . the next step would be to see the minister and tell him the text and the particular part of the sermon that had affected him. He was given to understand that people generally cried a great deal at this stage, especially in their first interview with the minister, and this was considered a very hopeful sign. If the conviction were deep enough, conversion would follow, sooner or later, but it was expected to be later at Ebenezer. Perhaps after twelve months waiting, if conviction remained, and a great desire to be baptized by total immersion, and go to heaven soon after supervened, the 'inquirer' might consider himself safe." (pp. 47, 48.)

The hero, while pursuing professional studies in a medical school, is moved by his deep religious feelings to engage in missionary labors among the lowest population in London. Afterwards he is constrained to become a minister and enters a Baptist theological college. The representation is, that the students, before completing their course, usually became Rationalists and rejected with contempt the doctrines taught in the college; yet they disguised their disbelief, and became pastors for the sake of the salary; and the implication is that in this way the educated dissenting ministers of England are generally deliberate hypocrites.

At the college our hero also loses his Christian faith and is distracted with rationalistic speculation. Afterwards he resigns his pulpit and seeks relief from "the bane of *thought*, the demon of the mind," in ritualistic Anglicanism. The demon is finally exorcised by absolute submission to authority in the Romish church. It is a process quite incomprehensible to us, by which an educated thinker, who can find no rest in submission either to reason, to revelation, or to Christ, can expel the demon of thinking which torments him, by ceasing to inquire and to reason, in submission to the authority of the Romish church.

The religious experience and life of the hero at and after his conversion, and to which he returned after his rationalistic aberration, are, as delineated by the author, essentially the same with the religious experience and life recognized and inculcated in our evangelical churches, and remain his inward experience and life after his reception into the Roman Catholic church.

GOD AND THE BIBLE. By MATTHEW ARNOLD.*—This work is a review of the objections which have been urged against the author's "Literature and Dogma." The author's design in this work, as in that, is "to show the truth and necessity of Christianity, and its power for the heart, mind, and imagination of man, even though the præternatural, which is now its popular sanction, should be given up." "At the present moment two things about the Christian religion must surely be clear to anybody with eyes in his head. One is that men cannot do without it; the other, that they cannot do with it as it is." The topics discussed are: "The God of Miracles; the God of Metaphysics; the God of Experience; the Bible canon; the fourth Gospel from Without; the fourth Gospel from Within."

The work is a further unfolding and defense of the author's well-known views, with the usual charm of his felicitous style. His attempt to reconstruct a Christian faith is vitiated by the fundamental error of recognizing religious belief as grounded only in the feelings, and receiving its form from the imagination; religion is an alliance between imagination and conduct. Religious belief can be firmly established only as we find a synthesis of it with reason.

We quote a single paragraph: "Sometimes a youthful philosopher, provoked at our disrespect towards metaphysics, tells us that he has been reading Hegel, and would greatly like to have a word with us about *being*. Our impulse is to reply that he had much better have been reading Homer, and that about Homer we, at any rate, would much rather he should talk to us. That divine poet is always in season, always brings us something suited to our wants. And now, when we have finally, after making good our general description of the Gospel records, to make good our special estimate of the fourth Gospel, and when . . . we are confronted by the theorizings of ingenious professors about it and might well be overawed by their exceeding vigor and rigor, a saying of Homer comes to our mind and raises our courage, and emboldens us to scrutinize the vigorous and rigorous theorizings with coolness. Yet the saying is not at all a grand one. We are almost ashamed to quote it to readers who may have come fresh

* *God and the Bible*. A Review of Objections to "Literature and Dogma." By MATTHEW ARNOLD, D.C.L., formerly Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford and Fellow of Oriel College. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. 16mo, pp. 329.

from the last number of the *North American Review*, and from the great sentence there quoted as summing up Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution: 'Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.' Homer's poor little saying comes not in such formidable shape. It is only this: *wide is the range of words! words may make this way or that way.* (ἐπίων δὲ πολὺς νομὸς ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. *Iliad*, xx, 249.)"

THE MODE OF MAN'S IMMORTALITY. BY REV. T. A. GOODWIN, A.M.*—The doctrine of this volume is this: "Man was created pure spirit, and as such, no doubt, had a separate existence before he entered the body which was formed for him of the dust of the ground." The spirit is the man. At death he leaves the body as he does his clothes, and the former will no more be raised in a future resurrection than the latter. The author examines at length the teachings of the Bible respecting the future state and the resurrection, and endeavors to prove that the above is the doctrine which they teach. His argument is not convincing, but is probably as strong an argument as can be made for his position. An ordinary reader would suppose that he denies the resurrection of the dead; but he says: "Let no one say that we deny the resurrection of the dead. We do nothing of the kind. If the New Testament does not teach the resurrection of the dead, it teaches nothing."

We regret that the author reveals superciliousness and ill-temper towards rejecters of his doctrine. He intimates that it is rejected by some through pride, and contempt for one who is not a great man; by others through opinionativeness and bigotry; by others through ignorance of the simplest laws of interpretation; and by others from the love of finding fault. He compares some of them to a class-leader, who had migrated from the sand-hills of North Carolina; and who thought he had proved from the Bible that the world is not round, because it is written, "I saw four angels standing on the four corners of the earth." "Our

* *The Mode of Man's Immortality*; or, The When, Where, and How of the Future Life. By Rev. T. A. GOODWIN, A.M., author of "The Perfect Man," and late editor of "The Indiana Christian Advocate." New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp. 238.

pulpits, and even the professional chairs in our colleges, have not wholly escaped the tribe; . . . sand-hillers, whether laymen or clergy, whether presiding at the plow or in the university, need not read this book." In treating of God's creating man in his own image, he charges with "infidelity" all who interpolate in the text such phrases as: "in righteousness and true holiness," "in moral nature," "in moral character." We were not aware that any one ever interpolated any one of these phrases in the text of the Bible; but the Westminster divines used the first of these phrases immediately before the phrase "after his own image"; and these, and the many others who similarly defined the image of God in which man was created, are, we must suppose, the persons on whom the author charges "infidelity." A few pages before he had said that some would probably denounce his book as "infidel"; adding, "It is the common resort of imbeciles and bigots."

We find the following extraordinary assertion: "The heaven of the average Christian is the slightest possible improvement on the Elysium of the ancients. It is, like their Elysium, beyond some swelling flood, and when reached, it is a lovely land, abounding with rocks and hills and brooks and vales, and *amply supplied with good things for the gratification of the appetite*—nothing more nor less than the creature of heathen imaginations, a perpetuation of Elysium, though called heaven by Christians."

CHRISTIAN BELIEF AND LIFE.*—This volume of twenty-five discourses, delivered in the chapel of Harvard University, will need no other recommendation among our readers than the name of the author. Though enrolled among the Unitarian clergy, and properly classed with them on certain important questions in theology, he is yet honored by evangelical denominations for his pleas in behalf of Christianity against the skepticism of the day, his earnest recognition of its supernatural elements, origin and authority, and sympathy with them in respect to many of its distinctive doctrines and duties, and especially as to Christian missions. If not admitting our Lord's absolute divinity, he acknowledges his divine mission, and bows to his authority in the Scriptures. He does not obtrude on us his dissent from the ancient orthodox creeds, much less make light of their mysteries. The

* *Christian Belief and Life*. By ANDREW P. PEABODY, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875. pp. 326.

nineteenth of these sermons, treating of the Holy Spirit, though not noting his Personality, yet inculcates divine aid. A reverent and kindly tone pervades all his discussions. In the sermon on Reverence (the third) he is properly jealous in behalf of "the parental relation" and "the offices of home piety," as compared with Sunday schools, for the culture of this virtue, but when he would have had these latter institutions among us, "like the English, opened only for the children of the unprivileged classes," we cannot but think he overlooks a vicious prejudice of our country and time which would have made such a distinction, if attempted, injurious and perhaps fatal to the success of these schools among the "unprivileged." Within the circle of Christian ethics these and other discourses of Dr. Peabody must have a charm for any intelligent audience, not only from his genial spirit, but from his scholarly and cultured thought. In discrimination and compactness he seems to us superior to Dr. Channing, though not in that simplicity of style which had much to do with the latter's power. And in taking this exception we must refer to such words (on pages 233, 236, 238) as "intenerates," "otiose" and "occlude," which seem to us scarcely defensible even before a scholastic congregation. The sermon on "a door in heaven" we remember hearing with pleasure in the orthodox church in Cambridge. And if we may judge of the others by those that we have read, they might all be preached in any Christian assembly with pleasure and profit to the hearers.

COMMENTARY ON THE PROVERBS. VOL. II. BY DELITZSCH.*
—The first volume of this work was noticed with commendation in the NEW ENGLANDER for July, 1875. The present volume contains the commentary on chapters xi-xxi, and is characterized by the author's well-known excellence as a commentator.

GENTILISM.†—This work is intended to prove that the primitive condition of man was not barbarism, but advanced towards civilization, at least as far as the condition of nomadic shepherds; that

* *Biblical Commentary on the Proverbs of Solomon.* By FRANZ DELITZSCH, D.D., Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by M. G. Easton, D.D. Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1875. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong. 8vo, pp. viii, and 350. Price \$3.00.

† *Gentilism.* Religion previous to Christianity. By Rev. AUG. J. THÉBAUD, S. J. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 31 Barclay Street. 1876. 8vo, pp. xv. and 525.

his primitive political state was the patriarchal; and the primitive religion, monotheism communicated in an original revelation, traces of which were preserved by tradition long after the degeneracy into Pantheism or Polytheism. The author finds his proofs in an extended examination of the primitive history of the peoples of Central and Western Asia, of Egypt and Ethiopia, and of Europe; and in a briefer examination of the less known primitive history of the Turanians. He does not profess to be an original explorer in these fields of inquiry, but uses the facts ascertained by the most learned scholars in their investigations of monuments, inscriptions, sacred books, mythologies, and literatures. The volume is full of valuable information and suggestions, and the argument presented is of great force.

THE SENSUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE 19TH CENTURY.*—This volume contains a review of the Sensualistic Philosophy of the last century; an examination and refutation of James Mill's Analysis of the Mind, of Positivism, the Evolution Theory, Physiological Materialism, and Sensualistic Ethics; vindications of the spirituality of the mind and of the validity of *a priori* notions; and a chapter on the supernatural, in which the miracles of the Christian Scriptures are considered. These are timely themes demanding vigorous and earnest discussion from our ablest theologians. The volume contains valuable thoughts on the subjects discussed. But we think it would be more effective if it were less flippant and contemptuous towards those whose opinions are controverted. We were surprised in reading the refutation of Sensualistic Ethics to find President Edwards and Dr. Samuel Hopkins grouped with Hume and Bentham, as teaching theories "which really amount to the same," and which "are all, in fact, modifications of the selfish system." We were especially surprised to learn that Dr. Hopkins teaches "the most utter selfishness." "I see not then, how from the Utilitarian premises, the practical conclusion can be avoided, that each man is his own properest supreme end, his own God! What more intense expression could be given to the most utter selfishness? It is instructive to see Dr. Samuel Hopkins, an outspoken advocate of the benevolence scheme, after narrating through

* *The Sensualistic Philosophy of the 19th Century considered.* By ROBERT L. DABNEY, D.D., LL.D., Professor in Divinity in the Union Theological Seminary, of the Presbyterian church of the South, Prince Edward, Va. New York: Anson D. Randolph & Co. Crown 8vo, pp. 369.

many pages its disinterestedness, coming (vol. 1, chap. 8) to this conclusion, and avowing that self-interest must remain practically each man's immediate guide. Thus we are led back to the vilest results of the selfish system."

REV. FREDERICK BROOKS'S SERMONS.*—The author of these sixteen sermons was already favorably known to a large circle of friends through his personal connections, and pastoral fidelity and usefulness, when a new interest invested his name in the public mind from his accidental death by drowning in the autumn of 1874, at the age of thirty-two—this disaster befalling him also on a philanthropic errand. This volume, with an introduction by Rev. Phillips Brooks, is a fit memorial of his gifts and worth. The quality of the sermons shows his intellectual and spiritual affinity with the admired Boston preacher. Without the same fine analysis, the younger brother has a similar freshness of thought and feeling, delicate appreciation of his sacred theme, earnestness of aim, and genial helpfulness. His theological position we suppose to be "broad church," and while ourselves interested in the sermons of that school we feel obliged to say of them that their subjects and methods are often adapted rather to the cultivated few than to the masses. The thoughtful reader will recur with wonder and regret to the removal that seems so untimely of a man so gifted and faithful, in the opening of his ministry.

MOSES. By J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE, D.D.†—This volume comprises twelve sermons on as many scenes or incidents in the life of Moses. The aim of the preacher is not primarily to present a pictorial or dramatic description of the scene, but to use it for the spiritual quickening and edification of the hearers; and to this his delineation of the events in the life of Moses is strictly subordinate. For example, the sermon on the words, "Speak unto the children of Israel, that they go forward," is a sermon for New Year's day. The subject is: "The best mode of journeying through life." The heads are: "Go forward, (1) from that point

* *Sermons, by the Rev. Frederick Brooks*, late Rector of St. Paul's Church, Cleveland, Ohio. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. pp. 299.

† *Moses: A Biblical Study*. By J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE, D.D., author of "Year of Salvation," &c. Translated from the Dutch by James Kennedy, B.D. Edinburgh: T. T. Clark. 1876. Crown 8vo, pp. 362. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, 743 Broadway. Price \$2.25.

to which God has conducted us; (2) along that path which God bids us take; (3) by the light which God affords; (4) with the staff which God provides; (5) to the land which God prepares." As "a biblical study," the volume is disappointing; as a series of sermons, it is interesting and edifying. The "plans" remind us of Reinhard's; they are worthy of attention, as presenting a method of treating a subject in a sermon not very common in this country—the occasional use of which would help to give variety to preaching.

MURPHY'S COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS.*—This commentary includes a revision of the translation, arranged according to the parallelism, with breaks to indicate the divisions of the thought; a comment aiming chiefly to bring out the meaning of the psalm, with little attempt at illustration; an introduction prefixed to each psalm, giving briefly what is known of its occasion, subject, and arrangement; critical notes placed by themselves after the comment on each psalm; and a general introduction occupying 50 pages, treating of the place of the psalms in the Old Testament, their titles, nature, and poetical character, instrumental accompaniment, themes, and arrangement. Prof. Murphy is already favorably known as a commentator, and the volume before us is a valuable addition to his works in this department.

OEHLER'S THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. VOL. II.†—The first volume of this important work was noticed in the *NEW ENGLANDER* for April, 1875. The second volume completes the discussion of "Mosaism," and contains the second and third parts of the work. The second part is entitled "Prophetism," and is divided into two sections. The first treats of the development of the theocracy from the death of Joshua to the close of the Old Testament Revelation; the second treats of the theology of Prophetism. The third part is entitled "Old Testament Wisdom" and treats of the books of Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes,

* *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms, with a new translation.* By JAMES G. MURPHY, LL.D., T.C.D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast, and author of commentaries on Genesis, Leviticus, and Exodus. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1875. 8vo, pp. viii and 694.

† *Theology of the Old Testament.* By Dr. GUST. FR. OEHLER, late Professor Ordinarius of Theology in Tübingen. Vol. II. Translated by Sophia Taylor. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1875. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong. 8vo, pp. vii and 497. Price \$3.00.

and some of the Psalms. We have read with special interest the development of the Old Testament doctrine of the Messiah and of his kingdom. The whole work admirably unfolds the profound significance of the Old Testament. We commend it to the many scholars who are forgetting the old maxim: "Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet; Vetus Testamentum in Novo patet."

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.* BY DANIEL G. BRINTON, A.M., M.D.—This work aims to present an inductive analysis of the religious sentiment; it seeks to ascertain what in the mind of man gave birth to religion and is ever breathing into it life. The subjects treated are: The bearing of the laws of mind on religion; the emotional elements of the religious sentiment; the rational postulates of the religious sentiments; the prayer and its answer; the myth and the mythical culture; the cult, its symbols and rites; the momenta of religious thought.

The author starts from the position that mind is co-extensive with organic life. "The distinction between the animal and the vegetable worlds, between the reasoning and unreasoning animals, is one of degree only." "We may be competent to explain the phenomena of mind by organic processes; and equally competent to explain all organism as effects of mind; but we must never suppose an immediate identity of the two; this is only to be found in the formal law common to both; still less should we deny the reality of either. Each exhausts the universe; but at every step each presupposes the other; their synthesis is life, a concept hopelessly puzzling unless regarded in all its possible displays as made up of both." He distinguishes, however, "the laws of mind, regarded as physiological elements of growth" from "the laws of thought, these, as formal only, being held as nowise a development from those." Proceeding from this starting-point, he finds in the laws of thought "the norms of absolute truth." The religious mind "must assume that there are some common truths, true infinitely, and, therefore, that in all intelligence there is an essential unity in kind." He argues against the theory of Nescience as held by Hamilton, Mansell, and Spencer; and against the objection from anthropomorphism, quoting the words of Novalis, "It takes a

* *The Religious Sentiment. Its Source and Aim.* A contribution to the Science and Philosophy of Religion. By DANIEL G. BRINTON, A.M., M.D., author of "The Myths of the New World." New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1876. Large 12mo, pp. vi and 284. Price \$2.50.

god to discern a god." He presents three postulates of religious belief: I. There is order in things; II. This order is one in intelligence; III. All intelligence is one in kind." And he finds "the satisfying and exhaustive conclusion" in "intelligence, not apart from phenomena but parallel with them, not under law but through perfect harmony above it, *power one with being*, the will which is 'the essence of reason,' the emanant cause of phenomena, immanent only by the number of its relations we have not learned." The author recognizes religiosity as constitutional in man. His investigations are conducted not in a denying and destructive, but in a constructive spirit. The work evinces much intellectual vigor and an extensive range of reading, and is suggestive and quickening to thought. But the author does not reach, by his course of thought, the personal God, to whom we can cry "Our Father;" and the idea of our own personal existence after death, "potent as it has been as a moment of religious thought, must be ranked among those that are past." "We are driven back to the teaching of Buddha, that true thought alone is that which does not die." Religion is "*Expectant Attention, directed toward an event not under known control, with a concomitant idea of cause or power.*" The one message of all religions is, "Seek truth; do good. Faith in that message; confidence in and willing submission to that order, this is all the religious sentiment needs to bring forth its sweetest flowers, its richest fruits." This result would seem to indicate that there has been some defect in the premises or some error in the reasoning. It cannot satisfy the religiousness of man nor nourish his spiritual growth. The author aims at reconstruction; but his words seem rather the wail which Gæthe ascribes to the spirits who were bearing away from sight the fragments of "the beautiful world:"

"Woe! woe!
Thou hast destroyed
The beautiful world
With powerful fist;
In ruin 'tis hurled
By the blow of a demi-god shattered.
The scattered
Fragments into the void we carry,
Deploing
The beauty perished beyond restoring."

MORAL CAUSATION.*—Mr. Patrick Proctor Alexander's very lively and readable treatise upon Moral Causation, has passed to a second edition. We cannot be surprised at this, for it is one of the most spirited metaphysical tractates to which this fruitful age has given birth. The immediate occasion of it was a still briefer essay entitled *Mill and Carlyle*, which contained a few brief comments of the author upon Mill's doctrine of Freedom, as expounded in his examination of the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. Of the volume containing these comments Mr. Mill vouchsafed a somewhat elaborate notice in the third edition of "*the Examination.*" This notice called forth the present volume in which Mr. Alexander devotes himself to a deliberate assault upon all Mr. Mill's utterances in respect to moral freedom and follows him up without mercy in a series of acute and humorous criticisms which are not easily outdone in any metaphysical discussion within our knowledge. The author is evidently master of his subject, and with all the humor which he allows himself, he connects a thorough mastery of his topic in all its relations. He spreads himself moreover into all the kindred fields of inquiry, and discusses with great ability most of the fallacies which are held by the modern materialistic and associationalistic school. We would advise all our readers who would enjoy a feast of wit and wisdom together to procure and peruse this acute and lively treatise.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

LIFE AND LABORS OF DUNCAN MATHESON.†—The employment of lay-evangelists in popular awakenings is not so much an invention of our times as many seem to suppose. More than fifty years ago laymen in New Haven churches went out, two by two, into various towns, as far as forty or fifty miles, holding religious services, and virtually preaching, though only for a season. The Haldanes of Scotland earned a wide and honorable repute as evangelists, giving their time and wealth to the work, the younger not only in that country but on the continent. This sort of activ-

* *Moral Causation*, or Notes on Mr. Mill's Notes to the chapter on "Freedom," in his third edition of his "*Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.*" By PATRICK PROCTOR ALEXANDER, M.A., author of "*Mill and Carlyle*," etc., etc. Second edition, revised and extended. William Blackwood & Sons. Edinburgh and London. 1875.

† *Life and Labors of Duncan Matheson*, the Scottish Evangelist. By the Rev. JOHN MACPHERSON. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1876. 12mo. pp. 392.

ity is, however, more common and more organized in our day, and is brought more fully into sympathy with churches and pastors of different denominations. The volume before us is an account of one of the most remarkable and successful evangelists, who died in 1869, only forty-five years old, his vigorous constitution giving way under arduous and protracted labors. He reminds us of Mr. Moody in his strength of faith, devotion to the Bible, passion for saving men, physical energy, good native powers with imperfect education, and especially buoyancy of spirit and sympathy with the masses. Of the two, Duncan Matheson seems to us intellectually superior, though not working in such conspicuous positions, nor with such helpful combinations. Besides his work in Scotland, which was more largely out-door preaching, he devoted himself with wonderful enthusiasm and success to the help of the British troops and others in the Crimean campaign, as a Bible-distributor, nurse, and philanthropist. To this vocation of a Christian worker he gave up his trade, which was that of a builder, expending himself in disinterested toils that won for him the confidence and good will of all classes. In common with Mr. Moody, he placed himself beyond all suspicion of mercenary motives, and we think this distinction should be carefully noted in behalf of those "evangelists" and "revivalists" for whom it can be claimed, in contrast to some who are said to have built up a more *lucrative* business in this line than the regular ministry could furnish. This memoir is made up largely of letters and journals, though we observe, to the credit of the subject, that he did not *number* his converts. The editor has given more of his own comments and reflections than seem needful, and perhaps even the evangelist's labors are reported in too minute detail; but the record is inspiring, as of a rare Christian workman and a noble life.

FORTY YEARS IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE.*—It is related of two eminent missionaries of our American Board, in the same field, that in a house where they were hospitably entertained, on being offered in turn the most comfortable chair, one of them, being of a somewhat austere and gloomy habit, refused it as a luxury which a self-denying missionary must forego, while the other, as

* *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire*; or Memoirs of Rev. WILLIAM GOODSELL, D.D., late Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. at Constantinople. By his son-in-law, E. D. G. PRIME, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1876. 12mo, pp. 489.

noted for his cheerful temper, readily accepted it as a privilege which a missionary might well enjoy when it fell to his lot. The latter was the subject of this memoir. The two men, working together as they did so long and so successfully, illustrated the diversity and harmony to be found in true Christian service. Dr. Goodell is remembered by all who knew him as most happily endowed both by nature and grace. With strong convictions and consecrated aims, able and diligent and efficient in all departments of the missionary work, actively employed in translating the Scriptures, in preaching, and in a large correspondence, he relieved his own labors and attracted and refreshed others by a vivacity and pleasantry that seemed to be the free play at once of physical and spiritual health. In this way his communications to the *Missionary Herald* are believed to have surpassed all others. Our missionaries in Turkey needed no higher human tribute than the judgment of the Earl of Shaftsbury that they "have done more toward upholding the truth and spreading the Gospel of Christ in the East than any other body of men in this or in any other age"; and when it is considered that Dr. Goodell was "the pioneer of this noble band of missionaries at the Turkish capital, the one most honored and beloved, according to the testimony of all his associates," and that his work there "covered the entire period marked by that movement known as the Protestant Reformation in Turkey," the record here given commends itself at once to Christian readers and indeed to all philanthropists. The editor seems to have made diligent use of ample materials in journals and letters. Such a history of "forty years" so employed will now be read with the more interest in view of the actual and impending transitions in "the Turkish empire."

LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF A QUAKER AMONG THE INDIANS.*
—It was sometime ago remarked by a foreign reviewer that the Quakers, while distinguished among Christian bodies for missionary journeys and various philanthropic labors and sacrifices, have been less ambitious to organize results in such institutions as would serve for monuments of their work. Of course there is the signal exception of Penn and his colony, but the general fact may be noted in most of the Memoirs which make up the body of their literature. We have an example in this narrative, which is

* *The Life and Adventures of a Quaker among the Indians.* By THOMAS C. BATTERY. Illustrated. Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. 1875. pp. 339.

not a biography of the author but an account, in the form of a journal, of his work primarily as a school teacher and then as a peacemaker among the Kiowas and other tribes in our Indian territory bordering on Texas. It does not appear that he received any formal commission or emolument from our government, yet he acted in connection with the established "agencies," and individually sought in every practicable way to correct the wrongs and mitigate the miseries, and to further the Christian civilization of some of the most savage tribes, for this purpose separating himself from his home and encountering hardship and danger under purely benevolent impulses, and, as he believed, the promptings of the divine Spirit. In his work as a teacher of children, which for some reason seems to have been soon given up, he showed tact and patience, and in general was prudent in the management of affairs. Without literary pretension or ambition, he writes in a clear and simple style, and the *realism* in his narratives and descriptions gives the volume a charm which, though we had purposed only to look into some chapters, led us to read the whole. We have not elsewhere obtained so good an idea of what is meant among the Indians by "medicine" and the "medicine man." Our impressions are deepened of the wrongs they have suffered from neglect and bad faith on the part of the government, and especially from the treachery and violence of white settlers. Particularly it is shown that some of the crimes imputed to the Indians have been the work of white men disguised as such. It appears, too, that the Indians, like the whites, are of all sorts, and that they have chiefs who know how to appreciate justice and good will in the superior race. The facts recited will have special attraction and value for all who watch with interest what has been called "the Quaker policy" of our present administration. Eight portraits, from photographs, of Indian chiefs and women, adorn the volume. We wish it had a map also. It commends itself to the patronage of the public as a means of procuring pecuniary aid now needed for the author, who was compelled to forsake the field of labor "broken in health and constitution." We ask for it the attention of our readers.

NOTICES OF THE LIFE OF MRS. HENRY M. FIELD.*—"When I am gone, let me rest in peace. Do not publish anything to

* *Home Sketches in France, and other Papers.* By the late Mrs. Henry M. Field, with some notices of her life and character. New York: Geo. P. Putnam's Sons. 1875. 12mo, pp. 256.

attract the attention of the world. The world is nothing to me. I am going to God. Let me live only in your heart as a sweet memory, and in the hearts of those that love me." Such was the last and beautiful request to her husband, of one of the most cultivated and attractive women of the literary and artistic circles of New York. It is a request which will undoubtedly endear her the more to the large circle of friends who now mourn her loss. A collection, however, of a few of the tributes which have been paid to her memory by some of the most distinguished literary men of the country, together with a republication of her various literary productions, has seemed to Mr. Field not inconsistent with the wishes, thus expressed, of his wife. Mrs. Field was born in Paris, but was early married to the Rev. Henry M. Field, the editor of the *Evangelist*, and her death occurred March 6, 1875. The "kind words" spoken, at the time, by such men as Mr. Bryant, Mr. George Ripley, Mr. Charles L. Brace, Mr. Samuel Bowles, Dr. Bellows, Rev. O. B. Frothingham, President McCosh, President Mark Hopkins, Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, and many others, cannot but interest even a stranger in one whose character appeared to such different persons exceptionally attractive. Mrs. Field's own papers, twenty-two in number, which have a charm of their own, from the vivacity of their style, are to a great extent on French scenes and characters. We have only time to allude to one of them which describes a visit to the hospital in Paris, known as La Salpêtrière, that glorious monument of the labors of St. Vincent of Paul, where she saw and conversed with the wretched woman who in the days of the French Revolution was selected to be worshipped in Notre Dame as the "Goddess of Reason."

MISCELLANEOUS.

FRENCH POLITICAL LEADERS.*—This little volume is a book for the present, and is written up to date. It contains twenty-three "brief biographies" of men who are now the prominent political leaders of France, and whose names occur every day in the newspapers. There are no half dozen books which are at all accessible which can compare with this one thin duodecimo, in the amount of information which it gives with regard to contemporary French history. This very morning, on which the present

* *French Political Leaders.* By EDWARD KING. New York: Geo. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876. 12mo, pp. 326.

lines are written, the telegraph has brought an account of the efforts which Victor Hugo is making to obtain the remission of the death penalty in the case of certain communists, who are under sentence. In the sketch of his life, in this book, may be found a detailed account of his life-long efforts in this same direction—some of them as it would seem perfectly senseless—which throw much light on the measures which he is now taking. There are sketches, also, of Thiers, Gambetta, Jules Simon, MacMahon, Dupanloup, Jules Grévy, Laboulaye, Rouher, Duval, the Duc de Broglie, Buffet, the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, Dufaure, Ollivier, Jules Favre, the Comte de Chambord, the Duc d'Aumale, the Comte de Paris, Ernert Picard. Rochefort, Casimir Périer, and Jules Ferry. It will be seen that all shades of politics are represented. The sketches are prepared by Mr. Edward King, who was known as the excellent correspondent of the *Boston Journal* during the Franco-Prussian war.

THE VOYAGE.*—It has been very apparent that the author of those books which have proved so popular, "Ecce Cœlum," "Pater Mundi," "Ad Fidem," &c., has the mind of a poet. True poetic sensibility is manifest on every page. Perhaps his works might be even criticised as having a superabundance of this element. But, in the book before us, he has attempted to put his thoughts into metrical form. The idea of the volume if we mistake not is one which has been often suggested to him by the beautiful scene which opens before his own door on the banks of the Connecticut. He commences with a description of what may be seen from the "Manse."

"Green pastures dotted with cattle, and shady clumps;
Autumn-woods sprinkled with blood of the wounded year,
Blue sky, where a single great cloud barge drifts gently
With its bulwarks of silver, and opal, and gold."

He then passes to the "Church," near by, which we suppose to be his own; and then with the broad Connecticut in sight and and the blue "Sound" in the distance beyond, where the white-sailed ships are all the time going by, he takes up the "voyage of life" which every one is to make by himself. He describes the building of the ship, the launching, the commencement of the voy-

* *Thy Voyage*; or, a song of the Seas, and other Poems. By Rev. E. F. BURR, D.D. Seventeen illustrations and portrait of the author. New York: Nelson & Phillips. 1875. 60 pp.

age, the "one sailor" at the wheel as she pursues her way, through unknown seas, towards the distant port. The book is beautifully illustrated with what we suppose to be, many of them, scenes, with which he is familiar in his own parish. .

THROUGH NORMANDY.*—One of the most interesting portions of France to the traveler is Normandy. Its river-scenery is unrivalled for quiet beauty in all Europe. Its architecture is unsurpassed for picturesqueness. It has been the scene of not a few of the most important events in French history. Its cities and villages, its cathedrals and churches, its monasteries and castles are intimately associated with the lives and deeds of many of the most renowned men and women who have lived in France. In such a country, rich with so many associations, it is especially important to the traveler to be well acquainted before hand with its peculiar history. For those who have not time to read that part of Mr. Freeman's History of the Norman Conquest which more especially relates to Normandy, the work whose title is given above will be found of great value. Every place of importance is fully described, and an account given of the historical events which have rendered it memorable. The book is also very fully illustrated. With its help, a person who has never been in Normandy can easily, with a little study, make himself intimately familiar with every place and thing in the province which it is desirable to know.

THE ADIRONDACKS.†—This is a small duodecimo, furnished with several maps of the different sections of the Adirondack region and with a number of illustrations of the places of most interest. It is to be remembered that the various sub-divisions of what, in popular language, is called "the Adirondacks," are as unlike one another as possible. There is first the mountain region on the east; then the Raquette and Long Lake region towards the southwest; and still further away the John Brown tract. To the northwest is the Saranac country; west of this is Tupper's Lake, and the Oswegatchie, and Grass River regions. Then there are the St. Regis lakes, and still further north the Chateaugay woods. Mr. S. R. Stoddard, in this book, gives an interesting

* *Through Normandy*. By KATHERINE S. MACQUOID. Illustrated by Thomas R. Macquoid. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 12mo, pp. 556.

† *The Adirondacks*. By S. R. STODDARD. 12mo, pp. 183. S. R. Stoddard, publisher, Glenn's Falls, New York.

account of his trip through all these various regions; and an hour's study of his rather rough experiences will enable the reader to form a very tolerable idea of the peculiarities of this famous country.

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"ERRATA" IN THE APRIL NUMBER OF THE NEW ENGLANDER, 1876.

- Page 254, line 22, for "16' 53½," read "16' 53¼."
- Page 347, line 25, for "an scholar, a historian." read "a scholar, an historian."
- Page 381, line 23, for "decent debility," read "decent delivery."
- Page 384, line 16, for "his own autobiography," read "his autobiography."
- Page 388, line 16, for "leads to the barren repetition of thoughts to words," read "leads to the barren repetition of thoughts—to words, words."
- Page 389, line 15, for "McIlvaine, excellent in his work on elocution," read "McIlvaine in his excellent work on elocution."
- Page 394, line 20, for "what it was written aforetime," read "what was written aforetime."

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXXVI.

JULY, 1876.

ARTICLE I.—THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE OF MATHEMATICS.

MATHEMATICS, as part of a course of academical study, do not encounter the same objection which has been urged against the classical languages. Therefore they have no need of the vindication which has been so abundantly given to them. They have so direct and obvious practical uses; do so evidently subserve material interests, that they command a good price in the very markets of utilitarianism. On this very account, it may happen that their proper educational force and value are less considered.

Classical studies, having no so obvious applicability to material uses, could not have held their place in our systems of education, if scholars had not vindicated them by demonstration of their admirable effects upon the mind.

The people have been reminded, that the men who speak the purest, clearest, strongest English, are not usually those who have studied English only. When Webster poured luminous floods of thought upon the people's minds, or "shook their hearts" with the deep tones of their mighty vernacular,—though every word, and phrase, and idiom were intensely Eng-

lish, they knew that those grand powers had derived no small part of their culture from earnest study of Roman and Greek writers. When Everett gathered crowds of the people to listen to his discourse of Washington, or other themes of patriotism; when he led them abroad over wide fields of thought; when in his sonorous diction, his faultless periods, and the magnificence of his various imagery, he exemplified "the infinite loveliness of nature," his hearers knew how long, and with what delight, he had communed with those ancient bards, and orators, and historians whose writings cannot die, whose languages (as he rightly insisted) are improperly called "dead," for they have gloriously outlived the nations that used to speak them.

Made to understand how much classical study has to do with the formation of such minds, the people are willing that much money and labor, and the priceless years of their children should be expended upon them. A Yankee utilitarian sees that to produce a Webster, a Seward, or a Sumner, is quite as practical an achievement as to produce a reaper, a plough, or a sewing machine.

On the other hand, the more obvious connection of mathematical studies with material utilities—with accounts, and land-surveys, and navigation, and civil and military engineering—so easily win the consent of all to their occupying a prominent place in the curriculum, that we may not be giving due consideration to their effects upon the mind itself.

The effect of mathematical study upon the mind may be considered with reference to

I. *The cultivation of the powers of reasoning.*—These are the powers which are employed in every search for truth, and in every effort to convey the knowledge of truth into other minds. They are directly concerned in all acquisition of knowledge, and all communication of it; in all learning, and in all teaching.

The tendency of mathematical studies to promote accuracy and precision of thinking, and of statement, is obvious. All mathematical processes demand absolute accuracy. They do not tolerate the slightest lack of precision. We conduct all these processes under the conviction that the slightest error will utterly spoil them. We understand that unless we be exactly right, there is no knowing how far we may be wrong;—that

unless our reckoning can be relied upon absolutely, it is not fit to be relied upon at all. Therefore we conduct mathematical processes, not as we carry wood, but as we carry porcelain; not as farmers drive oxen, but as pilots steer vessels. A single heedless step may shatter the costly vase; a moment of inattention may wreck the ship. Scrupulous accuracy, conscientious care to be right, is desirable in every class of studies. They are the successful investigators, the safe intellectual pilots, whom it most decidedly characterizes. For the formation of this habit and character, mathematical study has advantage over every other. In no other is the pupil so easily made sensible of the necessity of precision in every step—of accuracy in every process. In no other does the pupil's mind so readily see that there is no medium between complete success and total failure;—that to make a single mistake is to break one link in a chain, or to loosen one stone in an arch.

The view which the mind has of each step in a mathematical process must also be clear. All mathematical reasoning is demonstration. It all leads to certainty. There are no mathematical opinions; there is only knowledge. When the mind has once apprehended the proper evidence of a mathematical proposition, it cannot possibly have any doubt about it.

Mathematical expressions are eminently free from ambiguity. They convey the same idea to every mind, and always a definite idea. Algebraic symbols and geometrical figures are not like grammatical phrases, liable to different interpretations.

This clearness and definiteness of thought and expression are desirable in every department. The nearest approximation to the impossibility of being misunderstood, is the highest excellence of rhetorical expression. But what writer or speaker ever makes more than an approximation to it. No other study helps to this so much as mathematics. The mind which in youth patiently submits to the severe discipline of mathematical study; which holds itself to the careful processes, requires of itself the distinct conceptions, trains itself to the rigid accuracy of mathematical investigation, and knows the rapture of mathematical discovery,—will not in its maturity, be satisfied with vague conceptions and careless reasoning in any department of thought. Such a mind will not be easily misled by glittering

generalities, dazzled by brilliant declamation, bewildered by cunning sophistry, or satisfied with lazy guessing. Those who have no definite opinions; to whose minds no subject presents itself in clear outline; who are consciously incapable of thorough investigation, and must always be feebly credulous, or as feebly incredulous, or dreamily bewildered;—are not generally persons who in youth loved mathematical studies, and faithfully pursued them. Their minds have not felt any such bracing and balancing influence. More probably they have been specially fond of fictitious reading, and have indulged much in dreamy reveries, the present deliciousness of which is made more fascinating by the fond fancy that, while they thus doze and dream, the wings of their genius are growing.

II. *The Cultivation of the powers of imagination.*—These are the powers by which the mind represents to itself ideal objects, and scenes, and characters. They are of high importance, not only for purposes of enjoyment, but for purposes of improvement.

It is a wonderful fact, that the human mind is able not only to perceive an object which is presented to its senses—to view and comprehend a scene upon which it looks—to know a character in real life, with which it is conversant—but to present to its own contemplation objects and scenes and characters, different from any real ones which it has known.

The sculptor sees in the rough block of stone, the lovely Venus, the graceful and agile Mercury, the majestic Apollo; and the light of that fair vision guides him in every stroke of his chisel, through all the patient labor which realizes his idea, and presents it to the view and admiration of subsequent generations. The eye of genius beholds landscapes such as the sun nowhere shines upon; and, by means of colors spread upon canvas, or by words written upon paper, in a painting or in a poem—can present them to the delighted contemplation of other minds. The pen of genius has given to our acquaintance characters, not a few, which were never embodied in flesh and blood, but which are vividly present to our imagination, and have no small influence over us. The powers of imagination which such gifted minds have exemplified, exist, in various degrees, in human minds generally:—else works of art might as well be exhibited to brutes as to men.

In education we are concerned for the right culture of these

powers. We are now to consider the influence of **Mathematics** upon them.

Let it not be supposed that mathematical studies have only a restraining or repressive effect upon the powers of imagination. Rightly viewed, and rightly used, they furnish, at the same time, healthful stimulus and safe regulation.

The processes of geometry and trigonometry, and the conic sections, directly familiarize the mind with forms and figures. Using diagrams as representative of all possible figures, in the limitless space, the mind at once possesses itself of the universal truths concerning the relations and laws of these figures, and of the lines and angles which define them. Three dots upon a black-board, three signal poles set up on a field, three stars in the sky, are all seen to have identical mathematical relations. By the same mathematical principles and processes the positions and distances of them all may be exactly determined.

Can any human mind become the possessor of such a power and such an instrument; find itself able thus to carry up into the sky the same measurements which it used on the ground; able to speak in the precise terms of mathematics, and in the confident tone of demonstration, of distances reckoned in millions of miles; know itself the possessor of an instrument of computation, which loses none of its power and none of its accuracy, carried how far soever into the infinite space,—and not feel its powers of imagination quickened, as well as its powers of reasoning strengthened? Will such a mind behold no forms but those made visible in material bodies; no landscapes save those which nature or art has realized? Will such a mind compute no magnitudes save those of existing bodies; no distances beyond those within which visible suns are shining? Will such a mind limit its thought to the uppermost arch of the telescopic heavens? Nay, there, where reason reverently folds her wings, the wings of imagination will still be outspread. She will pursue her adventurous flight, through the shining spaces, heaven above heaven, filled with statelier systems, and glowing with clearer radiance, on and on, toward that supreme heaven which is filled with the uncreated and unapproachable light.

From even so daring flight, she evermore returns with no wildness in her eye, no stain upon her plumage. Her sober

sister Reason greets her with a complacent smile, for in all that flight she has been guided by Reason's own maxims, nor has one stroke of her wing done violence to any of Reason's demonstrations.

A mind that is habituated to mathematical processes, invigorated by mathematical exercises, disciplined to mathematical methods, and emboldened by mathematical triumphs, is not likely to be wild in its adventures of imagination. Its flights may be high, but they will be steady; they may be daring, but they will be sustained.

Such was the mind of the Scottish Chalmers, whose cumulative periods pile themselves in cloud-like magnificence above you, now glowing with sun-lit splendors, anon darkening the landscape with awful shadows, while still you feel the granite solidness of his thought firmly supporting your steady footsteps. And no marvel, for that strong mind had experienced both the invigorating influence, and the wholesome regulation of mathematical study; and the earliest of his intellectual triumphs was in the mathematical class-room at St. Andrews, where, as his biographer tells us, "He was ready to guide his students steadily and consecutively along a strictly scientific course, but as they trod that path, he would have all their bosoms to glow with the same philosophic ardors which inflamed his own; for to him the demonstrations of geometry were not mere abstractions to be curiously and unmovedly gazed at by the cold eye of speculation. A beauty and a glory hung over them, which kindled the most glowing emotions in his breast. . . . And all that his beloved science was to himself, he would have her become to the youths in the class-room around him." "Under his extraordinary management," writes one of his pupils, "the study of mathematics was felt to be hardly less a play of the fancy than a labor of the intellect."

Nor may this rightly be set down as the triumph of an extraordinary genius, clothing with fictitious charms that which, of itself, is dull and dry and uninteresting. It was the work of an appreciative mind, doing simple justice to a noble science, and beautiful as noble, unveiling charms which before faulty or inadequate methods had too effectually concealed.

Those who are familiar with Chalmers's writings, especially his

"Astronomical Discourses," have in them most ample illustration of the efficacy of mathematical study in both nourishing and regulating the powers of imagination. Under such nurture and such regulation, these powers are developed in harmony with the powers of reasoning; these supporting and invigorating those, and those refreshing and adorning these. So grows the tree that is "planted by the rivulets of water," the sturdy trunk upholding and nourishing the leafy top; the ample foliage gathering, from all the air, refreshment and life for the trunk and the root.

Let the student of mathematics know to what appreciation of beauty this science can elevate him, and into what wide fields of rapturous contemplation she will conduct him. Let him dutifully submit to her discipline, and make himself master of her methods, remembering always that the first step towards triumphant mastery must be obedient subjection; his reward shall be, not only an enlarged power of abstract reasoning, but a vastly increased capacity for intellectual enjoyment. Let him know that if, in his youth, he will be simply faithful to this science, patient, tractable, diligent, she will do for the eyes of his mind just what one of her daughter sciences does for bodily vision, by her telescopic and microscopic lenses. She will make the boundary of the field of vision indefinitely recede, and she will bring into view ten thousand various forms of beauty and of life, too minute for perception by the unaided organ. She will not only aid his business, and his labor, and his acquisition of solid knowledge, but she will cheer his life by her joyous companionship; she will walk with him over all the fields of nature, and through all the galleries of art, and along all the paths of labor; and her frequent suggestions, and the continual application of her lessons will lighten his labor, will heighten his appreciation of every beauty, and will steadily deepen the tide of his enjoyment.

III. *Moral Culture.*—It is not an accident, nor a blunder, whereby we have transferred the terms of mathematics into the language of ethics. We speak of a right action as intelligibly as of a right line or angle; of an upright man as of an upright column. As often as we speak of moral rectitude, of a line of conduct, of a rule of action, of square business transactions, or of "crooked whiskey;" as often as we call sinning a fall, and tendencies toward it inclinations, and steadfast virtue up-

rightness, we illustrate the affinity of mathematical with ethical truths, in virtue of which the same terms are equally expressive of both.

Not to insist too far upon these etymological analogies, it is an essential consideration, that the careful and scrupulous habits of thought which mathematical study requires and cultivates is equally necessary to right moral culture.

The youth who patiently forms his mind to habits of scrupulous accuracy in mathematical studies, who constantly and patiently strives to conduct mathematical processes with perfect accuracy—we will not say that he can thereby gain the essence of virtue, but we do say that he is thereby learning the method of virtue, and is forming habits most helpful to the practice of virtue.

Admirably is this illustrated by the authentic biography of Washington. Few books had he in his youth, few teachers, and scanty school privileges. But his was a youth of diligent, faithful, successful study. The records of his mathematical studies have been preserved, and are among the most interesting memorials of him.

Looking over his copy-books, observing their scrupulous neatness and pains-taking accuracy, seeing how he was training himself to rigid correctness, attentively considering the plots of his surveys, the distinct setting forth of the elements of all his computations, and the full and clear presentation of all his processes, in all their unimpeachable accuracy, who does not perceive a real and beautiful correspondence between that faithful and conscientious self-discipline of the boy and the Aristidean integrity of the man?

A youth who despises such pains-taking accuracy and carefulness, may achieve some sort of success, but the blunders and the blots in his life will be apt to bear a pretty accurate ratio to those in his copy-books. He may become a brilliant man, but not a reliable one. Men may admire him, but they will not trust him.

Now, after all, what human tribute is it so good to receive as, that one's neighbors and his country should show that they have no interests too precious or too sacred to be entrusted to his care? Nay, what divine tribute is more blessed than this—"Thou hast been *faithful*?"

IV. *Religious Culture.*—No other mental exercises are better fitted than the mathematical to prepare the mind for the most worthy views of God. Who else can so intelligently consider the "heavens the work of God's fingers," as he who can carry his reliable measurements into them; can accurately survey their mighty spaces; can calculate the distance and size and weight of the heavenly bodies; their motions also, and the dimensions of their orbits, and the periods of their revolutions?

"The undevout astronomer is mad." Mathematical science enables us to attain views of God at once the most grand and the most sober, the best fitted to stir the mind to its utmost depths, and to tranquilize it with the deepest solemnity.

Religion evermore looks toward and into eternity. Now, by mathematics we cannot indeed compute infinity of duration any more than by mathematics we can measure infinity of space, or estimate infinity of power. But this science which teaches us how to compute all that is computable, and to measure all that is measurable, does surely best prepare us rightly to regard all that lies beyond its reach. In the very processes of measuring the fields of time, it brings us to the best positions from which to look out upon that ocean whose further shore its best instruments do not enable us to see—which really has no further shore.

We have referred to a Scotchman of the last generation, eminent in both mathematics and theology, even more eminent in practical Christian philanthropy. We recall a scene in the Scottish General Assembly, in which in the ripeness of his powers and of his piety, he found occasion to repudiate a pamphlet which he himself had written in his early days of superficial religious thought, and of secular ambition. Adverting to his ambitious pursuit of mathematics and his low estimate of the work of a pastor, he exclaimed—"What, Sir, is the object of mathematical science? Magnitude, and the proportions of magnitude. But then, Sir, I had forgotten two magnitudes. I thought not of the littleness of time; I recklessly thought not of the greatness of eternity."

Never surely did Chalmers more truly honor mathematical science than when he thus illustrated the vigor and decisiveness of thought which it had given him, in so eloquently rebuking his own foolish preferring of the earthly to the heavenly, the temporal to the eternal.

Nor were his mathematical discipline and habits of thought of less value in the masterly plans of philanthropic and religious enterprise which filled his life, and which he bequeathed as a rich legacy to Scotland and to the Christian world.

In the contemplation of God, in the computations of eternity, in the solemn estimate of the great concerns of our immortality, mathematical science presumes not to apply her demonstrations, for they cannot reach infinity. But if we have been faithful and docile pupils, we shall find that she has led us to most advantageous positions, and formed us to a valuable capacity for such high contemplations, and such solemn estimates.

In whatever aspect we view the effect of mathematical studies in the training of the mind, we see that their claim to an eminent place in our educational system is amply vindicated.

There is doubtless a possibility of injuring the mind by too exclusive devotion to this class of studies. The demonstrations of mathematics cannot be carried through the spheres of ethical and political reasoning, nor can they always be applied to questions of practical business. We need not overlook the distinction between mathematical demonstration and moral evidence. If one should exercise himself only in the former, he might be feeble in the latter. You cannot always carry a compass and theodolite with you and regulate all your steps by them along all the crowded and hurried paths of real life. But in this practical America there is not much danger of this. There is not much danger of our over-estimating the power which a character derives from that punctuality, accuracy, reliability—that habit of insisting on being right—scrupulously and reliably right—which the faithful study of mathematics so finely cultivates.

Fain would we cheer on the young in the manly toil of climbing these rugged heights by the assurance that on their summits one breathes the most bracing air, and looks abroad on the most magnificent scenery, and up through the clearest atmosphere, into the most glorious skies. Neither is there any sphere of practical labor in which one may not thankfully use the vigor of limb and valor of spirit which the mountain air and mountain scenery and manly exercise will have imparted.

ARTICLE II.—EUROPEAN WRITERS ON INDIA.

THERE is an evident increase in the number of scholars who are interested in studies on India; not only of those who acquire a little knowledge of Sanskrit as preliminary to general studies in language, but of those who are drawn into more extensive researches by the great and rapidly disclosed problems suggested by a survey of this ancient and singular civilization. Such students are often, at the outset, perplexed to know where to look for the most trustworthy authorities, especially if they have not the good fortune to reside near large libraries, or to have the advice of those scholars—few in this country—who have traversed the ground before them. It has occurred to the writer that a brief mention of the standard authorities, in European languages, on Indian topics, might be of service to such special students, as well as to that larger class of cultivated men and women who desire to be well informed in regard to subjects which are coming more and more into the thought of the western world.

The literature which has accumulated in this field during the last thirty years is voluminous and diversified. The necessarily tedious but cumulative labors of explorers in such a vast territory are beginning to bear abundant fruit, and the student of to-day is provided with helps which would have gladdened the heart of pioneers like Jones and Rosen and Colebrooke. No pretense will be made of a complete survey, and only such authorities will be named as are of standard value, and may profitably form the foundation of an Indian library. The list will be most profitably arranged under topics, though it may involve repeated reference to some books.

1. *Physical and Political Geography*.—There is no lack of brief general descriptions of India, or of more minute examinations of limited areas, but we have as yet no work which traverses the whole field with the thoroughness which the subject deserves. The best general survey of the configuration and productions of the land, one sufficiently complete for the general student, is by Professor Lassen, in the first volume of his *Indische Alterthumskunde*, 2d edition.

The *Geography of India*, with notes on commercial, civil, and social conditions, by George Duncan, Madras, 1870, is a little book of 171 pages, which contains in a nut-shell a great amount of information corrected up to date. The *Ancient Geography of India*, illustrated by thirteen maps, by the eminent archaeologist Alexander Cunningham, is a valuable representation of India as it was seen by Alexander, and later by the Chinese pilgrims. The topographical and other surveys now in progress will in time furnish the materials for a more exhaustive treatment of this subject.

Such special works as Hardwicke and Gray's *Indian Zoology*, two vols., Donovan's *Insects of India*, Jerdon's *Mammals*, and Day's *Fishes of India*, are beyond the needs, as they are beyond the reach, of most students. The most complete map of ancient India is that which accompanies Prof. Lassen's work, size $28\frac{1}{2} \times 28\frac{1}{2}$ inches. As this map was drawn in 1858, and was the first serious attempt to definitely fix the localities mentioned in the ancient literature of India as well as by Greek and Roman writers, some of the identifications were tentative, and have not in all cases been confirmed by later researches. A smaller and less ambitious map, by Col. Yule, is found in Dr. Smith's *Historical Atlas*. An excellent map of modern India is that in Stieler's *Hand-Atlas*.

2. *Ethnology*.—The proper ethnic classification of the population of India, and the degree of relationship in which the different constituents stand to one another and to foreign nations, are the great puzzles of our inquiries. Even now many of the aboriginal tribes are so little known as to make conjectures concerning their affiliations exceedingly hazardous.

The best general discussion of this subject is found in the first volume of Lassen's work mentioned above. The second volume of Dr. Muir's *Original Sanskrit Texts* is devoted to an investigation of the ethnic affinities of the Aryans of Northern India, and shows convincingly their relationship to the great civilized nations of Europe. We may here say that Dr. Muir's work is a model for such investigations. The author is exhaustive in his collection of facts, clear in his arrangement of them, and judicial in his decisions. Five volumes have been published, four of which have passed into a second, revised and enlarged edition.

As we have already intimated, the inaccessible jungles of Central India and the excessive shyness of their primitive inhabitants have hitherto made it difficult to obtain exact information regarding this part of the Indian people. Much has been learned from missionaries, and something from adventurous travelers, though the hasty observations of the latter are not always to be trusted. Col. E. T. Dalton's elaborate and costly book, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, concerns not only the population of that province but of all India, since Bengal has been the "common camping ground" of the various races which have successively found a home in the land. What is known of the Santals, one of the most interesting of these primitive tribes, may be found in Dr. Hunter's *Annals of Rural Bengal*. The Dravidian population of the southern peninsula, usually classed with these tribes as aboriginal, is discussed at length in the Introduction and Appendix of Dr. Caldwell's *Dravidian Grammar*. Hodgson's *Aborigines of Nepal* is also valuable.

8. *Languages*.—Of the two chief divisions of Indian speech, Aryan and Dravidian, an excellent survey of the different periods of the former will be found in the second volume of Muir's *Texts*. It is not our intention to speak of text-books for studying Sanskrit, as that has been done already, a year or two since, by Prof. W. D. Whitney, in communications to the *College Courant*. We may mention, however, Delbrück's *Das altindische Verbum*, a valuable work in which are found an enumeration and brief discussion of the forms of the verb occurring in the Rig-Veda. The same author has published a *Vedic Chrestomathy*, but the accompanying notes are so brief as to afford little help to the learner. Within a few months the St. Petersburg lexicon and Grassmann's special glossary to the Rig-Veda have been completed, which will greatly facilitate the reading of that ancient text. Ernst W. A. Kuhn has recently published our best grammar of Pali, the sacred language of Buddhism and the oldest recorded popular dialect which grew out of the Vedic Sanskrit. Prof. Cowell's *Short Introduction to Prākṛit*, a later descendant in the same line, is a sufficient guide to the understanding of the vulgar dialect of the plays. Coming down to the present time, Mr. John Beames has attempted, with excellent success, to collect and reduce to

system the facts of the popular speech in his *Comparative Grammar of the Modern Aryan Languages of India*. The two volumes already published treat of phonetics, and the noun and pronoun, and are to be succeeded by a third, devoted to the verb, &c.

The speech of Southern India has been discussed with great ability and learning by Dr. Caldwell in his *Grammar of the Dravidian Languages*. A second edition of this great work, revised and enlarged, has been published within a year. A brief survey of all the languages of India, with a map showing their geographical relations, may be found in Mr. Beames' *Indian Philology*, a little book of ninety-six pages.

4. *Literature*.—We may roughly divide Indian literature into three periods, ancient, mediæval, and modern. The modern Aryan literature, beginning about the 12th century, is described in the introduction to Mr. Beames' *Comparative Grammar*. The literary productions of the Dravidians are considered in Dr. Caldwell's book. We may here notice an entertaining book by Mr. Gover, the *Folk-Songs of Southern India*. In the same book an attempt is made to prove the Sanskrit origin of the Dravidian tongues, but with poor success.

An extended notice of the first two periods of Aryan literature by competent writers may be found in Lassen's great work, Weber's *Indische Literaturgeschichte*, Mrs. Manning's *Ancient and Mediæval India*, and Monier Williams's *Indian Wisdom*. The best description of the Vedas and the literature inspired by them is the *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, by Max Müller. The student may also profitably consult Colebrooke's *Essay on the Vedas*, annotated by Prof. Whitney, as also the latter's account of the same in his *Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, vol. 1. We may say here that Colebrooke's *Essays*, in two volumes, edited by Prof. Cowell, and his *Life*, written by his son, are by no means out of date, though that illustrious scholar has been dead nearly forty years. While much has been added to our knowledge of India since his time, no later scholars have surpassed and few have equalled him in thoroughness of investigation and candor of judgment.

The third volume of Muir's *Texts* is devoted to Hindu accounts of the origin and authority of the Vedas. An excellent survey of the dramatic and Puranic literature, together with

much other miscellaneous matter, may be found in H. H. Wilson's *Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus*, and in the other volumes of his works, edited by Dr. Rost and Fitzedward Hall.

5. *Religions*.—The best general account, brought down to the present time, of the religious systems which have prevailed in India is by Paul Wurm, Basle, 1874. Another excellent survey is found in Archdeacon Hardwick's *Christ and other Masters*. The reader has there the opportunity of a convenient comparison of the Indian religions with the other great religions of the world. In the fourth volume of his *Texts*, Dr. Muir compares the Vedic with the later representations of the principal Indian deities, and in the last volume portrays at length the Vedic religion. The same eminent scholar has also published a small collection of *Religious and Moral Sentiments from Sanskrit Writers*. Colebrooke's essays on the *Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus*, and on the *Indian Sectaries* are valuable contributions to our knowledge. Among special works on Buddhism perhaps the writings of Spence Hardy are the highest authority. For an account of the superstitions of the aborigines, Hunter's *Annals of Rural Bengal* and Fergusson's *Tree and Serpent Worship*, may be consulted.

6. *Philosophy*.—Indian philosophy is so closely connected with religion that a discussion of one in some degree involves the other. The earliest penetrating analysis of the six philosophical systems was by Colebrooke, and will be found among his *Essays*. The *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, by K. M. Banerjea, is designed chiefly for use in India, and puts in a clear light the absurd and contradictory speculations of the philosophers. Nilakantha's *Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophy*, translated and extended by F. Hall, is another work of the same class, and one of the best existing introductions to the subject. The survey of Hindu philosophy in Mrs. Manning's book is clear and compiled from the best authorities.

7. *Political History*.—The political history of India naturally falls into three periods—the Hindu, the Mohammedan, and the English—which, however, overlap somewhat, since foreign rule was but gradually extended over the country. The native chronicles of the Hindu period are mostly legendary, and

genuine history can be constructed only by piecemeal from scattered notices in native and foreign literature, from inscriptions on monuments, copper-plates, and coins. The greatest credit for performing this difficult, and to most men hopeless task, will always belong to Prof. Christian Lassen. His great work, already alluded to, in four bulky volumes, is a noble monument to his broad, acute, and persevering scholarship. The results of later researches will doubtless make it necessary to modify some of his conclusions, but his great services to India in the resurrection of her buried history will not soon be forgotten. The first and second volumes have been revised and improved by the author.

Of the second period we have not only the European but Mohammedan historians. The large *History of India as told by its own Historians*, by the late Sir H. M. Elliott, edited and continued by Prof. John Dawson, is a work which draws many of its materials from the chronicles of the Mogul emperors. The sixth volume was published last year. Another standard work is the *History of India* by Mountstuart Elphinstone, who for many years held high official positions in India. Though the history professedly covers the first two periods, the author devotes less than half of his book to the times of Hindu dominion, and, avoiding hazardous speculations, confines himself to the recital of ascertained facts. The original work was published more than thirty years ago, but in 1866 the fifth edition appeared with notes and additions by Prof. Cowell. There is no lack of writers on the English dominion in India, or on particular administrations. The most elaborate and widely known review of this period is Mill's *History of British India*, in ten volumes, edited and continued by H. H. Wilson. The original work, though marked by striking merits, was marred by serious defects. The author, having never resided in India, was sometimes led into error by an inability to criticize his authorities. His judgment was also warped by an inveterate prejudice against the Hindus. A more recent and reliable work is the *History of India*, in three volumes, by J. C. Marshman. The author devotes but a few pages to ancient India, and hastens on to the advent of the English. The history is brought down to the close of Lord Dalhousie's administration in 1857. The

History of the Marattas, by James Grant Duff is a full account of the rise of that power, which threatened at one time to give the law to all India. In Spruner's historical atlas will be found ten maps, which convey to the eye the changing political complexion of India from the second century B. C., down to the present time.

8. *Caste*.—The two best authorities on *caste* are the first volume of Muir's *Texts*, and Rev. M. A. Sherring's *Tribes and Castes of the Hindus*. In the former are collected all the statements found in Sanskrit literature throwing light on the origin and character of this institution; and in the latter is described the present condition of the system with its almost infinite subdivisions. The different *castes* are also described in Sir H. M. Elliot's *Races of the N. W. Provinces of India*, 2 vols., edited by John Beames. This work contains a great amount of information arranged under the four heads: *caste*; customs, rites, and superstitions; revenue and official terms; rural life.

9. *Architecture*.—Though the Hindus have never rivaled the Greeks in beautiful temples, they have produced much which is deserving of study. An interesting chapter on this subject is found in the first volume of Mrs. Manning's book. The fullest treatment of the subject is in Fergusson's *Tree and Serpent Worship*, and in a just-published volume of his *History of Architecture*.

10. *Manners and Customs*.—An old but standard book is *Character, Manners, and Customs of the People of India*, from the French of Abbé Dubois, 1817. Much may be learned of life in Vedic times from the fifth volume of Muir's *Texts*. Rousselet's *India and its Native Princes*, issued in sumptuous style by Scribner, is a valuable but costly contribution to the same subject. India as it appeared to the Greeks may be learned from the fragments of Megasthenes' history, edited by Schwanbeck.

11. *Famines*.—The terrible sufferings which the people of some districts of India experience from famine, at short intervals, invest this subject with more than a local interest. A short account of the worst of these famines, with some suggestions for their prevention or mitigation, has been published by Charles Blair of the Indian engineer service. London, 1874.

A lecture *On the Impending Bengal Famine*, illustrated by colored maps of the afflicted districts, by the eminent civilian and philanthropist Sir Bartle Frere, throws much light upon the causes of famines and upon the administrative measures by which they may be prevented. Vivid pictures of some of these terrible visitations are drawn by Dr. Hunter in his *Rural Bengal and Orissa*.

12. *Missions*.—The efforts of Protestant missionaries for more than a century and a half to convert the Hindus form an instructive chapter of Indian history. By far the most reliable and comprehensive account of their operations is in the book recently published by Rev. M. A. Sherring: *The History of Protestant Missions in India*. Dr. Rufus Anderson's account of the missions of the American Board in India is well known.

13. *Cyclopædias*.—We do not possess any work of this description relating exclusively to India which is perfectly satisfactory. Balfour's *Cyclopædia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia* is a valuable work in seven volumes, costing about forty dollars. Garrett's *Classical Dictionary of India*, with a supplement published later, is a much smaller work, and possesses only inconsiderable merit, while sharing inaccuracies in detail, hardly to be avoided where one man attempts single-handed to compass so vast a field.

14. *Periodicals*.—The *Indische Studien*, edited by Prof. A. Weber, of Berlin, and issued in Parts at irregular intervals, contains elaborate papers on Indian Philology, prepared generally by the editor. The *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, of Bengal, is a great storehouse of information on India. It is issued in eight numbers yearly, at four shillings per number. Many valuable papers have appeared in the *Calcutta Review*, published quarterly. The proprietor has proposed to extract the most valuable articles from the whole series and republish them separately in from six to ten volumes, which will make it accessible to all scholars. The *Indian Antiquary* is a monthly journal, edited by James Burgess, Bombay. It contains papers by the most eminent scholars of India, native and European, on archæology, history, languages, religion, folklore, &c. The subscription price is two pounds sterling, exclusive of postage. It has just begun its fifth volume. The *Indian Evangelical Review*

is a quarterly journal of missionary effort, edited by Rev. C. W. Park, Bombay. It is now in its third year, and has thus far been conducted with marked ability. Its fearless defense of the truth against the semi-atheism of a large part of the Indian press, its catholic spirit and the scholarly character of its discussions, commend it to all friends of India. The subscription price is \$3.50, including postage.

As we said at the outset, our list might be indefinitely increased, but it would swell this notice beyond reasonable limits, and perplex the student by an *embarras de richesses*. It might have been useful if we had added the prices to the books noticed, but we have not the necessary memoranda. It may be safely assumed that all books relating to India are sufficiently expensive by the time they reach America; but we suppose that all students who enter upon these studies have first counted the cost. It is a common experience that those investigations which lie outside of and above the daily wants of men bring scanty return in dollars and cents, and not seldom in fame. But we can assure the scholar that if he enters upon these intellectual conquests, burning his ships behind him, and seeking for truth with single-hearted zeal, he will at least have the satisfaction of contributing his share toward the solution of the vast and many-sided problem of human development.

ARTICLE III.—CONDILLAC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY.

Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances Humanes. 2 vols. 12mo. Amsterdam, 1746.

Traité des Systèmes. 1 vol. 12mo. La Haye. 1749.

Traité des Sensations. 2 vols. 12mo. Londres, 1754.

Traité des Animaux. 1 vol. 12mo. Amsterdam, 1755.

Cours d'Etude pour l'Instruction du Prince de Parme. 16 vols. 8vo. Parme, 1776.

Cours de Philosophie ou Logique Complete de Condillac. Par R. NOËL. 1 vol. 8vo. Paris, 1821.

I.

IN a former Article, we gave certain reasons for suspecting that what we may call the Identical, or better perhaps the Analytical, Philosophy of Mr. George Henry Lewes had been invented somewhat hurriedly as a corrective for Mr. Herbert Spencer's Synthetical Philosophy. Nothing *prima fronte* could be more unlike the universe of Mr. Spencer than Mr. Lewes's universe, and on closer inspection the unlikeness appears to be painstaking and specific contrariety. Instead of the Vacuum strewn with Atoms imported into modern science by Bacon and Gassendi, we have the Plenum of Descartes which has hardly figured hitherto beyond metaphysics; instead of the antagonistic forces, or the dual force, of attraction and repulsion which have yielded the contrasted phenomena, animate and inanimate, physical and mental, of Evolution, we have the differentiations of universal pressure; and instead of the ultimate antitheses of formal and material causes, of properties and substance, of phenomena and the Absolute which the duality of force compels us to recognize, or to assume, we have the resolution of all differences whatsoever, near or far, obvious or

occult into the differing aspects of the Plenum, an assemblage of co-existences which are only varying sides of the same thing, a series of effects which are but the procession of their causes, a world in short in which anything differs from anything else only as its relations differ. If each of these conceptions had been worked out with thorough intelligence, sincerity, and courage, the Transfigured Realism of Mr. Spencer would have developed into a Rational system of Dualism, Substantialism, and Theism; the Reasoned Realism of Mr. Lewes into an Empirical system of Monism, Idealism, and Nihilism; as wide a divergence and as perfect an opposition as the limits of sane thinking admit.

Yet the materials of both these reciprocally destructive cosmologies are the same, or are supposed by their authors to be the same. What differs is the manipulation of the materials. The facts of experience which Mr. Spencer distributes after one fashion Mr. Lewes distributes after another, and the contrast between the total results arises in the contrast between the fundamental principles of certitude by which the two distributions have been guided. Mr. Spencer's principle is this, that any proposition must be taken as certainly true whose negation is inconceivable. If we can get the criterion of a negation which the mind is wholly unable to entertain (as that force does not persist) we have got in the corresponding affirmation a sure truth (force is persistent). Pressed for a justification of this "universal postulate," Mr. Spencer explains that it is a necessary result of experience which in the long course of evolution has made it impossible for the mind to think otherwise than so and so. You may if you choose raise the question whether thinking so and so is trustworthy thinking, whether the things you necessarily think are also necessarily true things, but your skepticism is wholly speculative and futile for meanwhile you must go on thinking those things which experience compels you to think by having made their negations impossible. Now, as Mr. Mill has been at much pains to point out, all the more important propositions supplied by experience are, according to the celebrated distinction of Kant, *synthetical*, that is, propositions in which the predicate affirms something of the subject which is not already contained in the subject itself.

Thus, experience supplies the proposition that a trilateral, or this trilateral, is triangular. Triangularity is a wholly different thing from trilaterality, and to say that a trilateral is triangular is much more than saying a trilateral is trilateral; in other words it is a synthetical (or ampliative) proposition which adds to our information instead of an analytical (or identical, or explicative) proposition which merely defines or describes, or develops what we knew before. So experience furnishes the propositions that unimpeded bodies tend to each other with a force directly as the masses and inversely as the squares of the distances; that one part of hydrogen tends to unite with eight parts of oxygen to form one part of water, that certain compounds of nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon manifest vital phenomena, that of these some manifest the phenomena of animal life, that some of these manifest reason; and so throughout the realm of nature. These and the like are all synthetical propositions, which increase our information, in which the contents of the predicate are a positive addition to the contents of the subject. For Mr. Mill, knowledge and science are nothing but the perfecting of this kind of information, the patient and careful interrogation of nature to find out what predicates she joins with what subjects, and if in these junctions, or juxtapositions there is any discoverable order and law. He disdains the idea that we can get beyond our experience of her, or add anything of our own to what she is good enough to tell us of herself; that we have any potencies or impotencies of thought which assure us (not only of what she actually does but) of what she must do everywhere and forever. Hence his undisguised impatience with the dogmatism of science, the interpolation among the processes of nature of agents or factors (such as the ætherial medium) which she does not confess to in plain terms herself, and the extension of generalizations (such as universal evolution) beyond the bounds of all possible observation. Nobody saw more clearly than Mr. Mill that much of what is called Experimental Science is rank rationalism, the bold realization of our own abstractions, the imposition upon nature of our own necessities of thought or

the limitation of her by our own inability to think.* For if among the synthetical propositions which make up our real knowledge there are any which are known by us to be true not only in this or that case but of necessity and therefore universally, then evidently we have got hold of truths which it is not in the competence of experience to furnish, the truths first distinctly defined by Kant as transcendental *à priori* synthetical cognitions of pure reason. That space has three dimensions is a synthetical *à posteriori* proposition which we know to be true within the range of our telescopes, but that all space is of three dimensions is a synthetical *à priori* proposition which can only be known to be true by some faculty wholly above experience. Such propositions abound, according to Kant, in logic, mathematics, and morality. Precisely such, in spite of his ingenious disclaimers, are the propositions which his universal postulate commits Mr. Spencer to and out of which he has constructed his system of things. The whole theory of necessary universal evolution is perhaps the most surprising paradox and the most unfortunate *faux-pas* in modern philosophy, and we can only explain it by supposing that Mr. Spencer's familiarity with positive science is out of proportion to his knowledge of metaphysics and so, that, like Prof. Tyndall, he is unaware of the metaphysical implications which infest nearly all the great sci-

* Mr. Mill's qualified but very positive doctrine of idealism and nihilism was therefore a singular inconsistency, for there is as much temerity in denying as in affirming an unknown predicate (substance) of a known subject (phenomena). In Mr. Mill's case there was more, for the phenomena of memory which so puzzled him are puzzling because, like the dualism of force, they point to the very thing he denied.

The *Nation* (No. 534) thinks that philosophy lost in the late Mr. Chauncey Wright a thinker who but for indolence and want of ambition had it in him "to have brought the work of Mill and Bain for the present to a conclusion." If by Mr. Mill's work we are to understand so much of it as was faithful to his empirical principle it will be concluded by the man who completes the exploration of nature, who discovers the last predicate she joins to her last subject. If Mr. Wright could have done that his indolence was a deplorable thing. If we are to understand Mr. Mill's metempiricism (as it appears from the *Nation* that we are) then his work can be brought to a conclusion only by turning his qualified into absolute idealism and nihilism, that is by the reduction of his inconsistencies *ad absurdum*. Mr. Wright could certainly have performed this feat in half an hour by the clock, yet it is easy to understand the sort of indolence which prevented him from doing it.

entific abstractions and generalizations. In his devotion to the cause of the universe Mr. Spencer has gone down like Quintus Curtius with all the panoply of Empiricism upon him into the gulf of Transcendental Rationalism.

Mr. Lewes, as it happens, is a thinker who has studied, and for that matter written the history of philosophy before attempting to philosophize on any large scale himself. It was not to be expected therefore that he would follow Mr. Spencer into the abyss along with Dr. Tyndall, Prof. Fiske, and the gentlemen who write for the *Popular Science Monthly*. Synthetic extensions of knowledge which anticipate and outrun all possible experience, which ascertain the revolutions of the Cosmos from the little vicissitudes of a single consciousness, leaping from feeling to motion, from motion to matter, from matter to force, from the manifestations of all these to the necessary persistencies and the absolute reality underlying them are pardonable in one who believes, like Descartes, in the original infallibility and the divine guarantees of his own reason, but not in another who resolves reason into a late and minute product of the very evolution he is giving an account of. What might have been expected beforehand was that Mr. Lewes, warned by the catastrophe, would have gone back from the ambitious syntheses of Mr. Spencer to the modest ones of Mr. Mill. Unluckily Mr. Mill was in trouble himself; for, in the first place, his diffident and circumspect appeal to experience involved a distinct condemnation of all the larger proposals of Experimental Science and a final renunciation of that cosmology which is the standing proposal of Speculative Philosophy. Not only did it turn Dr. Tyndall's certitudes into guesswork and Mr. Spencer's universal postulate into assumption, but it said once for all, the universe which you can't reach with eye or ear or hand is past your finding out, and save for the dreams of faith and the fervors of devotion it must be left alone. Mr. Lewes could by no means consent to this for he held to the ancient tradition and was persuaded that what Descartes and Gassendi, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Spencer had attempted it was in him to do, "to furnish a Doctrine embracing the World, Man, and Society in one homogeneous method;" so that Mr. Mill was perhaps the one thinker at whose feet it was impos-

sible for him to sit. In the second place Mr. Mill had not only rebuked in this was the pretensions of all contemporary science and philosophy but had himself most manifestly broken down among the seeming simplicities of that very experience whose interpretation he thought philosophy might venture to undertake. For one thing he was forced to confess, which he did with characteristic candor, that the principle of Association of Ideas which had carried him safely through the superficial operations of the mind failed with the fundamental faculty, or fact, of Memory, a mystery which he turned over in despair to future speculation. But as memory is implicated in all perceptions and all reasonings the mystery turned over was really nothing less than the materials of his entire philosophy. It was, however, precisely in the region of Associated Ideas where he felt himself secure that ruin overtook him, for the very light thrown among the phenomena of feeling and thought by his masterly expositions only made it more apparent than ever that their real foundations were still out of sight, that the superficial strata deposited by experience are moulded from beneath and pierced in every direction by the rugged granite of intuitions anterior to all possible association of ideas. There are most certainly things, not only necessarily believed by all men to be true (the necessary, universal truths of Mr. Spencer) but which we know *are* true everywhere and forever (the necessary, universal truths of Rationalism). We do know beyond any peradventure, and if that were possible all the more certainly for Mr. Mill's counter-argument, that the shortest distance between any two points is a straight line, that all trilaterals are triangular, that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, that cruelty is base, that justice is due to all. These propositions are necessarily and universally true. If they are at the same time *synthetical* propositions, if the things affirmed "(triangularity," "baseness)" are exterior and additional to the things of which they are affirmed "(trilateral," "cruelty)" then we have got an extension of knowledge which experience never gave nor can give, belonging to the primeval granite and not to the sedimentary formations of the mind, whether the thin alluvium of experience as Mr. Mill describes it, or the ancient strata of ancestral experience which figure in Mr. Spencer's Theory of Evolution.

The *Problems of Life and Mind* is the distinct confession of Empiricism that the controversy over the question as originally formulated is closed and that the field of battle must be abandoned to the Rationalists. The news of the evacuation never reached Mr. Mill who fell where he fought, like Marmion, and the followers of Mr. Spencer are still serving their guns with all the enthusiasm of victory ; but Mr. Lewes, who understands the theory and history of war, knows perfectly well that the battle is over. He is, however, confident that there is still time to win another and with the promptitude of a veteran he has executed a change of front which completely alters the situation. Kant he declares to have been in the right as against the Empiricists in holding that the mind has cognitions of necessary, universal truths ; Mill and Spencer to be right as against the Rationalists in holding that all cognitions are supplied by experience ; but both to be wrong in holding that any of our cognitions are synthetical. Experience alone teaches us that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, that cruelty is base ; but this intuition of the particular, contingent fact carries with it the intuition of the universal necessary truth—we know that a straight line *must* be the shortest distance between two points, that cruelty *must* be base. And why? for the perfectly simple reason that these are all analytical truths and the pure form of their expression an identical proposition. What we mean by "straight line" is exactly what we mean by "shortest distance," what we mean by "trilateral" exactly what we mean by "triangular," what we mean by "cruelty" exactly what we mean by "base;" so that all we have affirmed is this, that the same is the same, or that whatever is, is, and the slightest experience is as competent for that affirmation as "pure reason" or any other transcendental faculty of the soul.

Mr. Lewes therefore resumes the engagement with artillery and ammunition captured from the enemy ; more than this, with happy audacity he carries the war into the enemy's country. He has appropriated the whole fund of necessary truths under the plea that they belong to him as identical truths supplied by experience ; and he has promised a cosmology as comprehensive as Mr. Spencer's on the assumption that such truths are sufficient to explain the universe. Now, as it hap-

pens, this identical manoeuvre (if a pun is permissible in so serious a discussion) has been executed at least once before in modern philosophy, and an examination of the earlier experiment, besides being of interest to any one who cares for historical connection, may prepare us for the examination of Mr. Lewes's two postulates (that all our cognitions are reducible to the form of identical propositions; and that identical propositions can yield a theory of the universe).

II.

In the year 1629 Descartes, goaded by the perplexities born of much study and vast experience of men and life, retired to Holland, to see whether in the midst of Dutch security and tranquility he could not find some solid interior ground of assured knowledge and reasonable faith. The very doubt which had carried Bacon out of doors to the observation and interrogation of nature drove Descartes into solitude and self-inspection; and, although such generalizations are always to be taken loosely, it may be said that Modern Philosophy was born of the meditations of Descartes as Modern Science of the experiments of Bacon. Having put aside with unflinching skepticism, item by item, the entire universe with which his great compeer had been busy, the one absolute certainty which Descartes found left within him was this: *Cogito ergo sum*; *Je pense donc je suis*; I think therefore I am. An astonishing amount of irrelevant criticism has flourished over this famous dictum, all of which might have been saved by a little attention to Descartes' exposition and use of it. It is neither the flagrant *petitio principii* of some of the critics; nor the empty truism of others;* nor yet is it a storehouse of materials for building a philosophy, or a germ out of which a philosophy

* The idea that the *cogito ergo sum* begs the question is founded upon the misapprehension that it is an imperfect syllogism, the expression of a particular truth deduced from a universal already taken for granted ("But *ce qui pense est, on existe*"). Perhaps no one ever had a greater contempt for this sort of reasoning than Descartes, and to suppose him capable of it here in his *premier principe* is to misunderstand his entire philosophy, which is not a deduction from universals but an intuition of particulars. In the *Réponses aux Secondes Objections* he has explained with his usual distinctness that the fact of existence is not concluded from the fact of thought by the force of any syllogism but as a thing known of itself

may be developed. It is simply an absolute certainty and its value for further use is in this, that it may be expected to yield a *criterion* of certitude applicable to other ideas as well as to this one. "I then went on," says Descartes,* "to consider in general what it is that is requisite to a proposition in order to

and by simple inspection of consciousness.—(*Œuvres de Descartes*; publiées par Victor Cousin, I, 427.)

As for the second criticism the proposition is so far from being a truism that it covers the whole ground of the Nihilistic controversy; is an affirmation that the soul differs from its thoughts as substance from mode. "Descartes, says Sir Wm. Hamilton (*Metaphysics*, I, 155), at least as understood and followed by Malebranche and other of his disciples, made thought or consciousness convertible with the substance of the mind." Hobbes thought it necessary to instruct Descartes on this very point. "I, myself, who think, he says, am distinct from my thought; and although it is not separated from myself it is, nevertheless, different from me." To this Descartes replies: "Je ne nie pas que moi qui pense, ne sois distingué de ma pensée comme une chose l'est de son mode," (I, 475), and what he does not deny here he takes for granted everywhere else. If we are not in error, Hamilton's reading is founded upon a misconstruction of the distinction between substance and essence as they are defined by Descartes. "Substance" is the thing in itself, the substratum of all attributes, properties, phenomena; "essence" is that particular attribute which makes the thing what it is, which determines its nature as distinguished from the natures of other things. Thus with Descartes, the essential attribute, or essence, of the substance "mind" is thought, of the substance "matter" extension. So to-day we would say—it is the essence of matter to resist; but not—resistance is matter, a nihilistic proposition. The Cartesian distinction is exactly expressed by Spinoza in the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Definitions of the First Part of the *Ethica*:

"J'entends par *substance* ce qui est en soi et est conçu par soi—."

"J'entends par *attribut* ce que la raison conçoit dans la substance comme constituant son essence."

"J'entends par *mode* les affections de la substance . . ."

"J'entends par *Dieu* un être absolument infini, c'est-à-dire une substance constituée par une infinité d'attributs dont chacun exprime une essence éternelle et infinie."—(*Œuvres de Spinoza traduites par Emile Saisset*, III, 3.) Whence flows the pantheistic conclusion that there is only one substance, of whose infinite number of infinite essences all things are modes or manifestations."

On the whole our conclusion is that the *cogito ergo sum* which gives the criterion of truth is a synthetical proposition, the passage from the subject to a predicate wholly different from the subject, on the authority of an intuition of necessary truth. If it is really nothing but the paltry truism, A is A, it cannot provide a criterion that will avail us when we come to the tremendous synthetical propositions which affirm the existence of God and of the external world. So that the fate of Descartes' philosophy, which is the most daring and extensive synthetical philosophy produced hitherto, is involved in this question about his *premier principe*.

* *Œuvres de Descartes*, III, p. 90. *Principes de Philosophie*.

be certainly true; for having just found one which I knew to be so I thought I ought also to know in what this certitude consists. And having observed that there is nothing whatever in this *Je pense donc je suis*, which assures me I say the truth save only that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to be, I concluded that I could take for a general rule that things which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true things." The philosophy of Descartes is the application of this rule or test to the contents of consciousness; the gathering together of all ideas which, like the first one, are found to be "clear and distinct."

The criterion again has been as obnoxious to the critics as the *premier principe* or first idea from which it was obtained; for, on the one hand, it is affirmed that an idea may be clear and distinct yet not true; on the other, that what we take for a clear and distinct idea may in fact be obscure and confused. According to the sensationalists our "vivid" ideas are all impressions of sensible things, while the ideas furnished by memory and imagination to the reason are all "faint copies" of those vivid originals; so that what the Sensationalist declares to be clear and distinct Descartes declares to be doubtful or false, and what Descartes declares certainly true the Sensationalist declares obscure and confused. But here again we may easily escape the ambiguity in the description of the criterion by attending to the use made of it, for when Descartes talks of a clear and distinct idea, what is it in fact about the idea that is so? Not only the idea itself as an occupant among many more of consciousness (for to this extent any idea may be discriminated by careful attention from any other); but beyond this the absolute necessity the idea is under of being true. His trouble, remember, was doubt; his demand, certitude—the assurance that something *must* be true; so, he says, in the *Discours de la Méthode*, "I determined to make believe that all things whatsoever that had ever entered my mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I took notice that while attempting in this way to think that everything was false, it was *absolutely necessary* that I who was thinking so was myself something ("il falloit nécessairement

que moi qui le pensois fusse quelque chose").* So, in his demonstration of the existence of God, the second step in his philosophy, what he pronounces to be clear and distinct is not only the idea of God as it exists in the mind, but the necessity that so existing it is true.† So again in demonstrating the existence of the external world; and generally throughout his philosophy clear and distinct ideas are identified as necessarily true ideas. The argument is not that they are necessarily true because clear and distinct, or clear and distinct because necessarily true; but the necessary truth is the very thing which is clear and distinct. To complete the preparations for a philosophy it only remained to enquire the origin of these ideas. Having excluded as necessarily false the suppositions that they may have been received through the senses, or originated by the mind itself Descartes concludes that they are born and produced with the mind from the moment of its creation. So that the clear and distinct ideas first identified as necessarily true are finally identified as innate ideas.‡ Thus the firmament of

* I, 158. Compare the *Meditations* and the passage already quoted from the *Principes*—"je vois très clairement que pour penser il faut être" is what gives the criterion of clearness and distinctness.

† "Comme de ce qu'elle (la pensée) voit qu'il est nécessairement compris dans l'idée qu'elle a du triangle que ses trois angles soient égaux à deux droits, elle se persuade absolument que le triangle a les trois angles égaux à deux droits; de même, de cela seul qu'elle aperçoit que l'existence nécessaire et éternelle est comprise dans l'idée qu'elle a d'un être tout parfait, elle doit conclure que cet être tout parfait est ou existe." III, p. 72. Compare I, 160.

‡ I, 289. According to Sir Wm. Hamilton (*Metaph.* II, 351) the criterion by which the native may be discriminated from the adventitious elements of knowledge (the character of universality and necessity) was first explicitly proclaimed by Leibnitz. "It is true, Hamilton goes on, that previously to him Descartes all but enounced it. In the notes on the *Programma* of 1647 he has the following sentence: 'I wish that our author would inform me what is that corporeal motion which is able to form in our intellect any common notion . . . for all those motions are particular, but these notions are universal, having no affinity with motions, and holding no relation to them.' Now had he only added the term *necessary* to universal, he would have completely anticipated Leibnitz." This unfortunate statement is a particularly good example of the levity with which Sir William Hamilton read the history of philosophy and ought to have mitigated Mr. Mill's regret that he never took the trouble to write it. If the reader will have the goodness to turn to the passage cited (X, 96) he will see at once that so far is Descartes from assigning universality as the mark of innate ideas that on the very same page he declares that our ideas of *motions*,

human consciousness is filled with constellations of "ideas," lighted by the hand of God, certainly because necessarily true, and shining with a radiance so distinct and so clear that any man who knows how to open his eyes and to dissipate the clouds that come between will receive what wisdom is possible or needful for him. From this conception sprang the system of Descartes himself; the "Mysticism" of Malebranche;* the Pantheism of Spinoza; and more indirectly the Preestablished Harmony of Leibnitz.

The principal function of British Philosophy has always been to pooh-pooh the philosophies of the Continent, and here for the second time was an opportunity which some Englishman was sure to find irresistible. As the mediæval systems born in the intercourse of the German mind with the intelligence of antiquity drew the *Novum Organum* from Bacon, so the Cartesian cosmologies drew from Locke the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. With the instinct of a born critic Locke delivered his attack upon a position which Descartes had left in the background and seemingly uncovered. Without disputing the assumptions that we are in possession of clear, and distinct ideas, and that they are certainly and necessarily true he denied that any of them are innate. Defining *idea* as anything "whatever it is which the mind is employed

figures, colors, et toutes choses semblables are native to the mind (*sont naturellement en nous*); and so far is he from neglecting the character of necessity that two pages farther on he declares that the "sole consideration" of the idea of God (one of his two innate ideas *par excellence*) will show that it contains not only "une existence possible et contingente, mais bien une existence absolument nécessaire et actuelle." (p. 99.) But it is to be observed that by necessity Descartes means the necessity that objective realities must correspond to our ideas; by universality he means usually (for there are at least apparent exceptions) simply inductive generalization (*c'est le propre de notre esprit de former les propositions générales de la connoissance des particulières*," I, 427); whereas by necessity Hamilton means the subjective necessity we are under of thinking certain things to be true; and by universality the consequent agreement of all men in so thinking. How he could have expected to find any traces of this criterion in Descartes is beyond guessing. It is certain that Descartes would have branded it at once as a capitulation to skepticism.

* There could be no more perfect misnomer, for the theory of the Vision of all Things in God is a collection of "clear and distinct ideas." The same remark applies to the *Ethica* of the "God-intoxicated Spinoza," which is perhaps as emotional as plane geometry.

about in thinking" he had no difficulty in showing by simple attention to the terms of the proposition and direct appeal to facts that no idea exists until thought about or perceived, and that a vast deal of perceiving and thinking goes on before the "innate ideas" put in an appearance in the mind. Where then do they come from? From the fountain out of which flow all other ideas, "in a word from experience." But what is experience? Our observation employed about external sensible objects (i. e. Sensation), or, about the internal operations of our minds as acting upon sensations (i. e. Reflection). "These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." Then follows the well-known analysis of all ideas, including the splendid *idola* of which philosophers have built their systems, into products of experience, drops flowing into the reservoir of the Understanding from the two fountains of Sensation and Reflection. Such being the origin of ideas what is the nature of knowledge? "Nothing but the perception of connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas;" which resolves into the perceptions, I. of the relations between ideas, and II. of the real, or actual existence agreeing to any idea. Where the perception of Relation, or Real Existence is direct, without the intervention of mediate ideas, knowledge is intuitive and certain. "On this intuition depends all the certainty and evidence of our knowledge; which certainly everyone finds so great that he can't imagine, and therefore not require, a greater." Descartes' criterion of truth, then, was the clearness and distinctness of ideas, that is, the intuition accompanying them that the things they correspond to (e. g. the soul, God, the external world) must needs be. Locke's criterion is the intuition of the relations between ideas and of the real existence agreeing to them. Evidently the new criterion needs to be carefully discriminated from the old one or we shall have the whole cosmology involved in Descartes' innate ideas reappearing with Locke's perception of relation and real existence. By a very fortunate conjunction the last and the greatest of the Cartesians was a contemporary of the first and greatest of their critics;* and to the aphorism of the

* The first that is whose criticism told. Gassendi anticipated Locke upon nearly every important point of the *Essay*. See below, note p. 453.

Essay, nihil in intellectu quod non prius sit in sensu, Leibnitz replied with the amendment, *Nihil . . . nisi ipse intellectus*. It is granted that an idea is that which the mind is employed about in thinking and so cannot be found there until something has set the mind to think. There are no innate ideas of particular, contingent sensations, but only external objects fitted to produce, and internal faculties fitted to receive sensations and to reflect upon the operations involved in receiving them; there are no innate ideas of necessary truths but only an experience fitted to suggest and a faculty fitted to perceive them. What is innate is not the ideas but the faculties; what is transcendental and underived is not the cognitions but the conditions which ensure them.* As a matter of history this rejoinder had the effect of exactly defining the question in controversy and, subsequent philosophy so far as it has had continuity and coherence has been the working out of one or the other of the two alternatives submitted. In one direction the innate faculties as discriminated by Leibnitz were developed by Kant into the transcendental *a priori* conditions of all sensation and reflection and of all knowledge; the criterion of truth, defined by Descartes as the intuition of objective necessity, by Locke as the intuition of relation and real existence, being now defined as the impossibility of believing otherwise than we do, the *subjective* necessity we are under of thinking so and so. In the other direction, the faculties of the mind were decomposed by Condillac, as ideas had been before by Locke, into products of experience and all experience was traced back to the senses.

* This brings us to a misconception which has affected all subsequent philosophy. The truth is that the flank movement with which Leibnitz met the attack of Locke had been completely anticipated by Descartes himself. In his reply to the twelfth article of the placard, or *Programma* referred to by Hamilton he distinctly explains that by innate ideas he means nothing different from the faculty itself of thinking, and to say that the faculty is innate is exactly the same as saying that the ideas are; they are natural to the soul as certain diseases are to the body in this sense that we are born "avec la disposition ou la faculté de les contracter." (X. 93.) Although this document is in the first edition of the *Epistola* (1667) it is difficult to suppose that Locke could have seen it. Taken in connection with Descartes' contempt for the argument from universal consent and his doctrine of generalization by induction the effect of it is to convert the *Essay* into perhaps the most remarkable *ignoratio elenchis* in philosophical controversy. Descartes would certainly have laid the book down with the question—*à propos de quoi ?*

Ideas and Intellect, Cognitions and Faculties are alike Transformed Sensations; and the criterion of truth is the intuition of Identity, a criterion not only good as far as it goes but well able to go anywhere.*

III.

Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Abbé de Mureaux, was born at Grenoble in 1715, and died on his estate at Bangenci where he passed much of his life in 1780. This made him the contemporary of Hume, a somewhat older man (1711-1776), and of Kant who was somewhat younger (1724-1804).† He is usually described as the thinker who imported the doctrines of Locke into France and gave them the French stamp and continental circulation. Mr. Mill speaks of him with considerable scorn as a shallow person who had no room for the profundities of the system he was bringing over the channel, and Dugald Stewart accuses him specifically of misapprehending and misrepresenting the fundamental thing in it.‡ Locke derived all ideas from experience, but then he split experience into Reflection and Sensation. In Stewart's opinion this division while referring all ideas to experience withdrew the mind itself, the faculties of the mind, and the operations of the faculties, from sensation, so that the real doctrine of Locke is to be looked for in the amendment of Leibnitz rather than in the supposed version of Condillac. Sir Wm. Hamilton has replied to this with an equally elaborate argument going to show that Locke was perfectly understood by Condillac and suffered no other injury than the development of his own theory according to his own

* Locke had already distinguished the intuitions of Identity or Diversity and of Co-existence as the most important among the "perceptions of relation"; and Hume held that mathematical propositions are analytical. To complete the pedigree we may add that Condillac's criterion has reappeared in Mr. Lewes's *History of Philosophy* and *Problems of Life and Mind*; while Kant's has descended through Hamilton to Mr. Spencer. Both of them, the Kantian rather more ostentatiously than the other, lead into the abyss of necience and skepticism. So does all philosophy which goes beyond what we consider to have been the proposal of Descartes; that is, which undertakes to ascertain not only what we know but how and why we know it. And this is, and we believe was meant by Kant to be, the moral of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*.

† Locke died in 1704, Malebranche in 1715 the year Condillac was born, and Leibnitz in 1716.

‡ *Preliminary Dissertation, Encyc. Brit.*

principles, for his Reflection, or Self-consciousness which seems to open a new source of ideas is in fact only reflex-sensation, the water of the other fountain at second-hand.* So far as Locke is concerned the dispute is an interesting illustration of the ambiguity which underlies the apparent plain speaking of the *Essay* and which perhaps it is too late now for anybody to clear up. So far as Condillac is concerned it quite forgets that he is to be interpreted not only as the disciple of Locke but as a successor of Leibnitz and therefore as a thinker likely to have a position of his own somewhere between the two. Locke, says Condillac after a hearty eulogy of his merits, "missed a number of truths which it seems that he ought to have seized; and at times he becomes obscure and even inexact. So his analysis of the human understanding is imperfect. It did not occur to him to look for the generation of the operations of the mind; he did not see that they too come from sensation as well as our ideas, and that they are all only sensation transformed; he did not observe that evidence consists wholly in identity; and he did not know that the true principle of the art of thinking is the intimate association of ideas (*la plus grande liaison des idées*). He touched upon nearly all these discoveries; and he might have made them if he had treated his subject more methodically."† Condillac, therefore, neither misrepresented Locke as Stewart says, nor was he merely a faithful follower as Hamilton says. Starting from the principal doctrine of the *Essay* and from the retort of Leibnitz, he declared: I. that all our ideas, and all the faculties which receive, or form them, equally come from experience, which is nothing but sensation, or transformed sensation: II. that these identities of all the contents of consciousness yield the one principle of all evidence, which is Identity: and III. that the art of thinking consists in an association of ideas close enough to make this identity clear. These three discoveries are claimed by Condillac as his own, and we believe belong to him. If they do, his rank in philosophy is much more important than the one assigned to him by his English critics or even by his own school

* *Metaphysics*, II, 195.

† *Cours d'Étude*, xv, 372. Stewart must have overlooked this passage.

in France. Where would Mr. Spencer, or any of the Sensationalists be without the analysis of the faculties? or either of the Mills, without the *liaison des idées*? or Mr. Lewes, without the principle of identity? It was Condillac and not Locke who cleared the continent of the Cartesian cosmologies; and it was Condillac who furnished the original draft of the final form of the Empirical Philosophy.

Condillac's first treatise is the *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances Humaines*, exactly described in the title as an "ouvrage ou l'on réduit à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement humain." It is the work of a very young man and as might be expected tells rather more of the influences under which he was trained than of the original position he was about to assume. The most curious thing about it is the abundant evidence it furnishes of the fact which everybody seems to have forgotten, although it might have been taken for granted that Condillac was a Cartesian long before he knew anything of Locke. Not only does he define the soul as a single, indecomposable, indestructible substance distinct from the body which is a mere temporary agglomeration of substances, but he fully accepts the old Cartesian consequence of non-intercourse and occasional causes. What was the state of things before the fall we do not of course know except as an article of faith; but in this life as a consequence of Original Sin the soul is yoked like a galley-slave to the body, the penal union being so intimate, and the dependence so abject, that the changes in the body which are only occasional must be taken as if they were truly physical causes of the changes in the soul. What the real efficient causes at work in this semblance of intercourse may be, Condillac declines to say, for the very sufficient reason that he did not in the least pretend to know. Here is his exact point of departure from the Cartesians and of approach to Sensationalism. The gap filled up by Malebranche with the energies of the deity is left a blank, and the ideas supposed to be their products are replaced by the sensations which arise in the soul nobody knows how, or flow into it nobody knows whence, on occasion of changes taking place in the body. These sensations are the constituents of consciousness, the problem of psychology being nothing but the processes of their composition,—how they

fuse into faculties, how they refine into ideas. They are a countless host, of whose real nature we can only say that we feel them, that we are aware of their presence; while consciousness or perception is the earliest operation of the understanding, and the fruitful germ of all the others. Of the whole number, by far the larger portion vanish as they come leaving no trace behind; but often it happens to us to have a more vivid perception of some of them than of the others, an emphatic accentuation of one or two overpowering our consciousness of the remainder. This usurpation of consciousness is the earliest form of the faculty of Attention, and is a momentous event, for when such conspicuous and impressive sensations repeat themselves they are directly recognized as having arisen before and as belonging to the same self they belonged to then. Thus the unity of consciousness and the identity of the Ego are disclosed while the primal faculty of Perception is differentiated into the faculties of Attention, Reminiscence, Contemplation, Imagination. So far, however, we have only automatic action and the elements of animal psychology. Sensations have poured into the receptacle of the soul, have vanished at once or tarried behind, and tarrying have fallen apart or fallen together according to their own affinities, the *liaison des idées* working without interference of any kind from within. It is clear that what is needed to lift the soul out of mere brute sentiency is some improved sort of association of ideas which will give it mastery over its sensations, enable it to put some of them aside, to summon others into its presence, and to muster and manœuvre them at will. This improvement is provided by the wonderful artifice of Language. Sensations themselves in their native diffuse state have a sluggish affinity for one another, a perception or reminiscence or imagination lying nearly inert in the presence of its most closely related associates. But a word holds an immense quantity of crude sensation in a condensed and portable form; you can take it anywhere and fire long trains of other sensations with it. It signifies so much itself and suggests so much more than it signifies that you can make it do anything if you only know how. Condillac was so pleased with this conception that after the manner of young men he rather ran it into the ground, two-thirds of his exposition of the origin of human knowledge being

devoted to a history of language, all going to show that the natural and artificial signs by which we express our states of mind, first to one another and finally to ourselves, are the supreme development of the principle of association of ideas, and the factor to which we owe all our superiority to the speechless and irrational brutes.* It is language which has given us Memory (as distinguished from mere Reminiscence), Reflection (as distinguished from Attention), Comparison, Judgment, Reasoning; the conclusion of the whole matter being that the Human Understanding is the sum total of all our faculties and all their operations; its source the abundant fountain of sensations; its single principle of unity the association of ideas.

The success of this striking little essay was so great that three years after Condillac assumed the offensive more openly in his *Traité des Systèmes*, a detailed criticism of the *premiers principes* or innate ideas of the Cartesians. It is of no great value except as accentuating the contrast between the rational and empirical procedures, for Condillac was evidently puzzled by the mysticism of Malebranche and the monadology of Leibnitz while he makes the capital mistake of supposing that the "ideas" of Descartes are abstract universals from which the system of particulars is to be reached by deduction; and he is totally unaware that the pantheism of Spinoza is a form of the Identical Philosophy which would have fitted his discovery later on, of the principle of certitude far better than the system he finally adopted.† Having delivered this parting blow at the Cartesians he returned to the English Sensationalists who now had a great surprise in store for him. While Locke was busy with the *Essay*, Molyneux sent him the following question: whether a man born blind who had learned to distinguish by touch between a cube and a sphere of the same metal and bigness could on recovery of his sight tell without touching which was the globe and which the cube. To this the "learned and judicious proposer answered: Not," and Locke agreed with

* In *Problems of Life and Mind* it is the "sociological data" which explain our superiority to the brutes.

† Here is where Mr. Lewes parts from Condillac. The latter as we shall see adopted the Newtonian physics which is also the basis of Mr. Spencer's system. Mr. Lewes's affinities are for the German systems since Hegel which come from the *Ethica* of Spinoza and ultimately from the Plenum of Descartes.

him, neither gentleman seeming to be aware that they had effected a revolution in philosophy, that their innocent query into the *modus operandi* of vision cut the single thread which held the objective world to Sensationalism and gave the push which toppled it over into the Idealism of Berkeley and the Nihilism of Hume. In the *Essay on the Origin of Knowledge* Condillac had strenuously contested this conclusion. Although holding the old doctrine of non-intercourse he yet insisted that the sensations of the soul contain trustworthy intuitions of the external world. "The slightest attention, he says, ought to make us know that when we perceive light, colors, solidity, these and the like sensations are more than enough to give us all the ideas we commonly have of bodies. In effect what one of them is not included in these first perceptions? Are not the ideas of extension and so on all found there?"* which of course they are, the only question being whether they have any business there and being there what they mean; a question concerning no man so much as Condillac. It was the *New Theory of Vision* undoubtedly which opened his eyes to the insufficiency of his analysis and the temerity of his assumption by showing him that he had made as uncritical and extravagant a use of sensations as any Cartesian of innate ideas; that the constituents of feeling into which he had decomposed the Understanding are themselves highly complex judgments whose affirmations of external realities can be verified, if at all, only by farther decomposition into their ultimate elements. So there was nothing left for it but to recast his whole system, to dig down to the very first beginnings of sensation and to show how these are built up into a consciousness of self and a perception of the external world. The result was the best known of Condillac's works, the *Traité des Sensations*, published in 1754, as beautiful an essay in psychology as can be found anywhere.† He supposes a perfectly organized but inanimate statue which

* *Origine des Connoissances*, Pt. I, Sect. 1.

† The new doctrine of vision, says Hamilton, which Condillac "hazards in his earlier work, in his later he tacitly replaces by the old." (*Metaphysics*, II, 161). Hamilton's editors have corrected this blunder but they have not added the obvious comment that involves an ingenious and elaborate misapprehension of Condillac's whole psychology. Berkeley's doctrine lay exactly in the line of his speculation, to have gone back from it to the old one would have been to reverse his engine; and it is Berkeley's doctrine which led him to write the *Traité des Sensations*.

is gifted with one sense at a time—smell, hearing, taste, vision—and then with combinations of these, out of whose operations he builds up a perfect interior consciousness, but a consciousness without the faintest hint or suspicion in it anywhere of realities beyond itself. The tremendous revelation of these breaks in with the prophetic sense of Touch. Until its appearance experience is wholly idealistic, sense and self are one and the same thing, the passive Ego is what its feelings are. But with the first touch there comes obstruction, resistance, reaction—the announcement of a something that is not self, the dim disclosure through the clouds of subjective feeling of the outer world.* The whole consciousness reorganizes itself around this *sentiment fondamental*; all the other sensations forsake the interior self to which they have clung and follow this one of touch to fasten themselves upon the new world which bursts upon the astounded statue with its wonders of odor, sound, motion, heat, light, color: an obtrusive materialism overpowering the idealism of primitive sensation.

But Condillac was far too intelligent and conscientious a thinker to suppose that all this ingenuity had taken him to the bottom of the matter. He was sure to reflect sooner or later, that the sense of touch however adequate to explain the generation of our perceptions is not for that a better guarantee of the truth of our beliefs. We do not verify the conclusion by merely discovering the original; to trace the multitude of our ideas back to their roots in one *sentiment fondamental* is to concentrate there the whole distributed burden of the proof. My perceptions of the outer world through the eye or the ear are not direct and intuitive as they seem to be but an unconscious inference from my perceptions of it through the fingers; but then what is *this* perception? derivative too? or if underived then any the more certainly true for that? We are as much in need of a certificate of character as ever; more so for having taken all the other senses in *flagrante delictu*; this one of touch comes into court with a presumption against it. It makes that same stupendous assertion of an external world directly perceived which they have been caught falsely making and we

* We are tracing the pedigree of Mr. Lewes's philosophy but here is the *premier principe* of Mr. Spencer's, that "simple impression of resistance" which ensures the antitheses and syntheses of the Theory of Evolution.

want to know what its claims to exceptional credit are. That is, we want a Principle of Certitude; all the more urgently for having just read the *Traité des Sensations*.

Condillac was now a very distinguished man; an eminence confirmed within a few years by an appointment to the vacant post of instructor to the young Prince of Parma, grandson of His Most Catholic Majesty Louis Fifteenth. Perhaps nothing could have indicated more distinctly the complete change in the temper of Europe since the 17th century; and the result was one of the most curious experiments in education since Seneca was made tutor to Nero, or Aristotle to Alexander. Its interest in philosophy is no less considerable for it forced upon Condillac's attention the necessity of providing the principle of certitude lacking in the *Origine des Connoissances* and the *Traité des Sensations*. At the head of a staff of instructors and under the very eye of the Papal court he undertook to bring up his pupil in all humane and princely virtues by bestowing upon him the whole encyclopædia of knowledge. Nothing, he observed to the young gentleman with tutorial candor, is worse for a prince who is one day to be a ruler of men than undue conceit of himself. The best corrective for the foul air of the court is the large atmosphere of the universe; to escape the adulation of the snobs about you it is needful for you to know what you really are yourself, what other men are and have been, what nature is.* In this way he set himself to do for his pupil what Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewes are good enough to be trying to do for us, who are also inclined to exaggerate our importance in the universe, that is to give him "a conception of the world, of man, and of society wrought out with a systematic harmonizing of principles." But clearly in order to be able to teach all this, even to a small boy who can't contradict you it is quite essential to have not only systematized learning but certitude, not only to know but to know that you know; and not only to know that you know yourself but to show the learner that he knows too; there must be a criterion of truth capable of communication from teacher to scholar and clear enough to satisfy both. This criterion, says Condillac, which

* See the introduction to the *Cours d'Etude* in which Condillac gives a most curious account of his method of teaching.

we have all been hunting for since two thousand years I have the honor to introduce to you, Monseigneur, as the Principle of Identity. Whether Monseigneur who had at this time reached the anxious age of ten years, was relieved by the discovery does not appear, but there can be no doubt that Condillac himself very considerably was, for it enabled him at once to save and to complete his philosophy by turning what had been a mere psychological hypothesis into cosmological theory. This is the proposal of the *Art de Raisonner* and the *Art de Penser*, the 3d and 4th volumes of the *Cours d'Etude*. I distinguish, he says, three sorts of evidence: the evidence of *sentiment* (the consciousness that I have a certain sensation); the evidence of *fact* (the perception of an external object); and the evidence of *reason* (which is the intuition of identity).* This most suspicious classification is a broad hint that Condillac is after all likely to shirk the fundamental problem of our cognition of the external world, for to co-ordinate our consciousness of a sensation and our perception of an objective reality as two intuitions of equal validity is to beg the whole question. On reaching the point, however, he explains, although in the most slipshod fashion, that the evidence of fact is ranked with the evidence of sentiment by virtue of the evidence of reason. Our sensations are effects of causes—an identical proposition: some we cause ourselves, the rest must have causes outside; these outside causes are what we call bodies: anything perceived in a body is what we call a fact; and so the evidence of fact is quite as good as the evidence of sentiment.† In this off-hand manner he promotes a perception to the rank of an intuition and smuggles the whole material universe into consciousness under cover of an identical proposition; all with an air of honest importation which probably took in not only the innocent Prince of Parma but Condillac himself.

* *Art de Raisonner*, p. 5.

† Here is the whole argument: Vous remarquez que vous éprouvez différentes impressions que vous ne produisez pas vous-même. Ou tout effet suppose une cause. Il y a donc quelque chose qui agit sur nous. . . . L'évidence de sentiment vous démontre l'existence de ces apparences; et l'évidence de raison vous démontre l'existence de quelque chose qui les produit. Car dire qu'il y a des apparences, c'est dire qu'il y a des effets; c'est dire qu'il y a des causes.—*L'Art de Raisonner*, p. 69.

Knowledge, then, in its elementary intuitive form is simply the consciousness we have of our own sensations. It is developed into a rational knowledge of ourselves and of the world about us by applying the principle of identity. This application is always through the process of analysis. Since sensations as they stand in consciousness do not disclose their identity of themselves we must take them to pieces and then put them together again in our own way; we must first decompose and then recompose, and when the differences which precede decomposition make way for the unity which follows recomposition, when the kaleidoscope of sensations is turned into the mosaic of rational knowledge, our work is complete. To show the temper of his weapon Condillac begins among the abstractions of mathematics which are the highest truths known to us of the third class, those known upon the evidence of reason. As samples of all mathematical propositions he selects these two: the measure of any triangle is the product of its altitude by half the base, and: the three angles of a triangle are equal to two triangles. No conceptions of the class could be wider apart and more unlike than our conception of three angles in a triangle and our conception of two right angles; but analysing them and comparing them with certain intermediates we discover that the two are really one; we have demonstrated the proposition by identifying the terms.* From the ideal constructions of mathematics Condillac turns to the concrete reals of consciousness. First, in an extremely curious series of identical propositions he proves that Reflection, the very highest faculty of the understanding, is only transformed sensation, thus putting his whole psychology along with mathematics into the category of things known to be certainly true through the infallible intuition of identity.† By an equally curious series he then establishes the non-identity of the two propositions: the soul is a sentient substance; the body an extended substance; thus apparently cutting himself off completely from the objective world. But tyro as he was the wonderful availability and aptitudes of the identical proposition were quite as well known to Condillac as a hundred years later to Mr. Lewes, for having dug the abyss

* *L'Art de Raisonner*, p. 9.† *Ibid.*, p. 39.

with one identical proposition he bridges it over with another as we saw a moment ago, and takes possession of the material universe on the ground that our sensations are effects of causes; in no wise disturbed by a suspicion that propositions which destroy each other cannot be identified. Nor was he at all embarrassed by his new possession. Perhaps the last man in Europe to have invented a theory of the material universe for himself he had nothing to do but cross the channel again and appropriate Newton's. It was, to be sure, a prodigious blunder for an old Cartesian to make. The Plenum would have exactly suited him, as it suits Mr. Lewes, while the Newtonian Physics with its indestructible atoms and antagonistic forces turned the principle of certitude into palpable nonsense. However, Condillac went to work gallantly and reproduced the *Principia* in eleven chapters of identical propositions, thus completely disposing of the universe as an ingenious variation upon the sublime theme, The same is the same. "All of which, he concludes, you will be convinced of, Monseigneur, if you only take notice that we have been mounting from discovery to discovery by simply passing from one identical proposition to another."* What would His Highness have said could he have lived to see the bewildering universe discovered by Mr. Lewes at the end of the same passage?

Comment upon Condillac's system of things can hardly be called for to-day. He was using a principle which he believed himself to have discovered and whose sufficiency he was quite sure of, so that he had none of the beneficial restraints of criticism and no caution of his own to check him. His absurdities therefore were a matter of course and are not very instructive for us, who have the benefit of Mr. Lewes's corrections. They serve, however, to bring out clearly one important truth which we should have supposed it was the religion of Empiricism never to forget, namely: that any subjective criterion of truth whatsoever must be ready to submit to the facts of experience, inasmuch as the discovery of the facts is the very thing we want a criterion for. Thus the principle of identity, if such a criterion exist at all, will carry a man just so far as the inexpugnable differences of phenomena permit him to go, and not

* *L'Art de Raisonner*, p. 203.

one step farther. To identify our sensations is the most vicious and futile realization of abstractions possible if the realities corresponding to the sensations are not themselves identical. Condillac saw clearly enough the barriers in his way and for the most part respected them. He distinguished with as much precision as anybody between sensations and the substance of mind, motions and the substance of matter, and between the two substances themselves. But he could not quite suppress the hope that the barriers would disappear in a larger knowledge; that behind the obtrusive contrasts of the Universe a fundamental identity awaited a more searching application of the principle of certitude. We have shown, he says in the *Art de Penser*, how sensations become successively attention, memory, comparison, judgment, reflection; how simple ideas become complex, sensible, intellectual and others; all by a series of identical propositions which taken together amount simply to this, that sensations are sensations. "If in all other sciences we could equally follow the generation of ideas and sieze everywhere the true system of things, we should see one truth give birth to all the others; and we should find the abridged expression of our entire knowledge in this one proposition: The same is the same."* Nothing therefore obstructs the Identical Philosophy but the seeming diversity of nature, and the temptation to get this diversity out of the way will be exactly proportioned to the exigencies of the philosopher; if they are very great the inclination will be strong upon him to say that if the facts won't fit the system—*tant pis* for the facts. Now, since Condillac's time, when there were plenty of alternatives to choose from, the situation has very seriously altered for the worse, and Mr. Lewes—if no other thinker of his school—is perfectly aware of it. He has seen the empirical systems of Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer falling to pieces from the strains of their own gravitation; he knows that the only asylum left for Empiricism is the Identical Philosophy. So the irresistible temptation we spoke of has come upon him,—to cast out the obstinate facts for the

* *L'Art de Penser*, p. 121. Compare this from the *Art de Raisonner*: Si nous pouvions découvrir toutes les vérités possibles et nous en assurer d'une manière évidente, nous ferions une suite de propositions identiques, égales à la suite des vérités; et par conséquent nous verrions toutes les vérités se réduire à une seule. p. 293.

sake of harmony among the remainder. *Sit pro ratione voluntas*. If there be anywhere in Nature a thing that will not consent to identification with all other things, let it be anathema. There are unfortunately some very considerable things that will not so consent, and the triumphs of Mr. Lewes's philosophy are the prompt suppression of them. He excommunicates the substance of the soul, the substance of matter, and the Almighty along with them : the floating phenomena of Feeling and of Motion which survive he identifies as subjective and objective aspects of one another. To all this the most fitting rejoinder is that Mr. Lewes's exigencies are not ours and that we really must be excused for declining to take his *voluntas* as our *ratio*.

ARTICLE IV.—THE ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES.

NOTHING has come down to us from classic antiquity more full of interest than the Mysteries of Ceres. They were the most wide-spread, the most dignified, and continued the longest of all the secret orders which have ever existed. Compared with the time these Mysteries flourished, Free Masonry, which boasts so ancient an origin, is but a child in years. For the latter, despite its lofty pretensions, can trace its history with certainty but two or three centuries at most; while Eleusinia has an undoubted record of more than a thousand years. And if we compare the extent to which the power of this Institution prevailed, and the number of cultivated men who identified themselves with it, no other secret order can claim an approach to its importance. For the strong hold which these Mysteries so long maintained among those nations which swayed the world, and the secrecy which concealed their doctrines, constitute most powerful factors in the education of humanity.

It must be admitted that mystery has a strong fascination for elevated souls. But when Revelation makes the relations between man and his Creator a matter of definite knowledge, there is no need of mystic orders. Nay rather, divine truth, which is the heritage of all God's intelligent creatures alike, is opposed to secrecy. But the case is different among the heathen. For if there was no secret receptacle for doctrines, where they may be kept pure by the combined effort of superior minds, they would quickly be lost amid the prevailing corruption. The mission of Eleusinia was to constitute such a receptacle. For thus the truths of Revelation, committed to the chosen people, and reflected from them by tradition, were kept alive among their Gentile neighbors until the appointed time, when the gospel reaffirmed and made them clear to all men.

The depth to which human nature sinks when left to itself is measured, both in its descent and return, by the objects worshipped. True religion consists in the act of communion between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man directly, without any intervention of image or symbol. For those who worship

Him aright must do this in spirit and in truth. The opposite extreme is the worship of devils, under revolting forms and with abominable rites of blood and uncleanness. For the conscience is active to accuse and alarm among the lowest of mankind as well as the highest; but it can think of a god no higher than its own moral level, and so creates a divinity of wholly depraved attributes. The supreme spiritual power is thus conceived of as diabolical, possessed of a constant desire to harm; and must therefore be propitiated, not so much to obtain favor as to avert injury. This we find to be the condition of men in all parts of the world when they are farthest removed from the knowledge of the true God; and accordingly, devil-worship constitutes the lowest depth of human degradation.

The first grade in the rising scale is pure Nature-worship, where all the powers and objects of the material world are personified and endowed with life. Here everything is double, the one over against the other. The material and visible are at first worshipped as the god himself, which is properly pantheism. But by degrees the personality is separated from its manifestation, and then the divinity is thought to reside in the visible object while making it the organ of his manifestation. This was the condition of Greece during nearly all the heroic age, and also the historical period, until, through intercourse with Phœnicia and Egypt, the ideas of a purer spiritual religion began to permeate and leaven the modes of thought. In the very earliest conceptions of the heroic age, we discern the remaining traces of devil-worship in the shocking vices ascribed to the gods; such as theft to Mercury, lasciviousness to Jupiter and Venus, and drunkenness to Bacchus. The same is also visible in the rites by which the deities were worshipped, as in the Bacchanalian orgies, when women became so frenzied that they ate raw flesh, and mothers, like Agave, tore their children to pieces. But this period belongs to a condition of human nature too low to leave much account of itself, and when records began to mirror the life of the Hellenes, this kind of worship had nearly passed away; while in its place a more refined and rational spirit prevailed.

The foregoing introductory observations are intended to explain the conditions under which the Eleusinian Mysteries arose,

and to show the place which such institutions hold in the moral culture of the human race. Our subject now leads us to the origin of these mysteries.

There are two origins claimed for Eleusinia; one, that it grew out of pure Nature worship in Greece; the other, that it was an institution brought from Egypt. The first, doubtless, indicates the true beginning; the second not so much the origin, as a sudden and great development of the Mysteries, by incorporating advanced ideas and new rites brought from the latter country. The first named origin exemplifies in a remarkable way the tendency to personify and allegorize, which forms so large a part of the process by which the classic mythology was created. Proserpine the young daughter of Ceres is emblematic of flowers, just as her mother is the goddess of the ripe fruits of the field.* The daughter is gathering flowers with her companions, herself a beauteous blossom, when Pluto, the god of the lower world, suddenly appears and bears off the blooming girl to be his wife. Ceres, discovering the loss of her daughter, and receiving no aid from the powers of heaven to discover and bring her back, is disconsolate, and curses the earth with barrenness. Men are reduced to starvation: for the furrow will yield no increase. In vain is the seed cast into the earth, for, however carefully the soil is prepared, nothing will germinate. The races of men are ready to perish, and even the gods fail to receive their accustomed sacrifices. Something must be done to appease Ceres that she may remove the ban and give her blessing to the labors of the husbandman. After long efforts on the part of the gods, she is persuaded on condition that Proserpine be restored to her. This is complied with in part, and the daughter allowed to revisit the earth for two-thirds of the year. As she returns the seed germinates, the flowers bloom, the fruit ripens. But she can remain only part of the year; the remainder must be spent beneath the earth when the flowers hide themselves in the sleep of winter. Each part of this story is significant. Pluto, who represents the lower world, the abode of fire, snatches away the flower from the field. By this we understand that a sudden Simoon, or hot wind, which is not unfrequent in the extreme south of

* Hymn in Ceresem, 1-40, 66.

Europe, blasts the vegetation. The stalk withers and no fruit follows. The drought continues and the ground will not sprout the seed which is sown anew. The prayer of man in extremity, and the cries of the beast ready to perish, are heard. After the drought, Jupiter, the Cloud Collector, sends his messenger Iria, the goddess of the rainbow, to Ceres. With Iria the showers descend; for Ceres is propitiated, and the earth smiles in plenty again. In return for this joyous release from famine Ceres is to be honored in such a way that she will never again withdraw her favor, nor famine waste the earth. She is to be worshipped by sacred rites which shall forever keep in remembrance the loss and recovery of her daughter, as well as the kindness with which she, as an angel unawares, was entertained while an alien from Olympus, and hiding among men. Such is the interpretation of the origin of Eleusinia growing out of Nature worship. The establishment of these mysteries, briefly stated according to this view, is as follows.* Proserpine is gathering flowers in a meadow of Argolis, near the river Erasinus, when Pluto appears with his chariot and black steeds and bears her away. Ceres discovers her loss, abandons Crete her usual abode, and goes in every direction on a fruitless search. After long wandering she stops near Eleusis, and is most hospitably entertained in the family of Keleus. Here she remains in disguise during the famine caused by her wrath on account of her daughter. When at last her true character is discovered and she is propitiated, she unfolds to Keleus the sacred mysteries which are to be celebrated perpetually in her honor. These were first imparted to Keleus and his daughters, because they had taken pity on her when she was a wanderer. Several other persons are mentioned as subsequently receiving directions from her touching the manner and substance of her rites. Musæus, and at least six persons named Eumolpus, are stated to have aided in their establishment. But these names are allegorical, and refer to the singing and music with which these persons adorned the rites. Besides these,† Diocles and Triptolemus share in the honor of their origin. But the great number of founders is to be accounted for by the fact, that each considerable family of

* Pausanias, II, 36, 7.

† Hymn in Cerecem, 473-8.

Eleusis, and in fact of all Attica, desired to identify itself with the founding of this the most honored institution of the ancient Gentile world. The different statements of the several authors who treat of their establishment, would be a mass of inextricable confusion on any other theory. But when we remember that the date of their origin—which, according to an inscription on one of the Oxford marbles, was 1399 B. C. ;* while Eratosthenes would put it circa 1383 ; and Callimachus 1327 (in both the former dates, taking Erechtheus as the reigning king at their inception)—long antedates written records among the Greeks. Besides, as much that has been written is retrospective, and made to explain a tradition, but is not the warrant itself for the tradition, we easily see how this diversity of statement could arise. For every king who directed, or priest who officiated when any important change was made in the ceremonies, would be held by his descendants to be the founder. Besides those already named, Erechtheus himself has been invested with this honor. This brings us to consider the current historical narrative of their origin ; not as they were known in mythological story, but in their actual character.† The statement is that Erechtheus derived these mysteries from Egypt, on the occasion of a large importation of corn to relieve a famine in Attica. This is in truth the second stage in the growth of these mysteries, which was effected by incorporating the recondite wisdom of the Egyptian priests with the institution already existing, by which greater completeness was given to the doctrines, as well as regularity to the rites.

Egypt has always been noted for its exuberant fertility ;‡ and for this reason was often resorted to by the neighboring nations in time of scarcity. Famines, similar to that recorded in the Bible, are not unknown in the Levant, as is witnessed by profane history.§ Many parts of Greece, and especially Attica, are so barren that they have never produced enough grain in ordinary years to supply the inhabitants ; and hence a dearth would be felt there especially. The importation of corn was doubtless the first incentive to intercourse with Egypt ; and a famine would make Greece dependent in the same way

* Marmor. Ox. Ed. Chand., II, 21.

† Diod. Sic., I, 29.

‡ Ewald Hist. Is., I, 408, § II, 3.

§ Abdollatif, II, 2 ; also, El Macrisi.

that Phœnicia was in the time of the patriarchs. Thus the story that Erechtheus when he imported corn also introduced the mysteries from Egypt, arises plausibly. For the more perfect form and fuller doctrines which Eleusinia received at this time, would easily pass for the first establishment among those who had no records but tradition.* Nevertheless the story which attributes them to Ceres herself, in the manner before explained, was wide spread; and has every indication of probability, because of its exact correspondence with Nature worship. And if any credence is to be placed in the ancient myths, there is undoubted evidence that the mysteries antedate the reign of Erechtheus. But, as is well known, intellectual culture of an advanced type existed in Egypt when the Greeks were yet in a state of semi-barbarism. However, an inquiring people as they were, would naturally be excited by the superior civilization they found in that country, and be ready to borrow from its advanced knowledge. Indeed Egypt continued until after the time of Herodotus to be the finishing school for scholars from Greece; who resorted thither to acquire the wisdom for which the priests were so famous. It was also a leading principle with these priests to keep their doctrines most sedulously from the common people. No where else, not even in India, that land of castes, was there a sharper discrimination between the learned and the ignorant. The common people in Egypt were degraded to the lowest level of bondmen. They had absolutely no part in the esoteric doctrines which the priesthood held. It was from the Egyptians, doubtless, that the Greeks borrowed the distinction of Exoteric and Esoteric doctrines. For such diversity was contrary to the spirit of equality which seems to have been natural among the freemen of Greece. The culture of this people was advanced in many respects by intercourse with Egypt; but the various authorities who point to the land of the Nile as the source whence Eleusinia originated err because they mistake a great improvement for the origin.

Neither is Egypt admitted by many to have been the primal seat of these mysteries. India comes in for its share in this, as is the case respecting almost all of the germs of civilization

* Isocrates, Panage I, 29.

among the sons of Japhet. Yet there is no more propriety in saying that India is the original seat of culture than that Egypt should have the honor. Nay, more: Modern research does not justify the claim to greater antiquity or higher progress in the former than is found in the other countries which were peopled by the same Aryan stock. It has been too much the fashion to refer everything back to India, and ignore the fact that neither its literature nor remains of art show greater excellence than those of several contemporary nations. The time has been when the Sanscrit was thought to contain almost all the germs of elegant literature. When this language and the antiquities of the Indian Peninsula were a new and unexplored region, as in the days of Sir William Jones and Warren Hastings, these ideas were natural enough. For the little that was then known, revealing much splendor and greatness, led to the view that there lay, in what was still unexplored, the roots of almost all modern culture. But the facts are better understood now; and the truth begins to be apparent, that contemporary migrations from one common Aryan stock carried the same ideas, and similar forms of speech to the East and the West; and that kindred institutions sprang up among the descendants in all their new homes. Accordingly, while there are undoubted similarities between the Phallic worship in India and the deification of Nature in her generative powers as a part of the Eleusinian mysteries, there is no good reason to think that the one borrowed from the other. For this Nature worship is, in fact, the first stage in advancing civilization among the heathen wherever it is found. Much stress has been laid upon the words *κόγξ ὄμπαξ*, which were said to be a part of the formula used in the initiation of the mysteries. It is generally admitted that these words are of foreign origin. The Abbé Barthelemy,* and Le Clerc† thought them Phœnician. Wilford, in the *Asiatic Researches*, says these words are Sanscrit; and his view was much strengthened by the declaration of Mr. Ouseley, the English Ambassador to Persia, that the Brahmins use the formula at present in their addresses to the gods. This, however, is by no means decisive. Admitting that these words are employed by the Brahmins, they may have been borrowed

* *Voy. Anachar.*, v, 538.† *Bib. Univ.*, vi, 86.

from the Greeks after the Expedition of Alexander the Great. It is quite probable, nay rather certain, that the influence of Grecian culture was felt wherever the conqueror went; and we should bear this fact in mind when estimating the relations between the two countries in question. Neither the conclusions of Ouvaroff, in his very learned work, *Essai sur les Myst. d'Eleusis*, which are derived from the fact that the Puranas affirm that Egypt was under the especial guardianship of Vischnu; nor the statements of Eusebius,* which represent the color of the Demiurgus Kneph of the same hue which Sir William Jones† finds to be consecrated to Vischnu, prove anything definite as to the connection between these two countries. Such coincidences between the institutions of different lands are accidental, and furnish no reliable data for argument. They are adverted to solely to explode the idea that Egypt necessarily borrowed any of her institutions from India, and that Greece derived them through such transmission. But, that there was a close connection between Greece and Egypt, and that the priests of the latter country were resorted to in order to obtain wisdom, is a matter of constant reference among classic authors.

The ceremonies of initiation before Ceres became one of the patron gods of Attica all took place at Eleusis, and were much simpler than after this event. We infer from the scattered traditions that all the rites at first symbolized the grief of Ceres; her wanderings in search of her lost daughter; and her sojourn in the house of Keleus, where she was nurse for Damophoon, and was kindly treated by the family. But beyond the fact that a drink made of barley meal and water was tasted, that a search for a lost person was acted, and that the grief of Ceres was dispelled by the coarse jests of the servant maid Iambe, little can be known. However, after Athens became the great protectress of Eleusinia, the ceremonies became very formal and august in character. They began first with the Lesser Mysteries, which took place at Agræ, near the river Illissus. They were celebrated in the month Anthesterion (February), and were simple, consisting chiefly in bodily purifications. They had but little signification except as a preparation for the Greater Mysteries, which occupied nine

* Prep. Evan., Lib. III.

† Asiat. Res., 3, 571.

days of every year in the month Boedromion (August), viz : from the 15th to the 23d. But no one could be initiated into these unless a year, at least, had elapsed since his admission to the former.* The whole ceremony was under the direction of the Archon Basileus. During their continuance all civil business was suspended. No prosecutions could be begun, and no arrests made. At first none but Greeks could be initiated. This regulation, however, was evaded in the case of distinguished foreigners by their adoption into native families. In process of time this ban of nationality was removed, and foreigners were admitted on an equal footing with natives. All ostentatious displays of wealth or distinctions were prohibited under the severest penalties. The people assembled at Athens, and marched in procession along the sacred way to Eleusis, about eighteen miles distant. This march began at the Ceramicus, and was conducted with joyous songs and shouts of laughter, and with dancing. As many as 80,000 persons joined in this procession, and these were all accommodated in the magnificent temple at Eleusis.† Without particularizing all the rites, which differed for each day, it will be sufficient to give an outline. The priest began by a most solemn warning for all who were profane, impure, or guilty of any known sin, to stand aloof. Both Aristophanes and Virgil give the substance of these proclamations.‡ The candidate was interrogated most strictly as to his moral character; and if anything detrimental was elicited, he was summarily rejected. Moreover, if he himself was conscious of any secret crime, he was bid to depart and not profane the mysteries by forcing himself where he had no part, and where he would incur additional guilt if he intruded. Nor were these conditions merely pretenses. For when Nero visited Greece he endeavored to receive initiation, but was refused;§ though at that time the despot of the Roman world, who held the destinies of his subjects at will. Had there not been a controlling reverence for the order, and a consciousness of its sanctity, either fawning sycophancy, such as was displayed in the Catholic Church in the days of the Borgias, or dread of the tyrant's vengeance would have insured his reception. But

* Plutarch, *Dem.* 26.

† Strab. *Geog.* 9: 1, 13; Herod 8, 65.

‡ *Ranae*, 354-70. Virg. *Æn.*, t. vi, 257-8.

§ Sueton, *Vit. Nero*, c. 34.

there was too much honor and virtue among the members of Eleusinia to allow such a miscreant to profane their body. Neither did Nero dare to wreak his vengeance on them because of the sacred character which these mysteries universally held among men. It is true that Demetrius, against the strong protest of the Chief Priest, forced an initiation when Greece was prostrate;* but this was entirely exceptional, as is shown by Plutarch, and caused great scandal. The case of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus† is apposite to prove the discriminating character of the terms of admission. For when accused of murdering Avi Cassius, he appealed to his initiation as proof positive that he was innocent, and his appeal was accepted as conclusive that he was guiltless of the crime alleged. After the solemn interrogation, the candidates, crowned with myrtle, were conducted into the shrine of the temple, where they washed their hands in holy water, being admonished, at the same time, that they must have internal purity, else the external rite would avail nothing. A pregnant sow‡ was next sacrificed to Ceres because this animal was destructive, whether wild or domesticated, to the growing crops. This act was especially significant in an age when the ravages of the wild boar were so terrible as to give occasion for the legend of Atalanta in Calydon—a story of the Heroic age second only to that of Troy. The initiated were now clothed in the skins of animals which had been sacrificed to Jupiter; and these garments were preserved carefully ever afterward, and were deemed efficacious in warding off diseases. The secrets of the mysteries were read to the initiated out of a manual consisting of two tablets of stone united together. The priests bore torches, for this part of the initiation took place at night, and amidst the most dreadful sounds and apparitions. Bright flashes of lightning were succeeded by the thickest gloom. Horrid shapes darted at the neophyte, and as he was led by the attendant priests, the ground seemed to sink beneath his feet. So awful were the sights and sounds that they were often expressed under the name of a *descent into hell*, and form the substance of that sublime description in Virgil's 6th *Æn.*§ After he had been suffi-

* Plutarch, *Dem.* xvi.

† *Jul. Capit. Vit. Anton.*

‡ Varro, *De Re Rus.* II, 4.

§ 225 ff.

ciently impressed by these phenomena, the scene suddenly changed. The conductor opened a vestibule, when all obscurity and horror were at an end. Up to this time the neophytes were called *Mystai*, because they saw everything obscurely. But henceforth they are called *Autopsai*, eye witnesses, since all was seen by them distinctly. These rites were emblematical of the search after wisdom. The soul is beset with doubts and perplexities until real knowledge is obtained, when the uncertainty of ignorance and sin give way to the clear light of truth. In the language of Stobæus:* "The first stage is nothing but errors and uncertainties; laborious wanderings; a rough and dreadful march through night and darkness. But now, when arrived at the verge of death,† which is prefigured by Initiation, everything wears a dreadful aspect; it is all trembling, horror, and affright. But this once passed, a marvellous and divine light discloses itself, revealing shining plains and flowery meadows on all sides. Here the initiated are entertained with hymns and dances, with the sublime doctrines of sacred knowledge, and with revered and holy visions."

On the second day of the ceremonies the whole company marched from Eleusis to the sea, for lustrations and bathing. The continuance of these ceremonies, and the return to Eleusis, must have occupied more than one day; and, therefore, the third of the nine, the only one about which there is doubt, is accounted for. The fourth day was devoted to a solemn procession in which the *Kolathus*, or Basket of Ceres, containing fruits and grain, was carried in a cart, and followed by a promiscuous crowd who shouted, Hail Ceres! The fifth day was that of the *Torches*; because, on the night following, the multitude ran about with torches, symbolizing Ceres who carried one lighted at *Ætna* in her search for her daughter. The sixth day was called *Iachus*, in honor of him who aided Ceres in her search. His statue was crowned with ivy, and carried in the procession. The seventh day was dedicated to games, in which the victors were rewarded with prizes of barley. The eighth day was, in substance, a renewal of the first; so that those persons who had failed to arrive at Eleusis at the proper time, yet through no fault of their own, could still be initiated. On

* *Florilegium.*† *Plat. Phæd., XXIX.*

the ninth day libations were made; and so ended the ceremonies at Eleusis. Those who failed to secure initiation were held in the utmost contempt, and those who gained admittance without going through the prescribed ceremonies were put to death. Nor was temporal death considered sufficient, for those who intruded were believed to be punished in the infernal regions. After the ceremonies were over the grand procession returned to Athens; and when they reached the bridge over the Cephissus, the most boundless hilarity was indulged in by all. It was a day of innocent mirth, when pungent, though good natured, sarcasms were unsparingly uttered. Hence to "speak on the Bridge" passed into a proverb, and gave occasion to tilts of wit and humor scarcely second to the Comic Drama.

The most binding secrecy was imposed on the initiated. The etymology of Mystery, from *μύω*, "to close the mouth," has a deep significance. The virtue of silence, and the power to keep secrets were conspicuous in the Greek idea of morality. The strong man was the one who could preserve silence; the wise man who knew when, as well as how, to speak. Though, without doubt, the Greeks were the best talkers that ever lived, this was greatly owing to the fact that they were also the best listeners. To keep a religious silence in times, and concerning things sacred, was especially noteworthy in their culture. Certainly no secrets have ever been so well kept as those of Eleusinia. Other mystic orders have invariably been betrayed. The fate of Masonry is fresh in memory; and the attempted punishment of the traitor shows conclusively that he betrayed what was vital to the order. Any person suspected of having divulged the mysteries was held in great abhorrence, and the severest punishment known to the Athenian code was denounced against the offender. Nor was the denunciation an idle threat, as is shown in several cases where there was only the charge of imitating the rites and ceremonies, but not of betraying the secret doctrines. Diagoras,* the Melian, was accused of divulging the secret rites, and for this the Athenians proscribed him, and set a price upon his head; though there is no evidence that he betrayed anything by which the

* Suidas in voc. Diag.

outside world was any wiser than before concerning the secret doctrines of the order. The case of the poet *Æschylus** shows the extreme jealousy with which the least appearance of unfaithfulness was watched. It was thought that he had given some intimations of the secret doctrines in his stage representations, and this so exasperated the people that they rushed upon him with full intent to tear him to pieces; and would have done so had he not escaped their fury by flying to the altar of *Bacchus*. Here he claimed protection until he could be tried by the *Areopagus*, where he was acquitted.

Perhaps the most abiding popular excitement ever witnessed at Athens arose from the fact that *Alcibiades* caricatured the mystic ceremonies at a private house.† The mutilation of the *Hermæ* caused a wilder uproar for a few days; but this was not so permanent. The feeling against him for this profanation of the mysteries was so strong that, although he was the idol of the people, and, at that particular time, was entrusted with a most important military command in the expedition against Sicily, he was arraigned and the whole expedition delayed after it was ready to sail. By various pretexts the proceedings were staved off and the armament departed; but he was prosecuted during his absence, was summoned home, and, in default of his return, was outlawed. His property was confiscated; and he declared accursed of the gods. Yet in the very circumstantial impeachment preserved by *Plutarch*,‡ there is no specification of making public the secret doctrines; only the charge of mimicking several of the rites. Nothing could better illustrate the sleepless vigilance with which these mysteries were guarded, and the severity with which any publication of them was punished. This vigilance was necessary indeed to the existence of the order, and can alone account for the fact that so much concerning it remains unexplained; or, if explained, must be by careful comparison of inferences drawn from indirect sources. It has been asserted, indeed, that the *Cretans* made a law that these mysteries should be public. But, as these people had the universal reputation of being liars,§ little confidence can be placed in their assertion

* *Clem. Alex. Strom.*† *Alcib. 22.*† *Andocides De Myst., passim.*§ *Call. Hym. in Jov., Titus, 1, 12.*

on this matter; and since there are no facts in history to substantiate this statement, it must be rejected.

THE DOCTRINES TAUGHT.

This is the most important point of view in which the Eleusinian Mysteries can be considered, and gives them their chief interest to us. The fact that they are acknowledged, by both contemporaneous and succeeding writers, as the depositories of the most important religious ideas, cause them to be of prime significance as an element in the world's culture. While they partook of the tendency of the times, and were divided into Esoteric and Exoteric, yet all the doctrines of the Lesser mysteries were public in comparison with those of the Greater. We can have no doubt that the general tendency of the order in all its parts, was to develop and maintain culture and virtue. For we have the testimony of competent judges who were themselves initiated. These invariably teach us that all those who shared in these mysteries became the particular favorites of the gods. They were deemed the only happy men in this life, and who alone acted their parts with wisdom and virtue. In the words of Aristophanes:* "On us only is the light of the sun benignant; on us who are initiated, and perform toward citizens and strangers the acts of piety and justice." Plato† holds the doctrine that after death only the souls of the initiated wing their flight to the mansions of bliss; while the uninitiated stick fast in mire and filth, where they remain in darkness. Of course it would be the tendency of any association, whether public or private, to hold forth the idea that its members by their admission became possessed of peculiar benefits. For if no such claim were made there would be no inducement to seek membership. But, in order for a society to continue in successful operation, and be patronized by great numbers of the purest and wisest of men during a long succession of ages, there must be a substantial basis on which it rests. Accordingly, when we hear such men as Plato, Aristides, and Cicero speaking of this institution with unqualified praise, we must conclude that it contained matters of the highest importance in the heathen world.

* *Ranæ* 456-8.

† *Phæd.*, 81, A.

The most obvious doctrine taught was the Immortality of the Soul, and the consequent belief in future rewards and punishments. That this was actually taught in the mysteries is acknowledged by both friends and foes. Origen and Celsus, two of the most learned and influential of their parties, agree in this. Origen,* when contending for the superiority of Christianity, bids Celsus compare it with any form of heathenism, with the opinions of any sect in Philosophy, and all the Mysteries. Celsus, in reply, asserts that Christianity offers no doctrines superior in their morality to those taught in Eleusinia, or stricter in their sanctions. For, says he:† “After all, just as you believe eternal punishments, so do the ministers of the sacred rites, and those who initiate and preside in the mysteries.”

Purification and amendment of life are naturally connected with the doctrines of immortality and future retributions. And hence it was held to be the purpose and end of initiation to restore the soul to its original estate of perfection, whence it had fallen by transgression. Epictetus affirms that all the ceremonies tend to the perfecting of the initiated. For he says that: ‡ “The mysteries become useful, and we seize their true spirit, when we apprehend that everything therein contained was instituted by the ancients for the instruction and amendment of life.” As to the particular virtues inculcated, they too, partook largely of the tendencies of the times. Much stress was laid on self-denial and bodily purity. Especially during the period of initiation were these enjoined in the strictest manner. But that their moral teachings did not consist solely in purification and abstinence, is clear also from what Porphyry says:§ “For the initiated are commanded to honor their parents, to offer up fruits to the gods, and to abstain from cruelty to animals.” The general duties of men in civil society, as well as their obligations to the Supreme Being, were a part of their more open or Exoteric doctrines; so that their whole object was to make men better in this life, and more fitted for the next. Neither is there any doubt that, during many centuries, while the mysteries retained their purity, they did much to oppose the growing immorality among the people. For Cicero asserts,|| that the mysteries

* Cont. Cel., L. III.
§ De Abst., IV, 22.

† L. VIII, p. 508.
|| Cicero De Legg., 11, 14.

‡ III, 21.

are the means by which we are drawn from an irrational and savage life ; by which we are tamed, as it were, broken into humanity. Hence he contends that they are called *Initia*, because they are the beginnings of a life of virtue and reason, from which we receive not only the benefits of a more comfortable and elegant subsistence here, but also are taught to press on in the hope of a better life hereafter. Isocrates, also, is not behind the great Roman in advocating their excellence.* He says: "The mysteries teach the initiated to entertain the most agreeable expectations concerning death and eternity." Nor is Socrates,† though not initiated, lacking in advocating their importance ; and his evidence is the more impartial, because it comes from one who had not the peculiar bias in their favor which naturally arose from membership.

But while we may decide positively as to what were the Exoteric teachings, when we come to the secrets proper we cannot be so certain. Hence the investigation of what was taught in the Greater Mysteries must be guided by a careful scrutiny of the few hints which are left, apparently unconsciously, by ancient writers. There was something marvellously awe-inspiring in the secrecy imposed on those who had a view into the penetralia of Eleusinia, else, at some time, their secrets would have been betrayed. And, on the other hand, we may be certain that they contained something extraordinary, else they had not been so sedulously guarded. The result of a cautious and searching examination of all that is left us on this matter, brings us to the conclusion that the great secret was *the rejection of Polytheism, and the acceptance of the Divine Unity*. The plea for guarding the secrets so vigilantly, not only from the common gaze, but also from those initiated into the Lesser mysteries, was, that there were some doctrines which would be hurtful for the ignorant to know. Their minds were not ready for the reception of difficult truths, and by the revelation of such, the people, in their ignorance, would be made sceptical. For, if a belief in Polytheism be destroyed, this would take away their only religion ; while their prejudice, being always on a par with their ignorance, would render it impossible for them to receive

* Panag., 46, 28.

† Phæd., XXIX.

the doctrines of deep meaning. It was believed by ancient philosophers among the heathen, just as among the Jewish doctors at the time of Christ's coming, and also by the leaders of the mediæval and modern Catholic Church, that there are not only many truths which it is inconvenient for the people to know, but also many things false which they should believe. Hence, among the heathen, the former were shut up in the mysteries. It is a fact which cannot be denied, that the more intelligent considered the popular religion absurd, and secretly professed to have a more rational system of belief. Where then can we look for a repository of their views save in the mysteries? Those persons who despised Polytheism were the intelligent and influential; those who would most likely be acquainted with all the Esoteric doctrines of the mysteries. While the fact, that the most intelligent were initiated, would justify us in the theory that they obtained them from that source, yet we are not compelled to rest on conjecture alone. For it has been shown * that the Egyptian mystagogues in their most recondite doctrines taught the Unity of the Godhead. Now the correspondence between the Egyptian rites of Isis and Osiris † with those of Ceres and Bacchus in Greece, are so exact that we would be forced to believe them to be connected together, even though we had no evidence that Erechtheus derived the mysteries of Eleusinia, in part, when he imported corn to succor the famine. Indeed every evidence points to the fact, that in form and substance, the mysteries in both countries were nearly identical, and hence we may infer that the Divine Unity was one of the secrets in each. Moreover, Plutarch says, in his tract concerning the failure of oracles :‡ "As to the mysteries, in whose representations the true and false character of the gods is clearly set forth, a sacred silence is observed, as Herodotus says." Chrysippus, also asserts :§ "The Mysteries are justly called *τελεταί*; for they are the final rites, those which take place when men's minds are properly prepared for their reception. And, further, that it was considered a great privilege to have right notions of the gods, and to retain them when received." This is strong evidence that there were doctrines touching the Divine charac-

* *Ety. Mag.*, *τελετή*.

‡ Plutarch, *Frag.*, 84.

† Cudworth, *Int. Syst.*, IV, 18.

§ De Def. Orac., 14.

ter taught in the mysteries very different from those held by the common people, and of far greater importance. We find frequent evidences among the classic writers,* that the gods generally worshipped were thought by the wisest men to be only dead men deified. Still further: They refer each other to their initiation into the mysteries to explain their doctrine, that Heaven was peopled with gods who were once men. Nor do they assert this merely with reference to the lesser divinities, who were ordinarily held to be men deified; but also to the *Dii Majorum Gentium*. It is the opinion of Warburton,† that the fragment of Sanchoniathon preserved by Eusebius, was the hymn sung to those who had been fully initiated. In this, the Hierophant says:‡ “Go on in the right way, and see the sole Governor of the world. He is one, and of himself alone; and to this source all things owe their being. He operates through all, was never seen by mortal eye; but does himself see everything.”

Another strong inference is derived from the letter of Alexander the Great to his mother, where it is shown that the chief Hierophant of the Egyptian mysteries, through fear of the conqueror, revealed some, or all of the secrets. Here we are told: § “Not only such as Picus and Faunus, Æneas, Hercules, Æsculapius, Bacchus, the son of Semele, Castor and Pollux, and those others of the same dignity, were esteemed by men to be gods; but even those deities of a higher class, the *Dii Majorum Gentium*, those whom Cicero, without naming, seems to carp at in his Tusculans; such as Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others were, in truth, only mortals.” This is evidence of the highest importance; and, as it agrees with what Cicero says, shows conclusively that in both the Egyptian and Eleusinian mysteries Polytheism was discarded. Whether there were other doctrines, besides the divine unity, taught in the Esoteric wisdom, there is no clear evidence. Ouvaroff thinks there were; but he adduces no proof sufficient to establish his view. But this doctrine is of sufficient importance by itself to justify the interest attached to the greater mysteries; and satisfactorily explains the atti-

* E. g. Cic. Tusc., I, 12.

† Prep. Ev., IX, 3.

‡ Div. Leg. M., II, p. 154.

§ Aug. Civ. Dei, 8, 5.

tude of the most intellectual and virtuous toward the admitted absurdities of the popular mythology.

THEIR DEGENERACY AND FINAL DOWNFALL.

From the nature of the Mysteries as a secret institution, they contained elements which could easily be turned to abuse. The time for initiation and for the grandest parts of the celebration was in the night. An immense rabble was drawn by curiosity to see whatever was public. Cheats, thieves, and prostitutes, were attracted, thinking this a favorable opportunity to ply their callings. The later great councils of the Catholic Church brought together similar camp followers, so that, as in the case at Trent, the cities where these met, literally swarmed with them. When the concourse at the Eleusinian festival grew very large, as they were in the time of the Athenian supremacy, excesses of the most flagrant character did undoubtedly follow. These things became notorious as is shown by the fact that the comedians* frequently laid the scene of their plays at the celebration of the mysteries, and made the rape of a young woman the subject of their representations. Bacchus was associated with Ceres in the rites; and the nature of this divinity would naturally lead their devotees to engage in such irregularities as were supposed to be pleasing to their patrons. The *κτεís* and *φαλλός*, which were carried in the processions as emblems of regeneration, and through the new birth, of purity in life, with most persons lost their moral significance, and were turned to incitements of lasciviousness.† Undoubtedly such a result has always followed the introduction of these emblems in religious rites, as may be shown from the Phallic worship in India and China, and in the Astarte pillars of the Syrian groves. A like result is shown whenever images or emblems are employed to aid worship. They may be innocent, nay even, incentives to worship, by enlisting the senses to help pure spiritual acts; but ere long the image supplants the abstract idea, and idolatry succeeds true devotion.

The extension of the mysteries so as to admit great multitudes made the terms of admission more easy, and introduced

* Fab. Bib. Grace, II, 22 (Art. Com. deper.)

† Theodoret Therap, I.

laxities in government and morals. Priests set up for themselves, and established imitations in new situations, which, from their remoteness,* had little or no connection with the parent order. New divinities were worshipped in their solemnities, without the consent of the chief Hierophant. From these and similar causes combined, these mysteries, instead of remaining the guardians of truth and conservators of morality,† became rather the depositories of falsehood and corruption. But such was their hold upon public opinion that they survived long after they had become an acknowledged injury to public virtue. When the Emperor Hadrian had a mind to abolish all the mysteries, he was induced to make a special exception in the case of the Eleusinian;‡ since the people held them in such estimation, that it was thought life would be comfortless without them. Hence, it being feared that their abolition would be attended with a popular outbreak, the Emperor was induced to spare them.§ Even Xerxes, who most cordially hated everything pertaining to Greece, had respect to the temple at Eleusis when devastating all around it. At the time of the introduction of Christianity the Mysteries endeavored to make a stand against it by combining with the different philosophical sects; but the foundations of all alike being decayed, they fell together before that "Stone cut out of the mountain without hands," which levels all that opposes its course. After a struggling existence prolonged until the year A. D. 385, they were included in the general proscription of Theodosius the Great, and the magnificent temple of Eleusis was destroyed by Alaric in the year 396.

The question: Whence did the Greeks derive their ideas of religion? naturally forces itself upon our attention. For the wisest among them had too much truth to derive it from mere natural religion; while, at the same time, their ideas were not distinct enough to show a direct revelation. The correspondence between their mythology and the Jewish Scriptures in many points is so clear that no candid mind can doubt their derivation indirectly from the Mosaic revelation and Hebrew traditions. A few of these correspondences only can now be

* Liv. 39.

† Clem. Alex. Ad. Gent.

‡ Ammian., Mar. Hist., 22, 16.

§ Aristid. Orat. Eleus.

noticed. The *two tables of stone* from which the great secrets were read at the initiation of the mysteries, direct our thoughts at once to the revelation on Sinai, and compel us to believe that they were imitations of the two tables of the Law. The material from which these tables were made, their inseparable connection, their number, and their use to perpetuate the most holy mysteries of religion, could not be an accidental conformity to the tables of Moses. Hercules of Greece was certainly copied after Samson of Israel. They both begin their public life by slaying a lion; they spend their time in deeds of valor for the protection of others; both are ensnared and meet their death by faithless women. The sacrifice of Iphigenia, in all its leading circumstances, refers so directly to that of Isaac, that we instinctively feel the one was copied from the other. Deucalion and Pyrrha saved in the little ark, which rested upon a mountain,* point conclusively to Noah. It may not be possible to say precisely how much resemblance is necessary to establish such a connection between two narratives that we must admit one to be a copy. But still, there may be an amount and exactitude of conformity sufficient to make us feel, with a certainty only short of demonstration, that such connection exists. So it is in the cases named, and many other instances which might be mentioned. It may be said that similar resemblances can be traced between the Jewish and other religions besides the Greek. So far as this refers to nations which could, even by the most indirect means, have had intercourse with the Hebrews, it presents no difficulty. No doubt the rays from that light which was spread over the seed of Abraham were reflected to almost or quite all the earth. The Jews in their different dispersions visited nearly every land. And it is no new thing for the conquerors to be taught by the conquered; as Cicero so well says of the Romans in subduing the Greeks. The Latin race did the same thing for those who wasted Italy. The Arabs for their Castilian conquerors. And, in like manner, the wisdom of Egypt, so far from moulding the Hebrew doctrines of religion, as Ewald † strongly holds, was itself purified and strengthened by the visitors from Canaan and Arabia. Precisely the same state of things respecting the

* Lucian, Timon.

† Hist. Is., vol. II, § I.

Esoteric and Exoteric doctrines, existed in Greece after it had free intercourse with Egypt, as there was in the latter country. The common people in both were polytheists; while the wise and learned had a more rational system jealously guarded from public inspection. The tendency of all men, when left to themselves, is to go backwards in culture and morality. *The fittest never survives except by Divine superintendence.* For we see that the descendants of Noah, after their separation had returned through the two stages of Polytheism and Nature worship; and, in the Arabic peninsula, sunk to the lowest of all. The family of Terah were idolaters. The book of Job* shows that the host of heaven was worshipped by the Idumean Emirs. Frequent notices in the Korān† give evidence that devil worship existed generally in Arabia prior to Mahomet. Hence the constant necessity of repeated revelations to keep alive the true doctrine during that long stage of preparation, "the sundry times and divers manners when God spake by the mouths of prophets." Egypt had, doubtless, through the descendants of Shem, received the traditions of Eden and Ararat. But during the long time from the Noachic covenant until Abraham, when the oracles were silent, the truth had been corrupted; though it had been gradually disseminated until all the neighboring peoples had received a share. Hence, when the Divine oracles spake again, the truths they uttered flowed silently and imperceptibly through the same channels of intercourse as before; so that we see no difficulty in asserting, that the Egyptian priests received their doctrines of the Hebrews during the sojourn of Jacob and his sons. The presence of Joseph in Egypt as its ruler, and the great distinction which he justly earned and which is shown by his new name, Saviour of the age, Zaphnath-paaneah; his intermarriage with the daughter of Potipherah, priest of On; the long residence of the Hebrews—all these things combined must have had a marked influence on the religion of this country. And whatever truths were borrowed from the Hebrews would naturally come to the governing class, since this was brought most in contact with them. In this way the Divine Unity and the Soul's Immortality, which always go hand in hand—being counterparts

* Job 31, 26-28.

† Eg. Suras, 2, 5, 6. Ed. Flügel.

of the highest religious culture—could be derived immediately from that people which had been entrusted with revelation. And from Egypt, as a centre of culture, and on the great highway of ancient travel, these ideas were extended to Greece, and through this medium disseminated over Europe. Thus the mysteries of Egypt and Greece became the receptacles and conservators of these truths which were necessary to educate men's minds until the fullness of times came, and the way was prepared for Him by whom life and immortality were brought to light. At his advent the heathen oracles were dumb because God had spoken. Mystery had passed away because the true Light had come into the world.

ARTICLE V.—A RECORD OF "THE OLD DOMINION."

It is but a small province, indeed, of the great Dominion that the particular Record now put forth discloses to us. Narrowly circumscribed, however, though it be in territorial extent; though within its borders there be neither famous city, nor notable town, nor even so many clustered habitations of men as to be fairly called a village; yet in this contracted area, at any time for near three centuries past, all that has made Virginia what she has been, instead of something else, has existed in the highest degree. *Ex pede Herculem*. It is not for us to study the minute anatomy of that monumental figure which Raleigh reared to the honor of his ancient maiden queen. But the close examination of even one small member may give better acquaintance with the whole than the broad and distant view, though never so comprehensive and complete, from which the inspection of petty details is excluded.

They were a loyal company, that "London Company" which planted the "First Colony of Virginia," years before their rival "Plymouth Company" had moved to set the "Second Colony of Virginia," otherwise called "New England," upon the northern American coast. The broad and stately river which invited them into the heart of the continent, they called, after the meanest of all Stuarts, the James. From the same ignoble source they derived the name of their earliest attempt at an urban community, which soon became the victim of the first American rebellion, the only absolutely abandoned town in the English colonies. And when they had fixed this dishonoring mark upon the noble river, which could not run away, and upon the infant Jamestown, which speedily fell into annihilation and left nothing but its name, they proceeded to imagine a "James City," which seems never to have been more than a name, and from which non-existence the actual County of James City, having real territorial limits and municipal existence, derived its curious name. Thus, too, having first called the county of Henrico from the earliest hope and heir of the Stuart

dynasty, they proceeded to commemorate that second born who soon succeeded to the fatal heritage, and, constituting a Charles City in the air, a name without a local habitation, they made a "Charles City County" to be called after it. And this county, than which nothing could be more thoroughly Virginian, is the province of the Old Dominion with which we have now to do.

There is not much of it. Twenty miles long it lies upon the broad James River, flowing southeasterly to the ocean. For a like distance on its northeastern side it is bordered by that stream whose unmelodious name has since been a sound of terror to so many thousand hearts, the Chickahominy. And the peninsula which these two rivers enclose, upon an average is not ten miles wide from their junction to the northwestern limits of the county.

What there is of it, however, is thoroughly and characteristically Virginian. Here, as through all eastern Virginia, the land lies in pleasant undulations of hill and valley, not interrupted by sudden or rugged rocky heights. Through the heavy clayey soil course abundant streams; and thick forests rapidly repossess the field from which they were centuries ago evicted, if men relax but for a short time their limitless struggle with nature. Over almost two hundred square miles of a region unsurpassed in natural attractiveness, in a delightful climate, less than five thousand inhabitants disperse themselves in purely agricultural pursuits, after nearly three hundred years of colonization; nor does it seem probable that the density of population has greatly changed since very early in that period.

Virginians, too, to the back-bone, have been these people of Charles City County at all times, as characteristically as their little province was Virginia. Half of them, to be sure, were black Virginians; but they too, until a day comparatively recent, were in effect if not in law *adscripti glebae*, bearing the old Virginia surnames and proud of them, and from generation to generation working the ancestral acres into corn and tobacco. The owners, however, of these acres, in all the broad Dominion there were none with better right to the harmless boast of being the "First Families;" for the earliest English

roofs in America were raised along this peninsula. Here were maintained for centuries those stately mansions where generous living and lavish hospitality reduced from year to year the paternal estates, and delivered them in due time to the son, burdened with incumbrances, their revenues anticipated, but with a constantly growing pride of family to be supported at whatever cost. At these successive "Landings" along the James, upon which the "great house" looked from across a broad sloping lawn, for centuries the ships had discharged their cargoes direct from Bristol, leaving the year's supplies of English wares upon the plantation, with the wines, in ample store, for the cellar, and often the books for the library. Sometimes, after the "Middle Passage" of that triple voyage which was once so common, from Liverpool to Guinea, to Virginia, and home, they landed at these wharves a freight charged with greater woes for Charles City County than any Cassandra had yet been found to imagine. And on their return the ship's sides were well stuffed with the year's tobacco crop, the young master perhaps going in the cabin for an old country education and travel. Even to this day, after all vicissitudes, through all disasters, the old names of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries maintain themselves near their family seats, and lead in the councils of this simple community. Nor are the county names even of the present century without high distinction. Virginia is proud of being "the mother of Presidents;" but not even in Virginia—nowhere but in the little Massachusetts town which gave father and son to be heads of the nation—can another county be found which contains, almost within cannon-shot, the birth-places of two Presidents—of two, indeed, who, born but a few miles apart, were inducted together into the two highest offices in the land.

And this, too, is, above all, the "sacred soil" of Virginia. Not only sacred by early history and tradition, but doubly hallowed by recent sufferings and sacrifice. All over these hills and valleys were pitched the camps of invader and defender, gathered against each other from Canada to Mexico. The northern navies swarmed along the James; over the land men fought and fell and sickened and died, for their country's sake as they all thought, by myriads. Directly across the

western line of the county stretched the high ridge called Malvern Hill, where furious battle and timely victory averted from the national army the destruction which impended over it. And just below, at Berkeley and Westover and Harrison's Landing, the great beaten army reached the shelter of its ships' guns, and took breath for those renewals of conflict which were so long in reaching final success. Surely this ought to be indeed the "sacred soil!"

Out of these latter times the Record of old times has come to us. How much of the Records contained in the old Court House of Charles City—that House which, with but a blacksmith's shop or so, alone constituted the shire-town of the county—escaped the ravages of the war we do not know. But one great folio—whether saved or stolen does not appear—in this year 1875 came to light in a city close to the Canada frontier, in the hand of an old Peninsular soldier, who would part with it for a consideration. And after a generous man had ransomed it to restore it to its proper custody, the present writer stopped it long enough to draw off this little sketch of the picture it gives of ancient Virginian laws, and manners, and political and social life.

It is a great leather-bound folio, of six hundred pages, from which but two leaves are missing. Upon its first page is its title, inscribed in a large and ornate hand:

"A Book of Orders of Court Begun April Court Anno Domini 1737. By Lewellin Eppes Cl^r [Clericus] Curiae."

And the last entry in the book bears date of March Term, 1750 [1751.]

Not very critical or eventful were these fourteen years, in Virginian or American history. All these British colonies along the vast Atlantic seaboard contained then but about a million people, organized into almost primitive communities, whose avocations were little else than ploughing the land or the sea. Even the great capital city of Philadelphia counted then but twelve thousand souls.

When the book was first opened, the second Hanoverian George sat upon the throne of the Stuarts. Under him the great Walpole was carrying on the affairs of a great constitutional empire through such a system of parliamentary corrup-

tion as has never since been rivalled until the days of Oakes Ames. His majesty's colony of Virginia, meanwhile, had been for some time under the government of one William Gouch, whose very name has lapsed into oblivion, and of whose eighteen years' administration the historian records that "the undisturbed calm of it leaves almost a blank in the history of Virginia." The new colony of Oglethorpe, stamped at its very birth with the name of those Hanoverian kings against whom it was so soon to rise in rebellion, had not yet been planted half a dozen years. Out of that infant colony of Georgia, almost at the very day our record opens, was just escaping like a criminal that singular man who was shortly to lead in England, if not indeed to begin and set in motion, the greatest moral revolution which the world has seen since the founding of Christianity; to establish the greatest schism since Luther, from a church of which he never ceased to be a loyal member: to organize the strongest priestly order since Loyola, while always disavowing authority to confer orders upon any: John Wesley, whose devoted asceticism seems never to have saved him, to the end of his four-score years and eight, from the wretchedest relations with women, was flying with his brother Charles from indictments by the grand jury, and civil claims for damages; having, it seems, thought too well of women who were bad, and spoken too ill of women who were good. As Wesley landed in England, there was just setting sail for the place he fled from that scarcely less famous, but very different apostle, George Whitfield, coming to lead in these colonies the great religious reaction which had already begun under Jonathan Edwards, and which, during the precise period covered by these records, was producing prodigious effects throughout these young communities, from New England to Georgia. Only four years before, in 1733, "William Byrd of Westover [in this same county of Charles City] Esquire," and his neighbor Peter Jones, had laid out, but a dozen miles or so up the rivers James and Appomattox, which meet just opposite this county, the town plats, which were soon to be the cities of Richmond and Petersburg. And at the time the book was begun, there was playing about his father's house on the banks of the not distant Rappahannock, a little boy, just past five years old, whose name was to fill a larger place in his

tory than any of the Stuarts, or Hanoverians, or even the great Tudor herself, to whom the Dominion was dedicated—the little boy George Washington.

In a fair, large, plain, and legible hand does Lewellin Eppes begin his record, and carry it forward for two thirds of the fourteen years, without help or intervention of other pens. At February Court, 1745 [1746]—when old England was scarcely recovering from the convulsion of the young Stuart's invasion—the most exciting event in these records is that Temple Eppes, whose compact and elegant manuscript had appeared a little earlier in the book, "Produced a Commission from Thomas Nelson, Esquire, Deputy Secretary of this colony, to be Deputy Clerk of this Court," and, "Having first taken the oaths appointed by act of Parliament to be taken instead of the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and subscribed the Test, was sworn Deputy Clerk accordingly." And thenceforth Temple Eppes kept the record in the place of Lewellin.

One does not go far in the proceedings of this court—which was both broad and high in its powers, having not only civil but criminal jurisdiction, in law and in equity, either unlimited as to amounts or subject to a very high limit only, and being also the administrative body of the county—without falling upon something startling to modern notions. "Joseph Makepeace [happy name for a party plaintiff] against Morris Evans, for forty shillings current money, three hundred pounds of Tobacco and a hog, due by bill here in Court produced, the Defendant being run away or so absconded that process could not be served on him,"—the record proceeds to recite the issue of an attachment and a seizure of certain chattels thereunder by the Sheriff, a hearing by the Court as to the ownership of the goods, a finding that they "are not the proper goods of the s^d. Morris Evans, and thereupon it is ordered that the s^d. attachment be dismiss, and that William Irby *the plaintiff's attorney* do pay costs and one attorney's fee, alr. Ex^o." [*aliter Executio.*] Of course there is an earlier New York precedent for such an adjudication, where, in Knickerbocker's history, the constable was ordered to pay the costs; but it need hardly be argued that the general adoption of such a course in modern practice would, while greatly intensifying the interest of a professional career, add nothing either to its pleasure or its profit.

Very soon, too, in the book do we get a notion of the composition of this Court, and of its extra-judicial duties. Five or six gentlemen in the commission of the peace, issued by "y^e Honble the Lieut Governor," with their Clerk and Sheriff under like appointment, constitute the entire tribunal.

From the historic names recurring constantly among them it would be plain, if we did not know it otherwise, that no democratic notion of universal equality guided in the appointment of the justices. "Do you know the laws of your country, Mr. Warrington?" said Colonel Wolfe, a few months before he took Quebec, to that young Virginian in England; "being a great proprietor, you will doubtless one day be a magistrate at home." Yet it is remarkable how commonly these "great proprietors," in this colony so loyal and so faithful to the Anglican Church, availed themselves, as we have just seen Mr. Temple Eppes to do, of the privilege of evading the oaths of allegiance and supremacy. For all that, their tendencies can hardly have been Romish; for that church was already losing its control even of the neighboring province of Maryland, and had never extended itself into Virginia. But on the other hand, dissent seems to have had but little sway among them; for it is not often, whether or not they decline these oaths, that they are found failing to "subscribe y^e Test."

Upon the very earliest recital of the membership of the Court we come upon some names that are as household words: "Charles City County ss^t. June Court, 1737: Present: Henry Soane, Francis Hardyman, Benj^a. Harrison, Samu^l. Harwood, Jun^r., James Eppes, Gent., Justices." To a distant reader, unfamiliar with Virginia families, it seemed at first that this must be the same Benjamin Harrison who, twenty-nine years later, set his name upon an official document destined to have much wider renown than the court records of Charles City County—the Declaration of the Independence of the United States of America. But upon consulting that respectable authority, the "Lives of the Signers," this assumption, instead of being either established or overthrown, is converted into utter uncertainty. It appears that at least six successive generations of eldest sons have borne this youngest son's name. When the little troop of Separatists had been but some twenty years settled at Ply-

mouth, one Harrison, whose first name is lost, but who is surmised to have been related to that Puritan general who came in due time to an honorable death on the scaffold, is found living in the opposite county of Surrey, across the James. It was his heir who established the family seat of Berkeley, in Charles City County, where from that time onward, unless indeed recent convulsions have broken up that comely succession, there has never been wanting a Benjamin to maintain the family dignity and the traditional hospitalities. But the biography consulted can only tell us: that this first founder of Berkeley, born in 1645, died in 1718; that the signer of the Declaration was in the third generation from him, and died in 1791; but when he was born or when his father or his grandfather was born or died, the author puts among unascertainable facts, mentioning only that the grandfather died at the age of 37; that the father, who had married the daughter of the king's surveyor-general, Carter, whereby he was able to increase his estate by judicious selections of lands, was killed by lightning, with two of his daughters, at the mansion house of Berkeley; and that of his eight surviving children, one daughter married Peyton Randolph, the first president of Congress, and the other William Randolph his brother.

The biographer having thus given certain imperfect data, it has been a pleasant process to fill out their defects and complete them from our authentic record, which would indeed be inadequate of itself for the identification of persons. Thus we find that Benjamin Harrison, Gent., at June Court, 1787, took the "oaths appointed by act of parliam^t to be taken and subscribed the Test, etc., in order to qualify him to act as Col^o. of the Militia of this County." Henceforth he is distinguished in the record by the military title thus acquired; as when, in October, 1740, he "brings his Servant man Samuel Martin into Court," to answer to what civil or criminal charge will never be known; for Lewellin Eppes, Clerk, left there a blank quarter of a page to be filled up at his greater convenience upon a to-morrow which, in these hundred and thirty-five years, has not yet come. Thus from month to month does he appear in the list of Justices holding court, even into July Term, 1745. But under August Term, 1745, five other names head the record, but not his; and

the first entry of that term records that "The last Will and Testament of Col^o. Benjamin Harrison dec'd was presented in Court by William Randolph, Gent., and Miss Betty Harrison;" whereupon "certificate is granted them for obtaining letters of Administration with the said will annexed in due forme Durante minori ætate of Benjamin Harrison, son and heir of the Deced^t." Nearly four years later, at June Court, 1749, the young "Benjamin Harrison, an infant, by his guardian" (who appears elsewhere to have been Beverley Randolph) takes a rule by default against one John Scot for judgment if he "appear not at the next court." On the sixth of December following, however, appears "Benjamin Harrison, *Gent.*, who made Oath according to Law as an Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Benjamin Harrison dec'd;" and at the January Court, 1749 [1750], "a New Commission of the Peace for this County" was read, and the oaths administered to the five Justices holding the court and to Benjamin Harrison. At April Court, 1750, the youthful and newly qualified Justice takes his seat upon the bench, from which he continues to administer the laws with his associates during all the rest of his record. And this youthful magistrate, plainly enough, was the athletic member of the Continental Congress thirty years later, who, when the outlaw John Hancock was chosen its President in place of his brother-in-law Randolph, and seemed to shrink with a diffidence not altogether constitutional, from the dangerous honor, lifted the little man in his powerful arms into the chair, with a laughing defiance of Britain and a generous good word for Massachusetts. Plainly enough it was his father who was struck down by lightning between the July Term at which he assisted, and the August Term at which his will was proved. His own birth, the date of which his biographer declares to be unknown, is closely fixed by the expiration of his infancy as not long before December, 1728. And remembering who his mother was, we may be sure that it is his brother of whom this record is made, in June, 1750, Benjamin Harrison being upon the bench: "Carter Harrison, Infant Orphan of Benjamin Harrison, deceased, with the approbation of the Court Made Choice of Benjamin Harrison for his Guardian."

What tenants the fortune of war and of social revolution

may have left now in that noble old mansion of Berkeley, we know not. Fifty years ago, the sixth successive first-born Benjamin maintained it,—that seat commemorating by its name the stout old royalist Governor, Sir William, who wrote home to the Privy Council, "I thank God there are no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sect, into the world, and printing has divulged them, and libels against the best government: God keep us from both!" But the younger brother of that first-born who succeeded to the ancestral estate, named William Henry, being cast upon the world to help himself, became President of the Republic his ancestor had helped to found; and to those who believe in the transmission of faculties, it is pleasant to read, these few days past, that it is proposed to make still another Benjamin Harrison, grandson of the President, Governor of Indiana. Nor is it much less gratifying, to one whose political recollections reach back nearly forty years, to observe that the name of *Tyler* appears but once in all this volume, in the county which in the fulness of time was to give birth to a President of that name; and then only in the humble capacity of a clerk to Benjamin Harrison the elder, making oath to a small debt of his master's, of ten pounds nineteen shillings and eight-pence, current money.

The judicial and administrative business of this tribunal go on almost conjointly, and are entered of record without discrimination. In each successive year we find an appointment of "Gentlemen to take the lists of Tithables" in the several precincts of the county; and in every year, but not with entire regularity, the Court lays the "County Levy." In all these levies the singular nature of Virginia money appears,—as remarkable a currency, perhaps, as any civilized community ever legalized. When, in 1691, the Scotsman Blair, Commissary in this province of the Bishop of London, was persuading the King and Queen into the liberal largesses which established the College bearing their name, and Mr. Attorney-General Seymour protested against the exorbitance of his demands, the Commissary suggested to him a view of the case which he had overlooked: "Consider, sir, that the people of Virginia have souls to save." "Damn your souls! Make tobacco!" was the

answer of the legal adviser of the Crown. And to this end, not forgetting, of course, that better part to which the bishop's legate alluded, did the honest Virginians give themselves, even those who did not actually till the soil; for, until a period since the latest date in this volume, the current money of Virginia, circulating side by side with sterling money and with the less valuable provincial currencies, was the staple product of her soil, deposited in warehouses and represented by receipts; and whoso would "make money" must do even as the Attorney-General had commanded. In this currency, "based," as the financiers of to-day would have it, "on the entire wealth of the country," are the levies laid, as thus: "To Lewellin Eppes, Clerk, for ex-officio services, 1080:" to the Sheriff and King's Attorney, a like sum each: "To cask for y^e above 8 articles, 40 each, 120. To y^e Undertakers of the great bridge [across the historic Chickahominy, no doubt], 1 lb. Tob^o. per poll, 1308 Tithables, 1308; cask for the same, 4 pr. ct., 52. To Jn^o. Peter Wagon, for cleaning y^e Co. house, and Small beer, 360. To John Shell and Henry Clark, for attend. y^e mad Tinker, 100." The generous provision of the cask to take home the salary in, naturally suggests a more recent financial condition of Virginia, when the market basket was used to transport the money, and the vest pocket to bring home what it bought. Later we find allowed: "To Peter Talbot, for nailing 2 bords on a tree, 20;" and, "To Richard Cook, Jun^r., for erecting stocks and pillory, 700." A guide to the probable value of the currency is found in the usual allowance of thirty pounds a day, rising, however, before the close of the book, to 50 lbs., for ordinary service as guards. And an exact equation is given in 1741, where it was "Ordered: that 457 pounds of Tobacco due . . . be paid by the Sheriff to Col^o. Benj^a. Harrison in cash at ten shillings and seven-pence p^r. ct." There are also such items as, "To Peter Royster for whipping 2 negros, Col^o. Light-foot, 36;" and at the close of the last levy the Sheriff is charged, not only with the whole number of Tithables, at 5 lbs. each, but with "Persons deficient in their number of Squirrels' heads, as by a List delivered the Sheriff to collect, (W^t.Tob^o.) 2045."

It fell to the Court also, "to settle y^e price on Liquora, etc., (viz^t.) West India Rum at y^e Rate of ten Shillings p^r. gall^d.,

New England Rum, 5s. pr. gallond [thus early were the Puritan colonies regarded with disfavor], French Brandy 20s., Virga. Brandy at 7½^{d.} pr. gall^{d.}, persico or peach brandy 10s., Madera wine 2 shillings a quart," etc: "Diet one shilling a meal, Lodging 7½^{d.} each night," etc.; at which rates "the several Ordinary keepers" are ordered to sell.

Not only were the inspection and maintenance of highways also the duty of this Court, as appears from frequent entries, but another somewhat peculiar charge seems to have belonged to it. We find it ordered, for example, "that the vestry of Westover parrish do divide the s^{d.} parrish into so many precincts as to them shall seem convenient for processioning every person's Land, and that they appoint the particular times between the last day of September and the last day of March now next coming, when such processioning shall be made in every precinct, and also that they appoint two intelligent honest freeholders, of every precinct, to see the s^{d.} processioning performed, and to take and return to the Vestry an acct. of every person's Land they shall procession."*

If the Court was charged thus with the verification of landmarks and boundaries, so also did it give authenticity and solemnity to the acts by which lands were aliened or encumbered. At every term are several entries such as this: "A Deed from Marmaduke Barnes to John Gregory in open Court acknowledged from himself unto the s^{d.} Gregory as his act and Deed and ordered to be recorded, and Charity the wife of the said Barnes being first privately examined relinquisheth her right of Dower in and to the land in the s^{d.} Deed mentioned, which is also ordered to be recorded." Nor does the Court regard itself as acting, even in these matters, outside of its judicial functions; it scrutinizes the instruments offered, and does not always allow them. "Benj^{a.} Harris, Gent., offers a Deed to be proved from Joseph Brun and Caton DeWert, to y^{e.} s^{d.} Harris; but Caton Brun and Mary Ann Brun, Witnesses thereto, on their

* Before the Reformation, in England, the "processioning," or perambulating the parochial and individual boundaries, seems to have been conducted with great ceremony, by the lord of the manor, priests in surplices, and most of the parishioners, and always on one of the "Rogation Days," late in the spring. In a less solemn form the usage has been maintained in England until a very recent period.

Oaths declareing they never saw their father and mother, the above s^d. Jos. Brun and Caton DeWert, sign, seal, or acknowledge the s^d. Deed, and thereupon y^e. s^d. Deed is rejected." "Benjamin Harris in open Court tenders a Deed to be acknowledged to M^s. Caton DeWert for a certain Tract of land sold her by the s^d. Harris ; but she refusing to accept of y^e. s^d. acknowledgment, therefore the s^d. Deed is rejected." It is perhaps not a surprising sequel to this incident that we find the next Grand Jury presenting "Mrs. Catharine [or Caton] Brun and Mary Ann Brun for perjury on the information of Mr. Ben. Harris." As the proceedings were very soon removed to "y^e. general Court" by *certiorari*, the remainder of this interesting tragedy becomes lost to our sight.

A court which hesitates to punish disrespect to itself is not likely to be held in respect very long; and that was not the fault with this court. We read: "For the insolent behavior of James Mitchell to the Judge of this court sitting on the bench, It is unanimously agreed by this Court that the said James Mitchell do pay unto our Sovereign lord the king a fine of seven pounds ten shillings curr^t. for his said abuse, and that the Sheriff doe take the said Mitchel in his custody and him safely keep until he shall pay the above sum or until he shall give sufficient caution for the paym^t. thereof, and also that he give like Security for his good behavior for Twelve months a day." When it is observed that the very next entry is of a verdict against James Mitchell for 7l. 10s., and judgment thereon, it becomes manifest that the defeated party had undertaken to avail himself of that remedy which was long ago said to be the alternative of an appeal, except that he indiscreetly omitted to "go down to the tahvern" to make use of it.

One institution appears in these records, in the highest degree creditable to those who devised it, in itself suited to a complex and highly developed society, but which seems not for many generations to have extended itself beyond these simple communities. From time to time the Court sits as "a Court for ye proof of publick claims," or, simply, "a Court of Claims." This modern device for the determination of demands against the public, had in fact existed in Virginia long before formal expression was given to it by a statute in 1705, by which, on every

election day, notice was to be given of the time and place of holding such a court, at which the public claims and grievances of every person within the county were to be presented, and, if satisfactorily proved, to be certified to the General Assembly for allowance. It is true that in our book these claims for the most part are "for takeing up a runaway man-slave belonging to" so and so; but even such claims as these are none the worse for being sifted through the scrutiny of an honest court before getting into the lobby of a legislature. Yet even the prospect of getting into "the supply bill" seems not always to have overcome the natural repugnance of a Virginian gentleman to engaging in this particular species of field sports. Richard Cumbo, Junr., is summoned by a constable, "for refusing to aid and assist him in the pursuit of a runaway, and is fined twenty shillings wth. costs for his s^d. contempt."

Before the date of this book the slavery of negroes was getting settled into the form which it retained, with but few modifications, until its violent end. But there are still many indications of the milder type in which that system first established itself upon American soil. At every term appear several entries like this: "Phil, a negro boy belonging to John Edloe, Junr., is adjudged to be eleven years old." At one term, after a round dozen of little Africans, with but one name apiece, and that very short, belonging either to "Mr. Secretary Carter" or to John Carter, Esq^r., have been thus solemnly adjudicated upon, "John Carter, Esq^r," appears "to answer y^e. complaint of Will Bell, a molatto serv^t. to y^e. s^d. Carter, for his freedom. It appearing by a certain Record of y^e. Co^{ty}. Court of Lancaster that the s^d. Bell hath two years to serve his s^d. master from y^e. fifteenth day of June next, w^{ch}. being considered by y^e. Court, it is thereupon ordered, that y^e. s^d. Bell doe immediately return into his s^d. master's service and him faithfully serve untill y^e. s^d. two years shall be fully completed and ended." So Walter Vernon is sued by his servant James Turner (whether negro or not does not appear) for his freedom; a copy of the Registry of Turner's age being produced, it appears he is still a servant to his said master, and he is ordered to return to his service and him faithfully serve until his lawful term of thirty-one years is fully expired. Thus also James Green is sued by his former servant Sarah Anderson

(of what color does not appear) "for her freedom dues"; and is found to be indebted to her on account of her freedom allowance under the indenture by which she was bound to him, "a Cow Calfe, a Cap, a hankercheif, and a p^r. of Stockings," which he is ordered to pay and deliver to her, or in lieu thereof fourteen shillings current money, with costs. So, "on the petition of Rich^d. Humbles ag^t. his master Charles Xtian for his freedom dues, it appearing that the s^d. Humbles hath not yet been paid by his said master what the law provides for servants at the expiration of their service. It is ordered he doe now discharge the same to his said servant." In a later case "what the law allows to such persons" appears from the judgment of the court to be "fifteen bush^{ls}. of Indian Corn and forty shillings curr^t. money or the value thereof in gooda." And another master, on his servant's complaint for not complying with the agreements in her indenture, is ordered to put her to school one year, as also to instruct her in the principles of religion, as he will answer the contrary on a second complaint for his failure. On the other hand, Col. Harrison "brings in his servant-man Thomas Sellars, who hath absented himself from his service, by which absence, and reasonable disbursement in taking him up, it appearing that the term of nine months is justly due to his said master, according to the computation the law in that case directs, it is ordered that he serve nine months after his time by indenture is expired." Here was one of the name, certainly, to whom there turned out not to be "millions in it." Another "Xtian" having complained against Ben Humbles, his servant, for running away, the latter is ordered to "serve his said master three months for his said servant's absence, and one hundred and sixteen days for his trouble and expence according to law;" a very literal way, certainly, to "*payer de sa personne*." One Isham Richardson, however, comes of his own accord, and "in open court acknowledgeth himself a servant to James Taylor for the term of four years. And Richard Cocke, Jun^r., complaining of his servant boy John Partin for absenting himself from his service (a euphemism which fell out of use at a later date in Virginia) and it appearing "that he hath behaved himself in an idle manner, it is ordered that the Sheriff doe give him ten lashes at the publick whipping post, well laid on, to deter him for the

future." Surely, however, a system under which questions of domestic discipline like these, instead of being arbitrarily settled by the master, were referred to the decisions of a court, was milder than some that could be imagined.

In civil contentions, and in the administration of public justice, whether by direct indictment and conviction or by *qui tam* actions and actions by the king or by public officers for penalties, the ancient English procedure is, as might be expected, closely followed in this ultra-loyal province. There was no striking out of a whole new system of judicature, as in the bold Puritan colonies of Connecticut and New Haven, although such new conditions as a variant and deficient circulating medium compelled some such novelties as have already been adverted to. Thus also, in a suit "for ten barrels of corn due by acct.," we find it "ordered that the defendt. doe pay unto the pl^t. the s^d. sum of Ten Barr^{ls}. of Corn with costs;" upon which singular judgment it appears from the margin that a *ca. sa.* was issued April 15, 1733. Where the taxation of costs is entered in the margin, it appears almost always to be part in the alternative of tobacco or money, and part in tobacco absolutely; or else altogether in tobacco. Thus: "Costs, 311 lbs. Nt. Tob^o. and 15 / or 150 lbs. Tob^o." or, "Costs 112 lbs. Nt. Tob^o." Occasionally some seeming anomaly strikes the eye, as the following (if "following" be a fit word to use) *non sequitur*; a jury having found for the plaintiff one penny, the verdict is "recorded and judgm^t. is accordingly awarded the pl^t. ag^t. y^e. Defend^t. for y^e. s^d. sum of one penny and y^e. *Suit is dismiss wth. Costs !*"

Perhaps in no direction has the jocund legal intellect so disported itself as in that ingenious fiction known as the action of ejectment. The riotous imagination of lawyers has always revelled in the introduction of new characters into this little drama; and here in Virginia, those famous English champions, Doe, Denn, Goodtitle, and Goodright, the Gog and Magog of the forensic arena, are displaced by new creations. The colder fancy of the New York bar contended itself with the unpoetic image of James Jackson; but the Virginia imagination took higher flights. Actions by Solomon Saveall against Simpleton Spendall appear from time to time, involving different messages; and thus also does Richard Thrustout assert his rights or those of

his lessor against one Thomas Holdfast, a casual ejector, whose defense is speedily assumed by an actual occupant of the premises.

The longest entry in the book is the entire record of a Chancery suit, including full abstracts of the pleadings and the final decree, and covering nearly three pages. The complainant alleged certain transactions with the defendant's testator, whom he thought "to have better skill in choosing of slaves" than the plaintiff, and to whom he applied to purchase for him "two new Negro Boys of the first Guinea Ship that should arrive in this collony convenient to James River." The defendants are decreed to pay "fifteen pounds current money and nineteen pounds fifteen shillings and two pence sterling money, the sterling money to be discharged in current money at 25 per cent."

Perhaps, however, there is nothing in the great book more instructive and entertaining, upon the whole, than the details that may be gathered from the "crown side" of the Court. Of what offences did our sovereign lord the king, in his colony of Virginia, see fit to take cognizance—whether against property, or the person, or the king's peace, or public morality, or religion; what offences are found to be most frequent in commission and in punishment—when these two questions are fully answered, not very much remains to be learned of the institutions or of the social condition of the community. And it might well be found that some prevalent notions, which will have it that none but Puritans enforced by positive law and penalty a conformity to outward religious observances, may need revision in the light which comes from this loyalist and Anglican record.

The first entry, however, of a penal character upon which the eye falls is an action by the "Churchwardens of Westover parish agt. Sarah Edwards for Fifty Shillings or five hundred pounds of Tob^o. for being delivered of a bastard Child Contrary to a Law in that Case made and provided." It is difficult to approve the wisdom of a statute which, providing apparently no punishment for the original offense against morality, reserves its terrors for the occurrence which our modern jurisprudence insists shall proceed without any obstruction or interference. In this case, however, the culprit Sarah, without protesting against the cruelty of the law, "appears and confesseth Judg-

ment for the s^d. Sum," no doubt hoping, as has been averred of another damsel in like case, that it would be a lesson to her.

The first Grand Jury in this volume (and there appears to have been a Grand Jury at every May and November Court) began and ended its entire business as follows: "We the grand Jury doe present Philemon Bradford, John Davis, William Loung, Richard Cumbo, James Bryan, for not attending their parish Church;" "which presentments are ordered to be recorded, and that the King's attorney for this County doe prosecute the above offenders as y^e. Law directs."

The next Grand Jury, finding that offense no doubt to have been suppressed by the energy of its predecessor, presents only the overseer of the upper precinct of Chickahominy River, for not cleaning the s^d. River;" "y^e. overseer of y^e. Road from the broad Run to y^e. Long Bridge;" "y^e. overseer of y^e. new Road from John Lide's to y^e. New church;" "Lucy Lee for having a bastard child;" "Ann Evans for having a bastard child." Six months later the grand inquest presents, besides another overseer of a road for not keeping it in repair, and two persons for not "listing" themselves or their negro slaves for taxation, Thomas Morecock, John Lide and James Duke "for not going to Church;" of whom at the following term Duke is "fined as the Law Directs;" and as to Lide and Morecock, "on the reasons given by" them, "the same is dismiss."

Crimes multiply in the next half year; and Lucy Pearman and Tabitha Brown are made the victims of misplaced affections; Francis Hardyman (who but a month or two before was one of the justices holding the court) and William Irby (the unfortunate attorney who at a former term was condemned to pay costs) are charged with not going to church, the same Irby with keeping a "tipling house," and one Robert Hemmons with profane swearing. At the following term Francis Hardyman, Gent., at the time sitting on the bench, is called to answer the presentment, and "making no objections" is fined five shillings in currency or fifty pounds tobacco, with costs. The like penalty is laid upon Irby and Hemmons; but as for poor Tabitha, "it appearing to the Court that she hath been delivered of such Child, It is considered she pay the fine inflicted on such offenders by Law, being One Thousand pounds of Tobacco, with costs."

Six months later Phillis Goeing, Hesther Burton and Elizabeth Thomas are presented for increasing the colonial population in an irregular way; three persons, of whom two are the same Francis Hardyman and James Duke, uncorrected by their recent mulcts, for not going to church; George Tree for not keeping his ferry according to law, and "Col. Thos. Bray for making his Negros work on the Sabbath day"—not "Sunday," as the anti-Puritan protest is wont to insist on phrasing it. In due time the established penalties follow upon these new offences as before; and Col. Bray is likewise condemned, for his undisputed misdemeanor, to pay five shillings or fifty pounds of Tobacco "for the use the law directs," the exact price, it seems, of staying away from church himself. Of the next batch of presentments, four in number, two are for having bastards, one for profane swearing, and one, "John Clarke, for not going to Church as y^e. Law directs and not takeing any care for a liveing." When the Court comes to impose the statutory fine upon this blasphemer, it declares a motive for its sentence, "to deter him from the like for the future."

From the frequency with which certain names recur in these criminal records there would seem to have been room in Virginia at this time for an "Habitual Criminals' Act." Here, for instance, comes swearing Robert Hemmons, and is presented "for making four of Col. Thos. Bray's Negros work on the third day of this Instant being Sunday;" and at the same time, with George Tree and Richard Cumbo, Junr., "for absenting his parrish Church." Four are presented, each "for not keeping his road in repair;" one woman for "the old, old story;" and John Prince for living in adultery with Elizabeth Howlet. The incriminated Hemmons, however, comes out of it pretty well, getting a dismissal of both charges, the one for his "absenting his church" on the ground "that he hath been resident in another parrish some time."

But the laws of religion are not always to be violated or evaded with impunity; and as soon as another grand inquest has the opportunity it presents, besides Mrs. Catharine Brun and Mary Ann Brun for perjury, the miscreant George Tree "for keeping unlawful gameing," and Martha Thomas and Lucy Evans for irregular maternity, no less than twenty male

citizens "for not goeing to Church as y^e. law directa." Thus from one semester to another does our Sovereign Lord the King renew his unequal contest with the powers of evil, until at the end, upon recounting the whole work of his Grand Juries, it is found that out of an aggregate of just one hundred and fifty presentments, sixty-seven were for failure in duty to the parish church;* thirteen for profane swearing; twenty-eight for unlicensed multiplication; eighteen for remissness in duty as overseers of roads, and the remaining twenty-four for divers felonies and misdemeanors, of which five were "for mis-behaveing in Church," and three "for playing at Cards on Sunday morning with a Negro Man belonging to Mr. George Minge."

Besides the matters brought under the notice of the Grand Jury, there was occasionally some penal process. Thus, on the information of a constable "agt. William Cryer for turning out, toping, and tending Tob^o. Suckers contrary to a law in that case made and provided," the king's attorney is ordered to prosecute. But this extraordinary charge coming on to be heard at the ensuing term, "the Court adjudging the same was done without his knowledge or consent, the said information is dismiss^t." One draws a sigh of relief at coming to such an end of an accusation of such vague enormity. It may be doubted whether even in that very county, where at this day, according to the latest census, the old Virginian herb is no longer even mentioned among the products of the soil, a much more definite

* Perhaps it is worth while to compare with the fictitious "Blue Laws of Connecticut" the following veritable provisions of English, and assuredly not Puritan, law. So late as James I. a statute re-enacted laws of 5th and 6th Edward VI. and 1st Elizabeth, that "every inhabitant of the realm or dominion shall diligently and faithfully, having no lawful or reasonable excuse to be absent, endeavor themselves to their parish church or chapel accustomed," upon penalty of twelve pence for every non-attendance. In the reign of William and Mary and of George III, exceptions were for the first time introduced in favor of dissenters; nor were these, with many similar penal laws in regard to religious opinions, finally repealed until her present gracious majesty had been more than nine years on the throne. "In the year 1817, at the Spring Assizes for Bedford, Sir Montague Burgoyne was prosecuted for having been absent from his parish church for several months; when the action was defeated by proof of the defendant having been indisposed. And in the report of Prison Inspectors to the House of Lords, in 1841, it appeared that in 1830 ten persons were in prison for recusancy in not attending their parish churches." See Amos on Hale's *Pleas of the Crown*.

idea would be formed of the nature of the offense in question than in those remote Connecticut farms which have now so largely assumed the production of that plant.

Thus also do we find "Benja. Harrison, Gent., informing y^e. Court that Richard Bragby and Elizabeth his wife and Mary Evans doth not take a sufficient care in bringing up their children to an honest way of Liveing as well as in y^e fear of God," they are ordered to show cause (if any) at the next Court why their children should not be bound out. And at the next Court "it appearing to y^e. Court very reasonable and necessary they should be, it is thereupon ordered they be bound by y^e. Churchwardens as y^e. Law directs."

Here too is a proceeding by information, which seems, however, to be used solely for the redress of a personal injury. "Beverly Randolph, Esqr.," whose name alone, without the addition, signifies plainly enough good blood and broad acres, exhibits an information against John Irby, that he "hath contrary to the leave, License or consent of the said Beverly hunted and ranged on his lands contrary to a law in this case made and provided;" whereupon the plaintiff, maintaining thus the right of the fine old English gentleman to the sanctity of his preserves, recovers of said Irby five hundred pounds of tobacco with costs.

The administration of purely criminal justice, also, is not always in its methods precisely accordant with now prevailing ideas. On one occasion a court of Oyer and Terminer, constituted for the trial of felonies by special commission, though consisting of the same justices as the county court, proceeds to the trial of one "Ben, slave of the Hon^{le}. Phil. Lightfoot, Esqr.," for feloniously breaking and entering the public warehouse at Cabin Point, and stealing a hogshead of tobacco. The Court, without being embarrassed by the intervention of a jury, find him "guilty of the fact. But the said prisoner Ben praying the benefit of y^e. act relating to the benefit of clergy, it is considered by the Court that the s^d. fact comes within that act, and thereupon have ordered that the s^d. Ben be in open Court burned in the hand, which was instantly done by the Sheriff, and that he receive on his bare back thirty-nine lashes at y^e. publick whipping post, which being also done the s^d. Ben

was *acquitted!*" No doubt the astonished Ben might have wondered, if these were the terms of an acquittal, what sort of observances would have attended upon a conviction.

Here, too, comes Sarah Carter, to answer one of those numerous presentments of the Grand Jury for some one else's illicit indulgence. "She being on Examination found guilty, and failing to give security for the fine inflicted by law on such offenders, it is considered she receive on her bare back twenty-five lashes at y^e. publick whipping post, which was accordingly Executed." And this seems indeed to have been the established rate at which the legal penalty of fifty shillings or five hundred pounds of tobacco for this particular infraction of the laws might be compounded—the rate, that is, of two shillings or twenty pounds of tobacco to the lash.

Some of us have not yet forgotten the *argumentum ad hominem* with which the zealous humanitarianism of twenty years ago was often met and confounded: "Sure wud ye have yer daughter marry a nagur?" And if, inferring possibilities from our various personal observations, we made light of the peril thus threatened, this record might have taught us that the conjunction which seemed so unnatural was yet very far from un-supposable, even in the face of severe penal sanctions. For in one case it is "Ordered that the Churchwardens of Westover parrish bind Joseph Barham, a bastard child begot by a Negro on the body of a white woman, to Charles Christian as the law directs." And such seems to have been from a very early day the propensity of some part of the female population of Virginia to rush into these dichromatic embraces, that as early as 1692 a stringent statute of prohibition was thought necessary: "For the prevention of that abominable mixture and spurious issue which hereafter may increase in this Dominion, as well by negroes, mulattoes and Indians intermarrying with English or other white women, as by their unlawful accompanying with one another," any free white man or woman making such a mixed marriage was to be forever banished; while white women who without marriage should have mulatto children were to pay fifteen pounds sterling or be sold for five years, the child to be bound out as a servant until thirty years of age.

Enough of the hints and pictures afforded by this volume of

a condition of political and social life which is extinct, and which contained much that was pleasant, and honorable, and not easily to be spared out of the world. But one cannot explore the great book, and follow the suggestions and clues which hang upon almost every page, without making more than one distinct personal acquaintance, and being stirred with special interest from time to time by some familiar name. Here, for instance, as early as March Court, 1737-8, is "Wm. Byrd, Esq.," the founder but a few months before of Richmond and Petersburg, "relinquishing his right of adm'on on y^e. Estate of his dec'd daughter Evelin Byrd," sufficiently burdened, perhaps, by the cares of his new colony to be compelled to escape such private duties as he might. Here too our old friend Thomas Sellars, who as Col. Harrison's servant was condemned to additional servitude for his fugacity, turns up after several years to be mulcted of five shillings for abstention from church, upon the presentment of the Grand Jury, "no sufficient reason being given for absenting himself." Unhappy Thomas! Even after a century and a third, many bosoms will feel a sympathetic pang for you. To you the active and the passive voice are alike burdensome; to work and to suffer equally painful; from both, following an impulse but too natural, you sought in vain to rescue yourself by evasion. To you the monkish proverb was indeed a verity: "*Laborare est orare*," and neither the one nor the other suited your joyous nature. Rest tranquil, Thomas, in your forgotten grave; confident that your descendants of this generation, under more indulgent institutions, are doing less either of the one or the other than your most hopeful noon-day dreams had ever pictured to you!

Here, upon another page, is caught another sidelong glimpse of that social world in which the heroic figure of Washington moved as familiarly as was possible to a demigod. For Daniel Parke Custis is found suing out an attachment and taking judgment against William Gray for the unusually large sum of £59. 9s. 10d. and costs; showing that John of those names, whose blooming widow nine years later caught and fixed the affections of the future Father of his country, was not the only Parke Custis of wealth and consideration. Here, at very frequent intervals, appears as a most persistent litigant the some-

what peculiar name of "Pridgin Waddill;" whose fondness for the atmosphere of courts is better understood in view of the fact that at this very time the Clerk of this same court bears the same family name. And in tracing the fortunes of the family of Gibson, which appears to have fallen frequently under the notice of the Grand Jury, for neglect of the means of grace, and for such lapses from virtue as naturally followed, one explorer at least, was startled enough to come upon the name of *Randal Gibson*. From early college days that name had been familiar to this writer, belonging to a tall and handsome young Louisianian, of a character at once dignified and attractive; in the war of secession a brave and distinguished Southern general, and now representing New Orleans in Congress. But whether there is more than a coincidence in the striking identity of names—whether this Randal Gibson who a hundred and thirty years ago is in various trouble with his entire family, and with the rest of them—though at one time under the name of *Randolph Gibson*—is put under bonds for good behavior—can be of any kin to the well-behaving and law-making Randal Gibson of to-day—that is still mere matter of surmise.

Another family, however, in Charles City County, was obviously the victim of its fatal surname. The wisdom of its ancestors having endowed it with the generic name of *Justis*, it seems to have given itself up to a continuous disproof of that dissociation which cynics have alleged to exist between Justice and Law; and from the earliest pages this auspicious name adorns the volume. Nor do these Bartoline Saddletrees of the County Court content themselves with the felicity of their terminal name. John Justis looks well in the title of a cause: but what could be better than the concentration of jurisprudence in the name of *Justinian Justis*, until this happy father, hero of many law-suits, commemorates himself and his triumphs by imposing upon his son the apt alliteration of *Justinian Justis Junior*? First comes this son of the house, as a simple and successful plaintiff in debt or assumpsit. Next, however, appears the father, defendant in a bill in chancery exhibited by "Eupha feme [or wife] Justis;" which, after successive steps of pleadings, continuances, etc., is at last dismissed for want of prosecution. But Justis feme having thereupon brought suit again in Chancery

against Justis baron, with precisely the same result, the Court sees fit to advise itself concerning this assertor of the feminine right of litigation; and "being fully convinced by sufficient proof that Eupha Justis hath often threatened to destroy the slaves or some part of the Estate of her said husband," the Sheriff is ordered to take her into custody until she give bonds in twenty pounds for her good behavior toward her husband for one year and a day. And on the other hand "her said husband" goes out of the record at last as defendant in a verdict against him for false and scandalous words spoken of the plaintiff; whereupon, belligerent to the end, he moves in arrest of judgment, is beaten, and judgment that he may be taken in satisfaction.

It remains only to deduce a moral from the history of one more family, whose name has already appeared in this paper. It will be remembered that Francis Hardyman, Gent., a Justice of the Court, was very early charged with neglect of his gospel privileges, made no defence, and submitted himself to the discipline of the law. Notwithstanding this dereliction, however, he seems during his life to have still been deemed worthy to sit upon the bench. In a year or two he is gathered to his fathers, and his will is proved. But within six months afterward, at the very day when an inventory of the father's estate is filed, begins a series of entries of a most startling kind, in which the heir to the name gives proof of the effects upon a youthful mind of the paternal disregard for external moralities. In February, 1741-2, when "Benjamin Harrison and Richard Kennon, Gent., Churchwardens of Westover parrish, prosecuted Tabitha Chandler for fifty shillings or five hundred pounds of Tob^o. for being lately delivered of a bastard child, Francis Hardyman appearing and in open court promiseing and takeing upon himself to pay the s^d. fine, * * thereupon the suit is dismiss^t." This is bad enough; but in March, 1742-3, one Hannah Flewellin having just been condemned to a like fine for a like offence, who but Francis Hardyman should appear and acknowledge to pay for Hannah Flewellin her fine before the laying of the next levy. No wonder that he becomes also involved in a Chancery suit with his mother in regard to her dower in the paternal estate which was no doubt entailed upon him; but it was hardly to be

expected that so soon as February, 1745-6, the inconstant Francis should be entering into the same engagement for one Ann Irby ; that in June of the same year he should render the like affectionate service for Ann Woodard, a damsel in similar misfortune ; nor that in April, 1747, his chivalrous instincts should have led him to rescue Elinor Brookes from the consequences of their mutual attachment. If no later record of like generosity has been found in the remaining years of this volume, it must be ascribed rather to an exhausted estate than to impaired vitality ; for in the tax levy of 1747 this heir of a Virginia gentleman is inscribed for 108 pounds of tobacco, "for whipping y^e. Negros," and almost upon the last page he disappears forever from our view as defendant in an action for assault and battery. Let the obvious moral end our tale, if it does not either point or adorn it. If the son's teeth are set on edge, may it not have been the father who ate sour grapes on the Sundays when he absented himself from church ? And if "Sabbath-breaking and procrastination" have been traced as results from an excessive indulgence in the vice of murder, is there not revealed to us here a lower depth that De Quincey had never thought of, in the public flogger of unruly negros ?

ARTICLE VI.—*LOGOS AND COSMOS: NATURE AS
RELATED TO LANGUAGE.*

LANGUAGE is to be regarded—under whatever theory as to the manner of its origin—as one of the gifts of God to man. Especially, as the main and essential instrumentality in the development of man's intellectual, moral, and social being, it is in the highest sense one of the most truly invaluable of those gifts. Human language is, indeed,—apart from the written representation,—nothing but a mode of human activity; yet it is one for which provision has been made, not only in the constitution of man, mental and corporeal, but in that of the world in which he lives.

This topic, namely, the adaptation in the constitution of the world to the exigencies of language, we shall endeavor to unfold in the present article. It is one which, so far at least as concerns all that comes under the head of "the environment," has usually had small place given it in treatises on physico-theology, and none at all in those on the science of language. This constitution of things is, it is true, one that has relation at the same time to other ends; but is especially worthy of notice here, where it is so much overlooked. It is to be remarked that—since language, though not identical with thought, is yet the product of thought, the expression of thought, and the aid to thought—the adaptation of nature to language must be, in part at least, coincident with its adaptation to the mind of man.

I. **LANGUAGE.**

The principle is a familiar one, that language is, and must be, composed mainly of words that are general in their signification. This is even an absolute necessity of language in order that it may be language at all: is more than a mere difficulty from the limitless number of words it would require to denote everything by proper names. Let us suppose, for a moment, that we had proper names, and only such, for all the objects of thought which we now denote by general words, single or com-

bined ; that we had such names for actions and events, as well as for persons and things ; one such name, for instance, for "the Death of Socrates," another for "the Battle of Waterloo," another for "the Revolution of 1688," and others for other events and series of events, of whatever kind, public and private,—names which should not be "connotative," or in any way descriptive, but each simply a mark or sign for an individual event that had actually occurred ; let us suppose, also, names for single qualities and as confined to individual objects ; such an apparatus of mere names would not be language—would not serve the ends of language in communicating thought or conveying information. All that the word could do would be to indicate that the speaker had in mind and recollection the individual thing signified. All beyond this would have to be guessed at or inferred, or conveyed in some other way than by words. What had never been known as an individual thing to both speaker and hearer could be the subject not even of this amount of communication. To combine two or more such words would not help the matter ; indeed, they would not admit of combination at all, but only of being joined together in succession, or, juxtaposition. A word-combination is such only as it indicates a thought-combination. To conjoin two names such as John and Thomas would convey no thought : among the thousand possible relations between the two persons, what might be meant would be wholly unindicated. Even if to the name of a person should be joined a proper name of the house he lived in, or of his horse or ox, or of a field or river or mountain, it could only be in certain circumstances, and with the help of other means of indication, that any particular relation between the two could be understood as intended.

We come thus to another fundamental principle—to which the one just now discussed is mostly subordinate,—namely, that of the combination of words in speech, or discourse. By this we mean the necessity of employing for the most part two or more words for the expression of a single thought, to which they each contribute a part or an element.*

* We must beg leave respectfully to remonstrate against the innovation on the part of Professor Max Müller, in Vol. IV of "Chips from a German Work-Shop," in

This combination is necessary, in the first place, as an economy required by the limited capacity of our minds. By combining two or more general words we can indicate an object of thought more specific than either of the words would denote by itself. By various combinations we can express thought in endless variety: can describe objects more or less specialized, also individualized by relations to ourselves or to other individual things. So infinite in number and variety are the thoughts we have occasion to express, that we can conceive of no possible way for the ends of language to be fulfilled except it be constituted so as to involve combination, and even the frequent union of a considerable number of words in single combinations.

As with a small number of letters or vocal elements we are able to produce the external form of an endless number of words, and to use with advantage and with ease a far larger number than would otherwise be possible—are able readily to apprehend them when spoken and to read them when written,—so with a limited number of words, or thought-symbols, capable of various combination, we have a manageable instrument for the expression and the communication of an unlimited variety of thought.

There is yet another end served by combination, which is far higher and more important than any mere gain on the score of economy. Even as new words can be formed at will by new combinations of letters, so new thoughts can be expressed and be communicated by means of the combination of words: that is, things can be described and thoughts conveyed which are specifically different from anything in the actual previous experience of those to whom the words are addressed; and what is newly conceived by a speaker or a thinker can find suitable and adequate expression.

For anything of this sort to be done, without the principle of combination as a feature of language, would be absolutely impossible. What is thus done is done by the action of that wonder-working faculty which, even more than the capacity

substituting "combination" to denote the kind of word-formation usually designated by the term "agglutination." This new usage, if accepted, would entail the danger of ambiguity and of confusion of ideas to a considerable degree in applying the term to designate a class of languages, while the objection to the old word is quite trivial.

for general conceptions, distinguishes man from the brute, that faculty to which in its higher workings we sometimes apply the epithet *divine*,—we mean the faculty of making new thought-products out of elements derived from old experience—a power which we can call by no better name than *the imagination*. This faculty is needed as truly to enable us to receive new conceptions and new thought-combinations through the medium of words as it is to empower for the creation of new products. As a constructive faculty, it is essentially the same—that is, as really constructive—in the one mode of exercise as in the other.

Combination is a highly generic term and comprehends a great many specific sorts. What, then, is the kind of combination here under consideration? It is a very different kind from that of letters as combined into words,—which itself is considerably different when, on the one hand, we regard a letter as a vocal element, and when on the other as a written character. The combination of words in discourse may be defined or described as follows. Requiring the use of general terms, it consists essentially in the application of a plurality of words to one and the same object of thought. A general word “connotes” some quality, act, or state, or some relation to an object, or some composition of parts or elements,—in short some attribute,—that is common to many individual things. Now, as one and the same thing has a plurality of attributes—is the subject of properties and qualities, and at the same time of acts, states and relations, and of several of each of these either all at once, or at different times,—we have a ground for the application of several words to one and the same object, each word contributing its part to the total conception or thought. This is obvious enough in the simple combination of adjective with substantive, and of a verb with its subject. We may regard transitive verbs and prepositions and other interpositive or connecting words as connoting at the same time two attributes, each the converse of the other, or, if a relation simply, the opposite sides of the relation,—not only an attribute on the one hand as appertaining to the subject, or first term, but another on the other hand as appertaining to the object, or second term; that is, we may regard such words as applied at the same time

to the two objects denoted by the two words between which they intervene, their meaning as applied to the one being the converse of their meaning as applied to the other. We may thus recognize one comprehensive principle as the ground of every form and mode of the combination of words in sentences. By the use of these interpositive, or connecting, or transitive, words, we have a plurality of separate objects brought together as members of one and the same total combination. In this way we leap over from object to object and link all together into one total complex object.

This combination of words supposes, as already intimated, a corresponding combination of thought: carries with it, that is, a union of thought-elements or thought-objects as making up a total thought, and this most frequently more specific as well as more complex one than the parts are which compose it.*

Combination is not indeed an absolute necessity in every case and for all the ends of language: it is not, like the use of general words, a condition indispensable to the very existence of language. There is no impossibility, in the nature of things, to prevent the expression of an entire thought by a single word; the thought complete as including subject and predicate, and mode as well as object of thought. We see in fact single words thus employed. When the word *fire* rings out with the proper tone to sound the alarm, it conveys a thought that might be expressed in a formal and regular proposition; and there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent the appropriation to such use of a distinct and separate word, a word which should have in itself full predicative meaning. So, when the imploring cry of *water!* comes from men wounded and fainting on the battle-field; and so in the many other cases in which

* Our argument does not demand, nor do our limits permit, an inquiry as to what makes the unity of a thought or of a thought-object, nor an analytical exposition of what is meant by an attribute. We have only to remark, as to the attribute, that a thorough analysis will find it always resolvable into a relation, simple or complex, together with an object or objects of that relation. This view of it would reduce the principles which underlie the synthesis of thought to greater simplicity than is given by the statements upon which we rest as above.

We have omitted, as unnecessary, to make any reference to the different species of word-combination. such as the predicative and the attributive: these merely superadd something to what is contained in the general definition we have given. We thus desert, it will be perceived, the usual route, with its starting-point of the relation between predicate and subject.

the mere name of an object will, in the appropriate circumstances and as uttered with the suitable tone and manner, convey an entire thought and make known a fact. Moreover, such words as the Latin *pluit, fulget*, do by themselves express a full thought, and this as their proper and only function ;—it is immaterial, as to our present purpose, whether we say that here we have a predicate without a subject, or that, in the one word, both a predicate and a subject are included.

It is altogether possible that a single word should serve for the full expression of any thought whatever that is general in its nature, provided a word were appropriated for the purpose, —no matter to what degree of complexity the thought be specialized, and no matter how many words we now actually employ for its expression. The thought must be one which there is repeated occasion to express ; with this proviso, there is no limit to what it may comprehend : it might embrace, for instance, the whole of a narration extended and circumstantial to the utmost that this limitation will allow. And actually, in communication by telegraph, and in other supposable cases, a single word, or a brief symbol, previously agreed upon, may sometimes with advantage take the place of a long sentence.

We may even, without absolute absurdity, make the extravagant supposition of a language which should consist wholly of words specialized to such a degree that, instead of sentences, there should exist only single unconnected words. How poorly we should be served by a language like this is obvious enough. It would be impossible, on such a plan of language, to express anything of a new description, to make known anything in any way unlike what had been before known and named ; combination being for this, as we have already observed, absolutely indispensable. Besides this capital defect, it is obvious that the number of words which such a language would require to be any way of much use would render it quite unmanageable : since, in their import, the words would have to be for the most part exceedingly special, the number required would be immense.

The more general the words of a language are, the greater is the economy ; that is, the smaller will be the vocabulary that will suffice. Wide generality means the same as elementary

simplicity: the more general a word is, the more simple and elementary is the notion it signifies: in logical phrase, the extension of terms varies in quantity inversely as the intension. To express a large number and variety of complex conceptions, all made up of a relatively small number of elements, it is obvious that we serve ourselves with the smallest vocabulary when the terms we employ are absolutely elementary in signification. To refer again to the illustration from alphabetic characters,—an alphabet of consonant and vowel elements requires fewer characters than a syllabic alphabet like that used for the Cherokee or the Japanese; and a syllabic alphabet for the English and most other languages would require a far greater number; and a system of writing, hieroglyphic or other, with a separate character for each word, would require a number still greater. In like manner, a vocabulary consisting of words which stand for notions that are limited in their speciality and complex in their signification will need to be larger than one composed of terms more general and more elementary in their meaning.

Again, the more general the words of a language are,—that is, the more nearly they approach to elementary simplicity as respects the notions they signify,—the greater will be the variety of thought they will be competent to express, being limited, as they of course must be, in number. This also may be illustrated by referring to the different kinds of characters for representing words in writing, as will be quite obvious to the intelligent reader.

Thus it is that, in order to secure the advantages of combination, a supply of very general words is requisite; and these advantages would be lost for the most part to a language that should consist wholly of such words as were highly specialized. Hence the fact is that, in every language spoken by man, civilized or savage, a considerable proportion of the words are really of a high degree of generality.

The specialization which has often been remarked as a notable characteristic of the aboriginal languages of America may perhaps be pointed to in contradiction of the statement just made. But there is no real ground of contradiction in the case. This specialization connects itself for the most part with a struc-

tural feature of these languages, viz., their synthetic character, sometimes designated by the term polysynthetic. Single words, or what are reckoned as such, are framed by compounding or blending together, after a peculiar fashion, yet in a method governed by fixed rules, certain radical elements—usually monosyllabic, and in some cases consisting of a single vowel or even a single consonant,—the same never, for the most part, appearing as separate words.* The whole word thus made up is the equivalent of what in English we should express by a phrasal combination, or even serves sometimes for an entire sentence, and occasionally is made of inordinate length, extending to a dozen, or even, as we are told, twenty or more syllables. Thus, in the instance often cited from Eliot's translation of "kneeling down to him" (Mark i, 40,) we have a word of eleven significant syllables, and meaning, as literally interpreted by Mr. Trumbull, "he came to a state of rest on the bended knees doing reverence to him." Some instances given by Mr. Duponceau from Algonkin dialects are such as these:—Bring me the canoe; He came here in a canoe; He took him by the hand; I do not like to eat (live) with him; He is in haste to go a fishing.

It is to be observed that the radical elements which are thus combined have each a definite signification, answering to what we ordinarily assign to a separate word, and that thus they really perform the essential functions of words. It is true that they may have in actual use no independent existence; but it is likewise true of the words of our own language that we never use them but in combination with other words, and only in our dictionaries and grammars do they stand apart by themselves;

* This explanation of the Indian word-synthesis is substantially the same as that given by Mr. J. H. Trumbull, and finds full confirmation in the work of Mr. Riggs on the Dakota language. It differs from that which had been offered by Mr. Duponceau and adopted by others. Mr. Trumbull's familiarity with the Algonkin dialects and his linguistic acumen have qualified him to expose many errors of his predecessors. To his papers in the Transactions of the American Philological Association, the Number for 1869-70 more particularly, and to that *chef d'œuvre* in its kind, the Grammar and Dictionary of the Dakota language, by Mr. Riggs, (Smithsonian Contributions, Vol. IV), and to Rev. C. Byington's Grammar of the Choctaw, edited by Dr. Brinton, together with the *Mémoire*, etc., by Mr. Duponceau, the present writer is mainly indebted for the merely general knowledge which he has concerning the Indian languages.

except as combined they are really destitute of significance—possess it, at least, only in a qualified sense, as potential and not as actual significance. The compounds made by the Indian synthesis admit of being taken to pieces and resolved into radical parts which can be treated as distinct entities having a definite form—though more or less varied by the action of phonetic laws—as well as a determinate meaning.

It is to be observed, also, that the import of these several elements, so far from being very special, is on the other hand very general. Thus, there are many of what Mr. Trumbull calls “generic formatives,” and which he says “may be regarded—from one point of view, or another,—as rudiments, or as vestiges, of general names,” some of them even having actual existence as separate words. Thus “*minne*, or *min*, is the generic affix of names of berries, nuts and other fruits that may be eaten;” a highly general notion this, for which we have really no word in English. The Dakota word *cha** (a nasal) means a tree, or trees, or wood, and used as a prefix makes “tree-skin,” or bark, “tree-sap,” sugar, “tree-fat,” resin or gum; makes also words for things made of wood, etc.

Another class of formatives, called by Mr. Trumbull “characteristic particles,” denote generic modes of activity, such as doing a thing with the hand, or the foot, or the mouth, or by cutting, or by knocking, &c.; or they give a meaning that is causative, or frequentative, or intensive, or reciprocal, or intransitive, and the like. Thus, in Dakota, upon the theme *ksa*, to separate or break off, we have *ba-ksa*, to cut off, as with a knife or saw, *bo-ksa*, to shoot off or punch off, *ka-ksa*, to cut off by striking, as with an axe, *na-ksa*, to break off with the foot, *pa-ksa*, to break off or apart by the hand, *ya-ksa*, to bite off, *yu-ksa*, (*yu* simply causative)* to break off in any way.

It is much the habit of these languages to give names to objects by inventing words that embrace a description, and in some sort an analytic definition, of the thing denoted,—an ability and a habit which presupposes and involves a constant and familiar handling of notions that are general as distinguished from the

* This *yu-* has in one instance the force of the English *un-*, (*yu-shka*, untie,) thus coinciding singularly with the German *ver-* and Anglo-Saxon *for-*, whence the English *forget*; the notion of *change* to passes over into *change from*, or the general notion of *change* covers both.

special. Thus, the horse, says Mr. Trumbull, was called by the native of Massachusetts, "the beast that carries on his back a living burden." So the Dakota, "tree-skin," "tree-fat," &c., are defining words. Here we have analysis in thought preceding and going with the synthesis of word.

The preservation of the synthetic character of these languages comparatively little obscured by phonetic corruption and decay involves a constant recognition of the elements which make up the compounds, and the use of them as signs of the general conceptions for which they stand, exactly as if they were separate words.

It is thus apparent that this structural character does not necessarily involve the specialization of thought, any more than do the phrase and sentence combinations which we make with our words. It is connected neither as cause nor as consequence with the actual preference of the Indian mind for the concrete and the special,—a trait common to all uncultured men, and especially all rude and uncultured races. Not as the cause; for the language is quite capable of expressing highly general notions through this synthetic structure. Thus, *thing they eat*, is Dakota for *food*. Again, the Dakota, by prefixing to the active verbs the vowel *i*, makes of them nouns denoting the instrument. Translating this prefix loosely by *with*, a *with-sweep* means a broom; a *with-split*, a wedge; a *with-slab*, a spear, &c.; and a *with-make*, (*i-cha-ghe*) is an instrument in the most general sense.* Again, though the Indian cannot use the word for *father* except with the co-signification of relation to some specified person or persons, yet, by means of a prefix which signifies man, or man's, a compound is made in Dakota equivalent to a *father* simply, and apart from special relation. Doubtless, also, the Indian can signify the general by means of the special, as we by "our daily bread" mean our daily food. Nor is this synthetic structure the consequence of an exceptional predisposition to the concrete in the mind of the race. The Chinese is not at all a synthetic language; but its actual character, as what it is, is neither the

* There is a curious example of a highly figurative meaning attached to one of the words so formed. The noun *i-yu-shka* (with-untie) means, a something to untie a bundle with, that is, to give in return for a bundle of tobacco sent from another village or people in token of friendship; if there is nothing to give, the bundle cannot be untied.

consequence nor the cause of any unusual development of the faculty of abstraction.

We are usually told in further proof of the specializing tendency of the Indian languages that they have distinct radical or primary words for special modes of what we express by a general term, as for instance, for different kinds of walking, and of eating, and of going, and that they have no terms for these general notions. But, in such instances, after we have eliminated what is really the product of the synthesis already noticed, the little that remains need not be regarded as altogether extraordinary or exceptional. In our own English we have, for different modes of imbibing liquids, the words, sip, suck, lap, swig, swill, gulp, quaff; and at least some of these do not come under the general notion of drinking: a calf does not drink till taught to do so; people often sip their tea before they drink it; our soup we do not drink. Again we speak of a *pair* of shoes, a *span* of horses, a *yoke* of oxen and a *brace* of hounds; of the *hide* of an ox, but not of a man, or a calf, or a sheep, or a deer; of the *skin* of an apple, the *peel* of an orange. We have 'swarm,' 'flock,' 'herd,' 'drove,' 'gang,' 'band,' 'pack,' 'squad,' 'crowd,' 'throng,' &c., but no general word whatever for an animal or human assemblage in the general. The peasant of East Anglia who retains the old local dialect, and when his standing grain is beaten down by a storm describes it, according to the kind of damage, as "baffled," or "nickled," or "snaffled," or "shuckled," or "wilted," (Trench: *English Past and Present*), is probably altogether unused to the general term *lodged*, of Romanic origin, which we have in Shakspeare.

The Montagnais Indians in Canada, had, it is said, a "verb *piouan*, meaning "the wind drives the snow," but in which no trace appears of the words wind, snow, or to drive." Well, we have in English the word *sleet*, in which no trace appears of words for hail, or snow, or rain, or cold, or water or ice, though the corresponding notions are all involved in the one and single word. Compare also *drizzle*, *mist*, *fog*, &c. Of primary words, or what now seem to us such, we have in our English, even within the range of thought common to us with the Indian, a far greater number with limited speciality of meaning, than has any native language on the continent; and this in part even because of that very synthetic structure which is so often referred to as

pointing in the opposite direction. Thus we have bark, sugar, gum, in place of the Dakota tree-skin, tree-sap, tree-fat, and the simple word, kneel, instead of the five or six significant syllables of the Massachusetts dialect, interpreted as meaning "to rest on the bended knees." Is it not really the poverty of these languages—their scanty supply of primary special terms—which we here see, and which they have to eke out by such more or less cumbrous and circumlocutory compounds?

The absence of the substantive verb has been referred to by almost every writer on the general subject, as an instance of the specializing tendency, and a proof of the want of the power or the habit of generalization on the part of the Indian. But what is this verb *to be*—the so-called substantive verb—upon which so much fine speculation has so many times been wasted? What is it but a sign of predication, with further connotation of tense and mode, which we use when we have an adjective or a noun for the predicate, and do not use with verbs because they have predicative force in themselves? This is all there is of it. The languages of the Aryan family early distinguished a class of words by a form which conferred predicative force, while to another class, viz., substantives and adjectives, as expressing notions which there was much less occasion to employ in the predicative relation, they gave a different form. Thus the need came at length to be sometimes felt for a means of indication, when adjectives or substantives had to be used as predicates; and a verb which originally signified some special activity involving continued existence, such as standing, or dwelling, or sitting, was gradually converted to this use. In the Semitic tongues the occasion, and it may be the process, was essentially similar. Now, the Indian languages, as many others also have done, failed to make the distinction which would cause the need of such a word to be felt. The conjugation-system which they adopted and which as such conferred predicative force, was applied to all words alike—to words for qualities and for objects permanently existing, as well as to words for actions and events.* The language having thus taken on this form and

* Sir John Lubbock (*History of Civilization*, &c., p. 318) falls into the palpable error—apparent under the explanation above—of regarding the absence of the verb *to be* as the cause, instead of the consequence, of this conjugation feature; and we presume he is not the only writer of eminence who has done so.

structure, the development of a proper substantive verb was an impossibility. For, the need of it could never be felt, if indeed any place for it could be found without remodeling the structure of the language. The cultivation or the want of cultivation of the generalizing faculty has had nothing to do with the matter. As for the notion of existence, we are not to expect the Indian to say: whatever is, is; no thing can both be and not be;—or at least not till he has been a while at school;—but the Dakotas can say in their native tongue: God exists; or, there is a God, (Riggs: *Grammar*, &c., p. 58.)

That our aborigines must have *used* their language mainly for the expression of what is concrete and special,—or at least of what is purely sensuous,—that to this they must have been determined by their low grade of culture, their way of life, and their main occasions for the use of speech, and their consequent mental habits and preferences, is not to be questioned. Nor is it to be doubted that this fact would in some way distinctly impress itself upon their languages, and in a way which whoever would successfully interpret them must succeed in finding out. But the wonder is, rather, that so much appears which seems to us somewhat contrary to the mental character which we have to attribute to them.

Leaving now the savage, who has held our attention too long,—or it would be too long but for the exaggerated and erroneous notions that have widely prevailed,—we need to glance for a moment at the effect of social progress and cultivation upon language, and the demands they make upon it, so far as related to our subject. But little reflection is needed to show that the actual effect is by no means to give to generalization a preponderance over specialization, but rather the reverse. While true mental culture enlarges the sweep and strengthens the grasp of the generalizing faculty, the advance of civilization tends at the same time, in many ways, to the multiplication of words of limited, complex, and special signification. They are indispensable in every art, profession and occupation, and are demanded by the multiplied machineries and arrangements of a complex social condition. Every new invention adopted brings its retinue of special terms. Even science does not deal with her generalities

in such a way as to escape the necessity of a multitude of terms of highly specialized signification; and criticism and aesthetics are nothing without a full stock of special terms; and of literary skill there is none where there is not a nice sense for special meanings distinguished oftentimes by minutest shades of difference. Special terms are in constant requisition in the communication and commerce of ordinary life. The French excels as a conversational language through its copiousness in special terms which have relation to men and manners and to social life, as signalized by Goethe in the remark, "Oh, how that nation is to be envied which can express so fine shades of meaning in a single word!" Hence our frequent borrowings from the French to supply deficiencies in our own tongue.

Specialization, in the case of any people or race, or any set of people, civilized or savage, will predominate within the circle of the things which most interest and occupy their attention and with which they have most to do. Doubtless there are, in every language, many superfluous special words, some of which might better be discarded. The reader may perhaps recollect the passage quoted by Mr. Marsh, in his *Lectures on the English Language*, (1st Series, Lect. XXVI) from the instructions concerning "gentle speech" in *The book of St. Albans*, as a curious example of the multiplication of special terms sedulously cultivated and carried to a ridiculous extreme as a mark of fine breeding. A special term is prescribed for the act of carving in the case of each of the various kinds of meat; and so in other matters: a kind of superfluity of niceness to be deprecated as overloading language with an idle and useless burden.

Special terms, well chosen, are needed for succinctness and despatch, for compendiousness both in thought and expression. When unnecessary for such purpose, they yet sometimes have the advantage, as compared with more general terms, of being more picturesque and to a greater degree imbued with associated feeling.

Yet, special terms, however numerous, would not serve us well without a supply of others of wide generality. We have already considered what would be the effect if all the words in use were so specialized as to do away with combination. And, according as a language should approach to this condition, just

so far would it be restricted as to the range and the variety of the thoughts it would be competent to express.

The perfection of a language is to be found in a due admixture of words that are special with such as are general in their signification, the words ranging from the widest generality to the narrowest speciality of meaning. That universal character of adaptability in human language, which is such as to admit of its free development in either of the directions just noted, is of importance with reference to the main purpose of this article.

To follow out the leading of our subject, would require us to consider not only what language is, but how it comes to be what it is,—to trace the processes through which languages are developed and by which they ever, readily and pliantly, vary and transform themselves to suit the practical and intellectual needs of those who use them; and particularly, the processes of extension and change by the generalization and the specialization and the analogical transfer of meanings, processes which depend on some of the characters of language that we have been discussing; also, the mode of transfer which proceeds from the mental association of things that are observed uniformly or frequently connected in fact,—and this process, as involving a thought-combination of some kind, brings us to the general principle which underlies word-combination. To these should be added word-building proper, which, being for the most part a formation by composition, or synthesis, begins with the combination of separate words: it is thus and so far essentially the same as what we have already described, and all it ever does more than this is merely to take another step in limitation or change of meaning over and above the specialization that is involved in the combination itself. To these several processes is to be referred, on the side of signification, the whole matter of word-transformation and word-development. Through them is it to be explained how, from the rudest beginning, language grows up, step by step, to the highest stage of refinement,—how, by easy transition, it passes over from the outer world of matter to the inner world of thought and feeling,—how, at first confined to the sensible, it extends itself so as to bring within its compass the whole of the intelligible.

With these matters, it may be presumed that the reader who

shall have gone with us thus far is not unfamiliar. But—taking for granted the general fact that language is and must be, for the most part, a growth by natural processes—we are to notice particularly how, out of a very few radicals, founded upon conceptions so palpable and obvious as to seem the product of mere sense-perception rather than of any higher faculty of thought, is developed, by natural and easy steps, the whole body of the words of the most highly cultivated language, with all the manifold varieties and nice shades of meaning they carry with them. Here we observe the stock of original material such both in quantity and quality as to come within the capacity of uncultured intellect, and the gradual procedure by successive stages such as to make the marvellous final result a possibility. We are to notice, too, the gain on the score of economy, through the secondary meanings, the diverse applications and the shades of signification, which single words take to themselves, and which are to a great extent made known in the first instance, and are in use clearly discriminated, by the connection in which the words occur. By this means, together with the numerous forms that are made by derivation and composition, the number of words that have to be learned as primary words, and of meanings that have to be learned as primary meanings, is small compared with all the words and all the meanings that are embraced in the language. And thus the task, which comes to each generation, of acquiring the mother tongue, is made possible of accomplishment.

It is to be noticed, further, in regard to these processes of growth and these various applications of single words, that they involve something more than palpable and obvious similarities or contiguities: they depend largely upon analogies between different orders of things, and upon slight links of association as well as upon connections of a more gross and obvious kind.

We are not required in this discussion, to go back to the origin of language, though the topic is by no means irrelevant. So far as the roots of words can be traced, they are found to have been highly general in their meaning; and no considerable development of language is conceivable without words of this character. Combination too must have early come into play.

It is, indeed, quite supposable that the first words, as names either of objects or of actions, should have been used singly, just as we have already remarked that single words now are sometimes made to serve for an entire thought which is made plain by circumstances, and by expression addressed to the eye or conveyed by the tone of the utterance.

It is not, however, necessary to suppose that all words were used as absolutely isolated before they occurred in combination. An action-word may have been developed only as used in combination with one and another previously formed object-word. Yet this would not necessarily hinder its recognition as a distinct word, having its own form and its own meaning.

A view different from this, and opposed to the commonly accepted theory of a period when the roots of Indo-European vocables existed as separate words, is contended for by some, prominent among whom is the distinguished philologist, Rev. A. H. Sayce. His theory is that language began with words that were "holophrastic," or the equivalents of an entire sentence. In the preface to the recent, the second, edition of his *Principles of Comparative Philology*, he speaks of the "root-period" as "an early synthetic stage," and of the root as then a "sentence word, summing up in one whole what a later stage of language would break up into separate words or forms, the name of an individual object implying and including subject or object and 'verb' as well." "Hence," he adds, "there would be as many sentence-words as momentary impressions made upon the senses by a particular object; and if language rests upon onomatopœia or the like, sentence-words applying to the same object might be expected to resemble one another, and in this resemblance allow the philologist to discover those types of sound which he calls roots."

Now Mr. Sayce may be quite right so far as this, that, along with the earliest words, or "types of sound," there were conjoined unshaped utterances, varying with the "momentary impression made upon the senses," that is, as the object was affected in this or that way and varied itself by this or that mode of action; but he is far from right in regarding such ever-varying and unshaped utterance as itself any part of the word. When we have a "type of sound" appropriated as the sign for

a particular notion or thing, then, and not till then, we have a word,—and that is all that a word ever is or ever becomes,—and all over and above this, expressive though it may be, is something other than and aside from the word,—no more belongs to it than do the gestures which may accompany it, and is no more an essential or integrant part of it than is now the tone of voice we may use to enforce the words we utter an essential part of those words. It is a grave error, in these inquiries, to confound the indefinite and shapeless utterances, even though not inarticulate, out of which words may have emerged, with words themselves. Words, proper names excepted, are, from their very nature and from the nature of the case, general in signification; and this implies an external form, variable indeed within certain limits, yet when repeated recognizable as the same “type of sound,” and applicable to things on the ground of certain common attributes, either permanent or temporary. If Mr. Sayce means just what he says, his view is irreconcilable with any proper notion of what a word is.

It is important to remark under this head, that, so far as we can judge by tracing back words to their roots and by examining the rude tongues of savage peoples, it appears that words at the earlier periods were significant of what was palpable to sense, and, to a large extent, of phenomena of sensible motion; also, that the conceptions they stood for were so general as to serve by combination for great variety of expression; and, moreover, that these primordial conceptions are connected by such relations with others of different and higher orders as to admit of the development of language from such beginnings so as to cover the entire range of human thought. It should be added that, the mind of man being what it is, no other way for the genesis and development of language is to be regarded as possible.

Having pointed out these fundamental characteristics, some of them essential to the existence of language, and others important for its serviceableness or operative in its development, we shall, in the succeeding section, proceed to inquire what provision is made in nature for language, in adaptation to these characteristics.

ARTICLE VII.—THE UNITY OF THE PROFESSIONS.*

IF we look at the origin of the professions, we find that they have a common parentage, that they all alike have sprung from the *needs* of man. The animal creation around him, guided by unerring instinct, have no such needs. They speedily come to maturity and perfection without effort, and by the action of forces over which they have no control. Man alone seems arbiter of his destiny. With most varied needs and powers, and sublime possibilities of development, he is largely left by Divine Providence to supply his wants and discipline himself through the affluent resources placed at his disposal.

Whatever view we may take of the condition of the primeval man, it must be admitted that the historic man has always been the architect of himself, that he has fashioned and built himself up into whatever he has become. He has been the Phidias, who, by his own right arm, has been chiseling himself through the ages after his own ideal, however imperfect, at times, it may have been.

As he has toiled along this line of self-culture and development, he has gained at every step of the process, a clearer conception of true manhood in all its varied relations, and so has felt increasing needs, and applied himself with growing skill to supply them. In this way have come forth, one after another, the various arts, sciences, and professions, which have done so much to advance and adorn civilization.

A glance at our early Anglo-Saxon history will illustrate this method. Among the fierce tribes which swarmed around the German Ocean, and took possession of Gaul and Britain, were a mysterious class who gathered up into themselves the functions of teacher, priest, prophet, poet, judge, and physician. They monopolized whatever there was of rude learning among their tribes, and doled it out with despotic hand to a favored few. Of these the best representatives were the Druids,

* This Article was, in substance, delivered as an Address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Marietta College, Ohio, on the 29th of June, 1875.

who had a smattering of astronomy, natural philosophy, geometry, politics, and geography; who were the guides in religion, and the judges in temporal matters. They were the embodiment of all the professions among their people. And they were equal to the demands upon them. These untutored tribes, with the dimmest conception of what they might become, and hence with the slightest feelings of need, were abundantly satisfied with their guides.

But when Christianity came into the island with Augustine and his missionary associates, and began its gracious work on the heart and intellect of the Saxon, it soon awoke him to a realization of his condition, revealed to him by degrees, the sublime possibilities of his nature, and thus disclosed to him more and more his pressing needs, and made him thoroughly dissatisfied with his attainments, teachers and surroundings. He now seriously gave himself to self-culture to supply these needs. Soon the quickened mind of the nation began to bud into literature, for it was feeling the influence of a new power. Its spring-time had come, and though its budding life was often nipped by cruel frosts, yet in the end, it came forth to abundant fruitage. The nation was no longer satisfied to express meager thought in rude alliterative verse, but struggled on until the genius of a Chaucer made both his language and his verse immortal. Nor did the aroused Anglo-Saxon mind content itself within the domain of poetry alone. It yearned after all knowledge, felt as never before, its needs, and began to invade every realm of thought and expression. It wrestled with the high problems of theology under such leaders as Wycliffe and Hooker. It pushed its researches into philosophy and civil government under a Bacon and a Hobbes. It explored the principles of law under a Coke, and of medicine under a Harvey and a Browne. It founded schools and universities whence came forth in ever increasing numbers, the leaders of the people into every department of art, science, and literature. The Anglo-Saxon race has, under God, blossomed out, and come to this abundant fruitage *through its constant efforts to supply its growing needs.*

Such, in brief, is the method by which the various professions have arisen. They have each sprung from efforts to supply

needs, and have advanced toward perfection to the degree in which these needs have been *felt*. In their rude state of nature so-called (which seems rather to be a most unnatural state,) men are quite satisfied to commit their individual and social well-being into the hands of a pretentious few, as ignorant as themselves. But let the light in upon them, let them see their destitutions, and straightway under a goading sense of their needs, no longer contented with themselves, or their guides, they struggle on, blindly, at first, it may be, but surely, through the ever increasing avenues of the arts and sciences toward the noon-day of civilization.

But the different professions have unity not only in their *origin*—the *needs* of man, but also in their *end*—the *well-being* of man. They have been born of *human wants*, and the chief end of their existence is to supply them—to assist mankind to the attainment of whatever is highest and best to the individual and to society. They were all designed to contribute to one grand end—the perfection of the race in body, mind, character, and estate. Like the different members of the human body, while they each have separate functions, they were all to unite in advancing the common weal. Take, for example, the profession of law, regarded by not a few unthinking persons, as of doubtful service to society, and it needs but a few moments' thought to see that it is a beneficent calling essential to the highest well-being of the state. For, if men must live in society, they must have laws for mutual protection, and the higher they rise in culture and civilization, the more numerous and varied will be their relations and rights, as also the laws to define and defend them. Hence must arise in every well-ordered state, a complex system of laws, which require for their exposition and application, a body of men versed in jurisprudence, and devoting themselves to its study and practice. In vain do we fill our statute-books with just laws, unless these laws can be justly applied, and the legal profession is the instrumentality which the state employs to stand at the bar, and to sit on the bench to see that justice is done between citizens.

Nor does it militate against this view, that this highly useful and honorable profession is sometimes prostituted by unworthy members to the perversion of justice for selfish ends, for lia-

bility to similar perversion is the misfortune of every calling. Yet it must be admitted that Edmund Burk's caricature of the law's grievous uncertainty, expense, and delay, given in his "*Vindication of Natural Society*," to pour ridicule on the views of Lord Bolingbroke, is often too near the truth. "A lawsuit is like an ill-managed dispute, in which the first object is soon out of sight, and the parties end upon a matter wholly foreign to that on which they began. * * * * My cause, which two farmers from the plough could have decided in half an hour, takes the court twenty years. I am, however, at the end of my labor, and have in reward for all my toil and vexation, a judgment in my favor. But hold—a sagacious commander, in the adversary's army, has found a flaw in the proceeding. My triumph is turned into mourning. I have used *or*, instead of *and*, or some mistake, small in appearance, but dreadful in its consequences; and have the whole of my success quashed in a writ of error. I remove my suit; I shift from court to court; I fly from equity to law, and from law to equity; equal uncertainty attends me everywhere; and a mistake in which I had no share, decides at once upon my liberty and property, sending me from the court to a prison, and adjudging my family to beggary and famine." But though the claims of justice are sometimes defeated for private ends by those who stand as its advocates, the legal profession is a great conservator of good order, and of justice in the state. Its office is to see that every man wronged, or accused before the law, has exact justice meted out to him in open court, without fear or favor. Whether pleading at the bar, or presiding on the bench, it is the one grand duty of the profession "to magnify the law, and make it honorable" by its faithful application to every case that shall come to trial. But were such an ideal realized, it is to be feared that numbers in the profession would find their occupation gone.

In close alliance with the office of the lawyer, is that of the *law-maker*, which, though equally essential to the well-being of society, has hardly yet attained (in our Republic at least,) to the dignity of a *profession*. Statesmanship in its full breadth of meaning, is rarely seen in our halls of legislation. And yet there is scarcely anything of which we stand in more need as a nation. Thus far in our history, with an indifference which is

simply amazing, when we consider the magnitude of the interests involved, we have largely entrusted the making of our laws to men selected because they were popular, and could command votes, rather than because they were fitted for their high trust. Yet never was there a people that more needed skillful legislators. With a government based upon the popular will, and in some of its features, a hitherto untried experiment on the face of the earth, and extending across a continent, into which are pouring from almost every nation, peoples trained under the most diverse governments and religions, and with unexampled diversity of productions, and wealth and variety of mineral resources, all of which call for the wisest balancing of interests, and far-sighted and stable policy in legislation, we have too often been contented to surrender both our magnificent possessions and ourselves to the government of men quite innocent of the first principles of statesmanship, and versed only in party politics and tactics. And we are reaping the harvest which our folly has sown. Like a great ship at sea, our Republic has been driven hither and thither, now by free-trade winds, and now by high tariff gales, making for this port, or that, according to the whims of her officers.

We have as yet scarcely no settled policy in any department of legislation. We are at sea on the great questions of finance, of internal improvements, of grants to private corporations, of public lands, of education,—in short, on all the great problems which concern the public weal. And we shall continue on this uncertain sea of legislation, the sport and victim of conflicting parties and policies, until we give sufficient attention to public interests to secure the election of the most competent men in the nation for legislators. Were we feeling the need of such men, as our fathers felt the need of them, when in weakness and fear they entered upon their grand experiment of a Republic, we should, like them, find a Washington, a Jefferson, a Hamilton, and a Madison to shape our legislation and administer our laws. For in statesmanship, as in every thing else, the supply will be equal to the demand. It is a good omen for our nation that the people are coming to see their political destitutions, and are demanding of the men who seek their suffrages some knowledge of the duties of the office to which they aspire,

and that our higher institutions are instructing so many young men in the principles of political philosophy. May we not from these indications justly gather hope, that the time is not far distant when the men who tread the high places of political power among us shall be men *trained for their profession*, well grounded in the principles of statesmanship, and who shall enter on their great trust with an honesty that no bribes can approach, and a patriotism that no obstacles can vanquish. Could we but fill our national and state legislatures with such men, what a future full of blessing would await our Republic!

But if the professions of law and politics alike grow out of the needs of man, and are essential to his highest well-being, the same is equally true of the profession of *medicine*. For medical science holds to the human body, a relation similar to that which political science holds to human society. It recognizes the constant tendency of the body to deterioration and infirmities, and its office is "to prevent, cure, or alleviate" these diseases, and to render the body robust and stalwart, so that the man shall enjoy full possession of all his physical powers, and shall be able to wield them most effectively in the discharge of his duties. Hence the skillful physician, who by his knowledge of the laws of disease and health, and of *materia medica*, can restore a citizen to physical soundness and vigor, is a benefactor, not only to him, but also to the State.

Besides, such is the intimate and mysterious relation of the mind to the body, that it is to some a matter of doubt whether a mind can be perfectly sound that is not in a sound body. At any rate, it cannot be reasonably doubted that a diseased body often seriously affects, and sometimes perverts mental processes, and this to such an extent as to render the subject irresponsible. Hence arise most delicate and difficult questions in medical jurisprudence, which is evidently coming into greater prominence in our courts, and to have greater influence on their decisions. Indeed, so dependent is the human will on conditions of the body, and so intricate are the problems as to accountability for acts done in certain physical conditions, that it is worthy of serious thought, whether in many cases before the courts, only medical gentlemen should sit as jurors. Were our juries in these trials composed of such men, they

would be far more likely than now, both to shield the innocent and to bring to punishment the guilty. Thus the medical profession join hands with the legal to render beneficent service to the citizen and the State. They are the great conservators of health to the people, for they devote themselves not only to individual relief, but also to the searching out of curative agents, and of the laws governing health and disease, and their investigations within the last few years have resulted in discoveries of great value to suffering humanity. Is it, then, too much to hope, that through their skillful interrogatories of man and of nature, human life will not only be materially lengthened, but also made more happy and useful?

But man has other duties than those which he owes to society and to his body. He has a spiritual nature with immortal longings and needs, which cries out after God, and can be satisfied only by Him. Hence man, however degraded, must have a deity to worship. He must be continually feeling after God, though it be through the darkness of paganism. The *clerical* profession, therefore, has its roots in the spiritual needs of man, and must exist in some form, however rude, wherever the human race is found. In fact, among a barbarous people, the priestly office (as we have seen) generally overtops all the other callings, and, like Aaron's rod, swallows them up. For as man is first of all a religious being, so he most venerates and trusts those who instruct him in sacred things. Since, then, the deepest needs of man call for a religion, his well-being must be promoted to the degree to which his system of faith and worship shall satisfy these wants; and it needs no arguments to prove that the Christian religion most fully responds to the spiritual cravings of man. It were easy to show that other religions have failed to lift him out of his pollutions and degradations into purity and nobility of character and life. How powerless, for example, was the gorgeous religion of ancient Rome over private and public morals! What a glimpse do we catch of her best society through the keen satire of Juvenal! The recent disclosures, too, at Herculaneum and Pompeii but too fully confirm all that has been recorded of Roman society in Roman literature. It would seem as if nature herself, shocked at their stupendous pollution, had turned

away in disgust, and buried those cities from sight. And it is easy to see why these religions of earth have been thus impotent over man. They have addressed themselves to his intellect, his imagination, his taste, his passions, but have never descended to the center of the man and *changed his moral character*. They have expended themselves on the surface, and so have been powerless. The Christian religion alone aims directly at the *renovations of the heart*, because "out of it are the issues of life." It seeks to make man pure within, and to bring his whole being under the sway of the "royal law" of love. And now the man becomes a center of right influences to all about him. In the family, in the social circle, in the marts of trade, in whatever relations of life, and department of business, he becomes a power for all that is good and noble in character and life. Through the teachings of the pulpit these personal centers of moral and spiritual influences are constantly multiplying among the people, and slowly but surely spreading throughout the entire nation. Already the pulpit is the mightiest agency in our Republic for the production and dissemination of right moral influence. And it used this power with marvelous effect in our late struggle for national existence. In that terrible conflict, when the very pillars of the State seemed tottering, it was the influence which poured fourth from the pulpits of the North, that gave heart to the people, and sustained the brave men who were struggling on the field of carnage to save the Republic. And, indeed, it is within the truth to say that no permanent republic is possible among a people who are not largely under the influence of, and personally moulded by, the teachings of the Christian sanctuary. Democracies and republics cannot endure among a people swayed by selfishness. Circumstances may indeed call them into being—may build them up, but resting not upon principle, but simply upon the caprice of selfishness, circumstances will also demolish them. The heathen world, with all its pretensions and philosophy, never showed to us an enduring free government. The republics of antiquity were not the offspring of "charity," and so could not, like her, "abide." They came like the icy diadem of a winter's day, brilliant indeed for its hour, but as soon to melt and disappear, while a true liberty comes forth from the

renewed soul of society, like a rich vegetation springing from the bosom of earth, and sending down its roots deep into the soil of Christian principle, which, though it may for a time be covered up by the wintry storms of human selfishness, still lives beneath its sheeted covering, and shall come forth again with renewed vigor in the spring time of God's appointment. And not only is it true that no free government endured among heathen nations, but it is also true that since the advent of Christianity, no truly free government has long continued which was not built up out of its principles. Why is it that France, after all her struggles for freedom, seems to-day well nigh as far from a stable republic as ever? The answer may be found in her cherished infidelity. and in her form of Christian faith which is to a great extent powerless on the national heart. And why is it that Mexico, and the republics of South America, appear to have little else left to them but the name of freedom, while we rejoice in its blessings? It is not because "Castilian blood" is inferior to that which flows in our veins, but because the one government was built up by men who feared God, and *out of that inner life of liberty into which they had been brought by divine truth*, while the others were not. And if, under God, our Republic is to endure, it will stand through the ages, not so much through the agency of political parties, platforms, and constitutions, as by bringing the truth of God, through the teachings of the sanctuary, to the hearts of the entire people, that the truth may make each citizen a Christian freeman.

The pulpit, then, must be acknowledged to stand first among the professions as a promoter of the well-being both of the citizen and of the state. It leads the grand army of beneficent forces in the service of society. The pulpit

" Must stand acknowledged, while the world shall stand,
The most important and effectual guard,
Support and ornament of virtue's cause."

While it increases material values, promotes education, represses vice, and fosters all good enterprises, it is also the means of conferring the highest moral and spiritual benefits on the individual and the nation.

Thus far we have been looking mainly at the learned pro-

fessions, so-called, to trace their unity in origin and end—the needs and well-being of man; but the review would be imperfect, were we not to notice other callings, which the growing needs of society have summoned into being, and exalted to almost equal prominence with those already named. The *journalistic* profession, though of comparatively recent origin, has had a marvelous development corresponding to the rapidly increasing demands of the people. The newspaper, though a modern institution, has in some form now become *essential* to civilized society. The wonderful growth of trade within the last half century, and of commerce, which now whitens every sea, the amazing rapidity with which news flies across continents, and under seas, making the whole earth, if not of one language, yet in effect one people, the grappling of the public mind with all the great questions which concern individual and national weal—all alike call for the daily newspaper. And if rightly conducted, it is without doubt a most efficient promoter of the well-being of society. But to this end it needs in the editorial chair a man of rare qualities and culture. He should have high moral character and courage, clear and quick appreciation of the public needs, a well-balanced mind, sound judgment, rapidity of thought, and ripe culture of all his intellectual powers. In short, like the wise man of Horace, he should be

"Fortis, et in se ipse totus, teres atque rotundus."

Now the influence for good which such a man at the head of a newspaper can exert, is beyond computation. Sitting in the place of power, his utterances clothed with strange authority, he can send his influence abroad throughout all classes of society. Although he may not sit in the legislative hall, or in the chair of the executive, he may do as efficient service by moulding public opinion into just laws, and sustaining their enforcement. Though he may not plead at the bar, or sit upon the bench, he may as eloquently and successfully defend the right. Though he may not stand in the desk, he may be an efficient ally of the pulpit by his able advocacy of every good cause, and may reach and benefit many who never hear a sermon. In a word, there is no sphere of influence into which his may not sweep, and in which he may not do noble service.

But this enviable power is peculiarly liable to abuse. Instead of resolutely setting himself to mould public opinion aright, the journalist too often surrenders himself to its dictation, and sometimes to the guidance of its worst phases, so that his paper becomes a nuisance to all decent society, pouring upon it a flood of filth which ought never to have seen the light. Thus public morals become sadly undermined, and the whole structure of society threatened. The defense against such a catastrophe lies chiefly in public opinion, which should rise in its might and demand that our newspapers be issued in the interest of good morals; and when public opinion shall thus assert itself, if need be, by withdrawal of patronage, it will not be disregarded. Yet it is but just to the daily press to say that it is, though with sad exceptions, doing good service for society. It opens its columns to the freest discussions of all the great questions of reform in social life, in business, in education, in politics, in religion, and the grand outcome makes for the public weal. And when we remember how rapidly the periodical newspaper has leaped to its vast influence—that it has come into being since our Pilgrim Fathers stepped upon Plymouth Rock,—that it has already reached such influence in England as to be termed even by her statesmen “the fourth estate of the realm,” and that among us it has attained even greater power, we hardly dare to conjecture what is in store for it in the future. But this should make us all the more solicitous to guard its vast power against abuse, and assist it to fulfill what seems to be its high mission of good to society. With this end in view, should we not have schools for the *professional training* of those who are to become journalists, as we now have professional schools for legal, medical, and theological instruction? In them might be discussed by able professors, the great problems of government, of finance, of trade, of capital and labor, of public health, of reform, and the thousand and one questions which have to do with the well-being of society. And might we not expect that from such schools would come to the editorial chair men fitted for the high position, and sensible of the vast responsibilities which they assume?

But there is yet another profession lying back of those which have been named, and fashioning them all, which is fast rising

to equal and deserved prominence. The profession of the *teacher*, though as old as the race, springing equally from its great needs, and evidently essential to its highest welfare, has never come into greater general demand and honor than during the last half century. The world is going to school as never before, and never had it abler and more devoted teachers. Especially is this true in the higher walks of literature, science, and art. Never were there more minds aglow with scholarly enthusiasm for ripe culture in all branches of knowledge, and never did there sit as instructors in our colleges and professional schools men more competent than now to give such culture. Our country swarms with literary institutions, in which it is difficult to say whether the professors are more distinguished for their learning, their devotion, or their poverty. With singular fidelity to duty, regardless of personal considerations, they give themselves to the great work of *laying the foundations from which must rise all the other professions*. But they stand in an honored line, made illustrious by such teachers as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. And it is most auspicious for the future weal of our country, that the public is coming to some just appreciation of the magnitude of the service rendered by these self-denying toilers, from the least of them to the greatest, and is furnishing not a few of our literary institutions with resources, for the want of which they have been sadly crippled in their work.

In like manner it were not difficult to show that every honorable calling springs from some want of man, and adds to his happiness, but the limits of this paper permit a review only of those professions which require a *liberal* education, and of which the college is the nourishing mother. We find in them all essential unity. Like the main branches of a tree, they all grow out of a common trunk—the needs of man—and advance to flowering and fruitage, to satisfy these needs. In origin and aim they are *one*, each necessary to supplement the others in the great mission which they have undertaken for the perfection of society. We need alike legislators, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, journalists, teachers in all literature, science, and art, to develop both man and nature. As yet we know little of the capacities and resources of either. Each is, to a great extent,

a "terra incognita," which needs to be explored and developed. But when we look at the vast and beneficent discoveries which have been made in each within the last century, what may we not hope for in the near future from the incessant questionings of keen and disciplined minds in every department of knowledge? There are doubtless within every profession islands, if not continents, awaiting discovery by some skillful and adventurous Simpson, Morse, or Agassiz. And it becomes every educated man to do what he may to advance his own profession. "I hold," says Lord Bacon, "every man a debtor to his profession, from the which as men, of course, do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavor themselves, by way of amends, to be a help and ornament thereunto."

In an ancient city on the Rhine has been rising, for more than half a thousand years, a magnificent cathedral. Century after century armies of artisans of every kind have swarmed upon it, have faithfully done their work, and passed away. More than a score of generations have come and gone since its foundations were laid, and still its towers ascend, and the work will go on until the topmost stone shall reach its place, and the Cathedral of Cologne, perfect in every part, shall stand forth, the complete embodiment of the grand conception in the minds of its architects. In like manner are we, in our various professions, at work on a grander edifice than ever rose out of marble and mortar. We are building a *republic*—a nation of men—after the ideal left us by its great founders; or rather, may we not reverently hope, somewhat after the conception of the Divine Architect. A century has gone by, and the noble men who toiled at its foundations have gone to their reward, and bequeathed their work to their successors. May they not prove unworthy of the high trust, but manfully carry forward the work, and whether they labor on wall or tower, column or architrave, remember that they are all engaged in *one* enterprise, and that the noblest committed to man. Incitements to a faithful performance of this work crowd upon us on every side. With a country the most remarkable on the face of the globe, in which are empires opening into Christian civilization, and carved into States so fast that we can scarcely remember

their names, with most heterogeneous populations, and conflicting beliefs and interests, what combination of motives, of hopes and fears, to urge to a manly discharge of duty in our various callings. It would seem that it

* * * * "might create a soul
Under the ribs of Death,"

to look at the grandeur of the work. Be it ours to do a manly part, each in his sphere, to build up such a nation as shall make the conception of the poet a reality.

"What constitutes a state?

Not high-raised battlement, or labored mound,
Thick wall, or moated gate;
Not cities proud, with spires and turrets crowned;
Not bays and broad-armed ports,
Where, laughing at the storm, rich navies ride,
Nor starred and spangled courts,
Where low-browed Baseness wafts perfume to pride.
No: *Men, high-minded men,*
With powers as far above dull brutes endued
In forest, brake or den,
As beasts excel cold rocks and brambles rude;
Men, who their duties know,
But know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain,
Prevent the long-aimed blow,
And crush the tyrant while they rend the chain:
These constitute a state."

ARTICLE VIII.—COLLEGE ATHLETICS.

THE wide-spread and constantly increasing attention given, of late years, to physical exercises, the animated interest which they arouse in those who take an active part in them, and the enthusiasm with which people flock to view contests in the various branches of athletic sports as well as the prominence accorded by the public press to topics which treat of boat races, ball matches, and the like, have caused more than one sober minded person to wonder at this new phase in the development of our national character, and ask himself whether all this be a symptom of the natural and healthy growth of a love for outdoor sports and an admiration for health and strength indicative of a commendable desire to promote true physical culture, or merely a fresh turn taken by the fashion of the day tending to give undue encouragement to the acquisition of mere brute strength and clothe the victorious athlete with laudation as sentimental and revolting as the praises which the Roman ladies lavished on the sleek and brawny gladiators of the Empire.

If the question were one relating only to those who engage in these pursuits as a livelihood, the professional oarsman or ball player, the circus performer or the hired gymnast, it would be of no greater interest than the discussion of any other form of amusement in which the actors themselves engaged in their everyday work, and the most important side of the examination would turn on the probable effect such exhibitions would have upon the public which viewed them as spectators, and would involve the consideration of the question whether or not such enthusiasm be indicative of a depraved and degenerating popular taste.

But now-a-days the interest, so far from being confined to those contests in which professional athletes alone engage, is stimulated to a far greater degree by the prospect of a struggle in which gentlemen amateurs are expected to take part. A few years ago, the announcement of a boat race between two well known crews of watermen would bring together an im-

mense crowd to witness the event, while a few hundreds only were to be found on the banks of Lake Quinsigamond at the early races between Harvard and Yale. To-day the prospect of a contest between University crews will call together from all parts of the country, people who would never think of riding a mile to see the most exciting match ever rowed between professionals. How are we to regard this change? Is this tendency to encourage, by the incentive of praise and distinction, the efforts of the amateur athlete, one to be applauded or deplored?

At the Saratoga Boat Race, in the dash and hurry of the start which follows the pent up excitement and breathless suspense that precedes the firing of the first gun, during the rush and roar of the crowd as the boats come sweeping up to the finish, does the average spectator ever stop for a moment in the midst of his cheering to ask himself why he is splitting his throat? Or is he not rather more likely to become infected with the contagion and join in the "rahs" and the tossing of hats till brought back to his senses by the loss of his voice and the crown of his beaver? Does the athlete ever pause before beginning his long course of training and practice to weigh what he is giving up, and inquire whether the gain will compensate for the trouble and sacrifice? In the latter case we may be sure the question has a far better chance of obtaining due consideration. The oarsman, the foot-racer, or the ball player is assailed by too many temptations to relaxation, unknown to those who look upon him as the lucky recipient of praise and congratulation, not to be forced at the very outset of his preparation, to know clearly what he has before him, and to balance the disadvantages against the advantages likely to accrue. But to decide upon the after effect, the intellectual as well as physical results of athleticism, are questions, not for the country clergyman who has never seen a boat race or a foot-ball match, and probably never known a contestant in either event; nor for the closet theorist who, depending for his information upon the sensational newspaper reports of the effects of athletics on the body, and accounts of accidents purporting to have resulted from them, falls straightway to constructing an entirely *à priori* theory as to their probable influence upon the mind.

Such a method of treating the subject is manifestly absurd. A question like this, involving as it does, the consideration of established facts, and depending on data, some of which, at least, are obtainable, though perhaps with difficulty, is not to be treated in a merely speculative way; and any such argument, which starts with the conjectural, and by a plausible chain of reasoning seeks to establish the possible, is, of course, to be cast out as inadmissible.

Ten or fifteen years ago, it might have been said with truth, that the matter was still an open question, and that, whatever might be the case with Great Britain, athletic sports had not flourished long enough with us to enable a fair estimate to be made of their influence and effect. Since then, however, their growth in popularity, coupled with the fact that many have engaged in them who are now in their maturity, renders it possible for us to argue the case on its merits without straying from the solid ground of fact to ride our hobbies into the cloud land of theory.

Assuming, then, that athletics, as their most vehement opponents will undoubtedly be willing to admit, have become a national institution, our investigation branches into two heads:

1. Do athletic sports tend to benefit a man's physique and endow him with increased health and strength, or is there a greater danger of broken health and undermined constitution to him who enters into them, especially if this be at a comparatively early age, when the body cannot be said to have attained its full growth and development?

2. What is their influence on the intellect? Do they, even assuming that they impart health to the body, have a corresponding effect on the mind? Or does the cultivation of superior bodily strength incline to brutalize the mind, imbuing it with a tinge of the animal?

The first is a question to be dealt with only on a basis of pure fact. The second admits, perhaps, of more latitude in theorizing, though here, of course, the less one gravitates toward pure speculation, the better.

The physical education of the present day, and the methods now employed for the development of the human frame, are often made to suffer by drawing a parallel to the physical cul-

ture of ancient Greece and Rome. One marked difference ought to be taken into account, and one which makes an honorable distinction in favor of modern athletics. With the ancients the prime object was the development of individual excellence, the encouragement of the victor only. The sole design of their gymnastic training was to produce a body of stalwart youth, well versed in the arts of war. To the brute strength and physical courage derived from their pursuit of hardy sports, they attributed their boldness in warfare and their unquestioning obedience to command even in face of death. Homer, Virgil, and Horace all extol the benefits and delights of out-door sports, and throughout the classics are scattered the praises of athletic exercises. They are lauded, however, only as they are thought to induce personal bravery and individual strength, while those who carped at them were wont to embody their objections in the inquiry whether the victorious athlete would prove a brave soldier. Euripides who spoke of field sports with contempt asked if

—"He who could wrestle well, or run,
Would be the man to fight his country's enemies."

With us not merely pre-eminence is encouraged, and our physical culture has a far more comprehensive aim. To endure the exhaustive drains upon his vitality which the physician, the lawyer, or the business man may have to undergo, perfect health rather than enormous strength is to be sought, and if it can be shown that the tendency of athletics is to cultivate the latter at the expense of the former, the present enthusiastic encouragement which is accorded them is to be deprecated. Yet, without attempting to deny that the object with ambitious young men is the acquirement of superior strength, that to gain it they are willing even to risk health, we think it can be shown that the two may be pursued in common, and both attained in the highest degree; that the possession of superabundant strength is not incompatible with the possession of superabundant health and vitality. The great trouble with those who begin a course of physical training is that they attempt too much. Which should be especially observed in any line of athletics is the adaptation of special kinds of exercises to individual capacity. What is healthful and invigorating for

one may be dangerous for another. The liability to a sudden change in a person's habits is one of the most serious objections to athletics. *Festina lente* should be the motto of every man who undertakes a course of training. Gradual preparation, progressive development, is the object to be kept carefully in view. It is hardly fair when a headstrong young man trains foolishly and overtaxes himself to throw the whole blame on athletics. There are plenty who will assert that in the height of their preparation for some manly contest, they felt healthier, more buoyant and active than at any other time in their lives. The regular hours, the abstinence from luxuries, the plain and simple manner of living impart a glow to the skin, a clear brightness to the eye. Then it is that the athlete feels repaid for the exertions he has undergone and the sacrifices he has made. In athletics, as well as in the serious pursuits of life, attention to a specialty is the means for attaining excellence. The ambitious undergraduate, fond of the excitement of rivalry and competition, tries to row in his college boat at one season, play on the ball nine at another, and enter a foot race the day after a rough game of foot-ball. A frequent result is, at most, an acquirement of mediocrity in one or two things, and not infrequently he abandons all in his disappointment and falls back into physical idleness, when, if at the start he had taken up one line of sports and adhered to it, he might have perfected himself in that specialty.

No student need plead want of time as an excuse for not entering into some branch of athletics. And just here arises the mistake which the opponents of manly exercises are so wont to fall into. The cultivation of the mind is treated as antithetical to that of the body; whereas it is a one-sided development where either mental force or bodily strength is sought after at the expense of the other. The time consumed in the preparation for a university boat race is no more than the hardest student could and ought to give to his regular daily exercise. The dawdling walk of a mile or two with which many of our undergraduates content themselves, under the name of a "constitutional," is a farce which leaves the man no better off than before with the exception of having exchanged the close atmosphere of his study for the pure out-door air.

But the sluggish current of his blood has not been accelerated, nor the beat of his pulse quickened as if he had taken a half-hour's row or a twenty-minutes burst over a hard road at a brisk pace. Let him do this latter, day in and day out, and he will come back glowing with health and ready for his evening's reading with clear eyes and a cool head.

Yet we would not be understood to favor the pursuit of one kind of exercise to the absolute exclusion of every other kind. That would result in the development of one set of muscles to the neglect of others. One may take up a certain line of athletics and perfect himself in that specialty and at the same time ensure symmetrical development by other supplementary exercises. The pedestrian whose running or walking serves to strengthen the lower limbs, needs the use of the Indian clubs and parallel bars to enlarge the girth of his chest and the measurements of his fore-arm and biceps, while the boating man will pull the lustier oar if he accustoms himself to a run or walk at regular periods. Enjoyment, too, should be sought for as well as mere forced activity.

"In what 'ere you sweat
Indulge your taste. Some love the manly toils,
The tennis some, and some the graceful dance.

* * * * *

He chooses best whose labor entertains
His vacant fancy most. The toil you hate
Fatigues you soon and scarce improves your limbs."

Armstrong's "Art of Preserving Health."—Book III.

In boating, base ball, and the like, there is something more to be gained than mere listless exercise, and while to most natures there is a pleasing stimulus in competition, there is at the same time an element of sociability in those contests where the honors of victory are enhanced, or the mortifications of defeat lessened by sharing with one's fellows.

The interest which is excited by our annual university boat race arouses a proportionally increasing distrust in the physical effects of such a strain upon the constitutions of those who engage in it, and it has long been thought by many a question of grave doubt whether the college oarsman is likely to last as well in the long run as his less athletic contemporary. Fortunately for the accuracy of our conclusions the very same ques-

tion, depending on about the same conditions, has arisen in England in regard to the yearly aquatic struggle between Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and for several years the discussion has, from time to time, received contributions in the form of pamphlets and reviews, upholding or decrying the boat race and its supporters. There too, was felt the impossibility of reaching a fair conclusion because of the absence of statistics from which to reason as data. In order to remedy this deficiency a Dr. Morgan, of Manchester, himself an old college "oar," collected whatever information lay within the scope of inquiry concerning the after health of all the 294 men who had rowed in the university races from 1829 to 1869. Of these only seventeen appeared to think that they had been injured by their exertions in training for and rowing in the race, and by several of these seventeen other causes are mentioned to which their ill health might equally well be attributed.

Diseases of the heart and lungs are those to which the oarsman is assumed to be especially exposed; and whenever a rowing man dies from affections of these organs the paragraph which bewails his fate is pretty sure to close its threnody with a homily upon the fearful risks which the oarsman runs of untimely death or premature decay from consumption or aneurism of the heart. An examination of Dr. Morgan's work, however, is calculated to allay if not dispel any such gloomy fears. By a comparison of his elaborate and carefully collated statistics with the Reports of the British Registrar General, he arrives at the conclusion that "the rate of mortality from lung and heart diseases among rowing men is far lower than can be found in any Statistical Tables which ever were compiled." While, in subversion of the theory that the strain to which the muscles of the heart are subjected in the protracted struggle of a four-mile race may produce an aneurism, he quotes the assertion of Dr. Niemeyer that "the healthy heart never ruptures." And surely it is in the power of every man to ascertain before beginning a course of training, as a precaution due to the cause of athletics, as well as for any private reason, whether those important organs, the heart and lungs, are in a healthy condition, fit to warrant his undertaking what no one denies is severe exertion.

But perhaps the most valuable testimony of all, is that given by Mr. Tinné, captain of the Oxford four which rowed against Harvard in 1869. This consists of a letter to Dr. Morgan, and embodies in a few concise and temperate expressions the opinion of an enthusiastic oarsman, and yet, one who would not let his zeal for the sport get the better of that judgment which his experience had taught him. These are his words:

"My own impressions as to whether the 'Varsity training is injurious to men, are very much the same as I daresay you have heard from others, namely, that

1. If a man be sound to start with,
2. Trains honestly,
3. Does not play the fool when he comes out of training, he will come to no harm. Speaking for myself, I can say that I never was in such perfect health and comfort as when in training at Putney." This is the qualified statement of a celebrated oarsman. He does not attempt to defend the practice of rowing races on anything but its merits. There is no overflow of enthusiasm; but, on the contrary, his tentative language implies that severe training, begun without proper precautions and broken off suddenly is liable to be followed by injurious effects—an imputation which no reasonable person, however strenuous a supporter of athletics, would wish to deny.

The conclusion to which Dr. Morgan arrives is deduced from a comparison of numerous letters whose opinions coincide with the one quoted, and his reasoning is fully sustained by the facts he has cited. Dr. Morgan gives us, moreover, a statement from a member of his own profession, a fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, to the effect that "rowing in a racing boat with proper training and fitting men does good physically and morally."

But it is hardly necessary to multiply examples, for those of our readers who wish to, can get all the statistics they desire by turning to Dr. Morgan's little book; and we venture to say that opening at random the inquirer will happen upon a letter expressing temperate approval if not enthusiastic eulogy of the physical benefit to undergraduates of rowing and training for boat races. Even among the rare cases where harm was supposed to have been incurred, the majority testify to the fact

that the injury has not been transmitted to their offspring, giving, surely, ample evidence that whatever ills, due to their rowing careers, have befallen the oarsmen themselves, their constitutions have been left unimpaired. This deprives of their strong point those opponents to athletic sports who, failing to detect any signs of debility in the athlete himself, are wont to fall back upon doleful prognostications of the effect which this "sowing the seeds of disease" will have upon his unfortunate progeny.

Turning from the physical side of the discussion, let us now examine the question in its intellectual bearings.

To those who oppose competitive athletics, it seems inconceivable that advanced mental and bodily growth should go hand in hand. But it is pure begging of the question to assume, in discussing this subject, that the attainment of an active and vigorous frame, strengthened and symmetrically developed by hardy exercises, is incompatible with the possession of a mind, discerning, well-balanced, and trained to hard study. What need of going to either extreme in asserting that the victorious athlete is presumably one who cultivates his muscle at the expense of his intellect, or that the deep student and hard reading man must of necessity look upon the competition for a seat in his college boat or the first place in the foot race not only as unworthy his efforts but even positively detrimental to his chances of success as a scholar. One would think that this notion needs nothing more by way of refutation than a glance at the numerous examples our own country has furnished, of men who have begun by surpassing their comrades in manly activity, and ended by taking a foremost place among the aspirants for success in professional life or the leaders of public opinion in the councils of the State.

Washington's intellect can hardly be said to have suffered from the keenness with which he threw himself into the hunt and his acknowledged passion for field sports; nor is it at all to his discredit that he prided himself on his ability to outjump any other man in Virginia. It is much more reasonable to admit that the active training of his youth inured his body to the privations of the Braddock campaign and brought him back hardier than ever and better able to endure the mental and

physical sufferings in store for him at Philadelphia and Valley Forge.

Sumner was the best boxer as well as the widest reader of his class at college ; active with his hands, active with his head ; able to strike from the shoulder as well as give and receive the blows of forensic strife.

Nor, again, is it fair to blame athletic sports as an institution because at certain periods of the year the public press have given undue prominence to the description of the winning boat's crew or the victorious foot-racer. To none is this notoriety more distasteful than to the very objects of it, as the newspaper reporter has often found to his cost.

That the College Regatta at Saratoga is made too much of a national affair must be admitted ; and that the account of a set of oarsmen, given in language which would better be employed in the description of prize-cattle, shows, at least, flagrantly bad taste, is felt only too well by the athletes themselves.

One of the principal reasons given by Yale and Harvard for their proposed withdrawal from the College Rowing Association was this very fact, that the publicity attending these regattas and the extravagant way in which they were treated by the press tended to foist the event into undue and disagreeable prominence and fasten upon the participants an unsought and unwelcome notoriety seriously detrimental to the true interests of athletics. Unfortunately their motives have been misconstrued ; and not a few who are wont to declaim against the high pressure excitement which attends the Saratoga race may be found among those who rail at the two colleges for an alleged desire for exclusiveness which their detractors are pleased to term "snobbish" and undemocratic.

That athletic sports are liable to be made too important a topic by the newspapers is a fact to be acknowledged and deplored ; but one should be careful before proceeding to the wholesale condemnation of a popular institution to discriminate between faults inherent and those which are merely adventitious and admitting of mitigation or radical correction. It is urged, moreover, against muscular competition, that it engenders unworthy aspirations in the student's mind, and we are told that an inordinate desire for notoriety is thus stimulated

We are exhorted to emulate the example of our forefathers, those worthy but rather straight-laced moralists, who, with vigorous austerity treated the body as an impure vessel needing to be submitted to all manner of mortifications of the flesh to fit it as a store-house for the treasures of the mind, neglecting the former to cultivate the latter, forgetting the interdependence of the two. Whatever faults the student of to-day may commit, that is an error which, thanks to more enlightened ideas on education, he is hardly likely to fall into.

We fail to perceive why the charge of selfish ambition should be brought against a skillful athlete who strives for a foremost place, any more than against the scholar who aspires to the leadership of his class.

The popular movements in favor of boating, base ball, and the like, encourage a social, not solitary, emulation; while in the triumph of him who heads the rank-list, however laudable be his desire for self-culture, there are few sharers outside the fortunate student's own circle of relatives and friends. We would not be thought to depreciate scholastic competition, nor deny that it is one of the most important ingredients of our academic system; but, while acknowledging the value as a stimulus of rivalry in studies, we claim for athletics the benefit of the same element.

The history of physical culture is one of progressive development. With the ancients the tendency was naturally to lay great stress on the possession of mere brute strength. The Greek system of education gave twice as much time to the training of the body as to the training of the mind. But this was a better extreme than that to which the clerical austerity of the Middle Ages brought the Mediæval monk. Warped in body they grew warped in brain; and the craft, superstition, and bigotry of the cloister were the natural outgrowths of minds goaded to their labors by cruel mortifications of the emaciated frame. "Three of the four Greek fathers—Chrysostom, Basil, and Gregory Nazianzen—ruined their health early, and were invalids for the remainder of their days. Three only of the whole eight were able bodied men,—Ambrose, Augustine, and Athanasius; and the permanent influence of these three has been far greater, for good or for evil, than that of all the others put

together.*" And so it has been all the world over. Without citing examples or examining exceptions we may safely say that the men who have figured prominently in politics, literature, or science, have been those who excelled their cotemporaries in vigor of body. Genius, no doubt, will often by sheer force of will overcome the obstacles of weakness and disease; but the unhealthy body is too prone to act upon the abnormally developed brain, supplanting the vigorous thought by the emanations of a diseased imagination.

"Ginnyus, Ginnyus,
Take care of your carkuss!"

Said Reade's shrewd old Dr. Sampson; and his advice is pointed by the example of our own Poe.

How often have we sat in the lecture hall, of an evening during the Winter Course, waiting for the lecturer, some distinguished English author or scientist to appear, and expecting to see a slim, pale student, when there steps out on the platform a burly, broad-shouldered personage, with a commanding presence and hearty voice, who turns out to be the very man we have come to see. And then to hear people talk as though great bodily strength and robust health could not be united with a massive intellect and a brain capable of enduring a protracted strain. Why, 'tis the scholars, the hard students themselves who make the best athletes of all, as more than one hard fought race or game of ball will show. "The Royal Engineers, the select of the select,—every one of whom before he obtains his commission has to run the gauntlet of an almost endless series of intellectual contests—for years together could turn out the best foot-ball eleven in the kingdom, and within the last twelve months gained a success in cricket absolutely unprecedented in the annals of the game."†

Time and again come reports from this school or that, of complaints arising from the too great pressure brought to bear upon the scholars in their studies. At one time they come from a famous New England preparatory school; at another from some well known young ladies' seminary. But where do we hear

* *Saints and their Bodies*, by Thos. Wentworth Higginson.

† *Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*. Vol. II, p. 292.

complaints made against similar institutions on the ground that they are weaning the minds from study, or injuring the bodies of their students by giving too much attention to athletic exercises?

In the Annual Report of President Eliot, of Harvard, for the year '73-4, in a paragraph upon physical exercises, occurs the following sentence: "Most American schools entirely neglect this very important part of their proper function. Many young men, therefore, come to the University with undeveloped muscles, a bad carriage, and an impaired digestion, without skill in outdoor games, and unable to ride, row, swim, or shoot. It is important that the University should give opportunity for a variety of physical exercises, because this student prefers one form and that another, and an exercise which is enjoyed will be ten times as useful as one which is repulsive."

In American society with our tendency to rush at an early age into the serious business of life, weighting the immature brain and half-grown body with the duties and responsibilities of maturity, the longer time we give to both sides of our education the better.

The possessor of abundant health and strength has at his command a far better capital to start upon than a mine of wealth. It gives him self-possession, dignity, aplomb; qualities never amiss in trade or the professions, and which clothe their possessor with homage and esteem in every rank of society and smooth the way to success in mercantile or political life. "If I should make the shortest list of the qualifications of the orator," says Emerson,* "I should begin with *manliness*; perhaps it means here presence of mind"—the quality of qualities which a reasonable attention to athletics tends to engender and increase.

* *Letters and Social Aims.* p. 112.

ARTICLE IX.—FIFTY YEARS OF HOME MISSIONS IN ILLINOIS.*

THIS is not only the Jubilee of the American Home Missionary Society, but the fiftieth year of its operations in Illinois, "And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year." When this Society was born, Illinois was only eight years old. After the founding of Kaskaskia by the French in 1707, the first American settlement was made by Kentuckians in 1788. In 1820 the census reported 55,211. In 1826 the new society came to its work in Illinois for 70,000 people; and now, after this half a century, it looks back upon what it has done in this State for 8,000,000 souls, as many as the Colonies numbered a hundred years ago.

The same year in which this Society came up, the first railway was started in the United States. And to-day Illinois has 7,109 miles of railroad—1400 miles more than any other State. When, six years after this Society began its work in Illinois, Abraham Lincoln went forth as Captain of Militia in the Black Hawk war, only 3,000 men were mustered in the State for a summer campaign. But when, thirty years later, he was chosen to serve as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, his calls were responded to in Illinois by 258,217 three-years men, of whom 28,842, along with him, laid down their lives for their country. At the time of that Black Hawk war, the settlers who had ventured out from Fort Dearborn twenty miles, had to flee back—one of those families being that of Judge Blodgett, of the United States Court. And now around Fort Dearborn stands Chicago.

In 1826, Illinois had *one* Representative in Congress; in 1876, she has *nineteen*. In 1819 the first two Sabbath Schools were set up in this State, and now there are 6,000 of them. In 1798, the first common school in the Territory; now there are 11,648 free public schools. When this Society was born, Illinois had cast but two presidential votes; now she has furnished two double-term Presidents.

* Paper read before the Illinois General Association.

The first Protestant preaching in Illinois resulted in a revival of religion, and in a Baptist church organization—1796—with rules opposed to slavery. As late as 1812, Rev. Samuel J. Mills, on his tour through the West and Southwest, in behalf of the Missionary Society of Connecticut and of a local Bible Society, reported that in the Illinois Territory there was not a Presbyterian or Congregational minister—that there were five or six Methodist preachers, with about six hundred members, and five Baptist churches with one hundred and twenty members. To-day the Protestant church organizations of Illinois number 4,298.

Turning from these general contrasts, let us look at that specific missionary work in Illinois with which our churches have been associated. As there were reformers before the Reformation, so there were Puritan Missionaries in Illinois before this Society. One of the most thrilling chapters in the religious history of our country is yet to be written of the far-reaching plans and beneficent accomplishment of the old Missionary Society of Connecticut. On his first Missionary tour, in 1812, Samuel J. Mills stopped at Shawneetown, and preached, and organized a Bible Society; but he did not go across the State to St. Louis, as he had intended, because of the reported unsafety of the trip. But, upon his second visit, two years later, in company with Daniel Smith, he did risk the journey. At Kaskaskia, Governor Edwards generously entertained the object of their mission; and father Lippincott, in his historical sermon, says: "the missionaries made a deep impression upon the Governor's family." Finding only four or five Bibles among the hundred families of that old French capital, they consorted with the Governor in organizing a Bible Society there. Going over the river to St. Louis, which they found to be a village of 2,000 inhabitants, three-fourths of whom were French Catholics, they preached the first Protestant sermons on the west side of the Mississippi; they consulted with Governor Clark upon their Missionary scheme; organized a Bible Society; prepared the way for the coming of a missionary pastor for that town, and then went on down the river, to preach the first Protestant sermons, and to organize the first Presbyterian churches in Natchez and New Orleans. Dr. Palmer, in a recent commemorative dis-

course, candidly reported the founding of his church by Congregational enterprise. As one result of that tour of exploration, early in 1816, Solomon Giddings from Andover, a cousin of the great Commoner, Joshua, came on, located at St. Louis, developed his own first Presbyterian church there, and became a very apostle in all that region, on both sides of the river, so that, in the twelve years of his pastorate in St. Louis, he had organized a whole Presbytery of churches, six of them in Missouri and eight in Illinois. And all this time, up to the day of his death, he was under commission of that Connecticut Society, making to it stated reports, which, in the *Panoplist*, read like an Iliad. The churches organized by Giddings in Illinois, were those of Kaskaskia, Shoal Creek, Lebanon, Bellville, McCord's Settlement, Turkey Hill, Collinsville and Edwardsville.

Up to the time of organizing the National Society, the Connecticut Society had sent to Illinois the following named missionaries: Rev. Oren Fowler, sent to Indiana and Illinois; Revs. Edward Hollister and Daniel Gould, from Andover, commissioned for Illinois and Missouri, the Society refusing to send one man to a field so limited as was either State alone; Revs. Oren Catlin and Daniel Sprague, commissioned to labor "in the United States, west of the Alleghanies;" Rev. Isaac Reed, who gave most of his time to Indiana, but who organized the church at Paris; while the eloquent Sylvester Larned had been directed to visit Vincennes and Kaskaskia, on his way to the pastorate in New Orleans, where the good Elias Cornelius had followed with some Christian culture the planting of Samuel J. Mills. From 1820 to 1830 this society sent fifteen men to Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee. These were Revs. Hezekiah Hall, Nathan B. Derrow, John Matthews, Jesse Townsend, David C. Proctor, Lyman Whiting, Samuel Bolding and Horace Smith; but the last named is the only one whose service I have been able to identify with Illinois. This society also sent to Illinois and Missouri Revs. Joel Goodell, Benjamin F. Hovey, Asa Johnson, Cyrus Nichols, George C. Wood, Alfred Wright, and Joseph M. Sadd, nearly all of whom passed on over the river, and in Missouri soon came under the care of the new National Society. In 1822 the New York Evangelical Society sent to Illinois from Andover, Rev. David Tenney; and,

in 1824, from the same Seminary, the United Domestic Missionary Society sent John M. Ellis, who was located at Kaskaskia, and the Connecticut Society sent E. S. Howe. These men went on to organize the first Presbyterian churches of Alton, Carrollton, Vandalia, Springfield, and others of like grade. There is a fascination in this unselfish prodigality, with which New England was thus pouring her life into the West, and, all the time, into a rival ecclesiastical system.

During this period, the Presbyterian Board of Domestic Missions sent nine men to labor in Illinois, mostly as itinerants. In 1821, Rev. Dr. Gideon Blackburn, a pastor in Louisville, Kentucky, came over and held, at Shoal Creek, a camp-meeting, which resulted in a great revival. He also purchased, in 1835, 16,656 acres of land in the State and made it the foundation for the Blackburn University at Carlinville.

Up to the time of the organizing of the National Society, the policy, both with the Societies and the Presbyterian Board, had been to send out missionaries as itinerants, for two, four, six months or longer. Pastors were sometimes relinquished for such special service. These men would plunge into the wilderness, look up the people, preach, organize churches, and then go along. This process was found to be very unsatisfactory. The churches did not thrive upon such random preaching. Becoming interested in a man, they were only doomed to disappointment by his hasty leaving. Under this experience the sentiment had grown up in favor of a permanent ministry; and so, when the new society was set up, the people on the field besought a new policy. And so there is nothing new under the sun. It was an illustration of the working of the old style, that when the National Society was formed, it found in Illinois only four so-called Presbyterian ministers—Revs. J. M. Ellis, E. G. Howe, John Brick and Stephen Bliss, and the last two were only former preachers. And the new society did start off with a “new policy”—one gained from the practical working of the missionary scheme—a policy, which, with flexibility, its own experience of fifty years has confirmed. In our courts, the accumulation of precedents and of the wisdom of predecessors, is what secures them the weight of judgment. And this it is that gives accuracy and stability and effectiveness to the resultant regulations of mission Boards and Societies.

Let us now for a moment set ourselves back to the year 1826, and take our stand at the old capital, Kaskaskia, looking northward and eastward. Up the Mississippi, on the left is the French village of St. Louis, with Solomon Giddings working there, and not another minister beyond him to the North Pole. On the right, settlements are thickening in, Jacksonville and Quincy are just coming into existence as villages, and all beyond, toward the north, is wild, wild wilderness of boundless prairie, charming groves and river-courses, with the relief only of the old French post at Peoria, Fort Armstrong on the Rock Island, the opening lead mines in the north-west corner of the State, and Fort Dearborn at the mouth of the Chicago River. Surely the question now is not whether the new society, along with the other organs of American evangelism, can furnish this empire of a State, already full of people, with the Gospel and its institutional adjuncts; but whether, themselves growing with the State, they can supply the present sparse population, and follow up that which is to come.

The great New York and Erie Canal has just the year before been opened. Along this channel, and around the great lakes, the tide of emigration is soon to flow, setting back into the prairies of northern and central Illinois. There is, too, to be a change in the style of the emigrants. Heretofore, the intelligent and wealthy, but lordly Southerners, emigrating with their slaves and other chattels, and taunting our people that they cannot hold slaves in Illinois, have passed on through to Missouri, where, by compromise, "the land-mark of freedom" has been removed, leaving this State to the "poor whites" of the South. But now, eastern folk, along their own parallels, are to seek their homes in this free Commonwealth. They will bring along with them their characteristic ideas, and, many of them, leaving the old seats of society during an era of revival, will come as fresh recruits in the service of the Lord, seeking to incorporate a spiritual religion into churches and institutions. Can this leaven be equal to the leavening of the masses, to the raising up of a Christian civilization?

The new society, undertaking its share of the task, starts off with two missionaries in Illinois,—Rev. J. M. Ellis, at Kaskaskia, taken from the United Domestic Missionary Society, and

Rev. E. G. Howe, taken from the Connecticut Society, who preached at Diamond Grove, (afterward Jacksonville,) at Springfield, and at Paris, and who, still surviving at the age of seventy-seven, has written me upon these matters from Paxton, Massachusetts. Thus far the great home mission field has been central or Western New York, where the new organization finds one hundred of the one hundred and thirty missionaries, whom it takes from the hand of the former societies, which had followed the emigrants from New England into those parts. Now that zone is stretching out rapidly towards the West. In the second year the society sends out from Andover, Solomon Hardy, who, before he takes his place at Shoal Creek, supplies Mr. Ellis' pulpit at Kaskaskia, while he goes out to explore the extreme northern frontier, in Morgan, Longamon, Green, and Adams counties.

In the third year, 1828, Rev. Dr. J. G. Bergen is sent from New Jersey to Springfield, where he finds a village of twenty-six log cabins, and the Presbyterian Church, which Mr. Ellis had organized—the same which became Abraham Lincoln's place of worship. Rev. John Matthews is sent to take Kaskaskia, as Mr. Ellis goes to Jacksonville. The two young licentiates, Thomas Lippincott and Cyrus L. Watson are commissioned for Edmondsville and Rushville. From Connecticut, is sent to Galena the young pastor, Rev. Aratus Kent, who had applied to the society for a place which was so hard that no one else would take it. In the Fall of that year Mr. Kent travels *nineteen days* on horse-back, following down the Mississippi to find the Indiana Synod, which was to meet with one of its churches in Bond County, Illinois. On his way he preaches to seventy-five of the one hundred and fifty soldiers at Fort Armstrong. Arriving at St. Louis, which also belonged to the Indiana Synod, he finds himself too late for the meeting.

But a new era of evangelism is about to dawn upon Illinois. It comes from a divine coupling of agencies widely separated. Ellis, at his ordination in the Old South Church, Boston, had received of Elias Cornelius the charge: "Build up an institution of learning, which shall bless the West for all time." He secures the location of a Seminary at Jacksonville. He reports to the society; and that report, in the *Home Missionary*, quick-

ens the divine ferment then going on in the Divinity School of Yale College, the result of which is the forming of the "Illinois Association," with the names of seven young men signed in solemn pledge to go out to that State. Those names were Theron Baldwin, Julien M. Sturtevant, Mason Grosvenor, John F. Brooks, Elisha Jenney, William Kirby, Asa Turner. To this list were added those of William Carter, Albert Hale, Flavel Bascom, Romulus Barnes, and Lucien Farnham.

This was the *fifth* Home Missionary Band. Four had already been sent west from Andover. In the fourth there were eight men, who, at the instance of the American Home Missionary Society, had been ordained in the Park Street Church, Boston, by the Presbytery of Newburyport,—and this as a prudential measure, to make the young men, as was supposed, more acceptable at the West. Among these I count the pastor of my boyhood in Ohio, Rev. Henry Shedd, who raised up a son to be a foreign missionary; and Rev. Dr. M. M. Post, of Indiana, who, as himself a sort of Theological Seminary, has put four sons into the ministry, one of whom is in the foreign service. Another Band had numbered four, among them John M. Ellis. They had been ordained, under home mission auspices, by a Council in the Old South Church of Boston—Drs. S. H. Cox, Matthias Bussen, Elias Cornelius, Justin Edwards, and B. B. Wisner, participating. It was in connection with this Council, held September 24th, 1825, that the idea of a National Home Mission Society got its first public recognition, and the impulse which carried it on to realization. In October, 1831, ten young men from Andover were ordained in New York by its Third Presbytery, ready to start on the next day as home missionaries; while eight more from Andover and Bangor and Princeton, among them Jeremiah Porter and Edmund O. Hovey, were then on their way to the West—eighteen in all, the largest company ever sent out by the Society. But of these six bands, the Illinois Association was the first one to go out to a given locality, as did the Iowa Band fourteen years later. Every one of those twelve New Haven Apostles, except Grosvenor, who was detained by ill-health, upon the completion of their Seminary course, came on to Illinois, under commission of the Society, with outfit furnished and a pledge of the current missionary salary of four hundred dollars.

In 1829, Messrs. Baldwin and Sturtevant, assigned in their commission "to the State of Illinois," came on and set up the Illinois College—Mr. Sturtevant becoming an instructor, and Mr Baldwin locating at Vandalia, the capital, where his first convert is William H. Brown, whose estate at Chicago, in the reciprocity of missions, has made over to the American Board property to the value of \$35,000. In 1830, Asa Turner, Jr., locates in Quincy. He organizes the first church of the place. In the county he sets agoing the Tract, Bible and Temperance causes. The next Summer he holds a four-days meeting, in which there are twenty-four conversions. He develops three out-stations, which he soon organizes into churches that are now strong and useful. In 1833, he breaks over into Missouri to hold a series of protracted meetings. After the first, in which there are sixty conversions, the campaign is arrested by the cholera. In a strain of heroic sadness the missionary reports to the Society: "When these calamities are overpast, those of us *who may survive*, will try again to gather the lost sheep." He goes East a year, for Illinois College. In three and a half years he brings his church to self-support; and in the first year of that self-reliance, he reports \$360 for benevolent causes. A member of the church, in gratitude, wrote thus: "To your Society, as a means under God, do we owe the blessing and high privilege we now enjoy. Where had we now been had not your Society sent us a helper? We would not for the universe go back where we were one short year since; and there we should have been had not your heaven-born charity reached us."

After such a pastorate of eight years, Mr. Turner heard the Macedonian cry from over the river in Iowa Territory; and, in 1839, at Denmark, he gathered the first Congregational Church of Iowa. And the General Association of the State, when it kept this jubilee, reported to that patriarch, who did "survive" the cholera of 1833, and who was present, two hundred and twenty churches, one hundred and sixty-five ministers, with two Christian Colleges, the model Academy, at Denmark, and a Professorship in the Chicago Theological Seminary. And all of this is largely the showing of the American Home Missionary Society for its thirty-seven years of operation in Iowa.

Following up our Illinois Band, we find all of them but one, by the year 1833, settled in Illinois, under commission of the society,—Brooks, at Collinsville; Jenny, at Alton; Kirby, at Mendon; Carter, at Pittsfield; Hale, at Bethel, and then at Springfield for a life-work; Barnes, at Canton; Farnham, at Lewiston, and then at Princeton; and Bascom, in Tazwell County, where, in six years, he organizes Presbyterian churches at Pleasant Grove, Tremont, Peoria, and Washington, leaving, after six years, in the three counties of Peoria, Bureau, and Putnam, eleven Presbyterian churches, and ten Presbyterian ministers, organized into Peoria Presbytery, where he had found but one minister of that order,—and then we find him in a home missionary agency, and in pastorates at Chicago, Galesburg, Dover, Princeton, and Hinsdale, and still doing invaluable occasional service among the churches. Mason Grosvenor, in whose brain was born the idea of the "Illinois Association," true to his life-plans, has been these many years a professor in the Illinois College.

Within that period—up to 1833—came also Dr. Edward Beecher, as President of the College; Lemuel Foster, to found the First Presbyterian Church of Bloomington, and to fill up a long life with extended usefulness; Warren Nichols to Atlas; Elisha H. Hazard, with a commission for "Ottawa, La Salle," and Putnam Counties; N. C. Clark, to organize *twenty-eight* churches in the Fox River Valley; and Jeremiah Porter, to organize the First Presbyterian Church, of Chicago, and then to fill up these forty-six years of western ministry, which seems yet to be as fruitful as ever. These men plant their own churches, travel, hold protracted meetings, organize other churches, set up Tract and Bible Societies, and Sunday schools, and pioneer the cause of temperance and of education, after the sample given in that first Quincy pastorate.

At this point in our history, the society, now seven years of age, has sent forward to the Illinois frontier, *thirty-seven* missionaries. Now, the Black Hawk war is over; and, as a result, the Rock and Fox River countries are opened to settlement; and a new impulse is given to emigration. And the missionary corps is correspondingly reinforced. Rev. R. W. Gridley comes on from an eighteen years' pastorate at Williamstown,

Mass., to do missionary work at Big Grove, Ottawa, and Jacksonville. Rev. J. A. Reed, takes Warsaw, and then goes over to superintend home missions in Iowa. Dr. David Nelson, the converted infidel, a revivalist, and the founder of "Mission Institute," at Quincy, is commissioned for Adams County." Elijah P. Lovejoy, the photo-martyr of freedom, comes to Alton from a two years missionary work under commission in Missouri. John J. Miter, works up Knoxville as a missionary, and then goes up to become one of the fathers of the churches in Wisconsin. Jairus Wilcox, brings on the church and the academy at Geneseo. Familiar missionary names of that period are those of Chauncy Cook, Milo N. Miles, Amnon Gaston, Lucius Foot, Levi Spencer, Darius Gore, Daniel C. Rockwell, A. B. Hitchcock, Wm. B. Dodge, Joseph H. Payne, L. G. Wright, L. H. Parker, the founder of many of the churches in Central Illinois. G. S. F. Savage, who, at St. Charles, in the three years of his commission, reported two revivals, the building of a church edifice with a bell in it, the doubling of the church membership, and the four-folding of the Sabbath school, and then went on to fill out a twelve years pastorate, from which he was called to these sixteen years of public service for the churches and the country; and, without commission, Horatio Foot, who, after an early career as an Evangelist, to the Quincy pastorate, and yet abides to rejoice in what God hath wrought.

When, in 1860, our Presbyterian brethren withdrew from the society, its total number of missionaries fell from 1,107 to 863, a diminution of 244; in Illinois the number fell from one hundred to eighty-three, a dropping of seventeen.

During the score of years between 1840 and 1860, the society had in Illinois an average of ninety-six missionaries. For the sixteen years since that separation it has had an average of *seventy-five* Congregational missionary pastors in the State.

In the whole fifty years the society has sustained in the State an annual average of *sixty-six* missionaries—has planted and trained *four hundred* Presbyterian and Congregational churches, in about equal numbers—and has expended upon the field not less than \$600,000.

There are now in Illinois 482 Presbyterian churches. There have been organized in Illinois 311 Congregational churches.

Of these, sixty-five, by consolidation, or by change of center, or by a death that glorified God, have disappeared from our roll. Of the present number, 245, *one hundred and sixty-three* have been organized in the last twenty-five years, *since* the *first* Congregational in Chicago took its rise. In the last fifteen years, since the Presbyterians withdrew from the society, 85 churches have been organized, and 124 houses of worship have been built.

But these figures can convey no adequate conception of the amount of labor performed, of the extent of good accomplished. We are to consider that this work has been done for the two denominations in all the leading cities of the State, as well as in all the smaller communities. Kaskaskia, and Vandalia, and Springfield, and Jacksonville, and Quincy, Decatur, Danville, Urbann, Peoria, and Ottawa, and Rock Island, Aurora, St. Charles, Geneva, Galena, Freeport, Belvedere, Elgin, and Chicago, have all been home mission beneficiaries. And the influence of this body of churches upon Illinois we do not realize until we consider them as the repositories of the organic force which Christianity imparts to social life and the civil State.

An essential part of the home missionary scheme is its system of superintendence—an agency for exploring, for organizing churches, for promoting the building of houses of worship, for doing evangelistic service, for supplying missionary churches with ministers, for raising funds, for inspecting and endorsing applications,—in short for aiding the beneficiary churches and their pastors by all feasible means—eyes and ears to the society, hands and voice to the field. Besides all the work of administration, the superintendent usually preaches every year more gospel sermons than he would deliver in any pastorate.

We find that five of the Illinois Association have served the State in this capacity: Baldwin, Hale, Boscom, Kirby, Jenny. Indeed this agency, as a method of the society, was inaugurated here. It grew naturally out of the ideal of the band, which was not simply to plant the college and around it the cordon of supporting churches, but to put in motion throughout the State all civilizing and Christianizing influences. In order to this some one must take the field to explore and superintend.

Mr. Baldwin was the first agent, entering upon his work in 1833, and continuing in it four years. A specimen of his work was a tour, made in that first year, on horseback, in company with Mr. Hale as assistant, from Jacksonville to Chicago, a trip of seven weeks, and of seven hundred miles, on which they preached fifty sermons and held several four-days meetings. Arriving at Chicago, which they found to be a town of three hundred and fifty inhabitants, with twenty-two doggeries, they were glad to find that the society had already sent forward the missionary, Jeremiah Porter, for whom they preached five times within a week. During that same year Rev. Aratus Kent came across from Galena on horseback, lodging nights upon the prairie, as he found only one settlement on the way. He came over to see if it was not time to start a mission work at Fort Dearborn, and was also glad to find Mr. Porter, and to welcome him as his nearest neighbor. He reported to the society: "I have rarely addressed a more attentive and apparently devout congregation than that which I met on Sabbath morning in the garrison, and which, combining the people of the village and gentlemen of the army, constituted a large assembly for this country. It is an important station, for he will have opportunity to visit several settlements just forming in the vicinity, which are entirely destitute of Presbyterian preaching. And if the pier now commencing should be permanent, and the harbor become a safe one, Chicago will undoubtedly grow as rapidly as any village in the western country." With twenty-six members, all of whom were Congregationalists, except Dea. Philo Carpenter, the First Presbyterian Church was organized. On their way back the two agents fell in with Mr. Bascom in Tazwell county, and held an open-air four-days meeting, using an ox-sled for a pulpit. Mr. Hale, following Mr. Baldwin, took the work for five years, associating with himself Mr. Bascom, who soon took the work in the northern part of the State, in connection with his pastorate in the First Church at Chicago. He organized the churches of Ottawa, Bloomingdale, Millburn, Elk Grove and others. Mr. Hicks followed him in northern Illinois, and Wm. Kirby in central and southern; and these in turn were followed by Aratus Kent and Elisha Jenney. The last named, in his ten years before 1868, had to do with

the organizing of forty-one churches; with the building and dedicating of thirty-nine houses of worship, with the graduating of twenty-one churches into self-support, and with promoting numerous revivals of religion. Rev. H. D. Platt came between him and the present superintendent for southern Illinois. It is a further illustration of this work that in one year my associate, Rev. M. K. Whittlesey, besides the ordinary labor of his office, has preached one hundred and forty-seven sermons and has delivered fifty addresses; and that in each year he has been permitted to labor in several revivals of religion.

Consider also the relation of these home missionaries to higher institutions of learning in our State. The members of the "Illinois Association" came along and founded their college. Some became trustees, some instructors, all, enthusiastic supporters. One gave to it his life-work, and the fruit thereof is the abundant reward. The *Home Missionary* for April, 1830, says of the young Rev. J. M. Sturtevant: "He writes that, having performed about two months' missionary service, he was appointed instructor in the Illinois College and had entered on his duties. We learn from other sources that this college, in which the friends of Home Missions in this part of the country have taken so deep an interest, has commenced its operations with the most encouraging prospects." Mr. Baldwin, after his experience in founding this college, and after his six years of principalship in the Monticello Seminary, which he had developed, and which must have educated not less than 2,000 young ladies, became the originator of the College Society and attained the title of "the father of the western colleges." John M. Ellis and his wife planted the Jacksonville Female Academy, which is a tree of life. Knox College was a child of a missionary colony, and was nurtured by the missionary churches round about. "The Mission Institute," founded in 1837, within the precincts of Quincy, was intended by Dr. Nelson and his coadjutors mainly as a school for training male and female missionaries for the home and foreign fields. The *Catalogue* for 1849, which I have on hand, reports Rev. Horatio Foote as the President of the Board of Directors, and Dea. Willard Keyes the Secretary and Treasurer, the same, on account of whose benefactions to the Chicago Theological

Seminary, its "Keyes Hall" was named. That *Catalogue* also reports the names of fifty who had already gone forth as the ambassadors of Christ. Of these, there were fifteen male and nine female foreign missionaries, who were located among the Sioux Indians, in Jamaica, in West Africa, in India, in New Zealand; and among these were Rendall, thirty years in the Madura Mission; Mellen, twenty-four years in Africa; Geo. Thompson of the Mo. Prison and of the Mendi Mission; and Doane, 21 years in Micronesia, and now in Japan.

Beloit College and Rockford Female Seminary, twins, were born of the enterprise of home missionary men and churches. Wheaton, a child of the anti-slavery reform, has had its home and its nurture among the churches of home missionary planting. The man who conceived the idea and the plan of the Chicago Theological Seminary, and who set it agoing, Rev. Stephen Peet, had been a missionary and an agent of this Society, while it was the home missionary work in the Northwest that made it possible for such an institution to come into life and power,—itself at once the child of, and mother of, home missions. Of its 197 graduates, and of the 319 who have been in connection with it, *ninety-one* have labored in Illinois, of whom *fifty-two* are now pastors in the State. And so, for the different denominations, Illinois College has already raised up 100 ministers; Mission Institute, 50; Knox, 50; Beloit, 106; Wheaton, 17; and then each one about half as many more from students who did not graduate,—in all about *four hundred*. And in many other ways these institutions have been vast home evangelizing forces—such is the mutual relation of home missions and the higher schools of learning.

An item of home missionary service to all the Colleges of the State ought here to be put upon record. In 1830, while Mr. Baldwin was a home missionary at Vandalia, as a Trustee of Illinois College, he applied to the Legislature, in session there, for a Charter. Those enlightend Solons were terribly afraid of the Yankees, and of corporations of an ecclesiastical sort. In the hearing of Mr. Baldwin, one of them arose in his place, and said that, "if they granted a Charter at all, he was in favor of restricting the corporation to *one quarter section of land*, for, otherwise, those College men would use their immense funds

in buying up new land in the northern part of the State, and then put on tenants at will, and finally sway the political destiny of Illinois! The Charter was refused. It was in the same spirit in which Lieut. Gov. Kinney, in the Legislature, as Gov. Ford says, opposed the Illinois and Michigan Central, because it would flood the State with Yankees. And yet this Lieut. Governor was a preacher and a very popular man. And so this first College of the State waited four years for an improvement in public sentiment. Then Mr. Baldwin, reinforced by the new President, Edward Beecher, made another application for a Charter. By this time the Methodists and the Baptists were on hand for college charters. So the three institutions formed a ring. They took the bill, which the Jacksonville men had formed by a modification of the charter of Yale College. "It was so ordered in Providence," said Mr. Baldwin, in a letter to the writer, "that the chairman of the Senate Committee on Education was Col. Thomas Mather, then of Springfield, but a man of Puritan training under Rev. D. Porter, of Farmington, Conn. So we all joined our forces and agreed to commit our bill to him. But I spent two days in writing out an argument to show *the safety* of literary corporations and read it in the hearing of the Senate Committee, and of our Methodist and Baptist friends. The committee agreed to adopt it as their argument on the bill, and the result was, that we secured charters for Illinois, Shurtleff, and McKendree Colleges." And yet each one was limited to a quarter section of land, and was forbidden to open a theological department. Thus the Puritan and the Cavalier systems had met upon these prairie fields, and in the halls of legislation. The Cavalier had possession of the country—had picked its position. The contest was sharp and prolonged. But Puritanism now gives law to the Empire State of the interior. The old southern oligarchic, *precinct* system, at first incorporated into our civil polity, and regnant for thirty years, has, to a large extent, been displaced by that truly democratic, educating and elevating New England township organization; though, in the lower part of the State, from year to year, some of the counties are voting yet whether they will make the change or not. The free-school system, now only twenty years old in the State, has become the standing

order. So, too, the Puritan idea of freedom has had here its conflict and its victory. The first Constitution of the State allowed the old French settlers to retain their slaves. The slave code of the south was transferred to our statute book, as the Black Laws of Illinois. Notwithstanding the liberty proviso of the ordinance of 1787, when the State was only four years old, a desperate effort was made to open it to slavery. In the Legislature of 1822-8, it was by a piece of political jugglery that the *one vote* was secured as necessary to the requisite two-thirds for ordering an election upon a new constitution that should allow slavery. The canvass for that convention was one of the wildest excitement, and was prolonged for eighteen months. Of the five newspapers in the State only two went for freedom. The editor of one of these two was Hiram Eddy, a native of New England. For the other, the late Rev. Thomas Lippincott, and the late Judge Samuel D. Lockwood were special contributors. Gov. Ford says, that Mr. Lippincott wrote fiery handbills; and he says that, "the old preachers preached against convention and slavery." Rev. Stephen Bliss, of Edwards County, which had a Yankee colony and a Congregational church, himself a missionary from New Hampshire, was run upon the anti-slavery issue and elected to the Senate. Wm. H. Brown, who was one of the free-State workers, says that the great man of the day was Rev. John M. Peck, D.D., a missionary of the Baptist Mass. Missionary Society. "His plan of organizing the counties by a central committee," says Mr. Brown, "with branches in every neighborhood, was carried out by his own exertions, and personal supervision, and was greatly instrumental in saving the State." As an agent of the Bible Society he magnified his office by traveling about to disseminate the Bible ideas of freedom. At the election, Illinois did her best, and turned out 11,764 votes, and it was only a majority of 1,834 that saved the State from slavery. It was not until near the breaking out of the slaveholders' rebellion that the infamous "Black Laws" of Illinois were repealed. As the war came on, portions of Southern Illinois were held tremulously in the balance. Rebel sympathizers murdered a Provost Marshal and were never punished for it. Enlistments were made in the State for the rebel army. But the people had become so im-

bued with the anti-slavery spirit that they sent forth their 258,217 soldiers of freedom. The Congregational Churches of the State furnished for the army, *one in four of their entire male membership, including old men, invalids, and boys!* It will never be known how much was contributed to this general result by the influence of these missionary pastors, who had ever been the friends of the slave, who helped on the flying fugitive, who, not a few of them, were mobbed for their anti-slavery, and whose deliverances in their general association were always in advance of public sentiment.

In this review, we would put all honor upon the missionary operations of the other Christian denominations within our State. We rejoice in all their accomplished labor, and we claim a share in all their victories, as bringing honor to our State and to the Kingdom of our common Redeemer.

The review of these fifty years would be quite incomplete without an expression of gratitude to the men who came to Illinois from pure home missionary motives. Some of them came when as little was known of the State as is now known of Arizona. Others afterward came because of what *was* known of need and of hardness to be endured. They have themselves become a part of the history of the State. In large measure they have aided in giving it the character of a mighty Christian Commonwealth. They have been singularly honored of God with length of days, which shows that frontier life is not adverse to longevity. The missionary who had been at work in Illinois for two years before this Society was born, Rev. E. S. Howe, still survives in a green old age. Of the two who began to preach in 1828, Lippincott left us only five years ago, and Watson, at 76, is still an active pastor. And Hodges, a quarter of a century older than this Society, is yet in pastoral work. Aratus Kent came to the age of 76, and had a fifty years of ministry, with forty of them in Illinois. Of the original twelve, seven continue to this day; and, of the five who have gone beyond, three had filled out more than forty years of eventful ministry—Baldwin, Carter and Farnham—and of the other two, Barnes had sixteen years of missionary joy; and Kirby, in his twenty years of labor, left a name, which is as ointment poured forth. And of those who came later we have not a few, whose gray

hairs are an ornament to this body, whose presence among us is a benediction. We honor them, we love them. Concerning them we take to ourselves the Apostolic aspiration: "Whose are the Fathers." Whatever we may say of raising up men of the West for the West, this we gladly testify that the men who have made the West what it is religiously, and largely in a secular way, were those who came from the East to do anything and to become anything which the good of the West required. Losing their life, they found it. Their lustrous influence has become a part of the history of the cause of Christ in our State.

Such a history as this would lack in completeness without a reference to the influence, the heroism, the sacrifice, on the part of the *wives* of the missionaries. And yet it is as difficult to find the record of their lives, as it would be to do justice to the same, when found. Searching for their names and their work in the Reports and in the *Home Missionary*, we do not ordinarily find them until we come to the fragrance of the crushed flower in the brief memorial of the loving life and the happy death. Rarely do we find such a record as that of the founding of the Jacksonville Female Academy by Mrs. Ellis; or the forming by ladies, in 1833, of the Ladies' Education Society, by which a thousand indigent young women have been aided in a course of study, at an expense of not less than \$20,000. Yet many, many others have just as truly left their impress upon society, upon the Church, and upon its auxiliaries. Many a missionary who has been blessed in the training of the social life, has said, in honest tribute: "I am myself, largely, what my wife has made me." Much of his courage was due to her Christian pluck; much of his social amenity, to her refining touch; many a piece of his loving pastoral guile, to her instinctive good sense. The Sabbath School, the Choir, the Sociable, the Ladies' Prayer Meeting, each bears the imprint of her thoughtful, patient attention: while, as wife and mother at home, she has often been a model of domestic character. As they have been partners in life, so have they been partners in the missionary enterprise. Without the romance, and without the prayerful sympathy which attend the departure of foreign missionaries, they left their eastern homes of comfort and of culture, here to share in the experience of the rude frontier, yet they would be the last to

magnify, or wish to have us magnify, their physical discomforts and the aching void of social life. Rude homes, much of sickness, frequent removals, lack of domestic help and conveniences, maternal suffering and care, pastoral anxieties and labors, wear hard upon them, until the canker eats at the husband's heart as he sees his companion wasting away under the accumulating burden, which he sees no way of easing. I have been moved by the sacrifice of life on the part of the wives of several of the first Illinois missionaries. In the summer of 1833, Mr. Ellis, returning to Jacksonville from a missionary tour, found that his wife and two only children were in their graves, taken away by the cholera, which had swept off seventy persons in that neighborhood. In the same season and place, and by the same fell destroyer, Mrs. Farnham was removed. Then, soon, the wife of Mr. Jenney; then the wife of Mr. Watson; then the wife of Mr. Bascom, only four years after his coming to Illinois;—then the wife of Mr. Sturtevant,—all of whom passed away at the opening of domestic life. "Some of them," says one of the bereaved men, "were women at whose death hundreds were ready to exclaim—when shall we see the like again?—women of rare beauty, purity and high culture, to whose services to the cause, justice will only be done in another sphere than this." And yet in this earthly sphere their influence still lives. Of all such, the Saviour's words—"She hath done what she could"—are at once a memorial and a benediction.

Turning from this look backward through the last fifty years to a glance forward through the next half-century, what may it reveal of Christianizing influence in Illinois? May we not expect that another half a hundred years, starting with this measure of advancement, will witness a great increase in the number and spiritual power of our churches—a corresponding growth in our Christian Institutions—progress in the prevalence and power of revivals—a maturing of the Christian State under the training of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. May we not expect that the Illinois Home Missionary Society, besides doing its own home work, shall become a succorer of many mission enterprises toward the West and toward the South, and shall, of its sons, raise up many who shall go forward as ministers of the Word to help in the founding of other Christian empires in our

land. And may we not expect that our twenty-five Illinois young men, now at work in heathen countries, may, in the next half-century, be followed by a ten-fold number who shall go forth to make known to the nations, the unsearchable riches of Christ. All our home work, essential and glorious as it is, is only a means to the end of making our nation the great missionary power in the earth.

Very few of us will be here to unite in the celebration of the second jubilee of this National Society. But upon us of the present generation falls largely the responsibility of making that Centenary what it ought to be. If we carry on to our successors that which we have received from the Fathers; if we but use wisely the system of appliances which they have set up; if we be filled with the Spirit from on high, we shall resign our trust with assurance that, under God's foreordaining love, the report of a hundred years of this evangelizing scheme will give our sons occasion to review the past with still more absolute faith that the triumph of the Kingdom of Christ is near at hand.

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

THE ATONEMENT.*—We can confidently speak of Mr. Dale's work on the Atonement—of which this is the fourth edition—as one of the most valuable contributions to the theological literature of our day. It is the more timely because the subject, besides being a central theme of revelation, has been reopened in recent discussions both in England and in this country. The treatment here is thoroughly biblical, as it should be. It does justice to the author's reputation as a scholarly, discriminating, candid, and devout theologian. It has the advantage, as compared with most treatises, of insisting on the "Fact of the Atonement" as the objective ground for the remission of sins, in distinction from any theory regarding the mode of its operation, as also of pursuing the strictest method of interpretation; and this too with reference to recent investigations and controversies. After an ample and able introduction, the author in successive lectures argues the Fact of the Atonement from the History of our Lord, from our Lord's own testimony, and from that of the Apostles Peter, John, James, and Paul, separately considered. Another lecture is taken up with general confirmatory considerations, and yet another with "the Remission of Sins." While carefully distinguishing the fact of the Atonement from any theory and enjoining modesty as to any views claiming or supposed to be exhaustive of the subject, he would yet encourage instead of repressing thought in this direction, and his last two lectures attempt to illustrate the theory from our Lord's relation "to the Eternal Law of Righteousness," and also from his relation "to the human race." In this part of the work he does not seem to us so clear and helpful as in the foregoing exegetical discussions which will be found most serviceable not only to ministers but to intelligent readers generally. More than sixty pages of notes are added, contributing to the thoroughness and value of the discussion.

* *The Atonement.* The Congregational Union Lecture for 1875. By R. W. DALE, M.A., Birmingham. Fourth edition. New York and Chicago: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1876. pp. 503.

HALL ON THE RESURRECTION.*—The author of this little volume was a teacher of considerable repute more than thirty years ago, in Ellington, Conn. He was an enterprising scholar, possessed of much enthusiasm and characterized as an original and independent thinker. His Christian life was marked by earnestness and devotion. Some years before his death, which occurred in 1847, he became convinced, by his investigation of the subject, that the ordinary view concerning the resurrection of the body was erroneous, and, as the result of his reflection and study, he wrote the brief treatise which is now published by his children. A whole generation has passed since the book was written. Its author is unknown by all but the older part of the community in the region where he lived. But the subject is one which has equal interest for all generations, and any careful and thoughtful treatise respecting it is worthy of attention. Mr. Hall examines all the passages in the New Testament, which bear or are supposed to bear on the doctrine in question. He candidly considers the arguments of those who are opposed to him, and ingeniously and ably sets forth the strength of his own position. His conclusion is, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the present body is nowhere taught in the New Testament, and, also, that there is no foundation for the view entertained by many, that there is in the present human body some germ which will be raised to life and will unite the future body with the present one. On the contrary, he believes the opposite of both of these views to be distinctly declared. Since his treatise was prepared, the number of those who hold, in the strictest sense, to a literal resurrection of the present body, has greatly diminished. It would seem, indeed, that the declarations of Paul with regard to this point are sufficiently clear and satisfactory as against such a view, and that the objections to the theory from other sources than the Scriptures are such as to render it most difficult to accept and maintain. But so strong is the influence of past beliefs, that many Christians will look even now upon any denial of this view with a feeling that a most precious truth is assailed. We are convinced that there must be, hereafter, a more reasonable doctrine, than the strictly physical

* *How are the Dead Raised? and with what Body do they come? An inquiry into the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, as taught in the New Testament; with particular reference to the Question of a future existence of the human body.* By JOHN HALL, late Principal of the Ellington School. Hartford: Brown & Gross. Hall Brothers, Elmira, N. Y., 1875. 12mo, pp. 226.

and literal one, and that the Church has yet to attain to what is in the highest degree satisfying with regard to this subject. Whether Mr. Hall's positions can be regarded as all of them correct or not, we are sure that those who peruse his little book will be interested in it. It is creditable to any one, who, like him, is engaged in the work of teaching a classical school, that he has the ability and the enthusiasm to prepare such a treatise on a subject so remote from the studies with which he is daily occupied.

SCOTT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION.*—

The object of this volume is to discover, by an examination and classification of the quotations made by the New Testament writers from the old Testament Scriptures, the principles which underlie them, and to apply these principles to questions connected with biblical study. The author begins by presenting the large number of quotations, and then states the formulas and forms according to which they are made. He then enters upon a thorough investigation of the principles on which the writers proceeded, which principles he classifies by a fivefold division—psychological, grammatical, analogical, synthetic, and prophetic—and gives examples in illustration of each class. He compares, also, quotations made by the patristic writers from the Old and New Testaments, and refers to citations in the ecclesiastical authors, and even to the action and principles of the mediæval and modern philosophers in quoting from the Greek and Roman classics. By a full, though brief, survey of the entire field, he thus lays a foundation for the main part of his work, which is the vindication and application of the principles discovered. The author is a Scotch clergyman, and evidently writes, in some degree, under the influence of the education which he has received. He takes a strong position, as against all who would, like many German writers, find in Paul's quotations, at times, traces of the Jewish schools, a rabbinical element, or any traces, except, perhaps, as to what is formal rather than essential, of the Jewish schools. He also, in the application of his principles, makes the quotations, in their forms and methods and peculiarities, afford strong proof in confirmation of the genuineness and inspiration of the New Testament. His doctrine of inspiration is that it is, in

* *Principles of New Testament Quotation, established and applied to biblical science.* By the Rev. JAMES SCOTT, M.A., B.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1875. 12mo, pp. 169.

a proper sense, both plenary and verbal, but he does not adopt the strict mechanical theory. The book is evidently the fruit of much thought and study, and will be likely to interest those who examine it as well as to stimulate them to further investigation of the subject of which it treats.

MEYER ON PHILIPPIANS AND COLOSSIANS.—We are glad to announce to our readers the appearance of another volume of this most excellent commentary on the New Testament, which every biblical student and every minister ought to have in his library. The work is being issued at the rate of about four volumes annually, and though somewhat expensive (the price being \$3.50 for each volume) is valuable beyond the measure of any charge that is made for it. The parts already published are two volumes on the Gospel of John, two volumes on the Epistle to the Romans, and the one now before us. The work is introduced into this country through Messrs. Scribner, Welford and Armstrong, as our readers already know, and is a translation of the original German made under the direction of Dr. Dickson, of Glasgow

CASPARI'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE OF CHRIST.*—Dr. Caspari's book, which is now translated, and published by Messrs. T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh, has been known in the author's own country for several years. The translator is Mr. Maurice J. Evans, already favorably known by other similar translations of German works. This volume, as its title indicates, is simply a chronological and geographical introduction to the Life of Christ. It thus enters upon the controversy with the adversaries of the New Testament only from one side, and limits itself to one line of investigation. Within the field which the author chooses for himself, however, the thoroughness of the best German scholars is exhibited. The whole history of Christ's life is traced out, according to a clear and careful arrangement of its events as given by the different evangelists, and the great chronological questions are fully and learnedly discussed. A valuable appendix on the topography of Jerusalem will make the volume especially useful to all who are now interested in this subject.

* *A Chronological and Geographical Introduction to the Life of Christ.* By CH. ED. CASPARI. From the original German works, revised by the author. Translated, with additional notes, by MAURICE J. EVANS, B.A. With map of the scene of our Lord's labors, and plan of Jerusalem. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong. 8vo, pp. 314. Price \$4.50.

THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD.*—The author, in his preface, says: "This book is not a treatise on Homiletics. Neither is it a ministerial biography. But it is an attempt to give to my younger brethren in the pulpit, and to those who are preparing for the ministry, some practical hints which I should have been thankful to have received twenty years ago." Homiletics as a science is certainly not philosophically treated of in these pages, but the book consists of stirring and able addresses upon the work of the ministry. The portion in which the preparation for the "ministry of the word" is dealt with is particularly excellent. The fundamental principle of self-renunciation, and the duty of hard work are strongly emphasized. The author says to young preachers: "The great majority of those who have become eminent in the pulpit, have grown into their greatness. They have, under God, made themselves for their position, by watchful self-discipline, and steady perseverance. Now, you cannot reach the end at which they have arrived, without using means similar to those which they employed. At first they were, as you are now, inexperienced, and, perhaps, also somewhat censorious, more skillful in criticising the sermons of others than in sermonizing for themselves. But at length, inspired by love to Christ and to the souls of men, they have been led so to train themselves for their work, that they have become truly great."

These lectures were heard with great pleasure and profit by the students of Yale Seminary, and we are glad that they now find a larger audience. Without the originality and brilliancy of Mr. Beecher's course, or, perhaps the impressive, evangelical simplicity of Dr. Hall's, they are vigorous, humorous, instructive, and strike the middle key of good practical common sense, and at times exhibit that fervid eloquence for which the author is distinguished as a preacher.

THE SILENT HOUSE.†—There is something very attractive and almost dainty about this little volume. It is one of those books whose value is in an inverse proportion to its size. Its author is himself an earnest preacher and faithful pastor, and into this book

* *The Ministry of the Word.* By WM. M. TAYLOR, D.D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 900 Broadway, corner 20th Street. 1876.

† *The Silent House.* By E. P. TENNEY. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society.

he has condensed the experience as well as the study of a laborious life. The impressive title very well indicates the subject, and foreshadows its quaint and sometimes imaginative treatment. The "silent house" is the grave, and the book is a series of meditations upon the most solemn aspects of our common mortality, and the thoughts and motives which should most urgently press upon our minds in view of it. This material is disposed in five chapters, entitled Building in the Dust—Near Home—The Dark Days—Searching for the Light—The Light; but these brief captions only point toward the line of thought, they do not of themselves disclose the wealth and exuberance of the author's resources in developing it. The first chapter sets forth a great variety of sentiments and facts to show that death is universal, impartial, inevitable, always near, and often sudden. The second urges the brevity of life, and gathers a vast and weighty column of the metaphors and analogies by which scripture, poetry, science and philosophy compete with each other in endeavoring to arouse the mind to its danger and its duty. In the third there is an accumulation of facts which go to show how and why the last days of the wicked are "dark days;" days of terror at the remembrance of unforgiven sin, days of defenseless agony at the approach of a destroyer whom neither riches will bribe, nor pleasure, power, fame, or unbelief will be able to repel. The fourth chapter treats carefully, and we think very judiciously, the whole question of death-bed repentance. This is in our view the most directly practical and forcible thinking in the whole book. It is of itself alone of sufficient worth to make this little volume a valuable hand-book to all pastors, and indeed to all Christians who have occasion to minister to the sick and dying. The fifth chapter shows the soul prepared for death and triumphant over it.

All these topics are enriched with the fruits of a very wide and varied reading. The author has not only examined all the literature of the subject, but has brought to converge upon it also the light from an immense range of other studies. The thought is sometimes overloaded with the wealth of its golden burden. Some readers will feel a little impatient perhaps at the breathless rapidity with which they are hurried from one fact or quotation to another; and yet this very plethora of what Ruskin calls "talkative facts," though it would seem at first to mar the symmetry and simplicity of the style, adds very much to the value of a book like this, since it makes it a sort of thesaurus of all the

best thoughts and most telling motives which can be gathered on the subject. We have never seen a book which contained such a mine of suggestion and illustration to aid the preacher in urging a Christian life as the best preparation for a Christian death, and to help the visitor in ministering to the spiritual wants of the sick. It will be found equally useful to the private Christian also, in guiding his meditations upon the great questions of life and death. It is worthy of a wide circulation among our churches; and seems to us one of the most useful and valuable books to be found on the list of the works published by the Society whose imprint it bears, and as another token of the good judgment and cultivated taste which preside over the issues of that press.

THE DOCTRINE OF RETRIBUTION.*—This volume contains the Bampton Lectures for 1875. The subject is treated solely with reference to the philosophy of natural religion. And in this relation the author confines himself to a single line of thought, aiming to establish the doctrine by demonstrating the existence, and sovereignty of the moral intuitions and sentiments in the constitution of man. In establishing the position, that the facts of our moral nature distinctly point to a finality of Retribution, proof is incidentally presented of the reasonable truth of these religious beliefs, which transcend man's present existence and constitute a Natural Religion. In the course of the discussion the author traverses the various current forms of skepticism and false philosophy bearing on the subject. The work is able and instructive. It is cast, however, into the form of oral address rather than of philosophical disquisition; and the abundance and brilliancy of the rhetoric necessitate close attention to trace the thread of the argument and define and estimate its successive points.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

GENERAL HISTORY OF GREECE.†—Mr. Cox seems to have exhausted the Mythology of Greece, and to be rapidly using up

* *The Doctrine of Retribution.* Eight lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1875, on the foundation of the late John Bampton, M.A. By WILLIAM JACKSON, M.A., F.S.A., author of the "Philosophy of Natural Theology," "Positivism," "Right and Wrong," &c. New York: A. D. F. Randolph, 770 Broadway. 1876. 8vo, pp. xii, and 355. Price \$3.00.

† *General History of Greece.* By GEORGE W. COX, M.A. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

the History. This is his second venture in the latter region, and he explains it as an attempt to put his previous work into "a form which may interest readers of all classes as well as the scholar and the critic." The book seems by no means well suited to be the standard brief history of Greece, for it contains too much discussion of disputed points for the general reader, and in his opinions the writer stands too far apart in many respects from the views of others to be accepted and recommended as a representative of modern conclusions. We should be sorry to have any one form his ideas of Greek history and the Greek people from this book. The author seems to have had two main objects in view in writing. One of these is to show how superior he is to the weak credulity of most of his predecessors, in that they accepted as authoritative what he dismisses without hesitation as fiction. Especially is this true in his treatment of Herodotus, so that, as an English reviewer remarks, Mr. Cox seems to find no firm ground at all for history before the close of the Persian wars. This tendency leads him continually into what must seem to most students of Greek history unwarrantable skepticism. The other object in our author's mind seems to be to show how inferior in all elements of morality the ancient Greek was to the modern Englishman, "The quiet happiness of well-ordered English homes had never dawned upon the Hellenic mind." We forbear to ask how long it is since it dawned upon England, or how good evidence the absence of mention of it (granting for the moment such absence) from the pages of Aristophanes and Thucydides is of the want of the thing itself. The constant recurrence of such comparisons and the unmeasured abuse of the Greek character in a moral point of view seem to us great defects in this book. The author seems unable to understand an age and a civilization different from his own. It is dreadful to think what a book he would write about this country if he should chance to travel here. The one merit of the book is the theory of the place in Greek history of the Peloponnesian war, but that, we fear, would hardly be appreciated or even noticed by the general reader.

HEFELE'S HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH. VOL. II.*—The present volume of Bishop Hefele's great work traverses

* *A History of the Councils of the Church, from the original documents.* By the Rt. Rev. C. J. HEFELE, D.D., Bishop of Rottenbury, &c., &c. Vol. II. A.D. 326 to A.D. 429. Translated from the German, with the author's approbation, and edited by Henry N. Oxenham, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1876. [New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong; price \$6.00.]

the period of the Arian controversies. Beginning with the first Synod after the Council of Nicæa, it includes the contests of the parties, and, incidentally, the fortunes of Athanasius until the Second General Council at Constantinople, in 381. The interval between the Second and the Third General Councils, which embraces the Synods which dealt with Pelagianism, is then described. Dr. Hefele's thoroughness and exhaustive researches are generally admitted. It is his purpose to be candid, although it is not difficult to discern that his attachment to the Roman Catholic Church creates an involuntary bias of questions which affect the claims of that Communion. The work is one which scholars in ecclesiastical history will highly prize, and welcome in the English translation. It forms one of Clark's series, and may be obtained of Scribner & Co.

GERMAN POLITICAL LEADERS.*—This is the fourth volume of the series of "Brief Biographies of European Public men" which Geo. P. Putnam's Sons are now publishing. It supplies, in nineteen biographical sketches, much information, which it would be difficult to obtain elsewhere, respecting the men who are at this moment especially prominent in political life in Germany, and who may be taken as the leaders of the different parties into which the German people are divided. The first twenty-one pages are devoted to the Chancellor, Prince Bismarck. Of course, within these limits it is impossible to present more than an outline of the leading events in his career. But the writer, Mr. Tuttle, has succeeded in giving a clear impression of the policy which this extraordinary man has always proposed to himself. He says: "The case of Bismarck has sometimes been cited against the value of professional training for politicians. He appeared so suddenly on the field of European events, and assumed at once such a commanding position, that many have treated him as a prodigy in whom inspiration might almost be assumed. The premises here are as false as the inference from them is pernicious. It is true that no amount of study will wholly supply the place of natural genius or talent, but it is true also that simple genius without training and discipline, is often credited with achievements that it never performs. Otto von Bismarck is one of the most distinct results of thorough political education. His whole career previ-

* *German Political Leaders.* By HERBERT TUTTLE. New York: Geo. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876. 16mo, pp. 264.

ous to entering the Prussian ministry was one of study and preparation. At the Gymnasium he acquired control of the English and French languages; and throughout his career they have served him in many a diplomatic crisis. At the University, he was a profound and philosophical student of history, particularly that of his own country; and even to-day, in Parliamentary debates, he often astonishes his colleagues by his mastery of such details. While he was at Frankfort, his letters show that he prized the position chiefly for the experience and the valuable lessons that it afforded him. At St. Petersburg, there is but one report of his behavior. He lived in frugal style and gave few entertainments, but devoted himself assiduously to study and inquiry, and even became a proficient in the Russian language. These occupations did not give him notoriety, but they were not quite profitless. When in 1862 he assumed the direction of Prussian affairs, he brought to the duties a ripe experience, a familiarity with the language and habits and politics of other nations, the resources of a mind which had never ceased to acquire and assimilate useful knowledge, and habits of industry which have since astonished all Europe. This and nothing else is the secret inspiration of the great German statesman." The "Ministers" who are described in this book are Dr. Falk; President Delbrück; and Herr Camphausen. Prince Hohenlohe and Count Von Arnim are the representatives of the diplomats. Herr von Bennigsen and Dr. Simson are chosen from among the "parliamentarians." The "Party leaders" are Herr Lasker, Herr Windthorst, Dr. Loewe, Herr Schulze—Delitzsch, Herr Jacoby, Herr Hasselmann, Herr Sonnemann. Professors Gneist, Virchow, Treitschke, and von Sybel are taken as examples of "scholars" who have given themselves to politics.

MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, VOL. VIII.—This volume covers a period of about five years, embracing the latter part of the presidency, two years of retirement, and Mr. Adams's service in the twenty-second and twenty third Congresses. The volumes increase in interest as they approach the closing era of his public career. They contain numerous, and not unfrequently caustic, notices of Mr. Adams's contemporaries in public life, with few, if any of whom he stood in relations of cordial intimacy. Independent, intrepid, patriotic, he was, also, somewhat suspicious and jealous, and unduly impatient of everything that could be con-

strued into an attempt to control his opinions or conduct. His judgments of public men, therefore, are tinged with personal prejudice. The circumstances which led to his defeat as a presidential candidate for the third term were not adapted to sweeten his temper as regards the politicians by whom he was surrounded, by the intrigues of some of whom he was supplanted. In one point, at least, Mr. Adams excelled them all. His knowledge of political history and of political affairs generally has probably not been equalled by that of any other statesman since the formation of the government. As we enter the period of his great contest with the slave-holders on the floor of Congress, the attractions of the *Diary* are much enhanced.

The tenth volume just received, presents the *Diary* of Mr. Adams during his service in the 25th, the 26th, and the 27th Congresses. It abounds in racy passages in which the author sketches, from his own point of view, the characters of many of his contemporaries, and delineates scenes on the Congressional arena, in many of which he was a conspicuous actor. His infirmities of temper are obvious; but we find him a severe critic of himself. Of his genuine patriotism, high-hearted intrepidity, eminent talents, and learning in history and politics, there can be but one opinion.

DR. TARBOX'S *LIFE OF ISRAEL PUTNAM*.*—The object which Dr. Tarbox has had in writing this new *Life of Putnam*, cannot be better or more succinctly stated than in his own words. He says that it has been simply "to bring back to its old anchorage-ground an important piece of American History, which for a quarter of a century, by a subtle undertow has been drifting from its place." The fact is that, under the influence of what is really a provincial spirit, there has grown up around Boston, within a few years past, a disposition to claim for Massachusetts men all the glory of the battle which was fought in 1775, on the hill which is within sight of all the house-tops of their capital city. The curious way in which all the evidence on the subject has been perverted is interesting as a fresh illustration of the manner in which "popular delusions" are started and propagated. By a beautiful piece of reasoning, as conclusive as it is clear and simple,

* *Life of Israel Putnam* ("Old Put"), *Major-General in the Continental Army*. By JEREMIAH N. TARBOX. With map and illustrations. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks & Co. 1876. 8vo. pp. 589.

Dr. Tarbox has vindicated the right of Gen. Putnam to be considered the real hero of that battle. There can be no question that he planned it, and that he was there to superintend the operations. No sane man ever supposed that he was at all points of the field of battle; or that he was the only man that day who deserved well of his country; but the mark of "Old Put" is to be seen everywhere in that battle. It was his strategy and his tactics. Every student of American history should read this book.

CENTENARY EDITION OF MR. BANCROFT'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.—Every student of American history will be pleased to know that Mr. Bancroft has commenced the revision of his History of the United States; making use, for that purpose, of all the notes and papers on special subjects which he has been accumulating for forty years. He says that he has devoted to this work of revision "a solid year of close and undivided application;" and that "every noteworthy criticism that has come under observation has been carefully weighed, accepted for what it was worth, and never rejected except after examination." He says, also, that his "main object has been the attainment of exact accuracy, so that if possible not even a partial error may escape correction." Five volumes of the new edition have appeared in 12mo.

CAROLINE HERSCHEL.*—These memoirs reveal a character altogether unique. The leading facts in the life of Caroline Herschel, and in the life of her distinguished brother, Sir William Herschel, were generally known; but it was not known with what absolute devotion this remarkable woman sank her own personality in that of her brother. "She lived for him; she loved him; she believed in him; she helped him with all her heart and with all her strength." But of herself she never thought. When receiving honors from learned men and learned societies in recognition of her own independent services for the advance of astronomical science, she said: "I am nothing; I have done nothing; all I am, all I know, I owe to my brother. I am only the tool which he shaped to his use. A well trained puppy-dog would have done as much." After the death of her brother, she returned to her native city, Hanover, at

* *Memoir and Correspondence of Caroline Herschel.* By Mrs. JOHN HERSCHEL, with Portraits. New York. D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. 1876. pp. 355.

the age of seventy-two. There she lived till 1848, dying in her ninety-eighth year.

MEMOIR OF DR. NORMAN McLEOD.*—The sympathies of Americans, as a general thing, have been so thoroughly with what is called the "Free Church Movement" in Scotland, that little has been known here of the prominent men who remained, at the time of the "Disruption" in the "Kirk." Dr. McLeod was one of those men who felt constrained by conscience to oppose the disruption, but finally won the confidence even of the whole "Free Church." By his whole souled, honest, genial character, he drew irresistibly the love of everyone with whom he came in contact, even of those who differed from him most in their views. His relations to the Queen as one of her "Chaplains" in Scotland; his views of the rightfulness of the cause of the North in our civil war; his missionary tour in India; his frequent journeys on the Continent; his visit to this country; all give an interest to the memoir which is not supplied by any biography which has appeared for years.

MISCELLANEOUS.

. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL.†—This work is designed to communicate information which may contribute to a better understanding of the true relations between employers and the employed. The facts are derived partly from the author's personal observation and inquiry in Europe, partly from official reports and other equally trustworthy sources. The subjects considered are: Present Relations of Labor and Capital; The Superabundance of labor: How the working classes are affected by a rise of prices; the payment of Labor; the good and evil of Trades-Unions; Co-operation; Industrial Partnerships; Education of the working classes; Arbitration and Conciliation. The author holds that a regard to moral obligation on the part of both employer and employed is an indispensable element in the solution of the problem. In this we heartily concur. Political economy teaches that a right exchange is an ex-

* *Memoir of Norman McLeod, D.D.* By his brother, Rev. DONALD McLEOD. New York. Scribner & Armstrong. Two vols. 8vo. pp. 362, 432.

† *The Conflict between Labor and Capital.* By ALBERT S BOLLES, author of "Chapters in Political Economy," and editor of the *Norwich Morning Bulletin*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876. 12mo, pp. 211.

change, if equivalent services and morality requires that in every exchange each party be as careful that the service which he renders be equivalent to the service which he receives, as he is that the service received be equivalent to the service rendered. It brands as fraudulent every transaction in which one party aims to take out of the other, value or service for which he has rendered no equivalent. We are sure that the conflict between employer and employed will never be terminated without the recognition and emphasizing of moral obligation in the exchanges of business. This great social problem can never be solved by any science falsely so-called, which is developed solely from the principles of selfishness.

On this point, as well as on some others, some of the author's minor positions seem to us to be questionable. But he writes with great candor and fairness and with an evident desire to find the truth; and we cordially commend the book as a valuable contribution to the literature of this momentous question.

PRONOUNCING HAND-BOOK.*—This little book, that might be carried in the pocket, has a clear title, also on the outside of each cover:—"3,000 words," &c., which will remind most readers that it is just what they want. We take it for granted, they are not either wholly indifferent to their pronunciation of their own language, or quite beyond all need of ever consulting an authority, not always ready to open a ponderous volume. Compiled by professional teachers, with the use of Webster, Worcester and other competent sources of information, giving two or more pronunciations where as many are allowed by good usage, pointedly excluding vulgarisms, and dealing with nothing but questionable or divergent instances, in a small compass, this volume will sufficiently recommend itself at sight.

MISCELLANIES, OLD AND NEW.†—While this dainty volume attracts the reader's eye its contents will reward his attention, as both externally and inwardly a book for summer-reading though by no means superficial either in its subjects or their treatment.

* *Pronouncing Hand-Book of Words often Mispronounced, and of Words as to which a Choice of Pronunciation is allowed.* By RICHARD SOULE and LOOMIS J. CAMPBELL. Boston: Lee & Shepard. pp. 99.

† *Miscellanies Old and New.* By JOHN COTTON SMITH, D.D. New York: T. Meittaker. 1876. pp. 258.

The author, whose name we are pleased to see always printed in full, as reminding us of a most accomplished Governor of Connecticut in former times—is a prominent Episcopal divine, usually associated with the low church part of his denomination though of late we have seen him classified with the “broad.” The “miscellanies” here brought together are, as the preface tells us, “lectures and reviews,” “published at different times during the last seventeen years, and their purpose has been to show the bearing of certain literary, social, scientific, and religious questions, which from time to time have interested the public mind, upon great principles which underlie all history and life, and find their fullest expression and embodiment in Christianity.” The subjects are “Gladstone’s Homer and the Homeric age;” “the Suspense and Restoration of Faith;” “the Oxford Essays and Baden Powell on Miracles;” “the United States a Nation;” “Evolution and a Personal Creator;” and “Dante.” They are at once seen to be the fruits of scholarly culture; the style is perspicuous and manly; the spirit is that of loyalty to revealed truth, along with wide sympathies; the discussion of questions now agitated is clear and conscientious. Our attention has been drawn particularly to the essay on “Evolution,” which, with obvious merits, seems to us however to have attempted too much within the limits; and to that on the “Suspense and Restoration of Faith,” occasioned by two addresses from Dr. Bellows. The latter is an able argument for the Restoration of Faith rather than its Suspense, as marking our times in comparison with the last century. The author gracefully avails himself of an admission of Dr. Bellows in behalf of the Episcopal Church, maintaining its position as “favorable to unity,” but while he treats of the matter liberally we do not see that he fairly disposes of “distinctive peculiarities” which he claims are not “essential” and might be “dispensed with altogether,” but which do in fact repel other bodies from union and still are not “dispensed with in fact. It remains true that there are ‘canons’ in the way, and, as somebody has said, ‘they may as well be spiked.’”

THE FORTUNES OF MISS FOLLEN.*—This delightful story opens with a description of Baden and its curious market. The heroine makes her appearance as a young and delicate market-girl, pre-

* *The Fortunes of Miss Follen.* By Mrs. GOODWIN-TALCOTT. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

siding over a table of dainty laces or needle work, the fruit of her own toil. She is the daughter of a frugal couple who cultivate a small dairy farm on the hill-side, and so the chances are somewhat more in her favor at the outset than if she belonged to the more ignorant peasantry. She has a brotherly friend in the schoolmaster also, who later on would be nearer if he could, and who meanwhile with his books and talk feeds her growing culture with music and knowledge of art and of the great world outside the valley. She is an apt scholar. An early and happy love fades into a consuming grief; but an American gentleman and his wife become interested in her sweet face and pure character, and her elevation begins. They teach her English, and then employ her to teach their little Bessie German. Presently Colonel Ranney appears, a retired English army officer who wants a governess for his two little daughters, and Christine has got far enough along to prove just the one. The story of her blossoming out in beauty both of person and character as these changes successively come to her, is told very deftly and vividly, and in a style remarkable for its purity and its artistic use of the imagination. She is a sort of Undine, born not indeed of the waves, but of the vine-clad soil, and carrying with her everywhere the freshness and innocence of nature. None of these uplifting stages seem to be at all foreign to her, and after seeing her graceful motions and hearing her sing at her spinning wheel on her mother's porch, we feel that she has a soul within her, however she came by it, that is capable of everything which is attributed to her afterwards. We are certain that the author has produced no incongruity here. The story flows gently on, with a plot so transparent that few readers can be long in doubt whether Christine will finally share the fortunes of Conrad Kleist the schoolmaster, or of Colonel Ranney himself; and even the happy escape of little Alice, half thrilling and wholly natural as it is, could be hardly necessary in order to draw the meshes of love closer around the Colonel's heart. He is in deep enough already. The Colonel too is an admirable character himself; a good, honest, sensible Englishman, with no special ambitions, but with a thorough-going disposition to do the right thing when he knows it. And after he is happily located on the ancestral acres with Christine for the central light of his home, we can imagine his and her plans for the benefit of the tenantry around them. That is what they are about now, doubtless; for this picture is too realistic not to have its counterpart in the home of many an English country gentleman of the better class.

There are a few flaws in this graceful story. But they are all on the surface and easily detected. For one thing, we do not quite fancy the title; but never having written a story, we may not understand the difficulties which doubtless beset the selection of a title that shall be both appropriate and taking. There are one or two typographical errors we notice in the misspelling of a name or two. The affixing of the title *Herr* to Mr. Vassar strikes us as inconsistent with the fact that that gentleman is not a German, but a plain American. And we could also point out, if it were necessary, some cases in which the good *Herr* uses words in his narrative which seem to us rather too much like the elevated diction of Pope to be natural in even highly cultivated conversation. But the general style of the book is notable for its crystal purity and its closeness of detail. The writer, who is the wife of a learned professor in one of our theological seminaries, has evidently watched the scenes she describes, whether of home life in Germany, or mountain views in Saxony, or the Passion Play at Oberammergau, or works of art in the galleries. She is a good observer; knows what features to describe and how to group them; and then puts them into an artistic setting of pure English that is always elegant and often rises to the poetic. As will be seen therefore the book is quite as valuable for its information as it is interesting for its story of Christine. In this, as in some other respects, it far surpasses her previous works. The art criticisms are modest and unpretentious, but discriminating; the author manifestly has no fear of Rubens before her eyes. The chapter describing the Passion Play at Oberammergau is exceedingly interesting and valuable. The author witnessed the play, if we remember rightly, in the autumn of 1871, and her descriptions of it then in the columns of one of our religious weeklies were much admired and enjoyed by a wide circle of readers. The book is pervaded throughout by the most genial and genuine Christian sentiment; and it seems to us that no young mind can read it without being trained by it to a deeper and more affectionate insight into the beauties of the natural world, and stimulated also to a higher and purer life.

THE *AENEIDS* OF VIRGIL.*—To those who have known and admired Mr. Morris's poems, there seems to be a fitness in his trans-

* *The Aeneids of Virgil.* Done into English verse by WILLIAM MORRIS, author of "*The Earthly Paradise.*" Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876.

lating Virgil. The power of sustained narrative, the enthusiasm for the classical mythology, the control of a clear yet quaint style, which "Jason" and "The Earthly Paradise," revealed in him, seem to place him near the Mantuan bard and to mark him as qualified to interpret his strains. So we welcome this new version of the Aeneid and are prepared to find in it the most satisfactory reproduction of the great Latin Epic. And in many respects it is such. It is singularly faithful in close adherence to the very phrase of the original; it presents often happy renderings, especially of the conventional links between speech and narrative and of the heroic epithets; it bears the story along, giving generally line for line with not very unlike effect of metre and with very little hampering of the sense by the rhyme. Yet with all these merits it cannot be called a successful translation of the poet for the general reader. One reason for this failure is the constant archaism of the style, in which it seems to outdo Mr. Morris's earlier poems. At least in those, where the writer was uttering his own thought in shape as it formed itself in his mind, this archaic language rarely became obscure. But here either the love of antiquated phrase, or the effort after literalness, or the influence of the distinct Latin phrase upon his mind, making an ambiguous expression seem clear to him, has produced frequent obscurities, which have often compelled us to resort to the original to understand a line. One example recurs to memory, where "*obscuris vera involvens*" is translated "as sooth amid the mirk she winds." Then, too, Mr. Morris has contrived to give to Virgil too much of the peculiar tone which characterized his own poems, a sort of mellow, Indian summer coloring, such as befits his own description of himself as "the idle singer of an empty day." These qualities will prevent this translation from making its way as the accepted English version of the Aeneid, though it will be of use to scholars in suggesting happy turns of rendering. As an illustration of such success, the following occurs to us:

"*Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.*"

"A marvel dread, a shapeless trunk, an eyeless monstrous thing."

APPALACHIA.—This is a new magazine, which has just appeared, which we have only space to announce. It is to be conducted by the "*Appalachian Mountain Club*," which was organized early in 1876; and is to be devoted to the illustration of whatever may be found of interest in any point of view in the mountains of New England.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York.

Epochs of History.—The Fall of the Stuarts, and Western Europe from 1678 to 1697. By the Rev. E. Hale, M.A., Assistant Master at Eton. With maps and plans. 12mo. pp. 252.

A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures; Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with special reference to ministers and students. By John Peter Lange, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn, assisted by a number of eminent European divines. Translated, enlarged and edited by Philip Schaff, D.D., Professor of Sacred Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. In connection with American and English scholars of various denominations.

Vol. 2 of the Old Testament, Exodus and Leviticus.

Exodus; or, the Second Book of Moses. By John Peter Lange, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn. Translated by Charles M. Mead, Ph.D., Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover, Mass. 8vo. pp. 179.

Leviticus; or, the Third Book of Moses. By Frederic Gardiner, D.D., Professor of the Literature and Interpretation of the Old Testament in the Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Conn. In which is incorporated a translation of the greater part of the German Commentary on Leviticus. By John Peter Lange, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn. pp. 206.

Songs of Religion and Life. By John Stuart Blackie, Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. 1876. 12mo. pp. 242.

Plato's Best Thoughts. Compiled from Professor Jowett's Translation of the Dialogues of Plato. By Rev. C. H. A. Bulkley, A.M., Professor in Faith Training College, Boston, Mass. 1876. 8vo. pp. 475.

D. Appleton & Co., New York.

The International Scientific Series.—On Fermentation. By P. Schützenberger, Director at the Chemical Laboratory at the Sorbonne. With twenty-eight illustrations. 1876. 8vo. pp. 331.

The Warfare of Science. By Andrew Dickson White, LL.D., President of Cornell University. 1876. Pamphlet. 12mo. pp. 151.

The Gospel and Epistles of John; with Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, designed for both Pastors and People. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D.D. 8vo. pp. 394.

The International Scientific Series.—Animal Parasites and Messmates. By P. J. Van Beneden, Professor at the University of Louvain, Correspondent of the Institute of France. With eighty-three illustrations. 1876. 8vo. pp. 274.

Henry Holt & Co., New York.

The Ancient Régime. By Hippolyte Adolphe Taine. Translated by John Durand. 8vo. pp. 421.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

Beliefs of the Unbelievers, and other Discourses. By Octavius Brooks Frothingham. 16mo.

Stories of the Patriarchs. By O. B. Frothingham. 12mo. pp. 232.

Transcendentalism in New England. A History. By Octavius Brooks Frothingham. 8vo. pp. 395.

The True Order of Studies. By Rev. Thomas Hill, D.D., formerly President of Harvard University. 16mo. pp. 163.

Spiritualism and allied causes and conditions of Nervous Derangement. By William A. Hammond, M.D., Professor of Diseases of the Mind and Nervous System in the Medical Department of the University of the City of New York. Illustrated. 8vo. pp. 366.

Handbook of Scripture Geography; consisting of Sixteen Maps and Plans, with Historical and Geographical Questions and Answers on each Map. By Andrew Thompson. 16mo. pp. 128.

The Physical Basis of Immortality. By Antoinette Brown Blackwell. 1876. 8vo. pp. 324.

Wych Hazel. By Susan and Anna Warner, Authors of "Wide, Wide, World," etc., etc. 1876. 8vo. pp. 528.

Roberts Brothers, Boston.

The Sylvan Year. Leaves from the Note Book of Raoul Dubois. By Philip Gilbert Hamerton. 8vo. pp. 338. Price \$2.00.

Revolutionary Times; Sketches of our Country, its People, and their Ways, One Hundred Years Ago. By Edward Abbott. 12mo. pp. 208. Price \$1.00.

Round My House; Notes of Rural Life in France in Peace and War. By Philip Gilbert Hamerton. 8vo. pp. 415. Price \$2.00.

Poems. By Christina G. Rossetti. 12mo. pp. 300. Price \$1.50.

McMillan & Co., London.

Clarendon Press Series. A Manual of Comparative Philology as applied to the illustration of Greek and Latin Inflections. By T. L. Papillon, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of New College, Oxford. 8vo. pp. 243.

Angola and the River Congo. By Joachim John Monteiro, Associate of the Royal School of Mines, and Corresponding Member of the Zoological Society. With Map and Illustrations. 1876. 8vo. pp. 354.

James R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

Among My Books. Second Series. By James Russell Lowell, Professor of Belles-Lettres in Harvard College. 1876. 12mo. pp. 327.

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
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
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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXXVII.

OCTOBER, 1876.

ARTICLE I.—THE INFLUENCE OF THE CRUSADES
UPON EUROPEAN LITERATURE.

IN all ages of the world the conquests of war have received honor and glory. In this present nineteenth century the triumphs of commerce are the praise of the civilized world. Yet through war as well as through commerce are exchanges made; and valuable commodities, from unseen treasure chambers, pass between the combatants, and remain as memorials of past warfare. Behind the material splendors of victory, there hide subtle, and yet more permanent glories of spiritual conquest, and the subjugation of new intellectual domains. The kingdom of knowledge is enlarged and made more universal; and allies and vassals of different races minister to the tastes and necessities of their new masters.

The old wars of the Romans and Carthaginians, of the Romans and Britons and Gauls, brought knowledge in their train, but the commerce of mind, the enriching merchandise of literature, and the fact that the souls of opponents grow opulent by exchange, was splendidly illustrated by the wars of the Crusades. We say *merchandise*, and use the word not merely in its present meaning, but also as Comines used it, signifying a "negotiation, a friendly reciprocity between princes."

These wars of the Crusades which extended over many years, and renewed by different generations, left five millions of men buried on the hills and plains of Asia, made the Orient and the Occident acquainted; nay more, they brought about an exchange of ideas, of habits, of civilization, and even of language.

These wars at the time seemed an unmitigated calamity. Such waste of energy, such waste of spiritual love and passion, such waste of life and blood and treasure, to accomplish so little, was never seen. But enthusiasm and heroism are never wasted. God is never prodigal of courage, of virtue, of sacrifice, but to secure ultimate good. It was the isolation of nations from each other throughout Europe, that produced the barbarism of the Dark Ages, and with intercourse, though of a warlike kind, came intelligence, liberality, politeness, generosity, and honor. The nations who fought each other acquired mutual respect and admiration for each other. The Musselman infidels were more courteous and refined than the Christian knights. Their delicious climate, their luxury of dress and life, their tents, their horse-trappings, and, above all, their gorgeous architecture, and their love of science and song, opened the eyes of the Crusaders to the superiority of the Saracens. When Richard Cœur de Lion from England, and Saladin the Saracen from Arabia, met and exchanged knightly courtesy, and afterward matched the English battle-axe against the Damascene scimitar, to show what each could do with the weapons of his country, it was a *merchandise*, a negotiation of princes, also a commerce and exchange of knowledge and experience. And the influence of the crusades upon the invaders is especially marked in the literature that broke out into flame all over Europe, after the painful physical struggle of the Crusade wars was over, and comparative peace and rest gave opportunity for culture and enjoyment.

It will be of importance to show first the condition of Civilization in Arabia and her dependencies, at this time, and afterward to allude to the Barbarism of Europe, that one may better understand the source and strength of the imported wine of knowledge which woke new life in the thin, cold, northern veins. Rome had been conquered and devastated by the Goths and Huns under Alaric and Attila. The Latin language had become debased by the conquerors, and was barba-

rous and provincial. Vulgar dialects of conquered nations, indifferent to literature, and careless of bequeathed treasures of art, usurped its place, when Mahomet began his wars of conquest. When he finished his course of fire and sword, the Empire of the Caliphs had spread East and West. It possessed the East, the country of the Magi and Chaldeans where the star of the East arose, whence the first light of literature had shone over the earth. It held fertile Egypt with its temples of science, its magicians and priests, and the storehouses of the Pharaohs against famine of all sorts. It owned Asia Minor with her gorgeous cities, beautiful and terrible to see; that fair smiling land of the fig and the orange, the peach and the almond; it penetrated the burning plains of Africa, the land of eloquence and subtle intellect. Mahomet's flight from Mecca to Medina, which is called the Hegira, corresponds with the year 622 of our era, and the library of Alexandria was said to have been burnt by Amrou, the General of the Caliph Omar in 641. Ali, the fourth Caliph from Mahomet, began to protect letters. His rival and successor, Moahwihah of the dynasty of the Onomiades, did more for them, but hardly a century from the time of the barbarian outrage on the Alexandrian library, the family of the Abbassides, who mounted the throne of the Caliphs in 750, introduced a passionate love of art, of science, and of poetry. This was the age in Arabia which corresponds in brilliancy to the age of Pericles in Greece, the Augustan age in Rome, to the time of the Medici in Italy and the Elizebethan period in England,—perhaps the time of Louis fourteenth in France.

Haroun al Raschid acquired a glorious name by his love for letters. The historian Elmacin assures us that he never undertook a journey without carrying with him at least a hundred men of science in his train. He never built a mosque without attaching a school to it, a custom which the Roman Catholics emulate in our day. His successors followed his example, and thus was built a chain of academies which stretched all along the Mediterranean shore. His son, Al Mamoun, carried his father's enthusiasm to a yet greater fervor. Masters, translators, and commentators formed his court, which seemed rather a learned academy than the seat of government in a warlike

empire. When this Caliph dictated the terms of peace to the Greek Emperor, Michael the Stammerer, the tribute he demanded was a collection of Greek authors. Hundreds of camels might be seen entering Bagdad laden with manuscripts. Al Mamoun was a superb mathematician, and two of his co-laborers measured the earth. The Elements of Astronomy were prepared by the Caliph Alfragan, and the astronomical tables of Al Merwasi were written by two of his courtiers. This generous and enlightened monarch was as humane as he was learned, and said to one of his relatives who had revolted against him and tried to usurp the throne: "If it were known what pleasure I experience in granting pardon, all who have offended against me would come and confess their crimes." It was not strange, with such a Caliph, that literature gained such a hold on the Arabian mind. His city of Bagdad, the capital of the nation, the home of the Caliphs, was the capital and the home of letters also. Balkh, Ispahan, and Samarcand were the abodes of science, and Alexandria had twenty schools of philosophy.

Thus when Attila and Alaric conquered Rome, learning, wounded in the house of its friends, fled from Italy and found asylums at Bagdad and Cufa. It had been scorned and beaten with many stripes by the Northern Barbarians, but the Saracens rescued the maltreated but still vital sufferer; built magnificent hospitals for Greek and Roman literature, and nursed it to health again. Once restored to health and vigor they fell in love with it, wooed and wedded it, and sent a fresh brood of splendid vitality all over Europe. In the cities of Cairo, Fez, and Morocco, the magnificent Saracenic architecture adorned these divine temples of instruction. This architecture, so imaginative, so elegant, so ethereal, is still the admiration of those travelers who go to enjoy or study the cities of Spain. It has survived Gothic Kings and Arabian Emirs, Jewish Rabbis and Castilian Monarchs, the destructive religious wars of Christians and Moors, which alternately tore down the respective symbols of the two creeds and wilfully obliterated all signs of them, however beautiful, and almost defying time itself; for the pagan element of the crescent arch, the symbol of a Goddess, stands as a historical footprint of the Moors, in the midst of those splendid Gothic cathedrals which Sir Christopher Wren himself con-

fesses were "derived from the Moors." History, geography, numismatics, medicine, botany, optics, and metallurgy, were all Arabic sciences. Abou Ryal al Byrouny, who died in the year 941, traveled forty years to study mineralogy, and his treatise on precious stones is even now a rich storehouse of facts and observations. Aben al Büthav of Malaga, devoted himself to botany, traveling all over Europe, Africa, and remote Asia. His three volumes were the first good treatise on strict natural history every written. He died in 1248 at Damascus, where he was superintendent of the gardens of the Prince. Chemistry was their invention, gunpowder was their discovery: the compass was used by them in the eleventh century. The Arabic numerals came from India through Arabia; and paper, at first made only of silk, came from China through Arabia at Samarcand, where it was first manufactured, to Mecca. At this place, Joseph Amrou, used cotton in its manufacture. Spain eagerly seized on this new commodity, and the town of Sativa in the kingdom of Valencia, was renowned for its beautiful product, in which flax, which was abundant in Spain, had been substituted for cotton. In the time of Alfonso X, King of Castile, paper mills were established in Christian Spain, from whence the invention passed in the fourteenth century only to Trevisa and Padua. Just think for one moment what changes in the civilization of Europe were wrought by the Arabic numerals, gunpowder, and paper. But they were so universally known in Arabia, that their inventors never claimed their honors. It is pitiful to remember that, locked up in a strange language, in foreign and even hostile custody, there are in the Escorial, thousands of manuscripts, telling of all this glory of discovery, of science, of poetry, which but a few scholars, scattered here and there, can read, and to which even they cannot have access. The poison of luxury lurked in all this splendor, and has wrought death to the vitality of the race. The Arabic nation exists no longer. Wandering Bedouins, oppressed by a Pacha, ravage the lands almost like wild beasts. The European libraries hold all that is left of the Arabian literature, and slavery and ignorance rule that beautiful soil.

Let us now see what the Crusaders brought back to Europe as the result of their labors, and battles, and sufferings. They

went for one thing, a stone, and returned with another, bread, and from the birthplace of the race they won true treasures of life. Instead of possessing a dead tomb, they brought a living soul, that breathed upon their dullness and ignorance and superstition until they were born again into knowledge and feeling. Among other things they enriched the gardens of Europe with new and delicious fruits. The peach, the pear, the plum, the nectarine, the apricot, the grape, came with the lilies and roses and passion-flowers to live with the English crab-apple and field daisy. The damask (Damascene) rose still bears the name of its city, Damascus. The pretty white flowered hedgerows of *prim*, seen all over Europe and even in America, are the Arabian *privet*, meaning *privacy*, which the rude humor of the English soldier seeing the seclusion of the seraglios, rechristened when he brought it to his sweetheart or wife. These are but hints in the direction of agriculture, which the Moors carried to a high pass, studying the laws of climate production, the growth of plants and animals, and reducing experience to a science. The Crusaders brought back the rudimentary knowledge of many different sciences, since carried, after many centuries, to perfection. But the most enduring stimulus of all, was given in the world of literature. The rich Orient mind so fertilized the practical Occident, that the returning tide of the armies that swept over Europe was like the spring freshet of a river, bringing alluvial soil, and strange new seed and even a chemical solvent of the strong rocks of the Teutonic mind. The fervent imaginative, dreamy nature of the East, acted upon the swift ratiocination of the West, and seemed to transport the luxuriant Paradise of the South to the gloomy, savage North.

It is quite worth while to see if we cannot recognize the trade mark of some of these importations. They shine through the literature most plainly, as sometimes in stratified rock or any marked geologic deposit, there runs a vein of volcanic origin; or as boulders swept from a mountain side are found far off among stones with which they have no kinship.

Of the Arabian metallurgy we find abundant traces. Spenser's story of the wall of brass that Merlin intended to build about Carmoethen, in the third book of the *Faery Queen*, is one.

Merlin was called away and slain by the Lady of the Lake, but he left his friends at work around their brazen cauldrons, under a rock among the woody cliffs of Dynevor, to keep busy until their master returns. If you listen at a chink or cleft of the rock, you will hear them. Wayland Smith in Scott's novel of *Kenilworth* is a worker in metals. Friar Bacon's brass head, Queen Canace horse, the brand Excalibur, the magic lance are all gifts of Arabia to English literature. The sword of Orlando, Durandal, or Dumidana, the body of Ferragus rendered invulnerable by enchantment, are all found in the French Chronicles of Turpin, and from thence Ariosto took them to use in the *Orlando Furioso*.

Incantations abound, from the witches in *Macbeth*, through the dramas of Dryden, and one of the latest productions of English literature, "*The Inauspicious Day*" by Augusta Webster turns upon Astrology.

The Arabians were advanced students in optics although they never divined the real source of light, but thought that the eye emitted something, as the throat the voice. The wonders of the spectroscope would have astounded their theories, yet Alhagen wrote seven books on perspective. The Roman mirror mentioned by Chaucer, is an Arabian fiction. The mirror of glass of the strange knight is the same. It appears in Caxton's *Troye boke*, "a looking-glass having such vertue." Camoens, in the *Lusiad*, has a globe shown to Vasco de Gama. Cornelius Agrippa and the magical glass where he showed Geraldine reading to Surrey; the glassy globe which Merlin presented to King Ryence, which showed the approach of enemies and hidden treasures, is the same thing. Akin to this mirror of glass or globe, are Giamschad's cups of crystal, glass, and metal, which were cups of divination. The cup of Joseph which was hidden in Benjamin's sack, was probably one of these divining cups. The beryl to which Shakespeare alludes is the same. The burning glass and ring of Canace are Arabic in origin. The buckler of the Arabian giant, Ben Gian, is as famous among the orientals as Achilles among the Greeks. This was made by the fabrications of Astronomy.

Medicine came from Arabia through the Jews of Spain. The Arabic translations of Galen and Hippocrates, and the

translations of Avicenna, Averroes, Serapion, Andere, and Rhazes into Latin, brought the doctrines of these schools into all the monasteries of Europe. The monks were the leeches and surgeons of the day, and they spread abroad the Saracenic researches in chemistry, botany, drugs, and surgery. Indeed the learned teachers of the laity traveled into Spain to study in the Arabic schools, and the legends say that the Emperor Charlemagne himself went to Toledo for a wife, and brought thence Galiana, who had been splendidly educated by the great astronomer, Al Sarcas, who planned an artificial pond which by the running in and out of water, indicated the time of the day and the full of the moon. From her he acquired true respect for literature, and the love of this Spanish bluestocking induced him to teach his daughters to read. He caused many Arabic books to be translated into Latin, and as he was as patriotic as he was liberal, as large minded as he was large framed and thewed, made also a collection of French national songs, that kept alive the love of glory, the enthusiastic admiration of great actions, that vitality of imagination, and that belief in the marvellous which inspired at last a whole race with poetic impulse; imposed the duty of seeking adventure upon the heroic, and sowed the seeds of that chivalrous spirit which grew to such height afterward. The poet Eginhard is said to have suggested this to him.

Astrology shines out all starry, over the literature of this aftertime. The very name of the castle of Montiel (the "*Tower of Stars*") in the Sierra Modena, is a relic of Astrology. Mr. Hare says, "the imagination is unable to conceive anything more quiet and calm and unassuming" than the assemblies of astrologers that gathered within this fortress—"an assembly corresponding with the brightness of the stars that seem to crown its lofty battlement—a procession of angelic spirits, of which an exquisite and perfect emblem may be found in that host of white robed pilgrims which travel along the vault of the mighty sky." On the northern coast of Cornwall, the walls of Tintadil Castle on its rocky peninsula may still be seen; although the land of Leonis, the birthplace of Tristan, is now forty fathoms under water; this castle of tin had six stories, and the lady to whom it belonged was an enchantress and

astrologer. In "Minstrel Love," La Motte Fonque makes the hero Balder a poet and astrologer who lives in a tower. The Crusaders come en masse with their army into this story, and in consonance with the untraveled ignorance of the time represented, the Saracens are described as the very spirits of evil let loose. In *Ivanhoe*, the Crusader and the Templar figure singly. This idea of the astrologer, with his elevated gaze, simple and severe pleasures, and devout contemplation is wholly Eastern. Their respect for the precious seed thought, their belief in the spiritual essence of man, their contempt for the mere delight which dies and leaves no germ of value behind it, is in the strongest contrast with the utilitarianism, as well as the hearty animalism of the Teutonic mind. The fondness of the Arabian mind for poetry was excessive, but the thoughtful character of their intellects made them turn to treatises in verse in grammar, medicine, and even mathematics and theology. The splendor of their imagination was ethical and produced chiefly moral and didactic poems. They have no Epic poem; and but a few bits of satirical dialogue constitute all their dramatic poetry. The catalogue, in the Escorial, of Arabian poems is twenty-four volumes, and they do not contain a single epic, comedy, or tragedy. Firdusi's poems of sixty thousand couplets, the hero of which is the Persian Hercules, Rustam, is the nearest approach to an epic. Cyrus under his Arabian name of Afrisiab conducts the war. They have no plays, thus standing in direct contrast to the English mind which flowered most naturally and richly in drama. With all their fondness for love poems they seem to have known nothing of Ovid, nor the lyric grace of Sappho and Anacreon.

The number of poets was extraordinary. In the reign of the Abbassides there flourished a bright assemblage of bards, chivalrous lovers, and romantic princesses. Motanabbi of Cufa, styled the prince of poets, and Khalilihor-Ahmed who first subjected verse to regular rule, the Caliphs of Bagdad, the Sultans of Mosul, Aleppo, Seville and Cordova cultivated this elegant art with the greatest ardor. So afterward did the monarchs of France, Spain, and England. The lives of the poets written by Abul Abbas, son of the Caliph Motassem, notice one hundred and thirty of them. The fragments of a work

called the theatre of the poets, originally consisting of twenty-four volumes, are left. Hejras composed a biography of Arabian bards in fifty volumes; Safadi another in thirty. There were many women who wrote with elegance and genius. Valadata, a princess, was the Arabian Sappho. Aysba, Labana, Safia, Algasama, and Maria, the Arabian Corinna, were all famous, not merely in poetry, but in philosophy and mathematics.

This glance at the breadth and elevation of Saracenic culture, these facts which illustrate their superiority in means, method, and enthusiasm for study, prepare the reader in a measure to apprehend their effect on the European mind. Bel Rio the Queen of Saba longed to see the wisdom of Solomon. She stands as the representative of the Eastern mind; astir for knowledge, aflame for art, with a feminine love also for poetry and flowers.

The culture of Europe had at this time but two elements. There was the rude classicism of the monk, and the endless disputes in a circle of the school-men. Creative power had died out and the mumbling of dog Latin, and discussions as to how many angels could stand on the point of a needle at once, without jostling each other, occupied the ignorant piety of the convents. Then came this spiritual influence from the East, this voice of song which called the dry bones together out of their graves, and clothed them anew with flesh.

It would be natural then, to expect great influence upon the Northern languages from all this new knowledge, and a great stimulus toward poetry. New words came to express new thoughts and exotic names were naturalised with exotic importations. We shall find our expectations gratified in a reciprocal fresh growth of language and also in the fresh literature, that spring from the irruption of the Northern barbarians with their stern sense of religious duty, and religious conquest, upon the voluptuous, musical, languid Caucasian.

The European languages first felt this renaissance or renewal of vitality. The Eastern mind is religious in sentiment, and metaphysical, and fond of imagery. Their copious, rich and flexible language is very rich in its vocabulary. They have, for instance, two hundred words that denote a serpent, five hundred that signify a lion, and a thousand different expressions for a

sword. Imagine the stimulus of these fresh forms of speech, and the growth and enrichment of language! The patois descended from the Latin, as its name, the Romance (Roman) tongue implies, gradually expanded into the beautiful and noble Italian, the accurate and clear French, the rich and strong English, the philosophical and critical German. It would be most interesting to trace the magical springing of the lovely Troubadour verse, starting from the soldier's rude ballads in the impure Latin, and ending in Pierre Vidal, or Walther von Vogelweide; a delightful task, involving not merely language, but history on all sides, and the vital growth of nations.

One of the soldiers' songs, written in barbarous Latin, was composed in Italy in 871, by a follower of the Emperor Louis XI. to excite a mutual emulation to rescue him from his captivity when he was put in prison by his ally, Adelgizo, Duke of Benevento. Spain received this first impetus of the Moors, which thrilled through the land. Her first response was to neglect the Latin language which had heretofore been the study of scholars. She was captivated by the oriental imagery and splendid pomp of the strangers, and her earliest long poem, the Song of the Cid, was written, not in the old classic forms, but in the romantic spirit, and in new forms of versification.

The Italian gamut probably came from Arabia, through the Moors of Spain. The Arabian reciters who accompanied the recitations of their poems with their instruments were the forerunners of the Troubadours, as the jongleurs were afterward their caricaturists. But Spain's great efforts in literature came later. It took the great discovery of the new continent by Columbus, and the ardent thirst for discovery that preceded and followed that event, the hope and the fruition, to stir the phlegm of the saturnine Spaniard. Then came Calderon and his peers. But Spain accepted the chivalry of the Moors, the studiousness, the architecture, the agriculture as no other country did. She also took the bad as well as the good. The position of women even now in that country, held in fond and proud half-slavery, valued as a thing, and not a person, and treated as a child incapable of self-government; the unequal relation of men and women, is a direct and unfortunate inheritance from the seraglio and the harem of later Mohammedan life.

But Spain received the Arabian spirit in better things, and the learned teachers of the clergy and laity in France traveled to that country to study in the Arabic schools. Then Charlemagne brought that spirit to France, and powerful in all ways as he was, he transfused it into French life. From thence the Normans took it to England.

This awakening of letters in France was shown by the Troubadour literature. Her soil first responded to the Arabian germs of poetry and blossomed with beautiful flowers. These were always garden blooms, trimmed and decked with taste and order, and not at all like English meadows of cowslips and daisies.

The French Troubadours with the natural tendency to system of the French mind, first reduced the different dialects to a regular homogeneous form which, more or less modified in different nations, was called the Romance tongue. The Provençal was the earliest form of this new speech, and it was born and brought up at the court of Boson, King of Sicily, from 872 to 887. Number and accent of syllables, in their verse, took the place of the quantities and emphasis of Greek and Latin verse, and these laws of versification which the Troubadours discovered extended to all the new poetic literature of the North or the South of Europe.

There is something in the mechanical construction of verse that is connected in some strange, mysterious way with our sensibilities and the deep emotions of our soul. This symmetry, this proportion, this subtle relation of sound and sense, and soul, is before all knowledge, and primary even to conscious perception of beauty. The child, the infant in arms feels it in the rhythmical rocking of one person, instead of another's irregularity of motion, and Mother Goose, softly sung will lull a baby to sleep when any prose chanted in the same monotony will fail of the charm. Sismondi, says most truly, that "Rhyme is a perpetual appeal to our memory and our expectations." It stirs the imagination; it wakes up old sensations and makes us long for new ones. Rhyme, as we shall see by and by, is an Arabian gift.

This Provençal tongue broke out at once into song. The Counts of Provence and the first sovereigns of Europe emulated

each other as Troubadours. They were heroes in war, and to the heroic element in others they addressed themselves, and love and glory, ardently beloved by the singers, woke echoes in the hearts of the hearers. Fugitives from the Moorish territories, palmers who returned from a pilgrimage, knights from the wars, and students from the universities of Spain and Morocco, were the teachers of princes. To express devotion to one's mistress, martial ardor, and independence of soul was enough. They were steeped in these sentiments, and words flowed naturally from their lips. These poets, who had no learning, who could not even read the missals, who were ignorant of history, mythology, and customs, but who felt deeply these sweet and universal sentiments, were musical and harmonious.

The most distinguished of these warrior poets was William IX, Count of Poitou and Duke of Aquitaine, whose works St. Pelaye has collected, but Frederic Barbarossa, Richard I, Alfonso II, and Peter III. of Arragon, Frederic of Sicily, all were royal singers.

The accounts of the public festivals of music were very beautiful. A circular, calling for a Troubadour tournament, would be addressed to all the cities of the *Langue d'oc*, written in both prose and verse, to give notice that on the 1st of May, a golden violet would be given as a prize to the author of the best poem in the Provençal language. Once Arnaud Vidal of Castelmaudary took the golden violet for his song to the Virgin. In 1325, the Capitouls announced three prizes. The violet of gold for the first prize for the best song; the eglantine (the flower of the Spanish jasmine) of silver for the best *survente* or pastoral poem, and last the joy flower, the yellow and fragrant blossom of the thorn acacia, as the reward of the best ballad. These flowers were more than a foot high and were carried on a pedestal of silver-gilt, on which were engraved the arms of the city of Toulouse, where these graceful festivals were held. How lovely this *tourmex* of song held in the open air, and what charming devices and rewards for poets! This Academy of Floral Games survived until Sismondi's time, although it seldom crowned any but French poets. It seems, in copying these flowers always from the same model, and not

from the living, blooming flower, the artist forgot what they represented; the eglantine became a columbine, and the joy flower a marigold. Did the changes in the flowers typify the debasing of the art?

This recital of mere personal feeling on a limited range of subjects soon exhausted itself. The jongleurs grew witty and ingenious. They employed singular and difficult rhymes, hyperbolic gallantry, the ingenious conceits of the brain, rather than the tenderness of the heart; in short, *thought* gave place to *form*. Poverty of idea seized on the splendor of verse which had been carried so far, and in two hundred of the later poets there is nothing found but barren sterility. The jongleurs had corrupted the Troubadour poetry into a mere amusement for the rich. From an art, verse became a trade, and laughter and entertainment succeeded to heroic recitals and died out in buffoonery. Pierre Vidal, so full of talent, of exquisite sensibility and harmony of style, bitterly laments the decay of poetry in his time. He had the ideal of the old Troubadour before him. He says: "Poetry is the cultivation of high sentiment, the storehouse of universal philosophy, and the Troubadours are the instructors of nations." "Now men who exhibit apes and play legerdemain tricks are called jongleurs." How different from the days when *The Romance of Merlin*, *The Romance of the St. Grèall*, *The Romance of Tristram*, *The Romance of Lancelot du Lac*, were the subject of the Trouvères song. William of Lowis' *Romaunt of the Rose*, the most celebrated and most ancient of the allegorical poems, was founded on Arabian fiction grafted on northern chivalry, and though appalling in length and much abused by Petrarch, was immensely popular in its day. The squire's tale of *Cambuscan* and his horse of brass, the favorite for Milton of all Chaucer's tales, was Arabic, transmitted through French Trouvères. But the Arabian spirit of imagination gave way before the French spirit of levity and at once decay began, and soon came death. Now its dry dust is hid in the pyramids of its early splendid workmanship. We attribute this to several causes. First, it had such slender resources of learning within itself. Secondly, no one great poet sprang up, like Dante in Italy, to unite all the mysticism of Catholicism, with all the mythology of Rome,

to blend the heart and temper of a knight, with the passions and interests of a statesman and patriot, and bring heaven and hell to illustrate and explain this mortal life and history. Such a master spirit would have ennobled the subjects and standards of verse, enlarged and enriched its themes, and given scope and venture to humbler minds. And third, after all, there is a certain poverty of poetic nature inherent in the French character. They have adroit, nimble, and clever wit; their perceptions are acute, their conceptions clear, their sentiments delicate, and their taste exquisite, but—their work is shallow, glossy, and clever. They have neither profound imagination, or deep affections, and their verse never reaches or heats the soul. So Provençal poetry is dead and the Romance language is dead. It did not produce a single masterpiece, and among its crowd of agreeable poems, not one, more than another, takes hold on the memory. There are vast stores of Provençal manuscripts in the royal library of France, and one learned Frenchman, St. Pelaye, has devoted his life to making a partial collection of them, but no one cares to print his twenty-four volumes of manuscript, or examine the treasures of painful hand-writing, which he has left unexplored. The Romance tongue is dead, because those who wrote it could not endow it with vitality. The same qualities which shone then in the French character distinguish it now. M. Taine, in his sketch of the Normans, in his *History of English Literature*, has expressed these qualities so truly that we cannot forbear quoting, especially as he illustrates his statements by allusions to the Troubadour Romances. "He" (the Frenchman) "is deprived, or if you prefer it, he is exempt from those sudden half visions which disturb a man, and open up to him instantaneously, vast, deep, and far perspectives. Images are excited by internal commotion; he not being moved, imagines not. He is only moved superficially; he is without large sympathy; he does not perceive an object as it is, complex and combined, but in parts with a discursive and superficial knowledge. *That is why no race in Europe is less poetical.* Let us look at their Epics, *none are more prosaic.* They are not wanting in number. The Song of Roland, Garin le Loherain, Ogier le Danois, Berthe aux Grand Pied. There is a library of them. Though

their manners are heroic, and their spirit fresh, though they have originality and deal in grand events, yet in spite of this, the narration is dull as that of the babbling Norman Chronicles." Again, "shall we open the most ancient, the most original, the most eloquent, at the most moving point, the Song of Roland, when Roland is dying! The narrator is moved, and yet his language remains the same, smooth, accentless, so penetrated by the prosaic spirit and so void of the poetic. He gives an abstract of motives, a summary of events, a series of causes for grief, a series of causes for consolation." "Their idea remains dry, they conceive the divisions of the subject one by one, without ever collecting them, as the Saxon would, in a rude, glowing impassioned fantasy. Nothing is more opposed to their genius than the genuine songs and profound hymns which the English monks were singing beneath the low vaults of their churches." This, from a countryman and the critic of his time, reveals the causes of the death of French Troubadour minstrelsy.

But in Italy, slower to receive the stimulus, there were growing stately growths of the soil, the time and the seed. The debased Latin tongue was fed with a new element from Arabia which harmonized with the popular dialects and became in the hands of Dante, a noble language. This composite language was afterward made by Petrarch, smooth, resonant, and powerful. They possessed works of art, the inheritance of old Rome, remains of architecture and sculpture, roads, aqueducts, and a martial history. They had a transmission of culture, a transfusion of learning, a legacy of letters, an inherited taste for learning born in their souls. The singers also were from the aristocracy, and born into culture and taste. They earlier comprehended the height of human knowledge, and with their eyes set toward the future, their hearts held on to their brilliant past. How they must have gloried in Cicero and Livy, and Tacitus and Virgil! Indeed Dante expresses this, where Sordello of Mantua, one of the great Troubadour poets of Italy (Browning's hero) meets Virgil. "O Mantovano!" is the eager, passionate salutation of countrymen, the recognition of nationality.

Also the religious empire of the world culminated in Italy

at this time, and all its imagination was pressed into the service of religion. Churches, processions, pictures, carvings, and music were all consecrated to the church of Rome. All this also stimulated the higher imagination, and the poetry took hold upon the upper world of thought and feeling.

The influences of climate were potent elements of culture. The natural life is beautiful and free, and the spiritual life and the natural life acted and re-acted on each other. The spiritual life often has its highest action when the action of the natural life is most vivid. The relations of medieval verse, art, architecture, and music, show the fire and rapture of the soul, kindled into glory by earth and heaven alike.

All these influences combined to make Dante. His large, passionate, spiritual nature, could not spend itself in love poems, artificial madrigals, and labored sonnets, but passed to the mysteries of the invisible world, the secrets of the dead, and the three kingdoms thereof. From that day until this, all noble thoughtful souls turn to him with adoration and reverence. He binds to himself yearly, out of the centuries, his elect, who believe and tremble. His poem, "The Divine Comedy," has been justly called the most sublime conception of the human intellect. A poet, he created his language, a trouvère, he found it. Petrarch then further softened and purified it, and his sonnets are still models of tender elegance.

In alluding to the Arabian influence on Italy, Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, a poem in forty-six cantos, should be noticed. It was wholly on the wars between the Christians and Moors; as much so as the romances of *Adenez*, *Morgante the Giant*, the *History of the Paladins*, and the rest.

The influence of these later Italian writers on English and German literature can be plainly traced. Chaucer, the traveled wit and scholar, borrows his stories boldly from Boccaccio, who in his turn culled from ancient French fableaux; or from the old Italian source of the *Centi Novelli*, or from a Latin translation in the eleventh century of an Indian romance, under the title of *Dolopathos, or the King and the Seven Wise Men*. *Palamon and Arcite* is from an Italian source. Spenser and Milton also loved the Italian; and Milton's sonnets are more Italian in their form than Shakespeare's.

We have come now to the branch of our subject which to an American is most interesting, the indebtedness of the Teutonic mind to Arabian culture.

Apart from the great stimulus to mental activity and new forms of spiritual life, there was one transmission from the Levant, which impressed itself on all modern verse, namely, the use of *rhyme*. Rhyme belongs to southern languages which abound in vowels. The natural aptitude of northern languages, which abound equally with consonants, is for *alliteration*. This can be proved by the earliest known verse of the Scandinavians as well as by the habits of verse of one of the latest English poets, William Morris. He has been much abused for this "trick" by ignorant critics who do not know that alliteration is the natural law of the Anglo Saxon language; and that Morris but adheres to a native instinct in obeying this law. A pretty poem published in the *Daily Graphic* a few months after its birth, was so intensely English in this respect that it was a curiosity of literature. Its author, Mr. J. C. Edwards, spoke of it as "consonantal concatenation." The consonants then, held the characteristics of verse in the languages of the North, and alliteration, which is but a repetition of the consonants, is the ornament of northern poetry, while assonance, or the rhyming of the terminating vowels is peculiar to the nations of the South. Rhyme was essential to Arabian poetry, and from thence it was chiefly borrowed.

At this time there was rude versification all over Europe in the form of ballads and church hymns, but they were rhymeless and most irregular in character. Latin rhymes were first used in church hymns and called leonine verses, from the name of Leoninus who first used them; these are the Roman pentameters and hexameters rhymed. There were faint attempts at rhyme in the poetry of the Scandinavians, but the great impulse to rhyme came from Arabian verse. The great national epic of the *Nibelungen Lied* in the Icelandic traditions, in the ninth and tenth centuries is not rhymed; but the German version of it in the thirteenth, is rhymed in couplets. Here is a bit of alliterative German verse:

*Hell verheisen,
 Hats mein oheim
 Kunz mein leben, kühn mein lust
 Rasche mein rache, &c.*

The essential elements then of the poetry of the Germanic and Anglo Saxon nations are accent and alliteration. The leading principle of composition is to subordinate form to thought. No brilliancy of language or metre is accepted as a substitute for poverty of idea.

The Scandinavian nations, on the other hand, of Norway and Iceland, cared much for technicalities. The number of syllables was counted, the alliteration made refined and regular, and rhymes both initial and final were introduced. But these technical advantages were counterbalanced by an almost total stagnation of any higher artistic development. Lyric and dramatic poetry, traces of which are found in the earliest poems of the *Edda*, remain rudimentary, and at last verse degenerates into a purely mechanical art, valued in proportion to the difficulty of its execution. The Anglo Saxons went to the other extreme; while preserving the utmost technical simplicity, developed not only an elaborate epic style, but what is more remarkable, produced lyric and didactic poetry of high merit as early as the beginning of the eighth century. It is concise and direct; it has a tendency to melancholy and pathos, but also high moral idealism.

In Mr. Kroeger's admirable book upon the Minnesingers of Germany, the rise and history of German Troubadour song is described with great beauty and clearness. He traces the nature and origin of this verse, and analyses its forms. In this charming and valuable volume, one can find appreciative and faithful mention of the song and the singers, and the spirit in which they wrought. It holds the very essence of Troubadour life. This has been recently given to the public; and we hesitate to quote largely from its excellent contents, which should be read by all art lovers. We prefer rather to confirm his conclusions as to the rare and exceeding beauty and grace of the Minnesingers of Germany, and try to ascertain the causes which made the difference between their work and the French gestes, and explain its more enduring vitality.

Glory and gallantry finally degenerating into boast and licentiousness were the chief characteristics of the French minstrels. While the *Niebelungen* lay is known all over Europe and America, the *Song of Roland* few scholars even, are familiar with. Prof. Longfellow, a beautiful soul of another race and clime, has delighted to honor Walther von Vogelweide by words of praise and elegant translations, while this other faithful and accurate scholar has written a book about the Minnesingers, and given us literal and often charming versions of their songs. Meantime the French manuscripts, hardly disturbed except by Raynond in his nine volumes of selections, remain in the French library, growing more mouldy and dusty, year by year.

The different attitudes of the Teutonic mind toward two great themes, constitute part of this difference. In the early German tribes there were two marked characteristics. The religious instinct, the strong sense of duty, the quick conscience, all show a depth of moral nature; and again, they had deep respect for women. The Germans were not gallant like the French, who woo her to the face with a compliment, but stab her behind her back with a sneer. "They thought there was something sacred in a woman; they married but one and kept faith with her." In fifteen centuries, the idea of marriage is unchanged. Tacitus says: "She (the wife) will have but one body, one life with him; she will have no desire nor thought beyond; that she will be the companion of his perils and labors; and that she will suffer and dare as much as he, both in peace and war." Here is honor and fidelity; now comes in the adoration and enthronement of women which came from Persia and Arabia. To the Arabian, woman was a divinity, to be saved and spared all care, all suffering, all labor. The spirit of chivalry left women their freedom and borrowed the worship of their Arabian opponents. The most beautiful of the Persian ghazêles and the Arabian cassides seem to be literal translations of the Minnesingers, and *vice versa*.

In addition to this, the worship of the Virgin Mary added dignity to the adoration of women. It is interesting to notice that in all the higher forms of religion, women are introduced in such position as corresponds to their place in the tribe or

nation. The Vestal virgins of Greece and Rome, the Fates, the Graces, the nymphs and goddesses speak for their mythology. The Druidesses, the Nornes and the Valkyria Maidens of the *Edda*, the Virgin Mary for the Latin races, all tell the same story. This habit and expression of religion belongs in common to all the nobler races. When any theologic system or form of worship, however slight, was thought out, if it was raised above instinctive religion, we find that there were certain offices discharged by women. The feminine element is recognized and here comes in a vital difference in the notions of the French and Germans.

The Northman had a spiritual religion. No need of images or saints to make him worship. Odin is everywhere, the All-Father. The sea is full of Iotuns, dark, bestial powers, like the Wolf Femir, the treacherous Loke. The battle rages between the gods of light and beneficence and these creatures. They recognize life as a warfare between Good and Evil, and they must take sides. Energy and heroism, duty and suffering are their watchwords. Now contrast the French moods of pastime, of personal glory, of frivolous, futile pleasure, with these serious, impassioned moods of enthusiasm, and say which race is inherently poetic; which literature would take hold on the roots of our nature. One race looked at people and things, the other race cared for words. The poetry of one race culminated in Shakespeare, and Milton, and Goethe; the poetry of the other in Racine, and Alfred de Musset, who spent all his powers in his youth, and died, willless, soulless, exhausted in mind and body, with his lamp burnt out at its socket, fifteen years before.

Religious moods expand the soul, and enable it to project itself across the dim, widening gulf of death and seize the vast issues of an immortality. Religion opens long vistas of thought and feeling, out of the narrow range of daily life; it acknowledges the wants of the soul; its hunger and thirst; its noble discontent, which it tries to pacify with noble hopes for the future. Its very office is to stir the higher imagination and bring one near to the invisible and supernatural forces of life. Thus its influences are inherently poetic. Love and religion are the impulses of poetry in the soul. Natural beauty, human-

ity, joy and pain, all come within these two ranges of thought and feeling. Love and religion are the deepest chords of our many-stringed nature, and when they are struck the whole soul resounds with the complex and infinite melodies that ring out from their motion.

In these moods of impassioned sensibility and lyrical exaltation the Minnesingers wrought; and, within their narrow range of subjects, have produced most perfect poems and given the key to all the literature of the Northern nations. They saw, as the French never have seen and never will see, that moral life and purpose has an æsthetic side which belongs fairly to Art. They felt that the mere pursuit of pleasure in anything, even in Art, is ignoble and destroys itself; that is, the higher pleasure is sacrificed to the lower. Even Epicurus, himself, never confounded the subordinate and relative importance of ordinary pleasure, with the indispensable importance which consists *vivendo bene*. With their exquisite form and grace, with their passionate praise of their sweethearts, or of nature, or of noble living, there always is unconsciousness, and always sincerity; and this is another element of beauty.

The Protestant spirit, which broke away from Catholicism, afterward, in music, rejecting Palestrina for a future Mozart—also, in Art, painting and architecture, rejected the forms of verse of the Latin races, and found fresh, naïve shapes of their own. These metrical rarities have now become common, but nowhere are they so perfect as in the strains of the Minnesingers themselves. They used their gift of rhyme with surpassing sweetness. They enkindled the higher imagination. Love and religion were their native themes. They added to these a sensibility to natural beauty, which they expressed in clear and simple language. All through their songs, the changes are rung on these three motifs, and thus limited in range by the soul itself, or the writer's experiences. To us, their simplicity of subject and treatment may sometimes seem monotonous, as the endless saints and virgins that fill some of the European galleries may appear repetitious, but the mood of mind which produced these poems was full of creative power.

It would be impossible, as well as foolish, to try to return to these types of art of a former generation. Each age has its in-

terests and natural expression, and should speak its own deeds in the language of its own soul; but it is possible to work in the same spirit in which the mediæval singer wrought, and with equal sincerity, and equal fervor, to express this nineteenth century so that it will be recognized by those who live it, and also may be handed down to future generations in its form and spirit. We fear French literature is having an undue influence on our belles-lettres. The wholesome, robust English soul seems smothered by artificial roses, and wax candles that can be lighted and blown out at will. The poets and the critics are all literary artists, neglecting creative power, while they scan on their fingers, and act like pedagogues of prosody. Remember the decline of poetry when the Normans conquered England; remember its dry husks when Charles the Second brought French models into favor, and then remember, while granting full and generous praise to French grace and dexterity, that the soul must live, and that an imitative literature cramps and fetters the soul, which dies in its chains.

There is much that might be said of the influence of the Crusades on English literature. It received this directly from the soldiery, and indirectly from French literature. Dunlop, in his *History of Fiction*, says that the early French romances were written, not for the amusement of the French, but of the English. The romances of Perceforest, Merlin, Launcelot, Gauvain, Melcadies, Iristan de Leonnois, Giron le Courtois, Isaic le Triste, Galand, and the Palmerin of England, are quite filled with their prowess. The libraries of the monasteries contained romances. Perceval was in that of Lincoln Cathedral. Many northern romances were preserved in the Abbey of St. Dennis. Bevis, of Southampton, in French, was in the library of the Abbey of Leicester. In a catalogue of the Abbey of Peterborough, in 1247, are named, Amys and Amelion, Guy de Bourgogne, and Gesta Osnelis, all in French, together with Merlin's Prophecies, Turpin's Charlemagne and the Destruction of Troye. William of Wykeham gave many books to Winchester College. Richard Cœur de Lion was an example of direct Crusade influence. A minstrel himself, Blondel was his friend, and he favored and fraternized with that guild. The growth of English literature was slow like the English oaks,

and mighty, taking centuries to come to its fullness of stature. The novel, the direct offspring of the thousand and one Arabian nights of entertainment, has only reached its full height and stature in our day and generation.

The early kinship of the East and the West, which partially prepared the West to receive this later inheritance of learning, can only be alluded to; for it demands more recondite researches than belong to this cursory treatment.

It is doubtful whether America can ever feel any such kindling influence on her literature. From Japan and India she may borrow arts of design, rich and imitative color, and strong and fanciful architecture. Nay, from Hindoo Boodh and Brahma, and Confucius the Celestial, she may accept sweetness and light, and reverence for old age and feebleness, and precepts for wise living. But she has more to teach these nations. The West now leads the East, and America may speed the returning tide of civilization to its stagnation and barbarism. But above all let her hold fast to the dominant ideas of her Teutonic forefathers, and make love and religion the vital, controlling principles of her literature and her life. Then Christ will return and reign in his birth-place; and the Orient which gave him to the Occident, will receive this gift of his spirit back from the West which he has helped to civilize.

ARTICLE II.—THE BELFAST ADDRESS IN ANOTHER LIGHT.

What shadows of knowledge deceive the world, and in what useless dreams the greatest part of men, yea, learned men, do spend their days; much of that which some men unweariedly study, and take to be the honor of their understandings and their lives, being a mere game of words and useless notions, and as truly to be called vanity and vexation as is the rest of the vain show that most men walk in.—BAXTER.

The army of liberal thought is at present in very loose order; and many a spirited free-thinker makes use of his liberty mainly to vent nonsense. We should be the better for a vigorous and watchful enemy to hammer us into cohesion and discipline, and I for one lament that the bench of bishops cannot show a man of the calibre of Butler of the *Analogy*, who if he were still alive, would make short work of much of the current *a priori* infidelity.—HUXLEY.

The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer has been much praised, but little understood, as was lately shown by the surprise and misunderstanding that greeted Mr. Tyndall, when in his Belfast address he gave to it the weight of his own authority.—*The Nation*, in review of "*Cosmic Philosophy*."

We each enunciated not new views, but views to which modern science most unmistakably points.—Prof. PROCTOR, in Boston, referring to his own lecture in New York, April, 1873, and the Belfast address of Prof. Tyndall.

New York Tribune Extra, No. 23. Prof. Tyndall's Address at Belfast.

Address delivered before the British Association assembled at Belfast, by John Tyndall, F.R.S. Revised by the author, with a second preface replying to his critics, and an appended article on *Scientific Materialism*.—D. Appleton & Company, New York.

IN the preface to the new edition of *Fragments of Science*, which is also a reply to Mr. Martineau's criticism of the Belfast address, Prof. Tyndall informs his readers that having spent the leisure of a summer in Switzerland in revising the papers included in the new volume, bestowing special attention upon the address, he now commits them to the judgment of thoughtful men; from which it may be fairly inferred that he regards this collection of papers as a mutually consistent and harmonious series of utterances in behalf of the system of thought with which his name has long been associated, each of which is in that light capable of being successfully defended

upon scientific grounds, and that he feels prepared so to defend them.

The system in question, founded upon the correlation of force, is known as The New Philosophy, and to it we are indebted for the nebular theory in its present form, as it is expounded in the philosophical system of Mr. Spencer—the hypothesis of molecular or natural evolution.

The peculiar interest lately taken in the system has grown out of the delivery of the Belfast address; and the question which we are about to consider with respect to it is as to the nature of the system, and the attitude towards it in which the address leaves Prof. Tyndall.

The question is an exceedingly simple one if we may judge from the confidence with which it has been attacked, but by no means so simple as might appear if we consider the small success which has been achieved in dealing with it. For however justly the intention of espousing Mr. Spencer's philosophy, may have been attributed to Prof. Tyndall, a really thoughtful scrutiny of the facts will show, that through a failure to take into account what Mr. Spencer's system really is, and what the Belfast address in fact says about it, there has resulted a most singular misapprehension of the whole matter—a misapprehension so serious and radical, as to have led to a conclusion quite at variance with the facts.

What the Belfast address assumes to do, is, to account for the origin of life; attributing it to the inherent powers of matter. If this solution of the mystery is a valid one, Prof. Tyndall has previously shown, that it is through the operation of molecular forces acting under the law of correlation; and this agrees with Mr. Spencer's doctrine of evolution. Accordingly, Prof. Tyndall says, in the preface to his address: "I hold the nebular theory as it was held by Kant, La Place, and William Herschel."

Prof. Proctor also says, to the same effect, of the views announced by himself in New York, and by Prof. Tyndall at Belfast: "We both enunciated not new views but views to which modern science most unmistakably points." An assertion that both he and Tyndall have abandoned the current belief in creation to adopt the views of those men of science

who, founding their system upon the supreme potency of molecular force and correlation, and assuming to derive the phenomena of spirit from those of matter, deny creation to assert evolution. They disdain the "carpenter theory" as too *mechanical*, and offer as the scientific substitute, a *purely mechanical* theory of the universe, including life and thought, and a correlation of all the phenomena of the universe with matter and motion.

That this is the real nature of their system, and that it is in fact founded upon correlation, is clear to any one who is familiar with the subject, from the nature of the case, since human thought has as yet failed to discover any middle ground between matter and spirit, and whatever function of causation we deny to one we necessarily assert for the other, and since correlation, embracing all the functions of matter as it must if it be true, and believed in as it is both by Prof. Tyndall and by all the advocates of the new philosophy, with whom he claims to agree, compels them if they believe in materialism, to draw it from this fundamental axiom of their system.

And they themselves take substantially the same view as appears when Mr. Spencer asserts that the ground-work of both science and philosophy is in the conservation of force. He says :

"The sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it is thus the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis must be built up." *First Principles*, p. 192.

Again, Prof. Tyndall refers the first conception of evolution to a certain uniformity of law observed in nature,* concerning the grounds of which Mr. Spencer says :

"Thus, what we call the uniformity of law, resolvable as we find it into the persistence of relations among forces, is an immediate corollary from the persistence of force." *First Principles*, p. 195.

But it is needless to go into any lengthy discussion of the nature of evolution upon merely general grounds, it being more to the purpose to see how Prof. Tyndall himself regards it; while, if the discussion is confined to this particular point, the question will not be raised of imputing any views of others to him which he does not hold, and again, we shall leave with him the responsibility of imputing his own views to them.

* *Fragments of Science*, p. 162.

To the authorized American edition of the Belfast address there is appended an essay on scientific materialism from *Fragments of Science*, for the purpose as would seem of explaining more fully and decisively the exact position of Prof. Tyndall upon the subject than there was room to do in the address. The extraordinary manner in which the address is explained by the essay will appear as we compare the one with the other.

The object of the essay is to expound a mechanical theory of life, a theory which maintains, not simply that the animal economy is a mechanism, like a clock, which can be made answerable to the uses of an intelligent spiritual being, but that every one of the vital processes is a natural as distinguished from a supernatural or spiritual phenomenon, and that they are all of them sufficiently accounted for by the operation of mechanical laws; and the argument begins with this definition of a natural phenomenon :

"Mathematics and physics have been long accustomed to coalesce; for no matter how subtle a natural phenomenon may be, whether we view it in the region of sense, or follow it into that of the imagination, it is in the long run reducible to *mechanical laws*." *Fragments of Science*, p. 110, or *Belfast Address*, p. 108.

And proceeding naturally from such a definition, he speaks of the building of a pyramid in which the blocks are placed in their positions by human agency, and afterwards of the formation of a crystal of salt as an example of an architecture of a different sort, the agency being molecular force; concluding thence that the grain of corn and the animal frame with all their wonders of constructive power and skill, are equally, with the crystal of salt, the work of unchangeable necessity and law; asserting that with a sufficient expansion of the faculties which we now possess, and the necessary molecular data, the chick might be deduced as rigorously and as logically from the egg as the existence of Neptune from the disturbances of Uranus, or as conical refraction from the undulatory theory of light. And he ends the argument by saying—

"You see I am not mincing matters, but avowing nakedly what many scientific thinkers more or less distinctly believe. *The formation of a crystal, a plant, or an animal, is in their eyes a purely mechanical problem*, which differs from the problems of ordinary mechanics in the smallness of the masses and the complexity of the processes involved." *Fragments of Science*, p. 118, or *Address*, p. 116.

And in the argument the mechanical conception is held to distinguish the natural from the spiritual, as if the pyramid, which is confessedly a work of the human will, had been made without the agency of those mechanical laws which in the eyes of the materialist seem to displace volition, whereas we know if we reflect, that law is just as much indispensable to the artificial as to the natural phenomenon, and that force which is the materialistic synonym for law, must either be absent from the works of men, or fail to prove the absence of volition in the works of Nature.

But again, the doctrine of the essay, which is like that of the address ascribed to many other scientific thinkers, is also avowed as Prof. Tyndall's own, and he stands committed in direct terms no less than by the necessities of his system, to the doctrine that the correlated molecular forces are the ground upon which the processes of life are asserted to be purely mechanical processes—instances of the spontaneous interplay of matter and force.

But in the essay next following this in *Fragments of Science*, "The Scientific Use of The Imagination," the same mechanical theory is made to account for the beginning as well as the continuance of life. This is a natural and quite legitimate development of the argument, which throws light upon what we shall presently find in another quarter. Having remarked upon the current belief in creation, he contrasts with it the alternative hypothesis of evolution involved in the nebular theory.

"But however the convictions of individuals here and there may be influenced, the process must be slow and secular which commends the rival hypothesis of natural evolution to the public mind. For what are the core and essence of this hypothesis? Strip it naked and you stand face to face with the notion, that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular and animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself, emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena were once latent in a fiery cloud. * * * But the hypothesis would probably go even farther than this. Many who hold it would probably assent to the position, that at the present moment all our poetry, all our philosophy, all our science, and all our art, Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, and Raphael, are potential in the fires of the sun. * * * I do not think that any holder of the evolution hypothesis will say that I overstate it or overstrain it in any way. I simply bring before you unclothed and unvarnished the notions by which it must stand or fall." *Fragments of Science*, p. 169.

Then, unless it be true that life and mind with all their inexplicable wonders, are the necessary outgrowth of those purely physical and mechanical molecular forces which have their rise in the heat of nebulous mists, or in the fires of the sun, evolution must go to the wall, and Prof. Tyndall is the judge who pronounces the fatal decree.

And we are not imputing anything to him which he would disclaim; on the contrary we have allowed him to speak for himself in every instance, and the doctrine which appears in the extracts here given is the same which will be found upon however extensive a study of his writings, and it is inseparable from the system which he has formerly taught, and which he now formally adopts; and his own defense of which in the very words we quote he now commits after the most careful consideration to the judgment of thoughtful men; and it can easily be shown that it is the precise doctrine of the other men of science with whom he claims to agree, as when Dubois Reymond says:

"It is a mistake to see in the first introduction of life on the earth, anything supernatural or indeed anything more than *an extremely difficult problem in mechanics.*"

And other passages might be added in abundance if needed; but it is already clear that the one doctrine upon which evolution necessarily insists, and upon which its whole existence is staked, is the sufficiency of molecular forces mechanically correlated, and convertible into and out of each other, to account for everything which spiritualism attributes to creative power and wisdom, and it is further clear that Prof. Tyndall so understands it. Whether this is in fact the doctrine avowed in the Belfast Address, is a question of no small importance. Why it is important and to what extent, may better be considered at another time. At present our concern is as to the fact.

We have already shown by some of the passages in *Fragments of Science* in which he has asserted it, that Prof. Tyndall has heretofore held this doctrine, and again by his own words in the preface to the Belfast Address, that he regards himself as having avowed it afresh in the address. Yet if we look in the address after data upon which to base such a conclusion, it will be extremely difficult to find them, and if we mistake not those thoughtful people whose final verdict upon his work Prof.

Tyndall now challenges, will find themselves greatly perplexed to know what to do with what they do find.

For if they enter upon the search, as really thoughtful people will, with some clear conception of the doctrines which constitute the system they are studying, and with which the name of the author of the Belfast Address is indissolubly associated, and mindful as they must be of the great issues involved in them, they can scarcely fail to measure what they read by the momentous sense of responsibility under which they know it was spoken, as also by the acknowledged eminence of the speaker; and if he enters upon the discussion with a charge of unscientific method upon those who differ with him, they will expect him to be scientific, as, if he charges them with ignorance, they will certainly expect him to show himself well informed. But if the author of the Belfast Address is well informed about anything, what shall we say that it is, if not the new philosophy which he has spent his life in expounding to us as a substitute for our traditional beliefs, and the correlation of force upon which it is founded, and by authority of which he imposes upon evolution the fatal necessity of establishing the mechanical as distinguished from the spiritual nature and origin of life?

What must be the feelings then of such thoughtful minds when instead of what they so confidently expect, they come upon such a passage as this, in which Prof. Tyndall prepares the way for the supposed avowal, by explaining the principle upon which it is to be made, in which, speaking of the differentiation of species from one or a few primordial forms, he says:

"As to the diminution of the number of created forms, one does not see that much advantage is gained by it. The anthropomorphism which it seemed the object of Mr. Darwin to set aside, is as firmly associated with the creation of a few forms as with the creation of a multitude. We need clearness and thoroughness here. Either let us open our doors freely to the conception of creative acts, or, abandoning them, let us radically change our notions of matter. If we look at matter as pictured by Democritus or as defined for generations in our scientific text-books, the absolute impossibility of any form of life coming of it would be sufficient to render any other hypothesis preferable. But the definitions of matter given in our scientific text-books were intended to cover its *purely physical and mechanical properties*; and taught as we have been to regard these definitions as complete, we naturally and rightly reject the monstrous notion

that out of such matter any form of life could possibly arise."^{*} *Tribune Extra*, No. 23, *Belfast Address*.

The reasoning here runs in this wise. The object of evolution is to substitute matter for spirit in our theory of the universe, by showing that necessity and law are competent to render a complete account of all that has been attributed to spiritual power. But evolution is nothing to the purpose, unless we carry it back to the very beginning of life and mind in matter. But if matter is no more than Democritus and the text-books say, we go from bad to worse if we make the attempt; for nothing could be worse than to pretend that the higher faculties of man could grow out of the common properties of matter. But the difficulty after all is not so much with the truth of things as with our imperfect knowledge of the facts. And when we come to know the wonderful revelations which the doctrine of conservation has made, about the occult, mystical, and transcendental molecular forces, the difficulty immediately disappears. The old philosophers and methematiicians, held that matter had none but purely physical and mechanical properties, but the new philosophy which I have the honor to expound to you to-day, gives us a new definition of matter which better expresses what we now believe; and thus equipped we have no further difficulty with the problem.

This we say is the reasoning which we find in this phenomenal passage. The obvious difficulty about it is that it asserts as his deliberate conviction what it is simply incredible that he should even for a moment believe, viz., that molecular force is something different from a physical and mechanical property of matter; and asserts it, too, in behalf of the new philosophy and the hypothesis of evolution, which, as he has shown in two elaborate papers, must stand or fall by the contrary notion, that it is nothing but a physical and mechanical

* It will be observed that in the revised address the language of this passage has been changed, and seemingly for the very reason that Prof. Tyndall now discerns in it, and seeks to evade, the contradiction of his system which is here pointed out. It is to be borne in mind, however, that our concern is with the address as delivered, until such time as the author shall see fit to retract any position advanced in it; but whether he retracts or maintains the position now in question, he must equally do it directly in the face of his own positive declaration upon the other side.

property of matter, and that life, on account of its origin in molecular force, is a purely mechanical problem. And if we have here an assertion of the necessity of a new definition of matter, to rid us of the crude notions of Democritus, we shall find an instructive commentary upon the assertion in these words from the address, concerning the six propositions in which Democritus embodied his views of the nature of matter.

"The first five propositions are a fair general statement of the atomic philosophy as now held."—*Address*, p. 40.

If, then, Democritus implies the reprobated definitions in these five propositions, as he clearly does, it seems a necessary consequence that if we discard his definition of matter, we likewise discard that of the modern atomists with whom Prof. Tyndall would persuade us he now agrees; and we find him setting out to correct "the very inadequate and foolish notions" of others concerning this universe, and to contrast with them views which he holds to be more in accordance with the verities which science has brought to light, and ending with an objurgation of the vital principle of the system he is about to adopt, as he has declared it himself.

What Prof. Tyndall intended to do, was to rid his system of a fatal objection; what he has in fact done, is to stamp the objection indelibly into it. Most men have followed him, in regarding his address, as an espousal of evolution, but those really thoughtful men, whose judgment he now invokes, are more likely to say that he has fatally assailed it, and that the task which now confronts him, is not as has been heretofore assumed, to show how he can refute the theologians, but rather how he can come to terms with the materialists—not how he can answer our objections to his position, but how he can possibly meet his own objections to it? In short any really thoughtful examination of the case, is likely to show that the really legitimate answer to the Belfast Address, is to ask Prof. Tyndall how we can adopt it, without abolishing the nebular theory and Mr. Spencer's philosophy?

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ARTICLE III.—THE LAST CENTURY OF CONGREGATIONALISM;

OR, THE INFLUENCE IN CHURCH AND STATE OF THE FAITH AND
POLITY OF THE PILGRIM FATHERS.

THE present year is fruitful in historical studies; and it becomes those who to-day represent the Pilgrim faith and polity, to estimate afresh their value, as the traces of their power shall be found in the events of the century just closed.

At the birth of our nation, in 1776,—a little over a century and a half from the landing of the Pilgrims—it is supposed that the Congregational Churches numbered about seven hundred, with not quite so large a number of ministers. No statistics exist of the communicants, but they could scarcely have averaged over one hundred to a church, making seventy thousand in all. It is a simple thing to turn to the carefully prepared statistical tables of the *Congregational Quarterly* and ascertain our present strength, which is as follows: churches 8,488; ministers 3,300; membership 338,813. This indicates an increase of not quite five-fold. The increase is moderate, at best, while it falls far behind that of other denominations which have been running the race at our side. It will do us good to study a little into this phenomenon.

Taking things, first, in the aggregate form, we find that while, during the century, the Congregational Churches increased five-fold, the population of the country increased eleven-fold; so that, from this general point of view, we have come short, by more than one-half, of relatively holding our own; supposing religion as a whole to have exhibited no gain in its relation to the population. But the churches of all kinds in the land have multiplied, during the century, from about 1950, in a population of three millions and a half, to 72,000, in a population of thirty-eight millions; or from one church to every 1700 souls, to a church for every 529 souls. This is an aggregate advance of thirty-seven-fold, or more than seven times the ratio of increase of the Congregational Churches alone; proving that

the bulk of the increase has been in connection with other denominations. The fact is, that, whereas, a hundred years since, the Congregationalists were the leading religious body of the country, being double the number of any other, they now rank as the seventh on the list, being surpassed by the Methodists, the Baptists, the Presbyterians, the Roman Catholics, the Campbellites, and the Lutherans. With this result, a writer in the January number of the *North American Review* contrasts the confident prediction of Rev. Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, in his famous sermon before the legislature of Connecticut, in 1788, in which, speaking of "The Future Glory of the United States," he said, "that when we look forward and see this country increased to forty or fifty millions, while we see all the religious sects increased into respectable bodies, we shall doubtless find the united body of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches making an equal figure with any two of them!" The would-be prophetic President further said of our Methodist brethren, who had then just begun to be heard of in this country: "There are Wesleyans, Mennonists and others, all of which will make a very inconsiderable amount in comparison with those who will give the religious complexion to America." Alas! if one must not boast of the morrow, because he knows not what a day may bring forth, why did not the good President think how unsafe it was to boast of a century! Those to be "inconsiderable" Wesleyans, who had planted their first church in 1766, have had the presumption to grow, during the intervening hundred years (including all branches of Methodism) from almost nothing, that is from about eighty churches and preachers, at the time of this prophecy, to 20,453 preachers in charge, with 3,173,229 members. Even if we add, as President Stiles did, the Presbyterian force to our own, we shall muster less than one-third of the Methodist number, instead of being, as he anticipated, equal to any two of the larger denominations! During this same period the Episcopalians have grown from about 300 parishes to nearly 2,800, or about nine fold; the Presbyterians from about 300 churches to 5,000, or nearly seventeen-fold, and the Baptists (of all sorts) from about 350 churches to 24,794 with 2,036,719 members, or about seventy-fold. Judged, then, from the relative increase of

churches during the century just closed, the five Protestant denominations with which we are chiefly familiar stand thus in rank of comparative growth ; Methodists, three hundred and fifty-fold ; Baptists, seventy-fold ; Presbyterians seventeen-fold ; Episcopalians, nine-fold ; and Congregationalists, five-fold. There is, indeed, a certain unfairness to an old and large denomination, in this kind of comparison ; because a new and small body can always for a time more rapidly double or triple or quadruple its limited number. A sect which should, to-day, have but two churches in all the land, might have four next year ; and thus might boast of an increase of one hundred per cent. in a single year, while the strongest denomination in the country might only show an addition to its previous number of five per cent. The wonderful growth of the Methodists and Baptists appears not merely in manifolding their numbers, as these were at the beginning of the century, but in the huge aggregate which they exhibit.

This statement is not flattering to our denominational pride, especially when it is considered, that we started with an uncommon *prestige*, arising from the fact that our numbers were then equal to those of any two other denominations ; that historically we represented the spiritual faith and democratic polity of the Pilgrims ; that we possessed learning and wealth ; and that our ministers and members had the full confidence of the American people from the patriotic course which they had pursued during the War of the Revolution. Surely it becomes us to study carefully the causes which have limited our growth. These have been numerous, and are worthy of particular mention, as showing our errors and misfortunes, and as enabling us to judge how far we have gained in the wisdom of our methods, and in the hopefulness of our circumstances, during the last quarter of the century.

1. A certain limitation grew out of our geographical position. The churches were in New England, at the north-eastern corner of the land ; and of that section they had principal possession. This was a great advantage for local development ; but was less favorable to extension into other sections of the country. Had our churches been evenly distributed among the original colonies, or through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and

Maryland, in addition to New England, they would have operated more uniformly upon the general population of the country. As it was, the new regions, into which the population flowed, were adjacent not to them, but to the Presbyterians, Dutch Reformed, Lutherans and others who were already in occupation of those States, and who needed only to extend, as the contiguous inhabited area widened, their existing ecclesiastical organizations; while the Congregationalists must needs leap over old territory possessed by the other denominations, and seek to plant churches of a different order on the new ground which those brethren were naturally seeking to cover. This was somewhat like an army losing a continuous line of connection with its permanent base of supplies, and, in days when distance meant so much more than it now does.

2. A moral fact operated as another geographical limitation, to wit, the anti-slavery sentiments of the churches. New England was ever the deadly antagonist of slavery, which had only a nominal existence within her borders. Her sons, partly for this reason, emigrated almost wholly to the West, and only a few merchants and professional men took up a residence at the South, in the large cities. But two or three Congregational Churches existed, at the close of the Revolution, in the whole South, and these soon ceased all communication with the sister churches at the North, and affiliated with the Presbyterians. Indeed a consistently worked Congregational Church is incompatible with the practical operation of slavery. For, in such a church, the members are on an equality, and the discipline is by vote of the entire body. Imagine, now, a church composed indiscriminately of masters and slaves, in which each master was liable to have complaint entered against him by any slave whom he might maltreat, and whose case must be judged by the assembled membership, the majority of which was likely to be composed of bondmen jealous of their Christian rights! How long would the masters favor such a church polity? Again, how could the free polity operate with a large part of the membership owned by a few leading men, without whose permission under the existing State laws, no meetings could be held, and no individual slave member could leave his plantation, and by whom each troublesome communicant could be

soundly flogged, on his return from a church meeting, or could be sold to distant parts! Nothing else need be said to show how necessarily a genuine Congregationalism was excluded from the South, that is, from one-half of the country. Our principles were seditious, under Southern laws, and no attempts were made to extend our denominational fellowship into the slave States. Yet those are the States where Methodism finds, because of its former complicity with slavery, a million and a quarter of members, and five thousand ministers. Since the abolition of slavery, it has been found difficult to introduce an entirely new denomination on a pre-occupied ground. If now it be asked, how we account for the vast number of the Baptists at the South, seeing that their polity is also Congregational, the answer is, that they never carried out the polity in the presence of slavery. The writer consulted a leading Baptist minister and editor on this point, stating the natural antagonism of a democratic church polity to the practical operation of slavery, and inquiring what the Baptist experience had been. He replied, that slavery had compelled the sacrifice of this democratic autocracy; that, as far as possible, black Baptists had been organized into separate churches from the whites, thus evading the application of the polity to mixed classes; and that where this was impossible, the whites became an aristocracy in the church, and wholly controlled it, treating the black membership as a cipher. Thus the spread of the Baptists in the South was due to the intense denominational zeal produced by their peculiar views of Baptism, to their doctrine and practice of close communion, which forbade their merging into other communions, and to their virtual refusal to carry out the fundamental principles of the polity common to them and us. We have no regrets to express over our failure, in such circumstances, to show a representation among the various sects of Southern Christianity.

8. Another serious and almost fatal limitation was the lack, for a long period, of the organization necessary to a propagation of our church polity. One reading the ecclesiastical platforms of our fathers, and studying their methods, is struck with their provincialism. They were devised for a narrow home-use. They were adapted to a homogeneous population in a small

district of country. They do not seem to contemplate aggressive action, wide development, national boundaries. No provision is made for union of resources, and a reasonable singleness of direction. The fear was of every approach to centralization; the whole weight was thrown in favor of an independency tempered with local advisory councils. There was much opposition, at first, to ministerial district associations, and State associations were of a still later date. These latter acted also as missionary societies for the churches of their respective states, to aid the work in the new settlements. How even this instrumentality was denominationally neutralized will be seen under another head. But no provision existed for cultivating a sense of unity, for perfecting the fellowship of all the churches, for combining under suitable direction the financial resources and the personal labors which New England could have brought to bear with immense power upon the other sections of our land. One half of the century had elapsed before the organization of the American Home Missionary Society, and even that was not denominational. Meanwhile the rival church-polities had the unspeakable advantage of a complete organization for aggressive movement, under unity of management, and with a watchful vigilance which embraced every opening. We have illustrated, afresh, the weakness which has ever beset a democracy in the presence of centralized systems. Our fathers, in properly avoiding organized power, failed to provide suitably for organized fellowship and labor. They left largely to local zeal and individual enterprise, what should have sprung from the systematic supervision of the ablest minds. Nor was the minuter arrangement for local work any more complete. Too little use was made of itinerant methods of labor, and the system was not adjusted sufficiently to utilize the small beginnings of interest in new places, so as to employ lay-preaching and form a class-meeting, where there might not be opportunity yet for a church, with its settled pastor. This lack of necessary machinery, both large and small, will go far to account for the short-comings of our success. Candor requires us to confess, that our system, as bequeathed to us by the early fathers of New England, was poorly equipped for anything beyond parish work in that sec-

tion of the land ; and that we owe it to the pressure of necessity and the enlightening example of other denominations, that, in recent times, we have discovered methods of religious coöperation and organized fellowship for the churches of our order, harmonious with Congregational principles.

4. Another check upon growth came from the undue subordination of polity to the maintenance of a single form of doctrine—the Calvinistic. The early Congregationalists were nursed amid, if not upon, doctrinal controversies. John Robinson took part, in Holland, in the opposition to Arminianism, and the events of the times threw the churches into sympathy with the Reformed Dutch and the Presbyterian bodies, which shared their antagonism to Episcopacy. Hence there arose a disposition to consider Calvinism the main thing to be conserved and propagated, and to underestimate the importance of a scriptural church-polity. This tended to make an easy passage for our members into churches of other Calvinistic denominations, when local convenience or social and business considerations tempted. The common remark was: "The denominations are almost the same; they agree in doctrine; the *only* difference is in church government." This was the alluring statement of our Presbyterian brethren, as they opened wide their door to receive the New Englander who had come into their vicinity; and that New Englander had been taught the same theory before he left home. His liberal-minded pastor had always represented the Presbyterians and Congregationalists as virtually one, even if he had not gone a little further, and said, that, west of the Hudson, Presbyterianism was preferable. If that emigrant Congregationalist had lived in Connecticut, he had also been accustomed to a system of Consociationism, which could scarcely be distinguished from Presbyterianism, and probably had heard the local church to which he belonged popularly called "Presbyterian," according to the custom which, until within a few years, prevailed in that State. If a young man went to either of the two theological seminaries which for many years trained our ministers, the one at Andover, or that at New Haven, he was taught that, so long as he could find Calvinistic fellowship, it was of no consequence whether he remained a Congregationalist or not. Indeed, he was openly advised to

become a Presbyterian, in case he settled at the West. Prof. Moses Stuart stated, in 1829, in replying to strictures upon the American Education Society, that to his "certain knowledge," the Directors of that Society in and about Boston were accustomed to recommend "all young men who go from New England into the boundaries of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, to unite with the Presbyteries and not to hold on upon Congregationalism;" and that "nearly one-half of the young men who have gone from the Andover Theological Seminary have become Presbyterians." (See Baird's *History of the New School*, p. 388.) Those who did not take that advice, but established Congregational churches, were often viewed with suspicion, by their own brethren at home, as well as by the Presbyterians, into whose neighborhood they came, as probably loose in doctrine or disorderly in practice, and therefore unwilling to come under the supervision of Presbytery. Thus, attachment to the peculiarities of the Westminster Assembly's Confession of Faith was made completely to override the Pilgrim polity, which was the revival of the New Testament democracy. There was a noble side to this mistaken course. It proved how ready our fathers were to insist on spiritual truth rather than on outward form, and that they were prepared to sacrifice sect to general Christian interests. But in so doing it had been well not simply to have exchanged one sect for another; and also to have studied history, so as to have learned how intimately connected errors of polity have been with errors of doctrine, in all ages; that Romanism, for example, was enabled by its usurped ecclesiastical power, first to introduce doctrinal corruption, and then to prevent a return to orthodoxy. It would also have been wise to consider, that theological truth may be held in better spirit, and may be more freely and wisely developed and formulated, under one ecclesiastical system than under another. The choicest wine may sometimes catch a damaging flavor from the cask which contains it. Who can tell what would have been the fortunate result, if the exactly contrary policy had been pursued? If our fathers had had the wisdom and grace to say, that the differences between Calvinism and Arminianism should make no breach of ecclesiastical fellowship; but that the broad and scriptural Congregational

communion should embrace all churches and ministers who loved Christ as their atoning Saviour, and who were willing to respect one another's liberties? Blessed be God, that now we have reached a position, where we cling to our New Testament polity and accept a simply evangelical creed!

5. A very great limitation upon our denominational growth was occasioned by the adoption, in 1801, of a systematic plan of union with the Presbyterians in the regions west of New England. The occasion of this was, a wise and noble desire to provide for the religious wants of the new settlements. From the overestimate of mere doctrinal agreement, just noticed, the plan agreed upon was such as to favor, in its practical working, the growth of Presbyterianism. "The Presbyterian tendencies of the ministers of Connecticut were the originating cause of this plan," says Dr. J. H. Baird, in his *History of the New School*, p. 154. They did not take very great precaution to perpetuate Congregational principles. For, while under the conceptions which then prevailed, the mass of emigrating Congregational ministers and members were almost certain to go into the Presbyterian Church, as the wise and fitting thing, it was arranged that where Congregational Churches were nevertheless formed, they might, if they pleased, have a connection with the neighboring Presbytery, under Presbyterian pastors; might send committee-men to sit in its meetings, as if ruling-elders; might be entered on its roll, as under its care; and might form part of its basis of representation in the General Assembly. By this process, the pastors, who were full-fledged members of the Presbytery, were tempted to mould over the churches; the leading members, who appeared as *quasi* elders, were inoculated with the virus of the system; and the churches, though still managing their internal affairs by vote of the communicants (except in certain cases of discipline), were familiarized with the name Presbyterian, as in some sort applicable to themselves. As there was no ecclesiastical method then existing for keeping up a denominational fellowship with New England, they came more and more, every year, under the influence of those who were so ready to welcome them into a kindred denomination. The ministers found it useless to maintain Associations in addition to Presbyteries, while the churches,

one by one, came largely and naturally to the conclusion that they might as well be Presbyterian in name and form, seeing that they were so intimately connected with the system. Under this plan a Presbyterian minister settled over a Congregational church was not required to leave the Presbytery and join the Association, while it was insisted that every Congregational minister settled over a Presbyterian church should join the Presbytery and come under its power. Ministers and churches were thus lost, by scores and hundreds, while rarely, if ever, did a minister or church (until the anti-slavery agitation and the divisions in the Presbyterian body furnished new motives) change polity in the opposite direction. Rev. Dr. Fisher, in the General Assembly of 1835, candidly said, that "the Congregationalists from New England, being active and enterprising in the western country, the General Assembly had invited them to throw in their strength, to build up and enlarge the Presbyteries in that region. (Baird's *New School*, p. 448.)

With this union policy our Home Missions were made to harmonize. The contributions of Congregationalists were placed in the same treasury with those of New School Presbyterians, and were disbursed without reference to the denominational character of the churches aided. The result was, to speak in general terms, that the Congregationalists supplied two-thirds of the funds, and the Presbyterians furnished two-thirds of the beneficiary churches! Alas, what could a polity be expected to accomplish, whose resources were largely spent in building up a rival system, whose ministers were actually taught, in its own seminaries, to desert it, and whose members left it with their old homes, when they migrated elsewhere! Mitchell, in his *Guide to Principles*, etc., remarks: "It is computed that 400 churches, or more, have been gathered in the West, for the Presbyterian Church, by the benevolence of Connecticut alone. And I have seen it stated by high Presbyterian authority, that not less than 1500 of their churches are essentially Congregational in their origin and habits." Thirty years ago, Mr. Punchard wrote: "Our denomination has contributed largely of money and of mind to erect and sustain churches at the West, yet scarce one in fifty of these is upon the Congregational platform." Our practice has largely changed,

since these brethren bore their sad testimony ; but there can be no question as to the accuracy of their statements. Indeed, one need only to inquire into the ecclesiastical origin of the members and ministers of the Presbyterian churches in the West, and into the early history of a large portion of those in the State of New York, to be satisfied that, had no plan of union been adopted, and had the Congregationalists, on leaving their early home, adhered to their own polity, our numbers would now have been twice or thrice what they are, and the empire states of the Interior would have been a second New England, in their ecclesiastical character.

6. Congregationalism has suffered another important limitation from a direct effect of the doctrinal peculiarities of its former history. The early ministers were strong Calvinists, of the type now known as Old School. They held ideas of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, of human inability to all good, of sovereign personal election and reprobation, of atonement for the elect alone, of the nature of the influence of the Holy Spirit, and of the entire passivity of the sinner in the new birth, which now are seldom preached among us, and are held by few if any of our theologians, even such as style themselves Calvinists. There was little in the preaching of such doctrines to promote revivals of religion, or to secure individual conversions—though the grace of God did secure these results from the accompanying gospel truth. There was much in them to provoke controversy, and to secure reaction toward some antagonistic system, which, in the swing to the opposite extreme, was likely to be unevangelical. And such was the result. Rigid Calvinism caused a revulsion which first took form as a cold unevangelical Arminianism, very different from the Arminianism of the Wesleys ; then introduced "the half-way covenant ;" and then developed into Unitarianism. Thus occurred a lamentable apostacy, which largely paralyzed our churches for half a century, and, in Massachusetts, threw them back upon a life and death struggle in behalf of the fundamental doctrines of the gospel ; so that we lost our college at Cambridge, and in Boston out of nine churches only the "Old South" adhered to the faith. But for our free polity, which made it easy for the evangelical churches to cease fellowship

with those unsound in the faith, and to improve their own statements and defence of the truth, we should have had a ruinous defection. But even those who retained evangelical views, and who embraced "the improvements in theology" which were introduced by Edwards and his immediate successors, were much hampered with a philosophy of religion, which did not attract the masses sympathetically, or unite in its support the educated minds. And this thought prepares us for the next and kindred fact, to wit:

7. There was a prevailing lack of a true and influential method of preaching, such as is adapted to lay hold of the popular heart. Our ministers set their hearts upon learning and orthodoxy. They insisted too rigidly upon a liberally educated ministry. They did not allow sufficiently for what God's Spirit could accomplish among plain people by men of small culture, but of warm piety and of large faith. They had on hand a very elaborate scheme of metaphysical divinity, and they were not quite agreed as to the best philosophy of certain abstruse points, and so had not a few theological battles to fight in their pulpits. These battles were carried on with the artillery of closely written manuscripts. There came thus to be a dry style of sermonizing—logical, metaphysical, didactic; which could be accepted, even by the educated classes, only in a day when there was no current literature, and the people looked to the pulpit for their chief instruction and mental excitement, and in which the uneducated could take scarcely any interest. And then it was actually taught, by leading pastors and professors, that our mission as a denomination was to the upper classes, and that the masses we might wisely leave to be reached by other agencies—an error fatal to growth, and so contrary to the whole genius of the gospel, that it was almost equivalent to admitting that we were not the true ministers and churches of Jesus Christ! And while our clergy were thus philosophizing about religion, and keeping watch over orthodoxy, and reading written essays to drowsy audiences, warm-hearted, zealous, soul-saving Baptists and Methodists, who, with Christian wisdom, took it as their apostolic mission to reach and convert the masses, came in and stole away the ears and hearts of the people, overran a large part of New England itself, and swept

victoriously through the new settlements; using no manuscripts, dealing in no metaphysics, laying stress principally upon a personal experience of saving faith in Christ, and of the power of the Holy Spirit to renew and sanctify the soul, and allowing a privilege of preaching as broad as the language of Holy Writ: "Let him that heareth say come!" And the people came, by tens and hundreds of thousands! Lest this statement should be called in question, let us fortify it by a quotation from *Clark's History of the Congregational Churches of Massachusetts*, p. 226: "There was evidently an aptitude in the public mind to receive the Methodist faith and form of worship. Nor is it difficult to show how this came about. Old orthodoxy, tinctured with Arminianism, and cooled down to a luke-warm temperature in its delivery from the desk, had become the characteristic of Sabbath day instructions, in many of the pulpits, as it had been prior to the Great Awakening in 1740; and nothing could have been more favorable to the success of an earnest, loud-spoken Methodist ministry. In his doctrinal teachings, Jesse Lee, the pioneer of that denomination in these parts, suited such as were of Arminian tendencies; in his fervid style of address he was acceptable to many warm-hearted Calvinists tired of dull preaching. What with both these adaptations to the wants of the people, no wonder that Methodism had a rapid growth. Something of the kind was inevitable."

8. Mention might be made of still other hindrances to our denominational growth, to only one of which we will allude; namely, the misfortune of a partial connection with the State, for many years, in New England, and of an identification, in the popular mind with the old Federalists; which gave the poorer class of people the idea that Congregationalism was a starched and aristocratic affair, and not in harmony with democratic ideas and plans. Thus Prof. J. L. Diman, in his able article in the January *North American Review* of the present year, reviewing "Religion in America" for the last century, remarks: "This illustration of the social position of the New England clergyman is not simply a curious picture of the manners of the period, but furnishes an important clew to some of the religious changes afterwards witnessed. The clergy

formed an extremely aristocratic class, and it was hardly less their social eminence than their speculative teachings, which ultimately arrayed against them a portion of the population." Again he remarks: "The Baptists not only gained a controlling influence with a devout but humble class, who had little appetite for the elaborate discussions of the Congregational divines, but they were powerfully helped by the prejudice which exists, in every community, against the exclusiveness of superior culture. The rapid growth of the Baptists was, in large part, a democratic protest." Again: "The proclivity of the Congregational clergy for political discussion, so conspicuous in the period preceding the Revolution, was hardly less marked during the stormy times that preluded the memorable 'Civil Revolution of Eighteen Hundred.' Almost to a man the Congregational clergy of New England were on the Federal side. The biographer of Mr. Jefferson complains with bitterness that the ministers were all for Hamilton. As an inevitable result, the Democratic triumph swept from the New England parishes all whose sympathies were pledged to the victorious faction, and considerable numerical strength, if not much piety, was carried over to rival congregations." Similarly, Mr. Buck, in his *Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law*, says: "It hardly needs to be said, that the stringent parish laws of Massachusetts were promoting dissent and weakening Congregationalists. Instances are given in Essex County, of Congregationalists forming Presbyterian, Baptist and Methodist societies, merely to avoid the tax-laws." And to this we may add, that, when in the final efforts to disengage the state from its original connection with the Congregational churches, and to bring all denominations upon a legal level, our ministers and churches offered an unwise resistance, the effect was to array against them not only all the sects, but all whose sympathies for any reason went in favor of divorcing religion from the State. But we need not linger on further details. Plainly our fathers missed, in some respects, their golden opportunity.

To leave the matter here, however, were to do them and ourselves the rankest injustice. After facing the unwelcome facts already named, and ingenuously receiving the lessons of humility which they teach, it is still our privilege to find occasion of

pride in the influence upon our country, during the century just closed, of the faith and polity of the Pilgrims. For increase of numbers is not the only test and measure of moral power. There was something of genuine significance, as well as of pride, when, in the old Latin fable, the lioness was taunted with bearing but a single cub, and replied: "*Unum sed leonem!*" The question of pre-eminence between a lion and a rabbit could hardly be settled by the comparative size of their families, at the end of fifty years. Though the rabbit should come out far ahead in the returns of a census, he would hardly be able to crowd aside the king of beasts! Ecclesiastical systems must be judged by the institutions to which they give birth, by the men they produce, by the characters they form, by the moulding influence exerted over those outside of their pale. What, then, may be claimed for our Congregationalism, in its faith and in its polity, from this point of view? In considering the influence of the *Pilgrim faith*, we are not to inquire merely after the prevalence of Calvinism; although that was no doubt a power on character, and though it makes a most respectable numerical show, where one sums up the statistics of the Calvinistic bodies. But their views in this respect, being shared by other denominations, were no peculiarity. What was characteristic in the Pilgrims was not the creed, but *the manner in which they held it*; as being simply the expression of the truth thus far ascertained by the study of God's word, and subject to modification at any time when new light should be received from the same quarter. Thus their leading virtue, as part of loyalty to the truth, was the maintenance of free investigation on every subject. This they inherited from their pastor, John Robinson, of whose parting address, before they sailed, Winslow, who was present, says in his *Narrative*: "He charged us, before God and His blessed angels, to follow him no further than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of His, to be as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth by his ministry; for he was very confident that the Lord had more truth and light yet to bring forth out of His holy word. He took occasion, also, miserably to bewail the state and condition of the reformed churches, who were come to a period in religion, and would go

no further than the instruments of their reformation. As, for example, the Lutherans, they could not be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw; for whatever part of God's will he had further imparted and revealed to Calvin, they will rather die than embrace it. And so also, saith he, you see the Calvinists, they stick where he left them—a misery much to be lamented; for though they were precious shining lights in their times, yet God hath not revealed His whole will to them; and were they now living, saith he, they would be as ready and willing to embrace further light as that they had received. Here also he put us in mind of our church-covenant, at least that part of it whereby we promise, and covenant with God and with one another, to receive whatsoever light or truth shall be made known to us from His written word." It was in strict accord with this advice, that the original church at Plymouth covenanted "to walk in a church state in all God's ways made known or to be made known to them." And when the Westminster Assembly's Confession of Faith was received, the Cambridge Synod of the Massachusetts churches said, that they did "freely and fully consent thereunto for the substance thereof." And the result has been, that in the examination of ministers, on occasion of ordination or installation, we never have imposed any formal confession, but have allowed each person to present his views, orally or in writing, in his own way. The same practice long prevailed, in the New England churches, in the reception of members to the local church. Consequently there has been a steady tendency to theological progress. The elder President Edwards was accounted in his day a great innovator, or "new light," and his son, the younger President, enumerates ten marked "Improvements in Theology," to be attributed to his father's influence; while Dr. Finley could only explain his premature lamented death, in his 55th year, by saying: "He was pouring in a flood of light upon mankind, which their eyes, as yet, were unable to bear." Though he died eighteen years before our national birth-day, his spirit soon characterized our whole ministry, and developed that modified Calvinism, which is known as "New England theology," and which differs exegetically and philosophically from the older form. This has powerfully influenced the views of

several other denominations. The Baptists, who were High Calvinists, at first, came under its modifying power through its effect on Andrew Fuller, their leading theologian. The Low Church Episcopalians accepted its conclusions through Thomas Scott, the commentator. But very marked has been its reception among the Presbyterians; at least one half of whom, on the subjects of imputation, ability, and the extent of the atonement, agree with the Congregational view. This has come about not only by reason of the large transfer of Congregational ministers and members to that body, but also from the wide circulation of the writings of a succession of eminent theologians of marked originality and power; such as the two Edwardses, Bellamy, Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Taylor, Finney, and Bushnell; by no one of whom do we swear, and each of whom we are free to criticise, and yet by whom a needed and important work was done. And it is most significant, that no other denomination in America has produced such a brilliant array of fresh and influential thinkers, or can point, indeed, to a single theologian universally recognized as eminent for originality and suggestiveness. Theologically, New England, with its Congregational freedom of thought, has been the brain of America; and if religion had been only brain-work, we should have led all the denominations in number. It were well to realize that it is far more.

It may easily be imagined that, as the Pilgrim faith was thus intelligently progressive, it inspired efforts to promote education. It aimed at a learned ministry, and at a generally intelligent laity, who, according to the apostolic injunction, should "be ready always to give an answer to every man who asked them a reason of the hope that was in them." Under this prompting, Congregational New England established common schools, which have now spread into nearly every State of the Union, and have become a characteristic American institution. In addition to these, the same influence secured academies in all the larger towns, to teach the higher branches of English learning and the preparatory Latin and Greek classics; and from this example the land has derived its vast network of academies and high schools. Above these were placed the colleges, the two oldest of which in the country, and

the most celebrated, Harvard and Yale, were established by the Congregationalists. These were followed, just before and just after the Revolution, by Dartmouth, Bowdoin, Williams, Middlebury, and later, by Amherst, under the same auspices; to whose halls went the young men of all denominations and from all parts of the land. And thus came into adoption the American college-system, which has brought a liberal education within the reach of every earnest student. Still pressing on, in the pursuit of religious truth, our Congregational fathers set a noble example to other Christian bodies, by establishing the first Theological Seminary, at the beginning of the second third of our national century, at Andover, Mass.; a step which has since been imitated by all other denominations, even by those which for many years were accustomed to denounce an educated ministry as "man-made." And, before passing from educational appliances, it may be not amiss to note, that among us, also, was the first weekly religious newspaper started, the "*Boston Recorder*," now merged in "*The Congregationalist*;" and that in this department our churches have ever kept the lead; even the ablest and most widely circulated undenominational religious papers being under Congregational editorship.

The influence of the Pilgrim spirit is also manifest in the prominence of our churches in the cause of missions at home and abroad, and in connection with all benevolent effort. We learn from Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantation*, that among the reasons assigned by the Pilgrims for leaving Holland and emigrating to America, was this: "A great hope and inward zeal they had of laying some good foundation, or, at least, to make some way thereunto, for propagating and advancing the Gospel of the Kingdom of Christ in those remote parts of the world; yea, though they should be but stepping-stones unto others for the performing so great a work." And when their pastor, John Robinson, who remained with a part of the Church in Holland, heard that, in self-defence, they had been compelled to slay two Indian chiefs, who were engaged in a conspiracy to murder the colonists, he wrote from out of a Christian heart: "Oh how happy a thing had it been that you had converted some before you had killed any!" This spirit led to numerous successful efforts to Christianize the surround-

ing Indians, by translating the Bible into their language, and planting churches and schools among them. The feeling, just after the Revolution, may be learned from the fact that in 1788 the General Association of Connecticut formed itself into a Missionary Society, with a constitution which said: "The object of this Society shall be to Christianize the heathen in North America, and to support and promote Christian knowledge in the new settlements within the United States." When the Spirit of God moved upon American piety to undertake missions for the heathen world at large, the new step was taken by the Congregational churches, "in advance of all others," the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions being organized by them in 1810, with which the Presbyterians soon after consented to coöperate, as did also the Reformed Dutch. This bold movement gave an impetus to the foreign missionary cause in all the other religious bodies of our country, and in time they also entered upon the work. But our churches, though comparatively few in number, have kept the lead, both relatively and absolutely. The contributions for this cause for the last year are thus reported: Episcopalians, \$98,000; Methodists, \$386,000; Baptists, \$397,000; Presbyterians, \$412,000; and Congregationalists, \$476,000. As the famous Romist apologist, Milner, in his "*End of Controversy*," refers to missions as one of the signs of the true Church, our claim to that designation would appear to have good evidence of validity.

A similar leadership appears in the founding of other religious societies. The American Tract Society began in New England; the American Sunday School Union was planned in New Haven, Conn.; while the American Seaman's Friends' Society had derivation from the same source.

Another influence, which is coming to great power in the Christian world, has gone forth from the Pilgrim churches; we refer to the promotion of Christian union. The Pilgrims were, indeed, not only Protestants, as against Romish usurpation, but also Separatists, as against the corruptions and enforced uniformity of the Church of England. Nevertheless, they insisted on the fellowship of true saints, whatever might be their church relations. Thus, Winslow, in his *Narrative*, asserts that, in the parting address already referred to, John Robinson

"advised us, by all means, to endeavor to close with the godly party of the kingdom of England, and rather to study union than division, viz., how near we might possibly without sin close with them, than in the least measure to affect division or separation from them." The terms of admission to the Church were made such as to favor the reception of all true Christians, so that Cotton Mather says, in his *Ratio Disciplinae* (Intro. § 4), "The Churches of New England make only vital piety the terms of communion among them; and they all with delight see godly Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Antipedobaptists, and Lutherans, all members of the same churches, and sitting together without offence in the same holy mountain, at the same holy table." So also the Independents of the Westminster Assembly declared: "We took measure of no man's holiness by his opinions, whether concurring with us or adverse from us;" and Herle insisted, that to require other churches to agree with our views, as a condition of communion, was "setting the sun by the dial!" Hence the readiness with which our fathers united with the Presbyterians, in ecclesiastical affairs, as well as in missionary efforts at home and abroad. Hence the prominent part which we have borne, in organizing all the union benevolent societies, and the undue proportion of the funds which we have contributed to their support. Hence the difficulty of creating any sectarian feeling among our ministers and members, which should introduce a high church or exclusive element. And while this broad communion with visible saints has been our principle of faith and action, our free polity has enabled us to set an example before all denominations of the ease with which ministers and churches of evangelical sentiments could come into relations of ecclesiastical fellowship and coöperation, notwithstanding minor differences of doctrine and worship. This example of liberality will gradually act as a contagion of good, and lead other bodies of Christians to occupy a similar position. Even the close-communion Baptists feel the influence of our example and of the spirit of our common faith and polity, and are becoming restive under a restraint which keeps them apart from their brethren. And when each denomination shall thus have gone to a reasonable extent of liberality within its own organization, the

separating walls will be little more than paper, and Christian union will be a reality. And to such an end conduces our happy experience of continued denominational union, notwithstanding the theological and reformatory differences which have agitated us, and which have rent some other bodies with sore schisms. We have led them to suspect, that which we know to be true, to wit, that the exercise of ecclesiastical power, more than any other one thing, is the occasion of strife and division in the Church of God.

As to the influence of the characteristic *Pilgrim polity* during the century just closed, something more should be said than that the Congregational ratio of increase has not been as great as that of other polities. Good as well as evil has resulted from the liberal, undenominational tendencies of our ministers and members. They have carried into other denominations a leaven of our principles, which has operated to produce marked changes of spirit and method. Hence, on all sides, the rigid ecclesiastics are complaining that their respective organizations are being "Congregationalized;" which means, in general, that differing theological views are held with more charity; that the merely clerical influence is declining; that the people are more and more claiming a participation in the decision of all questions; and that the exercise of ecclesiastical power is being supplanted by the moral influence of argument and advice. Any one who will compare American Episcopalianism with the English Established Church, will see the modifications to which Episcopacy was forced to submit, after the Revolution, in order to gain a hold upon a people imbued with the democratic ideas of Congregationalism. And so the Methodist Episcopal Church has been gradually falling under the same influence, and elevating the intellectual character of her ministers, lengthening their terms of pastoral service, consulting the people as to the appointments of the preachers, and admitting the laity to a participation in the government. Our Presbyterian brethren, along with our members and ministers, have received so much of the Congregational spirit, that some of their leaders fear that they have too eagerly drawn the Grecian horse within the walls of Troy! They have been compelled to allow of brief term elderships, to consult the

people carefully on each local or general project, to liberalize doctrinal tests of ministerial standing, so as equally to recognize New and Old School divinity, and to consult anxiously how to prevent appeals from reaching the General Assembly (notwithstanding their theory of only one *church* for the whole land, with local congregations) and how to bring that cumbersome body within a suitable limitation of numbers and work! In the *History of the New School*, by Rev. S. J. Baird, D.D. (an Old School man), Chapter XXI is entitled "The System of Congregationalizing Agencies," and in the prefixed topics of the chapter the first is, "All our troubles came from Congregationalism;" which sad fact is duly set forth in the subsequent pages. Now that their reunion, after the long schism is, from the size of the denomination, developing the inherent difficulties of their judicial system, by which any local quarrel is liable to be carried up to the vast General Assembly for final review and decision, it is quite possible that the whole body may do what the semi-Congregationalized New School portion did for awhile just after the schism, viz: stop all appeals at the Synods, and make the General Assembly triennial instead of annual. Our principles have thus become a salt which has seasoned, with a democratic flavor, even the most centralized ecclesiastical corporations.

Nor, in considering the influence of the Pilgrim polity, must one overlook its manifest influence in favor of civil liberty and reformatory progress. Not without historic and logical reason has it been said that, in the civil compact drawn up and signed in the cabin of the *May Flower*, just before the pilgrim church landed, was the germ of our American political institutions. It is also to be remembered, that the town meeting in New England, which De Tocqueville thinks was the formative influence in shaping our civil Democracy, was but the copy of the church meeting, the same men for a long time assembling in the same spirit in each capacity; and that it is on record that Thomas Jefferson, prior to the revolution, studied this ecclesiastical polity, as seen in a Baptist church, with direct reference to its political bearing on the future history of the country. And so, when the Revolution came, the Congregational ministers were one and all its promoters, in and out of the pulpit, in and out of the army; while the Prelatists went

for royalty, their clergy fled the country, and their churches were without service. The way had been prepared for republicanism by the pulpit teaching and the church training of New England. Thus the reviewer in the *North American Review* for April, 1876, of Dr. Palfrey's fourth volume of the *History of New England*, speaking of the preliminary struggles with the royal governors, says: "There are, indeed, few more curious spectacles in the history of constitutional government than this of the people of Massachusetts, with no authoritative leader, with neither wealth nor social position, with very defective education, and with no clearly defined fundamental principles of government which they dared avow, carrying on a long, arduous, and successful constitutional struggle against the influence of the crown, and establishing precedents of which no one else in the whole world then understood the value. . . These village Hampdens, who came up to Boston, year after year, and voted solidly to disobey the royal orders, were the offsprings of town meetings and the Puritan church-system." And how almost exclusively Congregational was this influence in New England, may be learned from the fact that, when the Declaration of Independence was made, in 1776, the churches of all denominations in Massachusetts were designated as follows: Episcopal, 11; Baptist, 16; Quaker, 18; Congregational, 306. It also appears that, in 1760, when the whole population of New England was considered to be in round numbers, 500,000, the Congregationalists were estimated by President Stiles to number 440,000, or seven times as many as all other denominations together. Plainly they made the public spirit of the times.

It may then be supposed that when the national liberty had been secured, these Congregationalists would still be foremost in behalf of all that pertained to human freedom and progress. And so it has been. Dr. Hopkins at Newport, R. I., thundering from the pulpit and through the press against slavery and the slave trade, for twenty years or more, previous to, during, and just after the Revolution, was a typical Congregational minister. Newport was then the center of the commercial interest involved in the African slave trade, and the hearers of Dr. Hopkins were deeply involved in the guilt. John G. Whittier has

truly said, that "it may well be doubted whether, on that Sabbath day, the angels of God in their wide survey of his universe, looked upon a nobler spectacle than that of the minister of Newport, rising up before his slave-holding congregation, and demanding, in the name of the Highest, the 'deliverance of the captive, and the opening of prison-doors to them that were bound.'" Similar was the spirit of the younger Edwards, who did the same at New Haven, Ct., ten years later. And when the modern agitation against slavery began, Congregational New England became its headquarters and inspiration, and our system revealed peculiar facilities for carrying forward the reform ecclesiastically. Each church could act for itself in withdrawing fellowship from the iniquity, and needed not to await the action, neither was likely to be overawed by the influence, of superior church judicatories. This fact opened the eyes of many ministers and churches that had joined Presbytery, and led them, by retracing their steps, to regain liberty in two respects. At the West, particularly, the Congregational Churches were a unit in demanding the overthrow of the accursed system, and as they then patiently endured the shame, so they may now wear the glory. Were there time for the recital, the facts would be found to be parallel in connection with the temperance reform, which, in its early stages, owed more to such Congregational ministers as Lyman Beecher, Justin Edwards, and Nathaniel Hewitt, and to the endorsement of the New England District and State Associations, than to any other human cause. The same may be said of the Peace Cause, and of nearly every other genuine reform.

In looking to the future, and endeavoring to anticipate the denominational outcome of another century of the national history, we think that the experience of the past warrants the indulgence of bright hopes. The latter part of the century just closed witnessed a marked improvement in our growth. This could not so well be exhibited in the older communities, where the influence of the limitations mentioned was great, and where our new denominational policy, of life instead of suicide, had little opportunity to go into force with social and ecclesiastical powers already organized against us, and sure to seize and appropriate our members moving from other localities. The

Western States must be our reliance for showing an ability to grow, and to do our proper proportion of Christian work. Let us then glance at the changes in this section, in the interval between the issuing of the first *Congregational Year Book*, in 1854, and of the statistics given in the January *Quarterly* of 1876. In Ohio we had then unconnected with Presbytery but 124 churches; now 211. In Indiana only 7, of which definite knowledge could be had: now 26. In Illinois, 115; now 242. In Michigan, 93; now 200. In Wisconsin, 114; now 195. In Iowa, 57; now 229. In Minnesota, 2; now 94. In Missouri, where slavery before the war almost entirely excluded us, 1; now 70. In the the region west of Missouri to the Pacific Ocean, 7; now 186. In all the West we had then 420 churches, and have now 1473, being a gain in 22 years of about 329 per cent: although, east of the Mississippi, the ground had been so largely preoccupied by a kindred denomination. It would be unjust, also, to our future prospects not to notice that, even with the drawbacks named, our *polity*, simply as such, and separate from our name and fellowship, has been adopted by a larger proportion of the Protestant Christians of the land than has any other, and has thus proved its adaptedness to church work in the most varied relations. There are at this time about 70,000 Protestant Churches; of these the strict Prelatic polity has about 2,800, or 4 per cent; the modified Episcopacy of the Methodists, about 20,000, or 28½ per cent; the Presbyterian polity (including Reformed and Lutheran bodies) about 12,000, or 17 per cent; and the Congregational (including Baptists of all kinds, Unitarians, Universalists) about 37,000, or nearly 53 per cent. It may thus appear that, while our denominational *name* stands less prominent in the Census returns than that of several others, our denominational *principles* have vindicated themselves nobly and triumphantly. Our present circumstances are hopeful, moreover, because these our principles are better known and appreciated, and our methods are more nearly perfected. We understand our mission with a wiser intelligence, and we find it accepted in no small degree by others. Congregationalism means liberty, order, and fellowship; evangelical orthodoxy and moral purity; investigation, education and progress of thought; flexibility of

methods and a point of union for Christians who differ in unessentials. These ideas are not only to be held, but to be propagated. Derived, as we believe, from the New Testament, they are adapted to all lands and races, and tend to gain for themselves universal acceptance, as Christian character ripens and Christian experience broadens. Our members, learning their providential mission, have developed our system of benevolent effort and of ecclesiastical fellowship, so that it is now fitted for continental results as it formerly was not even for provincial action. We support and control our own religious organizations for the preaching of the gospel, the planting of churches, and the erection of sanctuaries on the home and foreign missionary field, while our National Council keeps alive a sense of unity, manifests our fellowship, and enables us to lay plans with wise consultation for the promotion of general interests.

Having thus a well developed system of church-fellowship, adapted to the widest territorial expansion, having theological views thoroughly evangelical, having a denominational life historically rooted in that which is most characteristic and most heroic in our country's record, having an organism which carries with it no narrow sectarianism, but is instinct with liberty and progress and tends ever to union, and having learned wisdom from both the failures and the successes of the period just closed, the Congregational Churches enter upon the second century of the nation with exalted hopes for it and for themselves, believing that in the Pilgrim Faith and Polity will be found a prophecy of those forms of the Church and of the State which, in the golden age of the future, shall prevail throughout the earth.

ARTICLE IV.—THE NEW THEOLOGY.

THE writer of this article is well aware that its very title is likely to arouse antagonistic feeling in many readers. Of those in whom the feeling of antagonism will, it is likely, be aroused, two classes are especially to be noted. To one class the noun employed in this phrase will be repugnant; for they have come to a condition of weariness and almost despair respecting all theologic inquiry. Among this class some, who are Christians and even teachers before the people of theologic opinion, have, because they suppose that superior advantages to the cause of Christianity lie in that direction, turned themselves deliberately and persistently away from the study of theology as a science. Others of this class have a cold and infidel contempt for the whole subject. So little chance for gathering any fruit seems to them connected with theologic research that they would gladly see all attempts at such research banished from the realm of human endeavor. From these latter, however, the following thoughts will obtain no reading whatever. To the second class belong those who, while they highly regard the noble science designated by the noun theology, find very objectionable the adjective which is here attached to the noun. Frankly to admit that we may strive for, hope for, and obtain a *new* theology, seems to them like a total surrender of the truths of Christianity. In the very term "the new theology" they detect neologic heresies.

The history of the Church shows us that there is always danger of a combination of the forces wielded by these two classes against the free, scientific and so salutary, unfolding of theology. Not infrequently has it even happened that the most openly infidel and the most stiffly orthodox have joined hands to repress the growth of the science of God and divine things. Theology is a plant which does not thrive best either under the frosts of neglect or the excessive coddling of too timorous cultivators. Like all the other sciences it thrives

best when it is ardently and boldly, but humbly and devoutly, cultivated.

The meaning and justification of our term, in the use here made of it, will best appear during the progress of the discussion. We wish only to secure a certain temporary deference to the real truth which the term suggests, until time is gained for impartial and fraternal examination. This granted by the reader, we will at once proceed to consider :

I. THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW THEOLOGY.

That those who oppose the distinct and self-conscious effort to investigate with a view to establishing such changes as are needed in the science of theology, recognize this possibility, is shown by the opposition itself. This opposition is based upon the assumption that a more or less new, and for that very reason undesirable, theology is not only possible, but even highly probable. This objective possibility, which the signs of the times are, as some fear, fast erecting into a probability, is not, however, the consideration to which we wish to call attention. Such a possibility or probability will of course give either alarm or joy, according as the changes contemplated seem likely to turn out changes for the worse or for the better. The possibility of "breakers ahead" and the need of the warning voice of Cassandra will always attend human research, whether into theologic or other questions.

There is another sort of possibility which is quite too likely to be overlooked altogether or thrown into the background. This is that possibility, nay, that certainty, of new and great developments, which lies inherent in the very nature of theology, as well as in the nature of man, the investigator and recipient of theologic truth. Theology, however some of its elements may be considered as directly and divinely communicated, must always remain liable to change. It must be at times liable to such considerable changes as warrant the use of the adjective "new," though in that cautious and limited way in which alone we can speak of our apprehension of any system of truths as new. The make of theology and the make of theologians are such as to show this inherent possibility of great changes.

For, let us consider that theology is a science with all the

characteristics which belong to the conception of a science. We are indeed always firmly to maintain for it the dignity which belongs to its true place as the most comprehensive and elevating of all the sciences; we are also to claim for its facts and laws the same undoubted force and integrity which belong to any facts and laws of the other sciences. At the same time we are forced, as the reverse of this position, to concede that theology is very incomplete and fragmentary in its knowledge of facts and laws, very uncertain and liable to change in its speculations and theories.

That there is a science of theology we need not stop long to argue. "Against the intolerable assumption of a certain school, who are continually talking in lofty terms of 'science,' but who actually speak of primary religious conceptions as 'unscientific,'" it is always in place to protest with Mr. Mivart. It can scarcely be doubted that there is abundance of material, and has been these thousands of years, for forming a science of theology. There is no vaster array of indisputable facts upon any topic of human knowledge, than that which can be marshalled at the call of him who wishes to study God and divine things. Indeed all facts are parts of his material; for, they all have their divine side. There are facts of history to be studied; such as are brought forward by comparative theology, by the Bible considered simply as a historical product, in brief, by the entire records of what men have thought and done religiously in the past. There are the facts of sensuous observation; all of the very facts with which the scientists of the present are dealing, and which in no case fail to reveal something of significance regarding their origin and laws of relation. There are also the facts of consciousness, especially so far as they lie within the spheres which have been designated as the consciousness of the ought, the God-consciousness, the Christian consciousness. There is surely no lack of facts upon which to build a science of theology. Nor can there be any doubt that the human mind has so gathered, compared, classified and denominated these facts, so discovered their connection and causes, as to form them into a science, or at least into the beginnings of a science. To have enough correlated facts, and to apply the mind to discovering their correlation, are sure to

result in the founding of the science appropriate to the facts. The product of handling thus any set of facts is science.

There may be, no doubt, much strong contempt thrown upon this claim which is set up for theology. It may be said: theology is inevitably rendered unscientific by the fact that the very existence of its subject of investigation is a vast assumption. God is the subject of research in theology. But the existence of God is not capable of scientific demonstration, nor his nature of scientific inspection and proof. But we may speak just as boldly of the enormous "assumption" which underlies all the sciences of matter, viz., that matter, the subject of investigation, exists; or of that other enormous and incredible assumption, which is, however, indispensable to the modern science of force, viz., that there is an all-pervading ether. And if any opponent of the claim of theology to be reckoned among the sciences goes forward to point out the disagreements of the theologians, their absurd and contradictory statements, the general incomprehensibility and unsatisfactoriness of the entire subject, we may confidently expect to meet him, thrust after thrust, by a parry which shall be at the same time a blow at his favorite science. Of all which fencing the inevitable conclusion will be the raising of a cloud of dust, and perhaps the infliction of a few skin wounds upon each of the contestants.

We believe that the skilled theologian may proceed to enunciate and prove the laws of his science, to unfold and illustrate the hidden connections of his material, as calmly and confidently, because as scientifically, as the student of any of the mixed sciences of matter. No doubt the theologians have often been inflammable enough to lead their opponents into the conclusion, that their cause was not a good one, and their alleged scientific knowledge either conjecture or fraud. Events, however, seem to indicate that we have only to give the advocates of other sciences as completely the upper hand as the theologians had it for several hundred years, in order to make them equally impatient of contradiction.

To say that theology rests upon vast assumptions, calling upon its devotees to begin by receiving that which they should rather end by proving, that it makes enormous and irregular

use of a certain unscientific faculty or process, called faith-faculty and believing, that it has few definitions and laws universally accepted—to say these things is by no means to disprove the claim of theology to a high rank among the sciences. The vastest and most important verities in all human science are postulates; the faculty of faith and the act of believing are indispensable to knowledge; and the circle of indisputable truth upon any subject is not large. Abuses of the necessity for postulates, of the faculty and process of faith, and of the obligation to adequate induction, are great and frequent in all the sciences. These abuses give a warning exhibition of the intellectual and moral risk which attaches itself to the growth of human knowledge. If the moral risk is greater in theology, it is not peculiar to theology. And there may be an advantage in recognizing the increased risk, and thus escaping in theology that rock upon which not a few scientists wreck themselves by immoral prosecution of their favorite science. We do not say that theologians have hitherto largely reaped this advantage; the advantage, however, lies closely connected with the risk.

Nor do we think that this just claim of theology to a place at the head of the sciences would have been so much disputed, had it not been put forth in connection with a false claim. Theology is the most comprehensive and lofty of the sciences. But theology has no just claim to exemption from any of the weaknesses which characterize the other sciences. If it is a science at all, it is a progressive science. If it can show any ascertained and systematized truths, it must also admit its pervading liability to error and constant need of readjustment. There are no completed sciences, no infallible systems of propositions. Every one of the sciences, by its very generic characteristics as science, is impelled to constant research, review of old opinions and alleged facts, re-examination of objections, restatement of law, retraction of error. Every one of the sciences is bound perpetually to renew its youth, and is also promised in the effort at renewal, constant growth, sometimes in the form of a general and uniform development, sometimes in great epochs of sudden unfolding. It is because we rejoice in the promise of an epoch for our science corresponding to that which many

of the other sciences have already enjoyed, that we have ventured to speak of the possibility of a new theology.

Science is inherently progressive. Its very nature is such as to guarantee successive changes. For, what is science? It is the product of mind engaged upon the facts of the universe. But the human mind is so constituted, and the facts of the universe are so disposed, that only comparatively few of the facts can ever come before the same mind. The scientific knowledge of any individual is always, then, a mere fragment. What is true of the individual is true of any special age in history, true also of the aggregate product of all human minds at any particular point of time. The discovery of new facts and laws may at any time make necessary a new adjustment of old hypotheses, opinions, and even alleged facts and laws. No man, however, who rejects God, and so the guiding hand from behind, can justify his belief that the changes in human science will always be on the whole in the direction of progress. The student of theology is the one above all others who should have confidence in the progressive, because divinely directed, course of human science. To that course he can safely and calmly commit his own science.

Whatever the student's attitude of mind may be it will still remain true that all the sciences, theology included, will be progressive, and so, happily on the whole, subject to new forms and new eras. Until the human mind, free from all bent toward error and from all limitations, has before it in one systematic whole all the facts, laws, causes and final purposes of the entire universe, science will be of necessity progressive. This conception of theology as a progressive science underlies our statement of the possibility of a new theology.

But the conception is met by a special claim set up in the supposed behalf of theology. This claim is that theology, inasmuch as its basis is a special revelation of truth in the form of language, has a special exemption from the liabilities to error which encompass the other sciences. It is interesting and instructive to notice that many of the scientists are making the same claim for their systems regarded as set over against the systems of theology. Both claimants are demonstrably in the wrong. God's great gift of the Bible does not deliver the

science of God and divine things from any of the frailties which are characteristic of all forms of human science. The Bible gives the theologian materials for his science, priceless, and obtainable from no other source; it does not give him or his science any measure of infallibility. Let us, however, examine this claim.

The science of systematic theology is an organism; it has various sources of nutrition, various parts with various functions. If there be, then, any element of the whole which is in itself perfect and infallible, it cannot, upon entering as one element into the whole, communicate to the whole its characteristics. Biblical theology is one element of the sum-total of theology; exegesis is one function of the entire organism. And even if its products may not be revised and questioned, they must coalesce with the products of natural, ethical, historical, and speculative theology. Now since no one claims that these latter products are perfect and infallible, the sum-total of their coalition with biblical theology cannot be perfect and infallible. To deny these latter products their place in the sum-total of systematic theology would be as unreasonable as the excessive cultivation of them to the neglect of biblical theology has sometimes been.

Biblical theology itself, however, furnishes no infallible product; the function of exegesis is as truly liable to disorder as any of the other functions in the organism of theology. Biblical theology is the most fundamental, and perhaps most promising and important of all the departments of theology. Could we have but one hand-book of theology we should undoubtedly be bound to take Schmid's *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*; next, Oehler's *Theology of the Old Testament*. In his introduction the former author gives a lofty and engaging view of the value of biblical theology. It is "the scientific historico-genetic representation" of the Christianity contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Now unless a man stands ready to claim that an unscientific, unhistoric, and unsystematic interpretation of the Scriptures possesses supernatural advantages over that which is scientific, historic, and genetic, he is brought by these words squarely upon the ground of that fallibility which belongs to all human science. But he is also brought within hearing of a divine

promise of progress in science. Every "scientific historico-genetic representation" involves a fallible process. The doctrines of biblical theology are a product which is arrived at by traversing innumerable steps, every one of which is taken in the liability to error. Biblical theology deals with a certain subject-matter, viz., the text of the Old and New Testaments. This text itself is discovered only after great and intricate research, is not now complete, and never can become complete. It is our object of ambition to reach as nearly as possible a text of the New Testament found in the best manuscripts written some centuries after Christ. We desire to find new manuscripts; we scarcely hope to come nearer in point of time to the original text. The preparation of the text for the exegetical student is itself a matter of obscure and fallible, yet scientific, research. We have to trust Tischendorf's eyes while he examines the codices for us, just as we trust the eyes of Darwin while examining the orchids. After the preparation of the text come the various steps of exegesis, which, according to Schmid, are three in number: first, authenticating a doctrine out of a single doctrinal passage as the sense of that passage; second, ascertaining the contents of whole books and divisions, or developing conceptions and statements of doctrine by comparison of several passages; third, deriving a sum-total of doctrinal thoughts, conceptions and statements from the sum-total of doctrinal passages and writings. The product reached after the third step is the contribution which the student of biblical theology has to offer to the student of systematic theology. The product can scarcely be overestimated, and should always be reached by special study, free from the trammels which a completed system of theology always imposes upon exegesis. The possession of this product is the first and indispensable characteristic of a Christian theologian. But how can any one for a moment suppose that the product, itself the result of "scientific, historico-genetic" research, conducted along several steps each one of which may be mistaken, can claim to be free from all liability to improvement and even retraction? No theory of inspiration of the text helps in the least degree to deliver biblical theology from its liability, in common with all branches of theology and all forms of human science, to constant change, readjustment

of old error, unfolding of new truth. The theory of inspiration is itself only the result of "scientific historico-genetic" research ; it is all the better theory, if it be itself largely a part of the result of biblical theology. But being such a result it cannot confirm any doctrinal system—though its doctrines be derived solely from exegesis—in any such fashion as to place the system beyond the liability to change. The fallible cannot authenticate beyond controversy the fallible. The exegetical function of theology, indispensable and fundamental as it is, does not avail to redeem the organism of theology from its inherent risk as a science. Biblical theology is not infallible; it cannot, therefore, render systematic theology infallible.

Should any faintness seize upon the heart of the young theologian when first he makes the discovery that his science, highest of all, is still changeful, and to a definite, yet large extent uncertain, he may be trusted to recover from the giddiness of the discovery. Amidst the changes, the Light which lighteth every man coming into the world, will no more cease shining than the sun, while the scientists are investigating and disputing as to the nature of the chromosphere or photosphere.

The inherent possibility of a new theology is proved by the very nature of theology considered as a progressive science. It is also proved by the nature of theology as seen in its connection with the other sciences. To this aspect of theology we now turn our attention.

The claim that theology is the most comprehensive and lofty of the sciences is a historic claim. It is also a just claim, though now often treated as a vagary of scholasticism. This position, however, renders this special science in some respects the most sensitive and dependent of all the sciences: sensitive, because immediately and keenly affected by the condition of them all; dependent, because relying upon them all for its material. The higher any organism stands in the scale of life the more sensitive and dependent is it seen to be. Man is of all animals most alive to whatever affects interests physical, social, intellectual, spiritual; he is also most dependent for his perfection upon the right adjustment of all which lies below him. This corollary from the claim of theology to the position of *scientia scientiarum* is quite too often forgotten.

We have recently had several amusing exhibitions of the extreme, but indispensable, sensitiveness of theology. Certain leaders of natural science, in mere wantonness it would almost seem, call in question the doctrine of prayer, or aver their adherence to materialism. The whole theological hive is astir forthwith, rushes out leaving its work of honey-making, and stings the wanton intruders. The students of the other sciences go on with their work, considering themselves interested in neither side of the controversy. This sensitiveness, however, is not so much a fault as an indispensable characteristic of theology. It is intimately and practically allied with all the other sciences.

Theology is also dependent for its material, for its facts and laws, upon all the sciences of matter and of mind. It restates their facts and laws from its own point of view. No fact or law of any science can be uninteresting to him who pursues the systematic knowledge of that God, whose force is concerned in every fact and whose reason is expressed in every law. The discoveries and changes in the views of all other investigators are likely to affect the work of the theologians. What is true concerning God and divine things, depends upon what is true concerning the works of God, the language, history and consciousness of man—channels, through all of which God is completing his self-revelation to the race.

This general truth of the dependence of theology upon the other sciences we will now examine in some of its special forms. We make no attempt in our divisions of the subject at logical and exhaustive treatment of the thought, but rather aim to serve our final purpose which is a practical one.

Theology is dependent upon natural science. Its dependence is, however, that of the organism upon the element which enters into it. One indispensable function of systematic theology is that which is performed through natural theology. All the sciences of nature so-called are engaged in investigating the various modes in one self-revelation of one God. To the student of theology the forces and laws which these sciences discover, but leave unexplained, are modes of the divine action. They reveal not an abstract nature, but the nature of the Father which is in heaven; and the doctrine from the Bible

which forms a glass, through which to view the wonders of earth and sky, is the doctrine of one consistent and correlated revelation of God through all the ascending series of life, light and incarnation of light. For the theologian, then, to treat disrespectfully any fact or law of the sciences of nature is to treat disrespectfully that Word of God through whom all things were made. It is his work to distinguish so far as he can from use of his own judgment and from docile hearing of competent scientific testimony—fact from alleged fact, law from hypothesis and mere opinion. The reverential attitude toward nature is a qualification for the study of theology; for, it is reverence toward him who is revealed in nature, who is its soul and life, toward God.

This doctrine of a divine self-revelation in nature, and this attitude of reverence and docility corresponding, make theology dependent upon the natural sciences. It is the dependence of the total organism upon the elements which enter into it.

And besides the direct effect which natural science has upon theology through that function of theology which is called "natural," there are many indirect effects. We know how doctrines of inspiration and habits of exegesis are influenced by new views of natural science. "This silly fellow," said Luther of Copernicus, "wants to upset the old established astronomy; but, according to the scriptures, Joshua commanded the sun to stand still and not the earth." With the demonstration of Copernicus' views the old astronomy was upset, and at the same time the theologic views of interpretation and inspiration have been modified. The eager pursuit of the sciences of matter has also had its effect upon the science of history, and through the latter upon theology. The sifting of testimony, the search after law, the estimate of the influence of physical causes upon natural characteristics and history, are to a considerable extent the gift of the student of nature to the student of history, and through him to the student of theology. The sciences of consciousness in their connection with theology are not without modification from the same source. These various direct and indirect influences and obligations show the dependence of theology upon the sciences of matter; show

also—this is the indisputable inference—the possibility of great readjustments of natural theology.

And since theology, like every other science, aims at harmony, the function and products of natural theology cannot stand at variance with, or in separation from, the total science. A new natural theology provides for a change in the whole organism of theology.

What is true of the science of theology in its connection with the sciences of nature is also true in its connection with the sciences of language. Theology is dependent upon the sciences of language. This dependence is most felt through the exegetical function and in the department of biblical theology. When we go to the Bible for our doctrine we are forced to ask: what does the Bible mean? The scientific answer to that question depends upon the sciences of language. The more advance we make in the sciences of philology and hermeneutics, the more clearly shall we be able to tell what the Bible means, and so what truths theology shall take into itself through its important function of exegesis. It is the conviction of those who apply the principles of the science of language to the work in hand, that we are just beginning to get into a condition for the scientific interpretation of the Bible. We cannot fail, then, to expect changes for the better in theology through the improved apparatus and condition of this its exegetical function. Every distinctively Christian doctrine, inasmuch as it is taught in human language, can be determined only in acknowledgment of this dependence of the doctrine upon the science of language. In answering, for instance, the central question of Christianity—Who is this Jesus called Christ?—no element of the answer is so important as that which is contained in the language of Christ himself. But the satisfactory view of Christ's claims for himself is dependent upon the satisfactory application of scientific principles of language to that special language which Christ used. A satisfactory view of the claims which others made for him is likewise thus dependent. And all the doctrines of Christianity are in the same case as the central doctrine.

Moreover, it is not in its function of exegesis alone that theology is dependent upon the science of language. The science

of language is needed to interpret history aright, the history of Christianity and of Christian doctrines, as well as all other history. But the true theology must always in human view depend largely upon the history of the past eras in the Christian church, and especially upon the time-honored doctrines of the church. Thus is theology indirectly through history made dependent upon the science of language.

Even the weighty testimony of the Christian consciousness, immediate and conclusive to the individual, cannot take on scientific form and so serve for the defense and enlargement of Christian truth, except in acknowledgment of its dependence upon the science of language. Certain facts of consciousness are the precious property (*propria*) of the Christian church. What are they? How are they to be interpreted? This is equivalent to asking, what does the book of Christian consciousness mean? and to answer the question we are impelled to invoke the aid of the science of language.

Theology is also dependent upon the sciences of history; that is, upon all the various authenticated systems of truth which grow out of a scientific study of the records of the past. Comparative theology, sacred, ecclesiastical, and profane history, but above all the history of doctrines, contribute largely toward that complex of facts, laws, and opinions, with which the science of systematic theology has to deal.

The beliefs and forms of worship which men have held to in the different eras and nations of history, can never become uninteresting or unfruitful to the thoughtful student of God and divine things. These all have contained certain germs and fruits of the true self-revelation of God. This fact endues them with a sort of sacredness in the theologian's estimate, however they may have been overlaid and polluted with error. The contempt for erroneous views of God must give way to mingled wonder and pity as we behold, everywhere and in all ages, the Light shining in darkness, but the darkness comprehending it not. Judaism and Orientalism, Manicheism and Augustinianism, European heathenism and European scholasticism, are worthy of study, and fruitful in instruction to the student of theology. Nor can either one of these pairs be adequately understood without the other. Comparative theology must be recognized as one branch of theologic research.

And further, since Christianity is a historic religion, and since its doctrines are given to man very largely in biography and story, a knowledge of history is indispensable to a scientific interpretation of the doctrines. Views of truth which were providentially developed during centuries of Jewish history, cannot be understood without an understanding of those centuries of history during which they developed. Nor can this Jewish history be studied in isolation from the history of other nations. And when we reach the flower of all Jewish and other history in Him who is the "flower of man and God," we are exercised to our utmost capacities in the search after those historic conditions, both of old-time Jewish formation and of more recent contribution from Rome, Greece, Egypt, and the East, in the midst of which Jesus taught, and finished that life and death which are preëminently the Christian doctrine. That theologian who remembers that Christ was as truly a historic as a supernatural person, cannot fail to recognize the dependence of his science upon the science of history. Words like "the kingdom of God," "the Son of man," "the Logos," recall the records of centuries. With such words do we deal in theology.

The history of the Christian church furnishes indispensable help to systematic theology. This age is full of contempt for the past; what is of old in science, politics, and religion, has little chance with the typical man of progress. They who are blown with this contempt need to be pricked all around with the sharp spears of history. The scientists are discussing whether Democritus had not the gist of the modern science of nature, and theologians also are turning their eyes to the study of what leaders in the church, so often quoted, so little understood, have in the past really believed. Such historic research is of very high importance. By its work we know better what is worthy of belief, and know also more grandly what sort of One he is who has guided and inspired his disciples through the centuries since his departure.

But especially necessary to theology is the history of Christian doctrine. For, rightly understood, all the formulas of the church are a product which can be accounted for only through the researches of the historian. Their very sum and substance

is historical, unintelligible to him who has no knowledge of their history. To give in an adherence to any of them—the Westminster confession, for instance—with no knowledge of their history, is no more a significant and valid act of loyal adherence to truth than that of the man who should have chosen his hereditary monarch in the War of the Roses without any knowledge of the claimant's lineage. The scientific research into the history of dogma determines the meaning of any particular dogma or system of dogmas. It also enables us to judge what is true dogma by furnishing the means for comparing the true and the false, for comparing both with the original sources of doctrine. It also shows what declarations of dogma are entitled to most respect and from the very nature of their origin likeliest to be true. It distinguishes between those which are derived from the Scriptures or the pure development of the Christian consciousness, and those which are the products of priestly or state craft and intrigue. It strips off the garments of light assumed by men who have been manipulated by emperors or popes into untrustworthy declarations of imperial or papal selfishness, and exalts the purely rendered, consentaneous declaration of the church of the ages. This is noble indispensable work which history, and especially the history of Christian doctrine, does for systematic theology. But the work places theology in a condition of dependence upon history—not servile dependence, but the dependence of the organizer upon his facts, of the organism upon any one of its special functions.

Theology is also dependent upon the sciences of consciousness; and, of course, especially upon those of them which deal with what is ethical and religious in the self-conscious life of man. The potent influence which the science of ethics both gives to and receives from theology is quite too little realized. It is the privilege of the theologian to attempt the scientific knowledge of God, who is the foundation, source, law, and impulse, of all human morality. The nature of the moral law looked upon as the expression of the divine nature, the divine government under that law, the person of Him who exemplified and kept it fully, the office of this law in the dispensation of the gospel, are all topics of most immediate and lofty import

to the theologian. His views upon these topics will inevitably depend very largely upon his views in the science of ethics. He can have no doctrine of the atonement without involving great ethical questions. Indeed, the question, how shall the figures of speech used in the Bible be interpreted? must be answered almost wholly upon ethical grounds. The relations of justice and love, the possible unifying of the two in one principle or act of righteousness, whether the correlation of the two be that of equality or subordination—to deal with these things one must have a clear and systematic knowledge of ethical truth.

Out of the religious as well as ethical consciousness the student of theology must derive his facts and laws. The scientific study of consciousness reveals both the nature of God and the nature of man; the former, inasmuch as man is made in God's image, and so still capable of responding to spiritual, divine influences; the latter, in so far also as man has polluted this image and stands helpless to renew its beauty within himself. Theology can do its work well only when it has a scientific knowledge of human religious emotions, needs and volitions.

But especially must theology go often and with childlike docility to question for its truth the Christian consciousness. From the scientific study of Christian experience it must be by no means frightened away through sneers at a "pectoral theology." It must clearly recognize and firmly maintain the possibility of scientific treatment given to the desires, sorrows, joys, hopes, and beliefs of the Christian soul. What all men in the practical contests of life recognize as the most indisputable proof of Christianity must receive scientific recognition at the hands of the theologian. The genuine student of the science of divine things must bow down before the heart of every Christian child, and desire to look therein, as reverently as the disciple bowed before the sacred resting-place of Jesus. He is dependent upon the child, and upon all like the child, for some of the highest proofs to the richest, profoundest mysteries of his beloved science.

This brief and imperfect statement of the relations in which theology stands to the sciences of nature, of language, history,

and consciousness is sufficient to illustrate the truth of its dependence upon them, both for its facts and for its conclusions from facts. To admit these relations of dependence is to admit the possibility of changes, coming with uniformity, or at marked epochs, in the science of theology. It is to admit the possibility, in the limited sense in which we employ the words, of a new theology. Constant readjustments, decided eras of growth, the separation of enormous errors, and the reception of lofty and newly discovered truths, accompany the growth of all these sciences. The same will accompany the growth of theology considered as a science in intimate relations of mutual dependence with the other sciences. The very claim of theology to be *scientia scientiarum* is a claim to the most complex relations of dependence. The claim is, therefore, an assertion of the possibility of a new theology.

This inherent possibility of a new theology is, moreover, proved by the nature of theology, considered as the science of that great concept with which primarily it deals. The concept with which theology deals is the concept of God. An analysis of this concept, and of the human soul in its relation to the concept, shows that the concept is the result of God's self-revelation, viewed as conditioned upon all the faculties of man in their symmetrical and harmonious development. This thought deserves and will receive a somewhat full discussion elsewhere. It is sufficient for the purpose of the present article merely to indicate the thought. Man's knowledge of God comes to him as the result of a divine self-revelation; for God unrevealed is an unknown God. The organon for this divine self-revelation is not man's intellect alone but man's entire soul, the whole complex of his activities in their mutual dependence and correlation. Different elements of this great concept with which theology deals are preëminently contributed through specific parts of the organon; for instance, the human will, in its connection with the bodily organism and the mental train of association, is used to impress upon the soul certain ideas and beliefs about God which are incomprehensible to the intellect; the affections, parental and filial, enlarge and strengthen the conception of Him as a Father. The sum-total of the concept of God, is, therefore, dependent upon the condition of the

organon through which the self-revelation of God comes. And since the condition of the organon, the condition of man, is always changing, the form and fullness of the concept also vary. From some men and generations certain aspects of the divine nature and government are quite obscured. The theology of every individual and age must necessarily show the condition in respect to development and symmetry, of the soul of the individual, or of what we call the spirit of the age. Some have drawn quite too near blasphemy in saying that man makes his own God. The truth is that man's condition limits the kind and degree of the self-revelation which is possible to God. It is by large, vital influences, by the Holy Spirit opening the soul of the individual and lifting up the race, that God secures the possibility of an enlarged knowledge of himself. Our science of theology must, then, depend upon, and keep pace with, this unfolding in the capacity of man to receive the revelation of Himself which God gives to him. The concept will change its elements as the organon changes; and with it will also change the science which deals with the concept.

The view of theology which has been given makes it indisputably the grandest of all the sciences, yet partaking of the common characteristics, progressive by its nature, connected in relations of mutual dependence with them all, and conditioned in the degree of its development upon the present fitness of man to receive the divine self-revelation. We believe this view to be sober and truthful, but also hopeful. The possibility of a new theology grows out of the very nature of theology; it accords also with the divine method of making known the divine nature to the human race. This method is historic, evolutionary. He who guides history and who evolves the progressive revelation of divine things is God. He who as a student believes in a God in history, a Saviour of the race, a divine self-revelation with stages of progress, will not only accept but rejoice in such a view.

Having thus far spoken of the possibility of a new theology as that possibility lies inherent in the nature of the science, we now proceed to consider :

II. THE NEED OF A NEW THEOLOGY.

There is always such need. The need grows out of the very nature of theology as we have seen it in the previous discussion. Errors are not only likely to exist in every system of theology, but as a matter of fact they do exist; there is also always a vast amount of new material which provokes and challenges theology for better treatment at its hands. We shall, however, push our statement beyond a general declaration of the need of a new theology. We think that there is in the present generation need of instituting a *new era* in theology. We have also hope that He who guides the race in its science, as in all its other manifestations of life, will before long vouchsafe to the people a renewal of interest in the scientific knowledge of divine things, as well as the power and grace to receive and assimilate the materials for this knowledge which are at their disposal. We need an epoch, and following it an era, in which the science of theology shall blossom and bear fruit as luxuriantly as do now the sciences of nature, language, and history. We feel both a deep necessity and desire that the minds of men should be lifted above the rocks, trees, and animals which are being so worthily studied just now, above the sun's corona, beyond the remotest stars, to the study of that omnipresent One who is in all these objects of study and as well in the students themselves. It is also our firm belief that these students are in all their researches, indirectly and often unwillingly, contributing to the benefit of the science they affect to despise.

In making such declarations we wish distinctly to deprecate the suspicion of sympathy with certain movements for a new theology. No thoughtful man can feel any fellowship with the contemptuous and destructive treatment which is often given to the past, its work and workmen, its views and symbols, its defects, or even its errors and follies. It is more and higher *constructive* work which we now need; such work alone can give us a new theology. Investigators whose prevalent attitude is polemical and combative, may be needed in the divine economies for building up theology, as well as in the case of the other sciences; it is not, however, in such that the strength and hope

of any science lies. The truth is, there is just now an immense amount of work, positive and constructive, to be done in the effort of theology to readjust itself, and especially to assimilate the material which the other sciences have so lavishly thrown into its hands. Every man, then, who is really interested in theology should be engaged in the effort to contribute something to this work of readjustment and assimilation. A thousand interesting questions are laid by all the other sciences at the feet of those who cultivate theology. These questions are urging, even harrying, us patiently to attempt their answer. Meantime how are many of us ministers, the cultivators of this science, engaged? So far as we have any time and brains for scientific study, we are too apt to be engaged in theologic battle-door and shuttle-cock. To borrow a somewhat undignified figure of speech from the gold, stock, and wheat exchange—we are engaged in acting the part of bears and bulls of orthodoxy. This wresting of nature, the Bible, history, and consciousness, in the interests of a polemical theology, must give way before the more patient and exhaustive study of all these sources by means of the improved helps which have recently been furnished.

This need of a new epoch and era in theology will be made more apparent by the two following considerations. The attitude in which the age stands toward the present form of theology is a proof of the need of a new theology. The attitude is largely suggestive of ignorance and unreason. The creeds, formulas, symbols, and theological systems of Christianity are, both as to their form and essence, made the special objects of thoughtless protest and attack. Nor can we by any means always claim that the defense of these historic products of Christendom is any more enlightened and truth-loving than the attack. Those who attack have not learned to acknowledge the value and province of creeds, know little of the historic growth of those symbols which are in existence, and above all are willing to make little effort at constructive work and at displacing the old by constituting the new. But on the other hand, those who defend the creeds too often forget their inherent fallibility, the weakness and even viciousness which the history of their origin and growth fastens upon them, the rea-

sonableness of the demand that they shall subject themselves to free scrutiny and readjustment. Between the two parties the time-honored, helpful, but fallible symbols and systems of theology receive the treatment which the Egyptians are said to have given one of their kings. They sacrificed much labor and countless lives to build him a magnificent tomb; after he had lain therein some hundreds of years they dragged his mummy out into the light of day and gave it to the boys of the street to roll and kick about in Egypt's mud. This treatment suggests certain truth concerning the fallible nature of man as well as concerning the fallible nature of his theology. The sober, historic and philosophic view of the subject forbids much hope from this hasty and clamorous assault upon the present creeds, forbids also any firm confidence in their perfectness or prospect of endurance. And this view, while it dulls our sympathy with the demonstrative criers after change and progress, still makes us ready to prepare the way for change so as to secure real progress. The fact that there is now an unusual demand for change forces us also to admit that there is an unusual feeling of need for change. That theologian who has a real respect for the truths of the Bible, natural science, history and consciousness, will, calmly and deliberately but earnestly and with persistence, give his influence to help on a salutary reconstruction and to restrain erroneous and mischievous destruction. He must, moreover, from observing the workings of the popular consciousness conclude that all this unusual dissatisfaction points toward, and prepares for, a new epoch and era in the science of theology.

This conclusion derived from considering the attitude of the age toward the present form of theology is reaffirmed by a second consideration. The need of a new theology is made apparent when we consider the great changes, which have recently been made and are now rapidly advancing, in many of those sciences upon which theology is dependent. It is not to be forgotten that theology is by nature and by right the most conservative of the sciences. Its position in relation to the other sciences gives it this nature and this right. Theology being *scientia scientiarum* inevitably comes last in its unfolding. Nor is this thought contradicted, as might at first be

supposed, by the history of the science. The theologic views of men, apart from the Bible and previous also to the formation of the sciences of matter, language, and history, can, so far as they are scientific, come only from a correct and systematic view of moral and religious experience. So far as they attempt to weave in nature and history, they are false, whenever the statements concerning nature and history which they receive from contemporaneous opinion are largely false. The Christian Church until comparatively recent times has not had the varied and authentic material which now lies before her for forming a Christian theology. What, previous to the last hundred years, have been the sources at command for developing the science of God and divine things? Almost entirely the Bible and consciousness. But, until the Reformation, the Bible was for centuries used scarcely at all, and the study of consciousness was cramped by the scholastic metaphysics. Since the Reformation Christian students have gone more to the Bible for their theologic systems. It cannot be denied, however, that they have gone to the book not always as a source of their science, but oftener as a convenient repository of proof-texts, to be cited according to need and in defence of a pre-established system. Besides, the most candid and ardent student of theology had formerly no science of the Scriptures to assist him. The function of exegesis had not as yet produced a science of Biblical theology. From the days of good Bengel or thereabouts this function has been more actively at work upon its product. At the same time the modern sciences of nature and history have enjoyed wonderful growth. It is only of late that theology has had the scientific products of the modern study of nature, language, and history, in its possession. It cannot, then, be to blame that it has not outrun its call; it is by reason of its very connection with the other sciences the tardiest of them all.

And, amidst the general clamor and disputing of the scientists, linguists, and historians, as to what is truth, the science of God and divine things is not to be decried because it waits to have the clamor somewhat abate, the disputes settled. The Catastrophists and Uniformitarians must fight it out on their own line, and then the victor can present his spoils to the

theologians. Meantime the latter are safer and more faithful to their science if they do not hang its truths upon either party of geologists. Let theology discover what is godlike in the nebular theory or in spontaneous generation, when either one is fairly proved. Any party or theory will suit theology, if it is found to be true.

This natural and appropriate conservatism of our science does not, however, deliver it from the need of epochs and eras of change. The sciences upon which theology depends have certainly made discovery of some truths which are both important and new. Indeed never before, so far as we can discern history, has so much new material been given and promised as near at hand to the student of God's nature and government. This fact forms a peremptory summons to a new theology. All this may be admitted without any senseless boasting about our age of progress or any inflated claims for the future; without also any faultfinding with the church and her theology. Should she and her students, however, fail to recognize the claims of this need, the need will not cease to press upon her.

The recent great development of the sciences of nature makes apparent the need of a new natural theology. In this department of the great science there is much fruitful work to be done. We have no fear whatever that the great guiding ideas by which theology holds on to the natural sciences will ever be effaced through too much scientific research. Even now those ideas can be seen emerging much enlarged, brightened, and beautified by the process through which they have gone. There will always be a first cause, a primal force, an underlying, substantial being, final purposes, types, ideas of proportion, beauty, order, and goodness, to be traced in nature. "Divine prototypal ideas are one by one emerging and reappearing, refreshed and invigorated by the bath of Darwinian Evolutionism;" so testifies truly a writer on "philosophical anatomy."

And not only are these great guiding ideas, which lead us to a God in the cosmos being reaffirmed by the natural sciences; the specific doctrines of Christian theology are being reaffirmed and illustrated. It is surprising that this thought commands so little research. Not the Bible itself gives us more potent proof of many leading Christian doctrines than, as it seems, is likely to be given by the unfolding of natural science.

Consider, for instance, what proof and illustration are brought to the scriptural doctrine of original sin by the researches of modern natural science. The hereditary element, the potent influence of race, the organic unity of the genus, the obscurity in genesis of generic characteristics and specific differences alike, the inscrutable mystery, yet clearly established fact, that the nature and destiny of the progeny are enfolded in the parent—these and similar considerations are familiar to the scientists. They have surely much material, prepared or in state of preparation to bestow upon the theologians. And as these latter are too prone to withdraw their science from this sphere and deal with its questions wholly as questions of self-consciousness, the former may remind them of other scientific truths. For, the close connection of body and spirit, the necessity of examining consciousness in the light of material conditions of consciousness and of historico-physiological research, are important truths for theology to receive from natural science. How also does it seem possible to connect with such research the much scouted doctrine of the resurrection. And how are the possibilities of material organization connected with this same doctrine, when we consider the indescribable subtilty, the incredible new qualities, which science is now ascribing to matter.

And further, what a far-reaching ray of light may be thrown upon the stern and awful side of the divine character, when we more fully comprehend how and why God is in nature, as science reveals Him, so stern and awful. We shall ever rightfully turn to his seeming carelessness of pain and seeming prodigality of life in nature, when the harder truths of theology press us. And we know that the clue to the two sets of difficulties is the same, if we can only find it, because the God of nature and the God of the gospel is the same. What enlargement and illustration may not the doctrine of faith also receive from the sciences of nature. Everywhere in nature as in the gospel is trust seen mediating between supply and need.

There is wonderful promise and encouragement to him who will cultivate natural theology. Nature is rapidly disclosing herself to her devotees. But they will never of themselves scrutinize her so closely as to see her heart and life-blood. That is left for theology to do. And he who tries the work

would better work upon his knees. For nature's heart is God, and her life-blood is the divine energy. Assuming this, as the student of natural theology has a perfect right to do, he must receive, not the conjectures of scientists—but the truths of natural science; and, harmonizing them with truths contributed from his other sources, he must proclaim what they tell of God.

The recent great development of the sciences of language makes apparent the need of a new biblical theology. There has been for centuries much worthy study of the Bible. But only of late have we come into a position to secure a science of biblical theology. And we are not to forget that the use of the Bible which is sufficient to start and nourish the Christian life is altogether insufficient for scientific purposes. So many critical helps have we now that the endeavor to set forth the teachings of the Scriptures in systematic, "historico-genetic representation" is enough for a life-time. This representation and the study for it have not yet found their due place in systematic theology. But, by as much as we value the teachings of the Bible in their contributions to the scientific knowledge of God and divine things, by so much are we bound to bring in the era of a new biblical theology. We are bound to call back our symbols and systems to the test of a scientific study of the Old and New Testaments. And this will certainly to some extent secure a change in them. We must, however, use the new biblical theology as an independent source of theologic truth—a source of self-sustained dignity, not a prop for a house already built without regard to it.

The recent great development of the sciences of history makes apparent the need of a new historical theology. As has been already said, any correct estimate of the symbols and systems of the church is inseparable from a knowledge of the history of those symbols or systems. Now, scientific history is not altogether to be sure a matter of modern growth, but it has certainly been subject to surprising recent developments. The effort of modern times to treat history scientifically was first directed toward Greece and Rome, but is now also turned toward Jerusalem and the Church of her king. And we who have a historic religion, a Saviour in history, and a history yet

before us, will welcome the results of research in this domain. We do not yet fully know what the disciples, martyrs and prophets thought and meant to say; we have many deep lessons to learn concerning the past and concerning the guide and inspirer of that past.

For the sciences of consciousness it cannot perhaps be said that they have undergone great development in more recent times. Their day is not just now, but it is coming. The people will come back from the macrocosm to the microcosm again: they who have been saying, in all the great world there is no mind, will then be declaring, in all the world there is nothing great but mind. When, however, the products of the other sciences are appropriated to a fresh unfolding of the sciences of consciousness, theology will use these freshly unfolded sciences for building herself up. If the workers in these fields give us enlarged and new views of psychology, ethics, æsthetics, and sociology—and this they undoubtedly will do—we must be ready to read the thoughts of God which are thus revealed.

But especially has the church reason to mourn over the field of Christian experience—so fruitful in scientific results as it might be made, so barren as it actually is for want of proper cultivation. When we have a new and improved Schleiermacher to treat scientifically the witness of the Spirit in these latter days, we may look for a fair blossom out of one green branch of theology. We greatly need a new scientific development of "pectoral theology." It is a greater crime against the Holy Spirit to make no place in our theology for his continuous work with the Church than to deny the doctrine of his personality.

We conclude, then, that the restless attitude of the age toward present symbols and systems, as well as the immense growth of new material furnished to theology by the recent developments in the sciences of nature, language, and history, alike prove the need of a new epoch and era in theology. This need, pressing more and more urgently, will be met. As God has been good to men in the new unfolding of other sciences, so will he bless them in a new unfolding of theology.

Neither those who denounce the present symbols and systems, and clamor for sudden revolution, and expect a complete rever-

sion of theologic opinion, nor those who oppose all change, and propose to wrap theology in swaddling-bands and withdraw it from historic and critical discipline, can command a wise man's sympathy. We are not so vastly wiser than the ancients that we should indulge in overweening pride; we are more blest than they, we have an enlarged opportunity and responsibility. They will best discharge this responsibility who see the opportunity, and take their stand, not to cry up the past or the future, but reverently to inquire for more truth of God. Is He not worthy of some scientific study which is not primarily polemical and combative? Will not the time come when men will say—grand is nature, grand is history, grand is the human soul; but grander than all else is He who is over all, in all and through all; grandest and worthiest of man's research is God?

That view of the nature and calling of theology which it is the purpose of this Article to set forth is now before the reader. Let him interpret the title according to what has been said in justification of the view which underlies the title. That all students should recognize theology as a progressive science, grand in its complex dependence upon the other sciences, hopeful in its prospect of a coming epoch and era when it shall take its appropriate place at the head of the system of human knowledge, urgent in its call for calm, patient, truth-loving research, and furnishing rare opportunities in all its various departments to him who will institute such research; this is surely devoutly to be wished.

In the hope of contributing something further toward the realization of this wish we discuss in a brief practical way two points more.

III. THE SOURCES OF THE NEW THEOLOGY.

What these sources are has already been sufficiently indicated. They are the sciences of nature, language, and history, already largely reconstructed in modern times, and the sciences of consciousness with their promise of a corresponding reconstruction. In a somewhat inaccurate way of speaking, theology may be said to have four principal sources of truth, viz., the Bible, nature, history, and the human soul.

Any new unfolding of theology must come from new knowledge concerning some one or more of these four sources. Much new knowledge is in these times offered by especially the first three. In the use of these sources there is scope for large practical wisdom. The following remarks seem at this point to be in place.

First.—These sources must all be used by the theologian, and used in their complex and reciprocal connections. It is a shallow and vain pretence which would withdraw any branch of human knowledge from its connections with other branches. All the sciences are inextricably interwoven in their material, discoveries, and interests. And especially must theology in its grand complexity desire to make successful use of all its sources.

We can recognize, of course, various departments in the one science, various functions of one organism. There are natural theology, biblical theology, historical theology, speculative theology, etc. There are functions of exegesis, observation of nature, self-consciousness, etc. But theology can harmlessly cultivate none of these departments to the exclusion or depreciation of the others, can exercise none of its functions in separation from the others. Theology is an organism. There are some who, in reaction from the long-time and injurious neglect of exegesis in systematic theology, would now have us aim only at a biblical theology. But they have forgotten that the Bible is itself a product inviting linguistic, historic, and psychologic research, and that it can never be withdrawn from a certain responsibility for its statements to natural science. It must stand, then, in its place in the organic unity of the science of theology. The Bible, used without fulfillment of the linguistic and historic conditions necessary to its exegesis, and given over to the rambling, allegorizing vagaries of men who want nothing of commentators or historians, may be made a damage both to theology and to the Christian life.

Even speculative theology has its place in the totality of the science. Theologic speculation should recognize its own nature, should be modest, but should aver its right to exist. No science can be built up without hypotheses, or without scope for use of the constructive imagination. We are not

forgetful of the declaration of the great Reformer in his *Tischreden*; "this same speculative theology has for its author the devil in hell." But we understand his language better when we find that he spoke of the speculations of his opponents, "Zwinglius and the sacramentarians." Luther seems to have been equally irritated against speculative theology when Erasmus in his *de libero arbitrio* confuted Luther's biblical (?) fatalism. Aristotle's dictum, "if we must not philosophize we must philosophize," is as true in theology as elsewhere.

Second.--These sources must be used as coördinate sources of truth. That they are not alike in the importance and magnitude of the contributions which they make to theology may be readily enough admitted. But no one is to be used merely as the servant of the other, and so subject to be wrested from its true purpose and dignity. They must be made not to bend to each other, but to blend with each other. Fact cannot contradict fact, law cannot clash against law; but theories of inspiration may contradict laws of nature, language or mind, and theories of the scientists may have to go down under facts of revelation.

For the great distinctive doctrines of Christianity the Bible is the undying source, but it is a source in so far as it is history and product of the divinely enlightened and quickened religious consciousness of man. It is also a self-revelation of God, but of the same God who is, though in respect to his qualities of grace only very obscurely revealed in nature. Nor are we to forget that there are certain qualities of God intimately concerned in the gospel which can be revealed by a look at a diatom through the microscope, or at a star through the telescope, as by no possible use of language.

Nothing else, however, can be so important to the theologian as that he should be grounded in biblical theology. Before its authentic deliverances he should stand with that childlike docility with which the true scientist approaches nature, the true psychologist the human mind. Within his Bible he finds the history and teachings of that One whose person will become more and more the source and proof of all true theology. The new theology, like all Christian theology only more abundantly,

will view all things and authenticate all views in Jesus Christ. This is an awful weight to hang upon the shoulders of a historic personality, but Christ can endure the weight.

We are led now to a few concluding thoughts which concern

IV. THE METHOD OF THE NEW THEOLOGY.

Its method will be renewed research into all the reconstructed sources of theology. There is no new method for theology but the more diligent and happy use of the same old method applied to whatever new materials are brought forward.

This research, viewed in the intellectual aspect, must command all the highest mental qualities which the church can furnish. He who attempts to grasp any of these more important problems and hold them up in the light of modern discovery and thought, needs keen and deep intuitions, wide and varied learning, great versatility and scope of reasoning powers. To relegate the weakest minds to theology will not serve to make it keep pace, even at its due distance in the rear, with the modern sciences of nature, language, and history. If the church has any intellectual giants let her lay her hands upon them and consecrate them to theology. Whatever men of inferior though fair talents can find their way into this work, let the church greet and nourish well.

There are, however, several of the more especially ethical qualities which the requisite research peremptorily demands. This research must be docile. Every one thinks himself equal to the place of dictator; no one sits at the feet of another. This does not promise well for the new theology. It is remarkable how young men, who, if they were set to the study of any of the natural sciences, would go in the painful consciousness of their pin-feathers many days, become full-fledged forthwith when they take up the study of theology. It seems to take less of theologic truth or error to upset the average brain than of any other sort of truth. But theologic truth is truth about the sublimest, most awful subject of truth. We do not question the willingness of many to swallow the *ipse-dixit* of Tyndall or of Calvin, but we do not call this true docility.

The student of theology should enter upon his science with

an oppressive sense of the vastness and weight of his undertaking. And since he has undertaken the study of a science so vast and weighty, he must open his mind to a free, wide, docile reception of truth. Of Christ's saying "except ye . . . become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," Sir Wm. Hamilton declares: "such is true religion; such also is true philosophy." And Bacon likewise declares: "The kingdom of man, which was founded on the sciences, cannot be entered otherwise than the kingdom of God is, that is, in the condition of a little child." The quiet, humble, childlike docility which enables the investigator to stand in blended awe and freedom before nature, the Bible, history, and the human soul, and to catch what he can of the divine voice which issues from them all, is indispensable to theology.

With this same spirit should every utterance of the past be treated; with awe on account of the divinity, the soul of truth, which is in each utterance, with freedom to reject all which cannot show itself to be truth. The unteachable attitude, whether of friendship or hostility, toward theologic symbols and systems, toward the material and call for a new theology, is thoroughly wrong. No other science is suffering such repression and reproach from this attitude as theology. Lack of docility has brought the science and its students into much contempt. With docility should go—Patience in research.

The great questions of theology invite laborious and uncomplaining investigators. But they who can follow any investigation through devious paths and weigh with critical and analytic skill the evidences on either side, are rare indeed. We Americans, having revolted from England, spread largely over a great continent, and grown to forty millions in a single century, can scarcely understand why problems of free-will, original sin, and the divine essence should long withstand us. The off-hand method in theology suits us better than the method of patient research. Could we but add docility and patience to the typical American mind, we should furnish one better fitted than any other nationality to deal with the new theology. Because, however, we have no patience, we have to go to Germany for almost all that is worth reading in theology.

Doubtless God, who is so infinitely patient in his own method of self-revealing, who waited thousands of years before he brought forth Christ in history, and who for as many thousands has not ceased to accumulate the proofs of his delicacy in the polishing of so small a thing as a single sea-shell, will inexorably demand patience in those who wish to understand his self-revealing. It is useless to fume and rage at the divine barriers; they will stand against all such assault. They will only slowly move back a little way to him who with a pious patience inquires of God. We are not to forget that it is worth much painstaking research to learn even a little, and to leave to the world that little learned, concerning the deep things of the Infinite.

And further, the method of the new theology should be that of minute research. *Divide et impera*, in theology as in the other sciences. The present investigations which are pushed into the various sources of theology will give the dogmatist some trustworthy resting-places in each. The student of systematic theology can never make an independent investigation into the whole field of scientific biblical theology. The life-long student of that department must do this work for him. And he in turn must have his text prepared for him by one whose work lies in that special direction. Not slavishly but with grateful docility and candor each must receive the fruits of other's work. And that critical sense which long study so highly cultivates must be largely used to decide whose work, in case of differences of view, can be most safely trusted.

Special investigations of divisions and subdivisions of the one science are needed in order to prepare the way for the new theology. Men who produce works like Müller's *Doctrine of Sin* and Dorner's *Person of Christ* confer an inestimable benefit upon every student of theology. But far more modest and feasible attempts in theologic writing might be made on every hand, were only the time spent in ignorant wrangling given to patient and minute research. Monographs on a thousand subjects connected with our great science might be, after due preparatory study, produced and given to students and to the common people. It shows the low condition of interest in theologic pursuits, that there is neither adequate provision for,

nor supply of, such monographs. The Millenarians are flooding the land with their pamphlets and books. Are these views true according to the Scriptures and history? Has scientific theology no answer, either adverse or favorable, to give to the Christian public? It is a great misfortune in our land that there is so little recognition or reward possible for any student in the Theological Seminaries, who wishes to pursue fairly and patiently the investigations appropriate to his science. The publishers and the public are alike indifferent; the churches put little means into the hands of his professors for encouraging him. But should he declare himself, no matter how long before any trustworthy research, either violently heretical or orthodox, he at once is likely to become famous. We believe that those men in the churches who already have wealth, learning, or recognized position, could do no better thing for Christianity in this land than to institute adequate means for encouraging the minute and patient cultivation of theology.

The method of the new theology also demands research which is as untrammelled as possible. We are well aware that the limit between due freedom and license is very difficult to fix, and that those whose theory of liberty is good are only too likely to abuse the theory in practice. Sir Thomas More wrote, with discernment far beyond his times, concerning toleration, in his *Utopia*, and then enforced his views by burning a few Protestants. The question as to what manner and degree of conformity to its symbols the church shall require in any age is a complex question, involving many historic considerations, and can never be answered once for all as though it were a problem of social statics. In ages when the current opinions and materials for forming an opinion have far outrun the formerly recognized symbols and systems, increasing liberty of dissent will inevitably take place. And, if it is long before the historic conditions for forming new symbols and systems are fulfilled, the extent of dissent will perhaps continue enlarging. There is, however, one law of progress which tends to modify and diminish this constant increase of divergence between the real science and its formulas. Thought, in theology as in the other sciences, moves not right forward but forward in imperfect cycles. Facts and laws and theories which have been pushed

by the advancing years into comparative obscurity come again prominently to the front. The old ideas and truths re-emerge, refreshed and invigorated by their Lethean bath. Thus will it inevitably be in theology—the new will largely be that which in essence is old, though in form it be new. The new biblical theology is the Bible of the Fathers, revised in text, interpreted more scientifically, and more thoroughly harmonized, part with part, and the whole with cognate truths from other sources of theology. The new natural theology is the old work of Him who has not rested hitherto, but who has in these latter days spoken through nature, with marvellous freshness, variety and power, to the children of men. God in history and God in consciousness is the same he has ever been. The old truths will not be lost or damaged but will be invigorated when more thoroughly separated from errors.

In this period of critical cleansing, then, we are not to be alarmed at temporary manifestations of unusual license; we are not by them to be driven from insisting upon that untrammelled culture which is indispensable to the best development of any science.

The safety of the church in permitting enough of liberty lies in this last characteristic, to be mentioned, of that research which is needed to institute the new theology. One indispensable element in the method of the science of God and divine things is—pure and ardent piety. The organon for receiving the divine self-revelation is the entire soul of man. An impious soul is unfitted to become a trustworthy organon. The more of pure and burning piety the theologian has—other things being equal—the better success will he have in his domain of research. We affirm this as a truth standing upon sure philosophic foundations. No mere sharpness of intellect will enable a man to see God as he is revealed in nature, the Bible, history, and the human soul. It is sad and foolish work enough when any man approaches even the least of the divine products with a soul out of accord with the feeling and purpose of God which are displayed in that product. It is sadder and more foolish when a man thus approaches God himself.

Surely no reader will confound the science of theology, as we have been discussing its characteristics, with Christianity or

the Christian life. Theology is by no means the sum-total of Christianity or the Christian life. But theology is, both by giving and receiving, intimately connected with them. The Christian life of any age depends to some noteworthy extent upon the theology of that age; the theology of any age depends also upon the Christian life of the same and preceding ages. When, then, we insist upon piety in the method of theology, we are only affirming that to understand the science of the Christian life one must know something of the subject. In certain aspects of the subject, it is to be known only by experience. Piety is the requisite experience.

Nor can he find and understand the work of God in nature and history who does not take the spirit of devotion, trust and allegiance into his researches.

And on the other hand, for the sake of the coming Christian life, we insist upon the imperative obligation which rests upon Christian students and upon the whole Christian Church, to prepare aright the way for "the new theology." The work of the schools of theologic training has an interest broader even than that which is most obvious. They must educate the student to lead the people kindly and safely in the path of God's great cosmic providences. It is not by frantic efforts to lift up or pull down the present orthodoxy that this part of the mission of the clergy can be fulfilled. It is rather by docile, patient, minute, and untrammelled, though devout, research. Every man who loves Christ and the church, and especially every young man, should have some intelligent conception of this demand upon his energies in his life-work, provided that work lies in the direction of dealing with theologic truths. With a clear eye, with an ear deaf to unseemly clamors, with cautious but free and manly step, with a loyal, loving, and cheerful heart, should he go forward into the truths which invite his research, and which concern the primal source and revealer of truth, *who is God*.

ARTICLE V.—MR. LETTSOM'S VERSION OF THE MIDDLE GERMAN EPIC.

The Niebelungenlied. Translated by WILLIAM NANSON LETTSOM. Second edition. Williams & Norgate. London and Edinburgh. Fr. Frommann. Jena, 1874. pp. 447.

MOST readers of English remember Mr. Carlyle's account of the *Niebelungenlied*, which account dates back to 1831 and was so admirably fitted to excite curiosity. Of late years the intercourse between Germany and America has greatly increased, and the young men who have studied in Germany (without perhaps having had time to master Middle German) have brought back such statements of the fervor with which the Germans regard their great mediæval epic as to make a translation* of the poem very desirable. The translation by Mr. Lettsom, whose title we have placed at the beginning of these remarks, was doubtless originally received in England with a good deal of enthusiasm. But nine years elapsed (it was first issued in 1865) before it passed to a second edition, and not many American scholars even if familiar with German literature were aware of its existence until the appearance of this second edition. Therefore, for a large circle of readers, especially for the many who have entered into different fields of scholarship during the last decade with a deep interest in German literature this book when re-announced was practically a new translation and as such calls for some attention. If it does not prove tiresome to those who have not read the old poem in the original, it will certainly offend those who have even superficially busied themselves with the sensuous Middle German.

The titles of the book are enough to excite displeasure. The title on the back is "*The Niebelungenlied.*" As this is the name by which the poem was introduced to English readers by Mr. Carlyle and is the name by which the poem has since been

* Professor Birch's rendering into English (Berlin, 1848) has been little known and generally inaccessible.

known in our literature we may perhaps accept it as the title of the poem. But it is no translation, except of the definite article. It is an adoption of the term *Nibelungenlied* as a sort of confession that the extent of intercourse between the two countries has made the untranslated title of the great poem possible as the title in the foreign country. But there seems to be no reason why it should not sound as strangely as "*Das Paradise Lost*" for Milton's epic would to a German if used in place of "*Das Verlorene Paradies*," or as *The Iliad Hoînôis* sounds to us. But it is not because Mr. Lettsom did not know how to translate the title that it so appears on the back. On the title page it is translated "*The Fall of the Nibelungers*." "*Das Nibelungenlied*" literally rendered means "*The Song of the Nibelungs*," if we may take the German proper name into English and make it a plural, or "*The Song of the Mistlings*," if we may coin an English word. The inserted *er* of Professor Birch and Mr. Lettsom has no place in the translation except by a false analogy. But where does Mr. Lettsom get the word, *fall*? Probably from the other title of the poem which has the word *nôt* instead of *liet*, "*Der Nibelunge Nôt*." But the word *nôt* does not mean *fall*, rather *need*, *extreme misery*, *contest-tribulation*. Our translator tells us (Note 1, p. 419) that the better manuscripts have *nôt* instead of *liet* (the name of the national poems is generally found in the last line of the manuscript of the poem) and still decides to call his poem, "*The Nibelungenlied*." If *nôt* is the better title, why not approve of Lachmann's printing it as the title and then translate it exactly? It is not a favorable omen for this translation that the author having two titles to select from chooses one and then gives an inadequate rendering of the other. It is a species of eclecticism that has little to commend it, especially when one is dealing with a poem that has been the subject of so many contests and over which the fight is still raging. To say that "*Der Nibelunge Nôt*" is the title of the better manuscripts is to put oneself on Lachmann's ground, but to print "*The Nibelungenlied*" as the title is to put oneself on Holtzmann's and Pfeiffer's ground, and virtually to say that the better manuscripts have given the wrong title. Mr. Lettsom does not seem to be aware of the battle over the manuscripts,

and that it was a greatly disputed point, a point underlying most of the modern controversies, whether A, the oldest Munich, or B, or C, the Lassberg manuscript, is the older and better. Such a fact a translator ought certainly to be acquainted with if he is to pronounce an opinion on the relative worth of the manuscripts. On reading the preface to Mr. Lettsom's translation one familiar even with the outlines of the controversies would be impressed with the inadequacy of his statements, and would regard most of his facts as either antiquated or inaccurate. The northern form of the legend is given at some length and a decision as to which is the original form of the saga unhesitatingly given. We are informed, on page xvii of the preface,* that "the author of the poem is unknown, and indeed, whether it be the work of one poet, or two or twenty, is still I believe a matter of dispute among German critics." Not a word is found in the preface on the question of referring the authorship of the poem to a von Kürenberg, which has been the prominent question since Pfeiffer's discourse before the Imperial Academy at Vienna, May 30, 1862, and which point was previously brought forward by Holtzmann† in 1854. It may be excusable in a translator not to know the *minute* condition of the public mind in the native country of the poem with regard to a poem which he undertakes to translate. But it certainly argues a superficial interest, one which the freedom of intercourse between England and Germany makes it difficult to justify, to find a translator of this poem taking no note of the fact, that just as German scholars were and are divided on the excellence of manuscripts A, B, and C, so they are at variance on the question whether a von Kürenberg seven

* The preface we suppose to be unaltered from that of the original edition, though no problems have been the subject of so much study and discussion in Germany during the decade intervening between the appearance of the two editions as the questions relating to this poem. Dr. Fischer's essay (Leipzig, 1874) may be commended to all who would get the result of these discussions in a concise and trustworthy shape. The full title of his essay is "Die Forschungen über das Niebelungenlied seit Karl Lachmann." It is a book of two hundred and seventy pages—and for all that is a concise presentation of the thousands of controversial pages that have appeared on this poem.

† Dr. Vollmöller in his prize essay *Kürenberg und die Niebelungen*, Stuttgart, 1874, gives F. J. Mone the credit of half suggesting this conjecture in the first volume of *Das badische Archiv*, Karlsruhe, 1826.

centuries ago wrote the poem of which our oldest manuscripts are a "Bearbeitung." Even if the short space of three years intervening between Pfeiffer's discourse and the first edition of this translation may excuse the omission in the preface to the first edition, twelve years seem time enough to have secured some recognition of the data in the preface to the second edition.

What shall excuse the looseness of such statements as the following: "Of the inquirers who have endeavored to solve these dubious questions Professor Lachmann is contestably the chief. He commenced his operations about thirty years ago with a treatise in which he avowedly took Wolf's *Prolegomena* to Homer for the model of his researches. He has since published an edition of the poem, etc." One might infer that Mr. Lettsom, when writing this preface in 1865, did not know that Lachmann was dead. To be sure he does not exactly say so, and might claim that he knew he had been dead already fourteen years, but it was in 1816 that Lachmann "commenced his operations" by applying Wolf's principles in the analysis of this poem and in 1826 that he published his first edition, which our translator approves. It is now almost sixty years since Lachmann "commenced his operations" and fifty years since he published the first edition, so that we are justified, if we may make Mr. Lettsom responsible for the old preface in the new edition at the time of the publication of the latter, in regarding him as nearly thirty years behind the times in the scholarship relating to the poem.

Mr. Lettsom finds much to admire in the six times accented *Nibelungen* verse. He shows how it differs from our ballad verse of fourteen syllables:

The gentle warbling zephyr's breath low answered to all;
and from the ordinary Alexandrine,

The gentle warbling wind low answered to all.

It is more like the verse,

The gentle warbling zephyrs | low answered to all,

and in Mr. Lettsom's view has a charm of variety which the other two forms do not present. But the six accents mark only the first three verses of each strophe. The last line of the

strophe with its additional accent, Mr. Lettsom does not extol, and in his translation treats the fourth line as though it were of the same length with the others instead of one measure longer. The metre of the three first lines of the *Nibelungen* strophe is not peculiar to Middle German (when all the *hebungen* and *senkungen* are present). The main peculiarities of the metre in Middle German are the possible omission of the *senkungen* or unaccented syllables, and a possible opening *arsis* in a line of two or three syllables all unaccented, and the adaptation of the accent to the sense, i. e., the resting of the emphasis upon important words or syllables and the division of each line into two nearly equal parts. Mr. Lettsom is delighted with the variety thus secured and wonders that modern English and modern German poets have not more frequently written in this verse. There is a good deal of variety in form in the *Nibelungen* strophe without doubt. But taking the strophe as it is, divided into eight short lines, there is a constant interruption of the movement in the narrative, and by the prolongation of the last half line of verse fourth in each strophe by a syllable or two beyond the length of the preceding final half-lines, a drawling, or perhaps better, a stammering effect is produced that is very annoying. This no modern poet however skillful could carry through twenty-five hundred strophes and be sure of a dozen readers for his poem. But Mr. Lettsom thinks it strange, as has been noted, that a measure of such boundless variety should have been so little employed in English, and finds it "still more astonishing that in Germany, where all its capabilities had been displayed six centuries ago, in a great poem which even now remains unequaled, later poets betook themselves to importing their metres from a dead language instead of cultivating their native soil, and imitated the lively vigor of old Greece with the galvanic convulsions of the accentual hexameter."

Mr. Lettsom does not intend, as his translation shows, to wonder that the verse just as it was employed by the Middle German poets has not been popular in English, because the essential of modern poetry is that the weight or quantity of the measures should by syllables be kept equal, and the omission of the unaccented syllables and a longer delay on the accents is at

variance with the more modern rhythm. Indeed, it is a question whether in this respect the more modern rhythm is as foreign to the Greek as it is to the Middle German. But if that liberty be denied, the measure loses something of its essence, and the metre of the thus modernized Middle German with its heavy cesural pause answers well enough for the rhyming ballad, as in some of Macaulay's lays, but any long descriptive epic poem in that metre would be very tiresome. It is explicable enough why the verse of fourteen syllables and the Alexandrine have been preferred in English, and we cannot agree with Mr. Lettsom, that to chop a poem of two thousand stanzas into short strophes of eight lines with three accents in each verse, will produce any more charming effect than to put the same amount of matter into stanzas of double length without a cesural pause so marked as to break each line into two. Something, indeed much, must always depend on the character of the poem, but it is not easy to conceive of a lengthy epic even in modern rhythm successfully made on the plan of the Niebulungen strophe. Why did not Mr. Lettsom think it expedient to preserve also in his translation the long fourth line of the stanza, if variety is the main end in a metre? Certainly those final lines of each strophe add variety to the measure, but it is a variety that mars the effect of the poem. We hold the same thing to be true of the division of the other lines, and that this old epic considered as a poem (whatever may be thought of it as a *collection* of songs) does not exhibit that perfect poetic form which the quality of much of its matter would lead us to expect, and that on this very ground he who put it into its present form was no master, no such marvellous fashioner as Walther von der Vogelweide, who was put forward by Von der Hagen as having given the last final shape to the poem.

But even if we were to concede something of rugged force and now and then a suggestion of the deep undertone of fate (so marked a characteristic of the ideas of the poem) to this metre, does it follow that the metre should be retained when translating from a language marked by inflectional ending into one where not merely inflectional endings have disappeared, but where verbs and adjectives though often from the same stems appear in much shorter forms? This question would

be best answered, probably, by taking account of the skill of the translator. A translator of the highest skill, a master of English form might make the strophe vital and organic in an English translation. Nevertheless there is almost as much difference in respect to inflection between the Middle German of the twelfth century and the English of the nineteenth as there is between the Latin of the first and the German of the nineteenth. If one, even a master of German form, endeavors to render the concise verse of the *In Memoriam* into German, it is found necessary now and then to sacrifice a valuable word. So, on the other hand, Mr. Lettsom, who is not a master of poetic form in English, carrying his devotion to the *Nibelungen* poem so far as to adopt the metre in his English has often to insert a patch-word to eke out the line.

Take chapter 34 of Lachmann's edition :

Gôte man dô zen êren eine messe sanc,
dô huop sich von den lûten vil michel gedranc,
dô si ze rîter wurden nâch ritterlicher ê
mit alsô grôzen êren daz wœtlich nimmer mære ergâ.

The simple meaning of the strophe is as follows :

To God's honor one then sung a mass,
Then arose from the people very great press,
When they became knights by knightly usage,
With such great splendors as can never more easily be.

Mr. Lettsom's rendering is wordy, except in the last line, where it is inaccurate.

But first to God's due honor a holy mass they sung,
And then a press and struggle arose the crowd among,
And then with pomp befitting each youth was dubbed a knight,
In sooth before was never seen so fair a sight.

This is not an especially patched-out stanza, but it is clear enough from it that under the moulding of Mr. Lettsom the metre has to be filled out with padding. This is a grave objection to the use of the metre, if it be necessary to the rendering. For in the original most lines of the poem are strong and kernelly, if one may say so. But over and over in the translation the idea is given in a solution of synonyms and adjectives, so that the fresh, sharp presentation of the original is lost. It is not to be supposed that any translation of this old epic can

give its sensuous ideas, its portentous whispers of woe, the simple objective movement without some loss. But the use of this metre in the hands of one who is not a poet magnifies the loss, and doubtless the four trochees employed by Herder in rendering the *Cid* into German and by Longfellow in the *Hiawatha* legends, the *Kalevula* metre, would be a less awkward instrument for one who can lay no claim to poetic power. Under no constraint from the necessity of rhyme, and released from the pressure of filling a void left by inflections, the translator would not be compelled, as was Mr. Lettsom, to eke out the sense from an inexhaustible storehouse of *thens*, *theres*, *sos*, and by constant repetition. That in the hands of a master of language (we do not now say of poetic form), this metre may even in English have a vitality, and a vitality that seems mediæval will appear by contrasting two of Mr. Carlyle's strophes with two of Mr. Lettsom's. It must be premised that Mr. Carlyle's verses (published in his essay by way of giving some flavor from the poem) are much more literal than Mr. Lettsom's, and therefore more likely to preserve the spirit at the expense of the form. We take the opening strophes of the poem. First, Mr. Lettsom's :

In stories of our fathers, high marvels we are told
Of champions well approved in perils manifold;
Of feasts and merry meetings, of weeping and of wail,
And deeds of gallant daring I'll tell you in my tale.

In Burgundy there flourished a maid so fair to see,
That in all the world together a fairer could not be.
This maiden's name was Kriemhild; through her in dismal strife
Full many a prowest warrior thereafter lost his life.

Mr. Carlyle rendered as follows :

We find in ancient story wonders many told,
Of heroes in great glory with spirit free and bold;
Of joyances and hightides, of weeping and of woe,
Of noble archers striving mote ye now wonders know.

A right noble maiden did grow in Burgundy,
That in all lands of earth naught fairer mote there be;
Kriemhild of Worms she hight, she was a fairest wife,
For the which must warriors a many lose their life.

It will be admitted by any one who reads German, that Mr. Carlyle has given something in these strophes nearer the orig-

inal both in spirit and form (Mr. Carlyle often omits the unaccented syllables) than Mr. Lettsom has attained. Mr. Lettsom seems indeed to have imitated in two regards Mr. Carlyle's translation. First, he has adopted the same metre, and secondly he has employed archaic words. There is indeed in this translation a great number of obsolete and uncommon words, and it evinces considerable familiarity with Spenser and Shakespeare, as one must expect from the fact that Mr. Lettsom's studies have been chiefly in early English. Such words as make, Spenserian for mate, drear as a substantive, heady, meiny for retinue, selle for a saddle, leman, are a few of Mr. Lettsom's favorite archaisms. But the employment of such words more frequently would not give any genuine mediæval flavor to the translation. They are *disjecta membra*, as the spirit of the original is lost in verbosity. It may be true, as seems to be presupposed by the use of such words, that most readers of a translation of this poem would be students of literature and therefore understand the words of Spenser and Shakespeare, as they occur. But to one who knows them these vocables are in strange contrast to the general vapidness and diffuseness of Mr. Lettsom's verses; more exactly, it serves to heighten the impression of these qualities to find these old words, so vital in their original belongings, thrown in to give a seasoning of antiquity and vigor to the "devitalized" reproductions of our translator. The apparent thing is that Mr. Lettsom has no poetic feeling, and the slavish adherence to the metre, the retention of its heavy cesural form, and the devotion to the rhyme make this want of poetic perception very conspicuous. Much of the life of the poem is sacrificed. That much of its essence has been unnecessarily lost, becomes, we think, clear from the comparison of the corresponding verses of this translation with those contained in Mr. Carlyle's essay. But a comparison of some of Mr. Lettsom's verses with the original will make it further clear that in blindly following the modernized version of Dr. Braunfels he has missed in some fine points the meaning of the old poem. Lettsom's strophe, 1054, is as follows. ("Each a chosen man," the last words of 1053, are the subject of the verb in the first line of 1054.)—

Led by the shrieks of horror ran with like eager speed,
 Some of the household fancied they came for funeral weed.
 Well might they be confounded, and from their senses start,
 The sting of deadly sorrow was deep in every heart.

The first line of the original "where they heard the women so fearfully lamenting," is translated with tolerable accuracy, "led by the shrieks of horror;" but the words "ran with like eager speed" have no counterpart in the original; the German is simply *kömen*, go. They however went from bed and without putting on their day apparel. Line second is in the original, "then some of them thought," or "it occurred to some of them that they ought to have clothes on." This refers to the heroes themselves, to whom coming suddenly, overcome by the news, in night-clothes or undress, it first occurred after they arrived at the place where the women were bewailing Siegfried's death, that they were not suitably dressed to be in ladies' society. Mr. Lettsom translates, "some of the household fancied they came for funeral weed," following probably Dr. Braunfels, who followed an antiquated explanation by Lachmann. The true rendering is apparent when the third and fourth lines are taken as an excuse for the heroes' sudden bewilderment and failure to stop to dress on hearing the report of Siegfried's death.

Nothing is more marked in the Middle German literature, than the purely sensuous, concrete character, both of the language and the ideas. It ought to be one of the chief aims of a translator to preserve just this character, and by a faithful adherence to the concrete method of describing things, much more could be done for a genuine translation of the poem than by the reproduction of a peculiar metre or the insertion of obsolete vocables.

Mr. Lettsom translates stanza 947 of the Lachmann edition, as follows. It is the picture of the chamberlain discovering Siegfried laid dead at the door of Kriemhild's apartment.

He saw him blood-bespattered, with weed* all dabbled o'er;
 He knew not 'twas his master stretched on the reeking floor;
 In went he to the chamber; with him the light he took,
 By which on such deep horror sad Kriemhild was to look.

* Used in the Spenserian sense of clothing.

The German gives the last line, "bî dem vil leidiu mære vrouwe Kriemhild ervant," by which Lady Kriemhild learned very sad news. The idea of looking "on such deep horror" is very unlike Middle German, removed a great way from the simple objective story of the poet. He would never call a dead hero a horror, or apply to the concrete object the abstract term that may be evoked by a consideration of the circumstances.

In Mr. Lettsom's stanza 87 we find the same infidelity to the concrete as well as the previously noted combination of archaisms and diffuseness :

Old and young together fiercely hurtling flew,
That the shivered lances swept the welkin through;
Splinters e'en to the palace went whizzing many a one
From hand of mighty champions; all there was deftly done.

Here are, one might fairly claim, two if not three archaisms, but the sensuous ideas of hearing the crashing encounter and seeing the flying splinters, so prominent in the original, are lost, and we have an abstracter presentation enlarged by the superfluous and unpoetical expressions, "swept the welkin through," and "many a one."

Mr. Lettsom's 998 is one of the strophes which Lachmann rejected as spurious, as the emendation of some late "bearbeiter." It has no possible *raison d'être* in the relations in which it is found. There are, Mr. Lettsom tells us, or tries to tell us, in his preface, one hundred and forty-three stanzas in Dr. Braunfels' German, mostly from the Lassberg manuscript which Lachmann rejected. "As Dr. Braunfels," he proceeds, "has inserted them in his text, and both he and Dr. Simrock have modernized them, I did not like to leave them out, though some of them might better have been omitted." Of these, 998 is one, and Lachmann added it merely as a note at the bottom of the page, on which it would be printed if put into the text. We agree with Mr. Lettsom that this strophe might have been better omitted. Furthermore, he cannot have the name of the judicious Simrock to uphold him in his following of the comparatively unknown Braunfels. Dr. Simrock has not modernized this strophe in the same sense that he has published it in the German version of the poem. Is it then the grand *old* poem that Mr. Lettsom wishes to give us? Even the little light of

his own judgment as to probability of genuineness he does not follow, but takes Dr. Braunfels and gives him to an English public. But even Dr. Braunfels is shabbily treated, as it is implied that he was unwise to insert the strophes. So there is not fidelity to the old poem, for there is not fidelity to Lachmann, who is admitted by the translator to be the acutest critic of the epic, nor fidelity to the unimportant Dr. Braunfels, nor fidelity to the perception of poetic fitness in his own mind in the selections or rejections of Mr. Lettsom. As to the translation in Mr. Lettsom's 998, Lachmann's 910, 5, it is unpoetical and incorrect, which circumstances do not extenuate its being an interruption to the narrative. The three stanzas of which it is the second are as follows. (The time is the lunch just after the hunt, the occasion of Siegfried's murder.)

997. Then spake the chief of Trony, "Ye noble knights, and bold,
I know just to our wishes a runnel clear and cold
Close by, so be not angry, but thither let us go."
Th' advice brought many a champion sorrow and mortal woe.

998. Yet could not then his danger* the death-doom'd hero spy.
Little thought he so foully by seeming friends to die.
His heart knew nought of falsehood; 'twas open, frank, and plain,
For his death dear paid thereafter who fondly hoped to gain.

999. The noble knight, Sir Siegfried, with thirst was sore oppress,
So earlier rose from table, and could no longer rest;
But straight would to the mountain the running brook to find,
And so advanced the treason his faithless foes designed.

That the rendering shows a formal rather than a genuine appreciation of the poetry, such a stanza as 987 after the above quotations will be sufficient to confirm. The bear which Siegfried had captured on the hunt and bound to his horse is set free on arriving at the camping-place, and the dogs pursue it through the kitchen to the detriment of utensils and the fright of attendants. In the old poem the strophe reveals in a thoroughly natural, naïve way the effect (alarming indeed at times to common people) of the outflow and exuberance of Siegfried's bright, inherent greatness. Mr. Lettsom's version presents us the following grotesque dilution :

* For the good reason that there was nothing in the world to indicate danger.

987. Scared by the din and uproar he through the kitchen ran'd.
 Ah! how the cooks and scullions from round the fire he chaced!
 Upset were pans and kettles, and store of savory haashes,
 Roast, boiled, and stewed, together were hissing in the ashes.

The last lines give a droll idea of the methods of cooking adopted on a medieval hunting expedition.

The striking description of Hagen, the heroic villain of the poem, the single marked descriptive strophe in the entire epic (for most of the characters come into our conception by what they do or possibly wear, not by any modern fashion of portrayal), has not fared much better at the hands of Mr. Lettsom, though there is a touch of genius in the original that cannot be wholly obscured.

1789. Well grown and well compacted was that redoubted guest;
 Long were his legs and sinewy, and deep and broad his chest.
 His hair, that once was sable, with grey was dashed of late.
 And terrible his visage, and lordly was his gait.

Even here we have the metre patched out with redundant words and the ubiquitous archaism. If the strophes already quoted are not enough to prove that this translation is of little value, they certainly show that it is not a poem. A perfectly literal rendering of this Middle German epic could not be metrical, but it would faithfully preserve the flavor of the original. A metrical version of this poem, to be successful, must take one of two directions, either towards the scrupulous exactness of Longfellow's Dante, or the poetical, creative freedom of Chapman's Homer. Mr. Lettsom's translation of a modernized version, that is, of another translation, could not take the former direction. His want of poetical perception made it impossible for him to give his readers anything of the latter order. So we have this version, neither accurate nor poetical, neither critical nor creative, not conceived in the peculiar tone of the original, and destitute of the Middle German flavor. This rendering required nine years in order to reach a second edition. Before it shall pass to a third it is to be hoped that a translation, in one of the two *proper* senses of that word, may have supplanted it altogether.

ARTICLE VI.—*LOGOS* AND *COSMOS*: NATURE AS
RELATED TO LANGUAGE.

[Concluded from page 533.]

II. NATURE.

OUR aim, in the preceding section, was to set forth certain leading principles which lie at the foundation of all language, and to show the part they fill and something of the manner of their working, namely: (1) that general words are a necessity of language; (2) that their employment in combination is likewise indispensable; (3) that a full supply of such words as are of wide generality is requisite, inasmuch as words of this character form the most essential part of language; and, finally, we considered the processes by which language grows and is developed and adapts itself, and particularly as they are seen to depend on these same principles of generalization and combination.

Word-combination, as we defined it, is the union of two or more words as applied to one and the same thought-object. The words, except when one of them is a proper name, are connotative of attributes appertaining to the object. Transitive words are applied to two objects, and thus united with two other words. The ground-principle is the same in every kind of combination, whether predicative or attributive or objective or whatever it may be. Combination is indispensable both as an economy and as the only means of conveying new conceptions.

Now—turning to the other side of the subject—since the objects of thought to be signified by words are furnished to our minds by the world that surrounds us, a certain constitution of the world is a necessity in order that language may have those characteristics which we see to be requisite. The wonderful manner in which the world we inhabit is adapted to the mind of man, so as to be brought within its grasp and under its dominion and facile management, as respects the exigencies of language,—even as it is for all other purposes, whether practical or purely intellectual,—has a valid claim upon the atten-

tion, not only of the philosopher and of the student of nature, but on that of the student of language no less. For the latter to overlook the relations between the world of things and the world of words is to fail of reaching down to the foundation, or at least to an important part of the foundation, required for the support and upbuilding of a complete science of language.

As a preliminary to the survey we are to take of the different departments of nature, we need to consider the features that we are there to look for as constitutive of the adaptation in question.

Generalization in language rests, of course, upon similarity in things as objects of thought. But something more than mere similarity is requisite for the generalization that language involves. When only similarity is discerned, as in the case of pieces of the same coinage, or other things that, as objects of cognition, are precisely alike and undistinguishable one from another, we have generalization in only a lower sense of the term. We then have the general as related merely to the individual. With only this relation, no combination of words in discourse is possible,—none, at least, that adds any notion beyond that of number or of individual designation; none, that is, but such as ‘three guineas,’ ‘this guinea,’ etc.

With generalization in the fuller and higher sense, the general is related not merely to the individual but also to the special. This implies diversity along with similarity. When we say, ‘a guinea is a gold coin,’ we imply not only likeness as between guineas, and likeness as between all gold coins, but diversity as between guineas and all other gold coins. Combination requires diversity.

In a universal proposition, such as the one above, the special (guinea) is subsumed under the general (gold coin). But, if we say, ‘these guineas are old,’ ‘some guineas were lost,’ ‘a tree fell,’ ‘the horse runs,’ and the like, we have two terms combined, (‘guinea’ and ‘old,’ etc.) neither of which can be determined as more general than the other. When we combine them, however, we have a notion which is more special than what is denoted by either of the terms alone; that is, we have a special included under each of them as a general. The greater

part of the propositions we have occasion to employ are of this description; and, when either subject or predicate itself consists of a combination of words, such combination is normally of of this sort, even in the case of universal propositions.

For variety of word-combination, there must obviously be a variety of attributes combined in the same individual thing. But this is not all. Were the same set of attributes to keep company throughout, and to the exclusion of all others, we should have only the similar and the individual. But when some of a set are parted from the remainder and found in other company, and in various other sets or aggregates, we then have the ground for various word-combinations. That is, the partial coincidence, or the intersection, of classes,—the running of threads of similarity in various directions, so to speak,—is a necessary ground of the variety of word-combination that we have in language.

For example, were all apples red, and were there nothing else red, there would be no occasion for the combination 'red apples.' Again, were there no white things but white sheep, and no black things but black sheep, there would be no occasion for more than one word for each variety, and the word 'sheep' would be used only when the whole class was spoken of; just so 'maple,' or 'oak,' would fully and always suffice instead of 'maple-tree,' 'oak-tree,' were not the words maple and oak sometimes applied to other objects, as the leaf, or blossom, or things made of the wood, etc.

The system of nature is not such a system as a logician might frame, in which diverging genera should part off from each other in total dissimilarity (the common properties of the class excepted), and species under genera should, in like manner, be marked by absolute and total diversity; but every part of the system is intersected by many threads or bands of similarity which run in various directions through other parts,—and things the most diverse from each other in essential nature or leading and prominent features, are yet connected by slight or occasional similarities, or by slender threads of analogy. This feature in the constitution of nature it is that fits it in a peculiar manner for the uses of language.

Another feature in nature that we are to regard as essential,

in subserviency to language, is such a degree of simplicity, and such limitation as to the number and variety of the elements of which the objects of thought are made up, as shall bring them within the grasp of our faculties and present them as manageable objects for our limited powers.

Again, while the number of elements is thus limited, some of them need to have, as we find them to have in fact, such an extensive prevalence as to furnish ground for the wide generalizations which we have shown to be requisite.

We may see this adaptation of nature to language, then, first, in the universality, and in the simplicity underlying the complexity, of the relations of *time* and of *space*.

Time, through the whole extent of duration, is but a repetition of the present, the past, and the future, the successive and the contemporaneous. We have duration of time, measurable by means of similar recurring events, especially by motions which take place under the action of constant forces,—events and motions, either furnished and obtruded on our notice by nature unassisted, or produced by artificial arrangements to which the forces of nature pliantly lend themselves.

The universe of space is made by the repetition of the elementary relations of that class: in other words, the whole of space is made up of, or divisible into, parts that are precisely alike.

Space has its three dimensions, as related to the filling up of solid space and the measurement of solid content, and to the definition and the measurement of position and direction, and hence of configuration. The cubes which are the units of solid measurement are packed in three directions, are therefore reckoned by multiplication with three factors, the cube itself being bounded by six surfaces, three opposite and parallel to three. The position of a point or body (*b*) is relative to that of some other (*a*) assumed as a point of departure or center of positions; and the position of *b* is at a certain distance either above or below, to the right or the left, the front or the rear, of *a*. Its measurement and definition have to take, as bases, three planes which intersect through *a* at right angles, and are thus parallel to the faces of a cube: they can be had only in a way

equivalent to this, the method of co-ordinates. The line connecting the points is the direction of b from a ; and has an angular relation to the line from a to any other position (c , or d , &c.) as it has of course to the co-ordinate planes.*

Figures in space are defined by surfaces, lines straight or curved, angles and points. A few elements, variously combined, make up every possible conception of space-relation. Every definite figure in space admits of being duplicated again and again without end. All definite portions of space are measurable by comparison of one with another,—this is not contradicted by the fact of incommensurable lines that may be found in every figure.

Motion and rest, as attributes of bodies, are resolvable into and explained by relations of space and time,—motion being known only as change of position continuous as to both the space and the time. Relations of space and time are the elements that make up the largest part of our notions of the things and events of the outer world, the bodily actions of men and animals included.

Relations of space and those of time are fundamentally distinct: neither can by analysis be resolved into the other. To explain space, or extension, by co-existing sensations of touch as symbolizing or representing sensations successive in time and connected with muscular movement, after the manner of Brown, the two Mills, Spencer and Bain, is—to say the least of it—to come short of explaining the geometrical properties which are the distinctive characteristic of space; yet, if we should accept this analysis, there would not be the less need of

* Relations of quantity, or number, do not suffice to explain space-relation. While position is measured by distance as quantity, it is by distance from the respective co-ordinate planes, and as above or below, to the right or left, front or rear of them respectively. Above, below, right, left, front, rear, are mutually relative conceptions, each involving all the others, and wholly inexplicable as mere relations of quantity. They give us a content of the quantity, or the quantities, that is *sui generis*. Is there not an oversight of this point which vitiates such speculations as those of Helmholtz, and of others, in regard to a supposable space of more or less than three dimensions? See his Article on "The Origin and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms" in the quarterly periodical, *Mind*, No. III, July, 1876. However, so far as such speculations are valid, they make for, rather than against, the idea of creative adaptation: this is true of any theory which refers space-relation to an empirical ground.

a special provision in nature to make space-relation a part of our knowledge. To resolve time into space, after the manner of Donaldson in *The New Cratylus*, mainly on the ground that time-words are borrowed from space-words, is to employ a kind of reasoning of which the fallacy was signally exemplified in the exploded speculations of Horne Tooke.* To resolve time and space into motion, on a theory like that of Trendelenburg and others, is to disregard the fact that the determination of rate of motion requires measurement of the distance traversed in a given time, and this by other means than motion, namely, by a linear measure that when applied is at rest.

While these two orders of relations are thus distinct, there is between them a correspondence and a connection that are of great importance with reference to language. Both alike come under the general relation of whole to parts, and of number, or numerability, as inseparable from this; and the quantities which they serve to constitute are, in the case of both, continuous quantities. Hence the same terms are so far applicable to both. The close correspondence is limited to one element of space, namely, to extension in a single line: this results from the comparative simplicity of time, as it has nothing that answers to the three dimensions of space. By the motions of bodies, a certain connection is established between time and space: as all motions of progression, while they take place in time, follow paths, or lines, in space, the line in space becomes a representative of a series in time. The points in their order on the line are actually reached in successive moments of time. A similar, though rather a converse, relation results from the fact that our perceptions and observations of material things, part by part, which are of necessity successive in time, naturally and usually follow the order of location in space. In simultaneity, or coëxistence in time, there is something analogous to a second dimension in space: that is, as either the motion of a point on a line or of a line through a point represents progress and succession in time, so other points or lines adjacent to these may with them represent the coëxistent in time, the simultaneous.

* Dr. Donaldson would seem here to have fallen unwittingly into Tooke's manner of theorizing, which as a general method he has strenuously combatted.

From all this it appears quite obvious how that time and space and motion furnish ground for the generalization and the combination that language requires and involves. Not merely do they, by their universality and homogeneity, furnish ground for the lower kind of generalization, but their elements so combine themselves in individuals—producing diversity along with similarity—as to provide for generalization in the higher sense, with the consequent word-combination, in great variety. Avoiding detail, it is sufficient to say, in brief, that the same thing stands in various relations of time, or space, or both, to other things and sorts of things; that is, has various attributes founded on these categories, and if a material body, admits of unlimited variety in respect of motion. The homogeneity and universality above-mentioned give the possibility of the similar attributes, while the uniformity and constancy of the laws of nature are the further ground of the actual generalities in things. The correlations of time and space and the union of the two in all matter provide still further for generalization and combination, besides what properly pertains to motion.

The kind of language we have in mathematical science employs terms and symbols that signify elementary notions of space and time and of the relations of number to which they are subject. It is thus capable by combination of expressing accurately, by means of a small number of symbols, every possible variety of conception under these categories, motion of course included.

The language of common life attempts nothing like this. It takes such forms, such prominent and frequently recurring varieties of figure and of motion, as nature offers to hand, some of them approximately regular and simple and others more complex, and to these leading and standard forms attaches names. Such is the constitution of things that we have neither an embarrassing multiplicity nor an inadequate poverty as the result, while a sufficiently wide generality is fully provided for. This does not come as a matter of course: the antecedent possibilities in the abstract, that is, the conceivable varieties of configuration and of motion, are infinite; and without selection and restriction we should be lost in a maze of inextricable and

unmanageable confusion. What it does come as a consequence of is the simplicity which rules throughout the domain of nature.

Here we may be allowed to anticipate, and make some reference to orders of things which are yet to come up for separate consideration. The limitation in question not only results from the simplicity of the fundamental physical—including the chemical—laws of matter, but is conspicuously evident in the forms of animal and vegetable life, which, with the immense variety they present, all run along a plan that lies within very narrow limits as compared with the infinite possibilities from which it is struck out.

The precise scope of this essay concerns only the broad features of the general plan of nature. But some instances of particular adaptations force themselves here so strikingly upon our attention as to deserve a passing notice. Those we shall adduce involve not only the limitation here in question and the wide generality which goes with it, but have, it will be observed, a further ground in certain correspondences between different orders of things.

Thus, in the human form, there is a right side symmetrical with the left, a front opposed to back, and upper to lower part, all in correspondence with the six sides of the cube and the three dimensions of space;—the like is a prevailing characteristic of the animal kingdom, extending to all above the radiates. Hence, terms from this source are furnished to be applied to inanimate things. The designations of right and left and front and rear are in constant requisition as pertaining to a great variety of objects. Yet, were it not that the relations are so prominently marked in the structure of the human body, it is difficult to conceive how the means could have been found to signify them. Here, as generally elsewhere in language, the means of expression are not so much devised by human ingenuity as furnished and obtruded on us by nature itself. The notions are, in this instance, of such a kind as would find expression only by means of terms employed in a secondary, derivative sense. Help came from the fact that the right hand is, in use, distinguished from the left. Without some such

natural difference, something merely casual must needs have been pitched upon to mark in any way the notions in question. Nor is it a trivial matter, in this connection, that, as a consequence of the inherent relations of space and further of these with the fact of gravitation, considerations of convenience have made the six-surfaced rectangular form, with more or less nearly approximate variations, the so common form in various artificial constructions: the advantage in point of convenience extends even to the matter of language. It is by this means that the terms length, breadth, and thickness, come into familiar use long before the full significance of the three dimensions is understood with reference to the calculation of areas and solid contents. Again, in the natural divisions of time—days, months, and years—we have a special provision for the needs of the human mind, and thus of language, that appears to be quite indispensable. Also, the relation between the fingers of the two hands and numeral systems is not here to be overlooked. It may be added that the secondary uses of such words as head, foot, brow, breast, shoulder, neck, arm, leg, lip, ear, eye, etc., are, to say the least, a very great convenience.

What is yet to be noticed is of still more striking importance. The form above mentioned in men and animals, coupled with the consequent usual forward direction in locomotion, explains the particular manner of the transference of many space words to denote relations of time.

We employ for the purpose two different representations, according as we picture ourselves as moving along the line of time, or as remaining stationary while the procession of events comes towards us in front and passes to the rear. Hence arise some seemingly contradictory expressions. We *go* to what is future, and it *comes* to us; but the former more appropriately as to what we do, and the latter as to what we suffer. We look *forward* to the future and *backward* to the past. On the other hand, the earlier is the *before* or *former*, and the later is the *after*, as in a procession of men, the earlier to arrive would be on the *fore* part, or front, of the next later; thus it is that “coming events cast their shadows before.” In the same way one event is represented as *following* another; the *late* is, by the way, etymologically the lazy, or slow. We have *former* times

and *aforetime* as before the present,—which gives us a verbal contradiction when we speak of looking *back* upon *former* times.

But, in either way of representation, what is antecedent to the present is the *past*, that is, either has passed or has been *passed*; and the present is a *point* which is *between* the two portions of the time as of the space; and distance of space in both directions coincides with distance of time,—and here phenomena of visual perception introduce still another feature of correspondence, as distance renders objects dim and faint to the eye and reduces their apparent magnitude.

Still, it matters not much in what light we regard such particular correspondences; we have, anyhow, the great fact of the correspondence and connection between time and space as a fundamental fact in the plan of the world, and one essentially important in reference to language. The words, on, in, at, to, from, about, instant, present, long, short, interval, progress, connection, besides the others we have mentioned, are but a part of all that might be named as applicable to both space and time. The special correspondences are, however, to the student of language, hardly less important than those of the larger and more fundamental sort.

We may proceed now to another order of objects, namely, the world of *material things*, but considered first apart from the sensible qualities by which they are directly brought to our knowledge, and without reference now to any of the phenomena or forms of living matter,—both of these will come up presently under separate heads.

Confining ourselves to this view, the only element we have to add to time and space relations is that of *causality*, and that of *substance* as required for this relation. This, namely, causality, gives to material substances their properties, which we know as relations to certain effects. The properties in question are (1) those of which the effects are motions in mass—or, it may be, static conditions, as the negative of motion, or, as what they really are, the resultant of equal and opposite motions,—or (2) they are chemical properties; and of these the effects obvious to ordinary observation are, either, changes in sensible qualities, or such as seem to be the production of

a new substance or the impartation of a new property,—that is, when they do not, as they may do sometimes, seem to involve the actual destruction of substance. Since substance comes and goes with the aggregate of its properties and qualities, what explains the latter will explain any notion we may have of the former as produced or destroyed. New properties are conceivable only as relations to new effects; so that we come, in the last resort, to effects that are either sensible qualities or else time and space relations. Of these, the latter have been already discussed, and the other will presently be considered.

Properties are known and compared only by knowing and comparing their effects. They are named only with reference to similarities observed in the effects; and only in this way are things named as possessing them. All, therefore, that need be stated here is that to the actual time and space relations of bodies another element is added by their physical and chemical properties, as causal relations to possible effects in the same or other bodies, effects which will and must occur under this or that possible set of circumstances, or occasions. The added element of complexity carries with it, of course, an added capacity for combination. Our notions of chemical properties will differ according to whether we have regard to the secondary effects of which we have spoken, or to those which, as immediate, lie back of these, and which are to be described as mere re-arrangements of molecules or atoms, and which are thus purely phenomena of time and space relation as pertaining to these substances; on this latter view, substance, time, space, and causality explain every thing.

The elementary physical laws—the chemical included—are few and simple; and by laws we mean uniform modes in which causality is exerted, and which in the present case are determined by the measurement of quantities under relations of space and of time. When completely and accurately known, they furnish the basis for a language of science which is competent for the exact expression of every thing actual or possible within their domain.

For obvious reasons, such a language cannot serve the ordinary purposes for which language is employed. But the same uniformity and the same simplicity in nature which make

possible the language of science are the ground of the uniformity and of the sufficiently manageable degree of simplicity in things and phenomena as presented to ordinary observation and upon which the language of common life builds itself. The conditions and properties of bodies as gaseous, vaporous, liquid, and as under various kinds and degrees of hardness and of elasticity, and as presenting structural differences, are sufficiently marked, in spite of the gradations which exist. And, as before remarked, among the forms and motions which bodies assume or undergo as a consequence of the properties and the laws of matter, there are leading varieties which, practically, are sufficiently distinct and sufficiently comprehensive.

We pass now to another order of things. Bodies have *sensible qualities*, which are a something superadded to the physical properties just now spoken of—and this is true notwithstanding that matter, with its space relations and physical properties, would be unknown to us but for the sensations which give the sensible qualities. These sensations arise upon the occasion of impressions upon the organs of sense. How it is that what we experience in sensation we locate in, and even actually identify with, objects permanently existing in space—as we do especially in the case of touch and sight, and perhaps primarily in both,—how these sense-products can bring with them and give us what is presupposed as given before we can locate them in it, but what in fact we cannot get without them,—and, especially, how through these we can find relations which do not appertain to them but to something else, is a problem which we are, happily, not here required to solve. Any theory, or any view we may take, of the nature of matter, will allow us to regard the qualities as attributes founded on, and consisting of, relations of some kind to the sense-products, or sense-presentations. In fact, both the qualities and the sense-products through which they are known are apprehended by us as under relations of space and time, besides others peculiar to themselves.

These sensible qualities have in sundry ways their ground in physical properties of matter, and further in physical effects as the sensory nerves are acted on by their appropriate stimuli ;

—and it is as a consequence of this that these qualities have their measurable degrees of intensity, besides other relations, notably those of concord and discord in sound, and of harmony and contrast in color;—and thus these qualities and their relations depend for their ultimate ground upon the mathematical relations of measurable space and time. In this manner and to this extent, these mathematical relations are the basis, or at any rate a shaping element, of these qualities, as well as of the before mentioned physico-chemical properties.

It is not true that a notion of the underlying space and time relations enters actually into and forms a part of our perception and our estimate of intensity, volume, harmony, and the like, in the sensations;* but there is such a correspondence between the physical causes and the psychical effects that, though the accurate measurements attainable for the causes is not so for the effects as taken by themselves, yet words denoting magnitude are naturally transferred to signify degree; likewise words for other space-relations are treated in a similar way,—as, for instance, harmony is, etymologically, a joining, or fitting together.

Though the sensible qualities in many cases run into one another by almost undistinguishable gradations, yet certain leading varieties—as of color, for instance—are either so widely diffused in nature or are so prominent in their impressiveness that they cannot fail of obtaining recognition by name. And though analysis of sensible qualities, without some test besides the sensation itself or the direct comparison of sensations, is always imperfect, yet such analysis is possible to a certain extent, and so as to serve sufficiently well for the ordinary needs of language.

The aggregation of different orders of sensible qualities in the same material bodies, and along with their physical properties, serves the ends of language, as it does other purposes of utility to man. It is easy to imagine a constitution of things

* In the case of melody, there is, of course, an appreciation, or apprehension, of the time-relations as well as of the harmonical relations between the notes. Even much of the effect of harmony depends on the succession of the chords. See article on "Some Disputed Points in Music," by Edmund Gurney, in the *Fortnightly Review*, for July, 1876.

quite different in this respect. We might suppose light and color to be reflected to our eyes only from a kind of substance as impalpable to touch as the luminiferous ether itself; we might suppose ourselves to have, as connected with such substances, all the visual sensations we now have, and to have none at all from the solid bodies that we perceive by the touch. We might suppose, also, that sound should proceed only from invisible and intangible bodies, as in thunder and lightning we actually have light and sound dissociated from any tangible cause. But as the case actually is, for the most part, all the qualities combine themselves together, and in bodies which have shape and size and weight and the like. There is such a blending of things in nature that attributes of the most various and diverse kinds unite in one and the same object.

The kinds of inanimate things as constituted by sensible qualities and physical properties and spatial attributes, are boldly and distinctly marked, so as to be apprehended without any high development of the generalizing faculty. They usually combine several attributes of each of the above mentioned orders. Such are water, ice, snow, earth, sand, clay, rock, hill, valley, mountain, plain, river, lake, etc., etc.

We should not overlook here, that class of qualities with which not only inanimate objects, but living and personal beings as well, are invested through the *feelings* and *sentiments* they awaken in us, and with which, as we say, we regard them. These likings and dislikings, attractions and repulsions, feelings of absorbed affection, of contempt, of hate, of disgust, of reverential honor, and the like, are usually so identified by us with their objects as making qualities appertaining to them, that only with the utmost difficulty do we realize that these qualities are imparted by the medium through which we look—which is, as it were, a colored or refracting atmosphere exhaled from us,—and that they would fall quite away were we to view the objects in the “dry light” of indifference or of mere intellectual apprehension. The difficulty is increased instead of diminished by the intensity of the feeling; and the feeling itself is intensified by the mental association of the object with the whole class of things of the same character. As, in the case

of qualities that depend upon sense, a capacity in different persons to be similarly affected by the same objects is presupposed as a basis for language, so is it to a certain extent in the case of qualities that depend upon sentiment: notwithstanding the actual diversity and disagreement, there must of necessity be instances enough of concurrence to furnish a common ground for interpretation,—the mere bodily expression of feeling would hardly serve without enough of such ground for a first foundation. Qualities of the description here in question, as well as the properly sensible qualities, superadd elements of complexity to those which arise out of the categories previously mentioned.

The *organized living bodies* which compose the so-called vegetable and animal kingdoms are formed upon certain types, which set them into groups, each group marked by peculiar characters; and moreover, there runs through all such a general plan that they fall into a systematic classification, more or less perfect according to the extent and the accuracy of our knowledge,—a classification in which we recognize not only genera and species and varieties, but classes, orders and families, and so forth, ranged under one another in a regular, all-comprehending gradation. The variations under the types, while they suffice to distinguish individuals one from another, are insignificant in amount as compared with the general characters to which there is a close adherence as these characters repeat themselves in individuals of a common descent.

Here, also, we have—besides the similarities of structure—the uniformities which constitute the laws of propagation, growth, and decay, that is, of all the phenomena of organic life. In these phenomena, there is an intermingled operation of the ordinary properties of matter and of those peculiar to vitalized substances, and differing in them according to the functions of the different organs,—an operation which is in part a concurrence of forces, but which involves also a conflict and a neutralization or counteraction of the physico-chemical by the vital powers. The latter class of properties are, of course, as well as the former, mere causal relations to phenomena.

It is proper to remark here, by the way, that if the existence

of an organized form is a prerequisite condition of the action of the latter class of properties, the origin of the forms cannot be attributed to them, and hence not to any properties inherent in substances as such. And even if this could be so, such properties, as having reference to this particular order of effects, would still be something superadded to the other properties of the substances.

Whatever may be the facts in regard to transformation and development, they are not such as to prevent the existence of distinct types sufficiently discriminated. The shading off which sometimes makes it so difficult to mark the boundary between kinds does not appear except upon a wide and minute survey.

As was remarked under the head of space and time relations, the limitation in the forms of organized beings and the simplicity of plan that runs through this department of nature cannot fail to impress us, when the antecedent abstract possibilities are at all considered. Moreover, there are within the plan itself analogies and "homologies" and "parallelisms" sufficiently obvious to ordinary superficial inspection and in many ways serviceable to language,—and the existence of these depends upon that of others which discover themselves to the eye of the anatomist and the intelligent comparisons of the scientific observer,—there are withal analogies between the organic and the inorganic world of matter that render similar service.

The structure of organized beings determines the character and kind of their movements. And it is in the motions of men and animals that we find, for the most part, the nucleus, the germinal matter, so to speak, out of which the whole of the luxuriant growth and the fruit and flower of language have developed themselves. Regarded not only as moving things but as animated beings, or active agents, and as producing effects and acting upon other beings or upon inanimate things, terms borrowed from them are applied to things of whatever kind considered as causes of effects and as possessing physical powers. Hence, also, the distinction of active agent and of suffering object enters so fundamentally into the grammatical structure of all language that has any structure at all. Hence, also, arises the personification which plays so important a part in language, which, however, is vivified and

raised to its highest power by elements under the head we are next to consider.

Turning then next, and finally, to the world of *sentient, conscious, intelligent beings*, we find ourselves and our fellow-men all subject to like passions and affections; all receiving similar impressions from and gaining similar perceptions of surrounding objects through the organs of sense; all endowed with similar capacities of knowledge and similar propensities to activity; with susceptibilities to similar motives of action; with similar capacities for suffering and enjoyment; and all subject to the same laws, as respects whether the lower or the higher operations of the intellect. We find also, in the minds of the lower animals—if we may so denominate that in them which transcends what is simply material,—we there not only find similarities among animals themselves, but we observe much that we cannot but regard as similar, so far as it goes, to what we experience in ourselves. When what we observe in them cannot be explained by anything analogous in ourselves, we are still able to refer everything to certain uniform modes of activity.

The soul of man does not stand apart, dissociated from the system of nature; it is linked in with it, as it must of necessity be to come within the sphere of language. Language, beginning with the sensible, can reach and cover what belongs to the soul only by means of the embodiment of the soul in a material organism and its manifestation through such a vehicle. This is over and above the necessity of a union of body and soul to render possible any manifestation whatever of mind to mind.

We do not concern ourselves now with the adaptation of the vocal organs to speech, as thus furnishing the material part, the outer body, of language. Something to serve this general purpose is of course a necessity; but we have assumed this as provided. Our business at present is with the meaning, or inner soul, of words; and we deal only with principles which lie at the foundation of all language, in whatever way outwardly embodied, whether in the way of speech or writing or any sort of symbols, including even gestural signs.

The channel by which words pass from the sphere of sense to that of consciousness is found in the ways in which the soul acts upon, is affected by, and manifests itself through the bodily organs. The transition being thus made, language presses into its service analogies of various kinds drawn from the domain of the purely material. The debt is largely offset by what is transferred in the other direction from the animate to the inanimate, and from the spiritual to the material; there is here a mutual play of give and take between these two worlds.

Language begins, of course, by taking soul and body together as one complex whole, one personal being, and without at all discriminating between what applies more especially to the one and to the other. But in many acts and states, one of the two united parts predominates above the other, and language comes by degrees to achieve finally the total elimination of the corporeal part and the indication of the simply incorporeal; and as it does with what concerns the whole, so it does with what has relation to parts, such as the eye, the hand, the heart, the blood, the breath.

The analogies between the material world, on the one hand, and the moral and spiritual, on the other—including linguistic connections of whatever kind—furnish a most interesting subject of study, alike for the philologist, the philosopher and the theologian. In the domain of the moral, as of the physical, we have the conceptions of power, of influence, of strength, of weakness, of growth and decay, of life and death, of attraction and repulsion, of light and darkness, of purity and defilement, of repose and of agitation, of peace and of conflict, of harmony and discord, of fitness and unfitness, of the sweet and the bitter, of the great and the little, the lofty and the low; we have splendor physical, and glory moral and spiritual. We are impressed, we are inspired, we apprehend and comprehend, we weigh and we revolve, we combine and analyze, we unite and divide, we include and exclude, we refer and we deduce and we unfold, not only intellectually, but in a purely physical sense according to the original import of these words.

Some minds have been so strongly impressed with this correspondence that they have been led to regard the material world

as finding one of its main ends in serving as a basis for a language to convey moral and spiritual ideas. A line of thought is possible in this direction which would lead us off from the solid ground on which we have chosen to take our stand.

These analogies and correspondences are largely to be accounted for by the fact that the law of causality prevails, within certain limits, in the one of these worlds as well as in the other, and that the phenomena of both are subject to the same relations of time, and are apprehended under the same laws of thought; and further, by the fact that emotions and sentiments of the soul are intimately blended with all our experiences of material things; as well as by the other fact that the moral and spiritual in our fellow-men becomes known to us only as manifested by actions which pertain to the bodily organism. As for the intellectual simply, it is constantly brought into exercise in connection with material objects, in all our perceptions of them, and in all our operations with and upon them, and hence terms are readily borrowed from the material and the external, and applied to the intellectual and the internal.

These analogies, or relations of whatever kind and in whatever way to be explained, are an important feature in the constitution of things as adapted to the needs of language, and especially with reference to its higher uses. The consideration of this apparent subordination of the lower sphere of existence to the higher, is most interesting and instructive, and cannot but be helpful to an exalted view of what we may without presumption regard as ends discernible by us in the creation of God.

The ideal theory of Bishop Berkeley would have us regard the universe of matter as nothing but a language, nothing but a method or order which the Deity follows in the communication of "ideas" to the minds of men, a method in which "ideas" serve as signs of other "ideas;" this view, consistently carried out, would also make Him the agent of transmission in all the intercourse of these minds with each other. The scientist of the present day, who resolves matter into mere force, cannot well avoid the conclusion that a doctrine of pure idealism is quite as reasonable as one of pure materialism. Whatever theory as to the nature of matter be accepted, the adaptations in every part of

the material world to the ends of language are too clear to be denied by those who give any place at all to the notion of adaptation as a reality in nature. It might indeed be presumed that, if there is adaptation to ends in any part of the system, it must extend to that which is the head and crown of all, the mind and soul of man, so far as that forms a part of the system.

Admitting, as we must do, in some sense, the actual existence of matter, how far the conscious workings of the soul take shape from its connection with the body, and how and where to draw the line separating these phenomena from the domain of the purely spiritual, is what no science and no philosophy has yet been able to teach us. It is only as to what lies on one side of this line that we have taken it for granted that man is to be regarded as himself a part of the system of nature. There is something on the other side of the boundary, which, to say the least, the physiological psychologists have no very near prospect of being able to force into line under their theories of "reflex function" and the like,—no matter what they may do as to all that lies in the lower department. To the higher category must be assigned the powers involved, if not indeed in all, at least in some of the use we make of general terms.

It was the contemplation of some of the facts we have thus set forth, that gave birth to the Platonic doctrine of ideal archetypes as the patterns of created things, which ideas, embodied in individuals under the mathematical relations of number and of space, were regarded as thus constituting the world of actual existence,—a doctrine, which, on the whole, we cannot but esteem decidedly preferable to that modern chimera of an original homogeneity self-differentiated by a process of evolution; so long, at least, as it remains unexplained how homogeneity can tend to difference, or what kind of a process of evolution that may be which can *evolve* what was not before in some way or in some sense *involved*.

We have, in the plan of nature, a system made up out of several orders of things in an ascending series, each more simple order re-appearing in the more complex above it, and thus all blended into a unity. In the elements which it superadds, each order in the series is distinct from the one below it. The higher powers of the soul cannot be resolved into sensation and the

law of association ; nor can sensation be made out of matter or motions of matter ; nor, conversely, can matter consist of sensation, not even of resistance as a sensation ; nor can the determination of the forms and the cycles of organic life be referred to inherent properties of substances ; nor can matter itself be resolved into any of its relations, such as those of motion, or space, or causality ; nor can relations of causality be resolved into those of time, or space, or both ; nor those of space into those of time ; nor time itself into nothing. Much less can we find any explanation of these things, or of their origin, by imagining them as developed one out of the other. Development explains nothing, only as we find the same elements and the same laws working in different stages.

Combination, in language, is provided for not only by the variety of attributes under each order of things, but further as individuals which come under any higher order unite in themselves the attributes of all the orders below. And generalization of the widest range is admitted by the analogies between the different orders, as well as by the duplications under each order or category of things, and by the carrying up of the lower into the higher. Diversity, is provided for, both under each order and in the diversity which distinguishes the orders from each other.

A fruitful source of combination is to be noticed in the changes which time relation admits, and which the same individual things undergo without loss of identity as objects of thought. Thus we have motion, or change of place, we have change of physical properties, of sensible qualities, of organic growth and decay, and of mental states and mental character, all without changing the conceived identity of the object, and thus all furnishing ground for predication and for other forms of combination.

The merely suggestive sketch that we have thus given, upon a subject so vast in extent, will yet suffice for our purpose. We see that the constitution of the world is such as to furnish an *alphabet of thought*, with which we are able to spell out the objects presented to our cognizance, and thus, by the employment of a limited number of symbols as variously combined, to represent to ourselves and to signify in communication with

others the unlimited variety of objects of thought which are presented to us in the world of actuality, or which we may frame to ourselves out of our own imagination. That is to say, we have a *noëtic* alphabet for the soul, or inner component, of language, which may be compared to the *phonetic* alphabet we have for the outer, or material, component, as analogous thereto, and as helpful to us in a somewhat similar way.

The languages we have in ordinary use are not, indeed, founded on an analysis of the objects of thought to their ultimate elements. This is a peculiarity of the language which science is able to employ when it becomes sufficiently perfected. The achievement of a universal language formed on this principle, not however for common use, but rather for the general purposes of science, and applicable to all sciences alike, has been the dream of philosophers. The capacious and far-reaching mind of Leibnitz brooded over his scheme of a *Lingua Characterica Universalis*, from his boyhood till his latest years, a scheme for a system of characters that should be, or should answer to, as he said, "a sort of alphabet of human thought," and which should serve as an unerring organon of reasoning and discovery, —described by him, in a letter to Seckendorff, as "*genus scripturæ vere philosophicæ, qua notiones revocarentur ad Alphabetum quoddam cogitationum humanarum,*" and elsewhere as "*organi genus novum plus multo mentis potentiam aucturum, quam vitra optica oculos juverunt, tantoque superius Microscopiis aut Telescopiis, quanto præstantior est ratio visu.*" The learned Bishop Wilkins worked out by the labor of years his *Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*, founded on a systematic classification of all the objects of human thought, and furnished with a set of arbitrary characters corresponding.* The *Ars Signorum* of George Dalgarno was a scheme not unlike that of Wilkins, and published a few years earlier, but worked out with less fullness in detail. For many reasons, all such schemes must fail. They are, at any rate, impracticable under the existing imperfection of human knowledge.

The languages we have for ordinary use are not made after

* A sketch of this scheme of Bishop Wilkins is given in Professor Max Müller's *Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series.

and cannot be reduced to any such method. The greater part of our words signify some complex combination of elements; and the notions we thus employ are analogous to characters of a syllabic alphabet, instead of one of vowels and consonants. The words—under the term *word* we include meaning as well as sound—are such as have come into being, or have shaped themselves from time to time, to answer to the needs of the advancing mind of man. They are thus, for all practical purposes, immensely superior to any supposable perfectly analytic language; and so it would be, even were the construction of such a language a possible thing or an actual achievement. The practical sense of mankind gives birth to language adapted to their needs in their actual circumstances and their actual condition of mental development.

For any use for which words are wanted denoting the ultimate elements of things as determined by thorough analysis, suitable words or other symbols can be found and employed, just as far and as fast as these elements can be ascertained and determined. In the symbols of mathematics we have such a language carried to a high degree of perfection; and, as extended and adapted so as to apply to physical facts of various kinds, we are indebted to it for the wonderful advances made by modern science and the consequent extension of man's power over nature. In the symbolic notation of chemistry, we have a signal example of the advantage, for both scientific and practical purposes, of a thoroughly analytic language adapted to a particular department of knowledge. The notes of written music are an example of an analytic language for another class of things.

In a perfect language of the analytic kind, each expression indicates all the elements which compose the object signified; indicates also relations to other objects within the domain to which the language applies; at least, furnishes the means of ascertaining them by the use of this instrument alone. This feature is the essential of the Leibnitzian idea,*—the realization

* It appears from a letter of Leibnitz, quoted by Dugald Stewart, that he was acquainted with the schemes of Dalgarno and of Wilkins, and regarded them as falling altogether short of his own idea of the principles on which a Philosophical Language should be constructed.

of which is possible, however, only so far as it can be accomplished by employing different methods adapted respectively to different departments of knowledge. Science is doubtless to be increasingly indebted, in the future, to the invention and the employment of such methods, both in the way of symbolic notation and of analytic nomenclature. Pretensions to the character and the name of science, as well as the degree of perfection attained, may to some extent be tested by the capability to be worked by such an instrument.

Were not the world of nature a veritable *cosmos*, a system of things with unity of plan, a fabric of which the warp and the woof are the uniform modes of operation which we call the laws of nature, with whatever else in nature goes to constitute the similarities it presents,—a fabric simple in its materials and methods of formation, yet by the blendings and interlacings of its threads presenting a manifold variety,—a fabric upon which as a ground are made to come out those everywhere recurring types, the forms of organized existence, with the combined simplicity, unity, and variety they exhibit,—were it not for conditions such as these, it is obvious that no science, and consequently no language of science, could have ever had a being. But it is equally true, though seldom considered, that no language of common life, no means whatever of communication from mind to mind,—or to say the least, none resembling in any respect what we now employ,—could have been realized in any way except under the like prerequisite conditions. In short, a *logos*, not only as reason but as word, is inconceivable without the *cosmos*.

Besides this general constitution of things, we observe also an adaptation to language with reference to the progressive development of the human faculties. The beginning of language has to be made with what is obvious to sense and with what we may call the concrete and thus readily apprehensible phases of the general. Nature accordingly presents obtrusive similarities of this description to the opening mind of the child, as likewise to the adult in a rude or primitive stage of culture; and provision is made for linguistic growth and enlargement by successive steps, as the mental powers gradually unfold themselves and as they extend their reach to wider and higher

spheres of thought. It is as a consequence of this that the general structure, or what, to distinguish it as including far more than mere grammatical structure, we may call the frame-work of thought and of expression that pervades a language, takes its character from the lower spheres of objects of thought and is carried up into the higher, somewhat as, in the vertebrates of the animal kingdom, the same general form appears in the higher classes as in the lower, though serving widely different purposes and more or less modified accordingly.

Much has been said by many concerning the imperfections of language; and wisely, if to put us on our guard against them, or to incite us to remedy them. We may truly regard them, however, as due not so much to the inadequacy of the provision made by the Author of Nature, as to the imperfect development to which the mind of man has hitherto attained, and, primarily, to the feeble and inefficient and perverted use which man has made of the opportunities furnished to his hand. As the mind of man makes real advances, intellectual and moral, we must look for corresponding improvement in language as an instrument both of thought and of expression. How near an approach the language of man—all its departments comprehended—shall ever make to what would answer after any sort to the ideal conception of Leibnitz, and to perfection in all respects, -in other words, how nearly the *logos*, as the embodiment and manifestation of the human reason, shall become the reflex of the *cosmos*, through which the divine reason manifests and bodies forth itself as the eternal Word,—will depend upon how near the character and the mind of man shall ever come to the complete and perfect development of the capacities by virtue of which he stands eminent above the surrounding creation, and how clearly he shall thus prove himself to have been indeed made in the image of God.

ART. VII.—NECESSARY TRUTHS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY.

ONE of the vexations awaiting anybody who meddles with the controversy on Necessary Truth, is the double meaning of the phrase itself. What is Truth—subjective or objective? What is Necessity—a determination of the mind, or a determination of things with which the mind converses? We have seen Sir William Hamilton actually calling Descartes into court to testify to the Kantian criterion of innate knowledge; a *naïveté* only to be capped by calling Kant to prove Reid's doctrine of the immediate perception of extension and motion. Hamilton abounds in these simplicities, but what shall we say of Mr. Lewes, who informs us that Descartes and Leibnitz, *as also* Kant and his followers insist, "that the mind brings with it at birth a structure which renders certain conclusions necessary."* As also! we may as well say that Spinoza and Malebranche, as also Locke and his followers insist, that all ideas flow from experience. Mr. Lewes has contrived to embroil all modern metaphysics in a single sentence. Nothing can be said to any purpose by any one upon this question of Necessary Truth, until the historical meanings of the phrase have been discriminated, and the one we intend to stand by has been exactly defined.

By necessity Descartes means objective necessity in ideals or reals, the constraint or determination things are under of being as they are, and not otherwise: by necessary truths he means the intuitions we have of these determinations. The first necessity, that is, the first which presents itself to the mind, is the necessity that where thinking goes on there must be a something which thinks (*une chose pensante*); or specifically (since this is a universal not to be admitted at the beginning of our search for truth), the necessity that my thinking must be the action of a thinking me. The second is the necessity that to the idea I find within myself of an infinite and infinitely

* *Prob. Life and Mind*, i, 247.

perfect being necessarily existing, such a being must correspond. The real existence of God thus established, we have a guarantee in his infinitely perfect character of our perceptions of an external world. It is certain that he will not deceive us; external realities must therefore correspond to our ideas of them. All these (the soul, God, the external world), are necessities of real existence. To them are to be added the necessities of the ideal abstractions of mathematics and logic, as that the sum of the angles in a triangle is two right angles, that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. In both worlds, the real and the ideal, the concrete and the abstract, necessity is objective. Its origin, according to Descartes, is the will of God, who has created the universe as it is and imposed upon it his laws as they are; a doctrine we need not discuss, and which we notice here only as emphasizing the fact that necessity is not in us or in the structure the mind brings with it at birth, but in things themselves. Our necessary truths are the intuitions of these objective necessities, and therefore not an impotency or infirmity of the mind, a mere inability to think otherwise than we do,* but the operations of a faculty, the exertions of positive power; which faculty or power is an endowment of the mind itself, so far from being a product of our experience of the universe that without it experience would be impossible. What experience does is to present the realities to the mind; what the mind does is to perceive the realities and the necessary relations maintained among them. How far Descartes was right or wrong in his enumeration of necessary truths, that is, in his philosophy, we need not stop to inquire. But this is the distinctive doctrine of Rationalism in all ages, whatever forms it wears; that we have intuitions of objective necessities real and ideal, particular and universal.

Locke imagined that he was controverting this rationalism when he declared that our necessary truths are not innate but derived from experience. Condillac supposed that he had saved and completed the work of Locke by declaring that all experience is transformed sensation. But the first really effec-

* We are unable to think otherwise than we do but for the reason that we perceive things must be as they are.

tive blow was delivered by Berkeley, when he made way with our intuition of the substance of matter as the basis of material phenomena. Hume followed with an attack upon our intuitions of the substance of mind, of force and cause, and of the deity; leaving only a universe of floating phenomena without any substance in which they inhere, or any reason or necessity which determines their order of co-existence and succession. Even this was only indecisive speculation upon the surfaces of things and sufficiently disposed of by the dogmatic stamp of Dr. Johnson.* The whole dream of Idealism and Nihilism vanishes before the simple affirmations of any man's reason and the only possible vindication of it is to turn reason into dream too. This was the work of Kant. The *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* exactly fulfills its title. It reinstates Reason as defined by all rationalists and the common sense of men, putting back into consciousness the intuitions which Berkeley and Hume had turned out of it; and then dissolves Reason and its intuitions in a criticism more searching and destructive than Hume ever thought of. It is true that we have all these convictions which have been paraded for ages in the fore-front of philosophy, intuitions of space and time, of substance, force, the absolute; and that we cannot get rid of them or go counter to them. Why can't we? Because we perceive that the realities of which we are convinced *are* and must be as they are? Not at all. We can't simply because we can't; the necessity is subjective—in the constitution of our minds. Thinking has its pre-determined forms which it necessarily imposes upon the objects we think about. We cannot but think of matter as occupying space, motion as occupying space and time, because space and time are *a priori* forms of sensibility: we cannot but

* "I observed that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true (Berkeley's, of the non-existence of matter), it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it,—'I refute it thus.'"—*Boswell*, 6th ed., i, 452.

Mr. Mill and the idealists generally, are greatly offended by this refutation. Yet it corresponds to Hume's doctrine that speculative doubt vanishes in practical life, which also, we believe, is the real moral of Kant's criticism. It contains the two intuitions that where there is resistance there must be a something which resists, and where resistance is felt a something which feels. The argument is conclusive until the intuitions are completely got rid of.

think substance, force, cause, law, the absolute, because these are *à priori* forms of reason. But does either sensibility or reason authorize us to affirm the realities corresponding to the forms which sense and reason wear? So far from it that any attempt to make the affirmation plunges us at once into a chaos of paralogisms, antinomies, and illusion. Neither of them have been commissioned to proclaim the being of God or of the soul; the abyss of "transcendental idealism" awaits them both. Our necessary truths are things which, whether true or not, we are under the necessity of thinking; and their criterion is the impossibility of thinking otherwise—the "inconceivability" of their "negations."

It would however be a profound mistake to suppose that Kant denies the ontological realities which, as a philosopher, he refuses to affirm. Unlike Mr. Lewes on the one hand, as Mr. Spencer on the other, he was incapable of either of these non-sequiturs. His conclusion was not nihilism but nescience, the nullity of speculation, the worth of action. The *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* is the flaming two-edged sword at the gate of Eden, warning men from the forfeited and uninhabitable paradise of philosophy to the rugged realities of life. None the less the Transcendental Esthetic and Logic is the legitimate child of the earlier English Sensationalism and the sire of the later. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewes alike accept the Kantian *à priori* Forms of Thought, explaining them as the registered results of ancestral experience. Both escape the charmed circle of nescience but each by a route of his own. Mr. Spencer retains the criterion of the inconceivability of negations but converts it into a "universal postulate" of objective validity. The structure of the mind has been moulded by the continuous action of the environing universe; therefore, relations of thought whose negations are inconceivable answer to established relations of things; objective necessary facts are infallibly indicated by subjective necessities. We cannot but think that if Mr. Spencer had studied Kant at first hand, and not through the haze of Sir William Hamilton, he would have foreseen the consequences of this prodigious *petitio principii*. They are perfectly well known to Mr. Lewes, who accordingly has substituted for the round-about postulate of inconceivable

negation the only "principle of certitude" left, the direct intuition of identity. Given the contents of consciousness produced and moulded by ancestral experience, modified by its own; then a series of simple identifications adds to them the certitude of things beyond them; self-consciousness rises on the wings of Reasoned Realism to the consciousness of the not-self: the subjective world awakes to find itself insphered in an objective world "identical" but vaster.

We conclude this preliminary outline with the distinct notification that we have nothing at all to do with the spurious necessary truths of Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer, or the criterion by which they are ascertained. By necessary truth we mean what Descartes meant, what intelligent Rationalism always means, the intuitions of necessary objective realities and relations, whose synthetical constructions are our experience of the universe; and our object is to inquire into the validity and value of the contrasted principle of identity.

We desire to add one other preliminary observation whose importance, if true, recent philosophy has certainly not attended to. The controversy between Rationalism and Empiricism has been already, or if not will ultimately be, narrowed down to this issue between the intuition of necessary synthetical truths and the intuition of identity. "It is a fundamental question, says Mr. Lewes, and of late years all metaphysical discussion may be said to turn upon it. More than twenty years have elapsed since I first suggested the solution here reproduced; but although it has been reargued in the second, third, and fourth editions of my *History of Philosophy*, I have not observed that any English writer has adopted or refuted it. . . . Believing that the view is a real contribution to the philosophy of the subject, I have endeavored by a fuller and more varied illustration to carry it home to the conviction of every reader."* It is not to be inferred from this that Mr. Lewes's is the first instance of an Identical Philosophy. Rationalism itself has given birth to more than one such system; for example, the Pantheism of Spinoza, whose starting-point is the Cartesian maxim that a "true idea must agree with

* *Prob. Life and Mind*, i, 413. No more notice seems to have been taken of the fresh illustration than of the original statement.

its object," identifies Thought and Extension as opposite sides of one thing, manifestations of two essences of the same substance. Mr. Lewes's contribution to the philosophy of the subject is the discrimination of the principle of certitude, the doctrine that "every truth is an identical proposition, or is capable of being reduced to one;"* and even this doctrine, as we have shown before, is either a reproduction of Condillac's or has been invented over again after him. But we agree with Mr. Lewes that the question is a fundamental one, and we share his surprise that so little notice has been taken of it. If we are not wrong his philosophy is the forlorn hope of Empiricism; beaten back at every other outlet its last escape from the abyss of nescience is the principle of Identity.

I. Every truth then is an identical proposition, or is capable of being reduced to one. Our reply shall be as succinct as the assertion. If all truths are derived from experience then no truth is an identical proposition or is capable of being reduced to one. There are identical propositions; that is, there are propositions to which for the sake of logical convenience we will allow the empiricist to attach the epithet identical; but there are no identical truths. A is A , or $A=A$, is an identical proposition; but the truth it expresses is a synthetical truth.

Let us suppose that a particular sensation emerges in consciousness, say the clear and distinct sensation supposed to stand for a sharp report of thunder; which we will call sensation A . What must take place before A can be identified as A or in the process of identification?

(1.) In the first place, emergence in consciousness involves displacement and differentiation. The new sensation is distinguishable only in so far as it overpowers and thrusts aside the other, contrasted sensations which are already in position. If it does not differ from them and repel them, if identical with them, it cannot be itself identified as a new sensation; the indispensable condition of the intuition of identity is a previous intuition of diversity. Before we can say, A is A , we must first have said, A is not B , C , or D ; the new sensation of thunder must begin by announcing itself as numerically dis-

inct and essentially different from all other sensations whatsoever. Observe the full force of this. The doctrine of Sensationalism is that there can be no feeling without change; the intuition of diversity—of elements that will not fuse together, of terms that cannot be identified, is absolutely necessary to any consciousness at all. In reality this exhausts the question. Unless it is the business of the identical proposition to discover that everything differs from every other thing, how reduce all truths to identical propositions?

(2.) In the second place: A is not B; what is involved in the affirmation A is A? Time is involved; a time too in addition to the time already spent in discovering that A is not B. Here again the Sensationalists have saved us the trouble of argument; they have given us the mechanical equivalent of sensation much as Joule has calculated the mechanical equivalent of heat. But the velocity of sensation is lightning to the dull flight of thought; the sensation has flashed into and out of consciousness before we have begun to ponder over it, so that what we are really manipulating in our proposition is the memory of the sensation; as in electrical experiments in the dark, the thing we seem to see is the blaze we really saw an instant ago. So when we venture upon the innocent truism A is A we have committed ourselves to the affirmation that our recollection of A is A; which is so far from being an identical proposition that it is not even true, for a memory is as distinct, numerically and essentially, from the original sensation as that from any other, or as the corresponding tremor of the brain from the one that went before. This leads us to the next question:

(3.) What is implied in the proposition A is A and not B? In that form, even if it were true, it is good for nothing; we must at least mean to say, this sensation is this sensation and not those others. That is, beneath the differences which enable us to discriminate them from one another and to identify each by itself there is a substratum common to them all—they are all alike sensations. Now that is a tremendous synthetical proposition; or if it is not we beg to ask how it can possibly be got at. Each phenomenon is identifiable only in so far as it is distinguishable from all the others. We should not be

aware of it at all if it did not differ; we are only so far aware of it as it does differ. How then discover the community beneath the differences since change is necessary to discovery? To say that A is a sensation, that in any aspect it is one with B, that back of the shifting phantasmagoria there is any unchanging character, is as wild a flight beyond the circuit of consciousness which depends upon change, as to say that behind phenomena there is substance. The mud is getting bottomless here, but we are tempted to ask one more question.

(4.) A is identified as A. By whom or by what is it identified? By A itself? or by B? or by some aggregate A B C, B C D? or by the sum total A—Z? Does the sensation recognize itself? then change is not necessary to consciousness. Does some other sensation recognize it? then over and above the sensation there is something which is not sensation, the faculty of recognizing others. B cannot recognize itself: it is wholly taken up by being B: it recognizes A. Does some multiple, some inherited fusion of feelings into faculty, recognize it? then there is a power in the multiple which is wanting in each of the constituents, a force not originating in, not reducible to, sensation, a dualism in consciousness not to be covered by any identical proposition. Does the whole aggregate recognize the new-comer, that inherited substratum and circumference of feelings which we call consciousness? All the difficulties which have beset us revive around this conception. How can any compound recognize a new feeling differing from every element of composition? A body, says Mr. Lewes when providing a basis for his physics, cannot act where a body is not. No more, we say, can one or many sensations recognize a new one without being the new one; the antithesis between feeling and feeling is as insuperable as the famous antithesis between subject and object. There can be no recognition without identity. Unluckily also there can be no consciousness without change. The dilemma is a deadlock. It is all in vain to invoke the *Deus ex machina* of Evolution. The unimaginable processes of experience, individual and secular, no matter how far backward we carry them, can put into the ultimate facts nothing that was not in the original factors; consciousness at the last is only what it must have been at the

beginning, an assemblage of feelings, simple and complex, each of which is an element of consciousness only upon condition of interrupting all the others. If it submits to be merged with its neighbors, if it cannot maintain its individuality, if it does not stand out with repellant forces of its own an indestructible atom, it is a lost feeling and no part of consciousness. Every sensation of sound must hold its own among all other sounds to be so; every sensation of savor, odor, light, heat, color, motion, pleasure, pain; every assemblage of any of these; every memory, every imagination, every complex notion, every abstract idea, must keep itself aloof and indomitable or disappear. *Vae victis*; a feeling which consents to be effaced forfeits its title as a constituent of consciousness for there can be consciousness only where there is change.

Are there then no identities whatsoever? Our reply is that among the phenomena there are none except the identity of each phenomenon with itself; and since the phenomenon cannot recognize its own, or the identity of any one of its companions there can be no judgments affirming identity, that is no identical proposition at all. What we do identify is not one phenomenon with another but two or more as effects of some cause, products of some force, or manifestations of some substance in which they inhere. Thus we may identify certain phenomena of motion as effects of the attraction of gravitation, others as effects of chemical affinity, others as effects of vitality, others as the actions of Socrates; all of them as modes of the substance matter: the sensations corresponding to them as modes of the substance mind; the universe as modes of the one infinite substance if we are pantheists, or effects of the First Cause if we are theists. Mr. Lewes is perfectly welcome to all these identifications and to all the identical propositions he can get out of them. Only he cannot eat his cake and have it too; he must take these or none at all. If he disdains our metempsychics then he must put up with the bare phenomena themselves, no one of which can be identified with any other save upon condition of ceasing to be. *Dura lex, sed lex*; the law-giver being Mr. Lewes.

II. The effect of the empirical analysis, then, is the entire disintegration of consciousness, *de fond en comble*, into a bed of

pulverized and incoherent elements of feeling out of which it would seem no more possible to fashion the syntheses of sense and reason than to make bricks without straw or to build a pyramid of the dust of Sahara. Yet there are no syntheses vaster than Mr. Lewes's identities. Having reduced all truths to the truism A is A he redevelopes the truism into all truths; the contingent particulars of experience into necessary universals; the dust-heap of feelings not only into consciousness but into a Kosmos, and what is very queer into a Kosmos which has no mysteries for Mr. Lewes. Mr. Spencer seemed to have a prodigious acquaintance with things but Mr. Lewes is simply omniscient. He knows what the universe cannot possibly be, viz., the product of any extraneous Power, or the manifestations of any absolute substance; and what it necessarily is, viz., an infinite and indestructible Plenitude of Phenomena. Given the phenomena in this condition with no substances beneath them in which they inhere and no forces among to determine them to cohere, we have tried to show that an identical proposition is impossible. We have now to apply the same critical process to Mr. Lewes's constructive use of the principle of certitude, the tremendous cosmological swing he has given to the intuition of identity. Before considering the objective constructions of his "reasoned realism," the positive affirmations of a world beyond the inner world of consciousness, it will be well to begin with the ideal constructions of Science, a department of consciousness which, says Mr. Lewes, is "very far removed from a real transcript of facts," whose most absolute conclusions "are formed from abstractions expressing modes of existence which never were, and never could be, real; and are often at variance with sensible experience;" which makes so little pretence of reflecting real existence that "it avowedly relies on data known *not* to be true except within its own sphere of abstraction."* The question is whether the intuition of identity will help us to any constructions, contingent and particular, or necessary and universal, which are valid within this circumscribed inner region of consciousness.

"Mathematical judgments," says Kant, who does not seem to

* *Prob. Life and Mind*, i, 288-290.

have known much of Condillac, "are always synthetical;" "pure mathematical science cannot exist without synthetical propositions *à priori*."* His illustrations are two propositions chosen for the reason that at first sight they seem to be strictly analytical. One is the arithmetical proposition $7+5=12$. Looked at narrowly, he says, our conception of $7+5$ contains nothing but the union of the two sums in one, which on the other hand is not contained in our conception of 12 at all. No cogitation of either will ever give us the other. We must go beyond them and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two—say by counting our fingers, or a series of points—when the other is seen to arise. "Arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical, of which we may be more clearly convinced by trying large numbers. For it will thus become evident that turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum-total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions." The other illustration is the geometrical proposition, "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points." My conception of *straight* is purely qualitative, its contrary being the quality *crooked* or *curved*: my conception of *shortest distance* is purely quantitative, its contrary being *greater* or *longer* distance. "The conception of *shortest* is therefore wholly an addition and by no analysis can it be extracted from our conception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend its aid, by means of which and thus only, our synthesis is possible." Now upon this exposition we have to remark that it is open to the *rationalists* to declare that the intuition which brings together the two separate conceptions from which we start, $7+5$ and 12, or, a straight line and shortest distance, is an intuition of identity and that the proposition with which we conclude in either case is an identical proposition, the very intent of it being to declare that $7+5$ is 12, or that a straight line is the shortest distance. Only in order to get this result, to reach the truism if it is one, he has been obliged to start the whole engine of consciousness with its complex machinery and multiple forces. But it is not

* *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, pp. 9, 18.

open for Mr. Lewes to say so for the reason we have already illustrated. The conception $7+5$ if it arises in *his* mind can only do so by putting aside all other conceptions including that of 12; the conception of 12 only by putting aside that of $7+5$. They are at the beginning distinct and asunder and maintain themselves only at the expense of one another; to bring them together is to annihilate one or both. Moreover in the act of bringing up one of them for comparison the other has fled away and the comparison if made at all must be made with the memory of the fugitive. In reality $7+5$ may be the same as 12, a straight line the same as the shortest distance but the reality is outside the empirical consciousness (i. e., is metempirical), the conceptions within consciousness being forever numerically distinct and unassimilable. Given nothing but phenomena simple and compound, feelings and fusions of feelings, then identification is exactly the one feat which forever transcends intelligence.

Suppose, however, that the empiricist has discovered the identity of two of his conceptions; what is the identity good for after he has got it? This particular conception *straight line* is the same as this other *shortest distance*, but is it known thereby that any other conception, straight line, is identical with any other, shortest distance? Our reply is that it is not known until the process has been repeated with the two new conceptions; you must go through the impossible comparison with each pair as often as a new one appears, before you can affirm identity. Mr. Lewes's reply is that there is no need for such repetition; having ascertained identity once you have it forever; what is true in one case is true in all cases of the same kind; the particular fact is necessarily true, being nothing but the truism A is A , and becomes universally true by "universalizing the conditions." It is this universalizing of conditions that Mr. Lewes relies upon for his entire cosmological construction, ideal and real, the certitude that A , whenever and wherever it occurs, in consciousness or out of it, will always be A . But here again we must interpose the defective machinery of a consciousness which is a mere aggregate of feelings, for any such universalizing of conditions. The most that can be done is to dispose of the feelings as they arise; but to go beyond this,

on the strength of a recollection of a previous identification to anticipate innumerable others is to introduce a solidarity and creative power into consciousness which is forbidden by the shifting character of the elements which compose it. And if the particular conceptions are not identical but synthetical (and for Mr. Lewes they are *not*), then to universalize the conditions, to declare that the conjunction which holds in this particular case necessarily holds in all, that every straight line *must* be the shortest distance, that every trilateral *must* be triangular, that all cruelty *must* be base, everywhere and forever, is pure rationalism; the claim to a knowledge which experience cannot possibly have given. The reader can apply the criticism for himself to any proposition of logic, mathematics, or morality. We turn to a question of far graver import.

It will have been observed that this interior tract of ideal construction in consciousness is a vast one. It includes not only mathematics but all science of any kind. The numbers of arithmetic, the points, lines, and spaces of geometry, the magnitudes of pure mathematics are all abstractions from individual phenomena given in sensible experience, the peculiarity of the process being that the data of the abstractions are invariant with the data of feeling out of which they are "raised." "The point, the line, the circle, are elements of ideal, not of sensible space," and express "modes of existence which never were, and never could be, real." So of all the motions, velocities, weights, momenta, and resistances of physics. "The first law of Motion is an absolute truth. But the supposition that any real body will pursue an uniform movement in a straight line is flagrantly at variance with all observation, and with what is even physically possible. No such phenomenon was ever seen." "Again: the path of a planet is said to be an ellipse. Everybody knows that the real orbit is nothing of the kind. The ellipse is not to be found in the heavens but in the calculations of astronomers."* So once more and much more conspicuously of the scientific hypothesis, which is so far from being a transcript of the real facts that it not only idealizes the facts themselves, but fills up the gaps, replaces the missing links in the co-existences

* *Prob. Life and Mind*, i, 293.

and successions of phenomena by ideal factors which are avowedly fictitious, which by no possibility could have been presented in any sensible experience. No man ever had any experience of the atoms which are assigned as the original constituents of matter, or of the æther which is imagined as the medium of their various interactions. In this way all the constructions of chemistry are as purely ideal as those of geometry. So is the whole theory of Evolution. So is biology, or any other science whatever. In a word our scientific or philosophical representation of the universe, or of any definite portion of it, is an ideal with which the reality is certainly at variance.

The first remark we have to make upon this doctrine is that the area of ideal construction, as laid out by Mr. Lewes, however ample, is not ample enough. In truth, scientific consciousness is no more ideal than any consciousness whatever. The constructions of the most refined and sublimated hypothesis are no more remote from, no more at variance with, real facts than the rough constructions of crude sensation out of which they are supposed to be raised. Take for instance the mathematical conception of a point which is got by abstraction as the extremity of a line, which is abstracted as the edge of a surface, which is abstracted as the boundary of a solid, which finally is an abstraction from our sensible experiences of bodies. The slightest reflection upon this peculiar psychical process will show that no one of the entire series of abstractions is more ideal than the sensations of body in which the abstractions are rooted; the real bodies are quite as much outside the sensations as outside the abstractions. To vary the illustration as much as possible take a biological abstraction, say the type *homo* or *felis*, or Mr. Darwin's hypotheses of Pangenesis and Natural Selection. It is very plain that the real individual cats and men, the actual survivals of the fittest germs under the actual siftings of natural forces are as much exterior to our immediate sensations as to the ideal types and processes raised from them. In short the whole consciousness is ideal if any of it is; the antithesis of subject and object, the ancient gulf between self and not-self, is fathomless, and impassable. Mr. Lewes is at liberty to justify his ideal construction by reduction to sensible experience; that is, to "identify" his scientific abstractions as

legitimate phases of feeling or logical refinements of sensation ; but not to identify feeling in any of its forms, raw or refined, as modes of motion which are beyond and antithetic to feeling. The real world, if we approach it from this direction, is outside all, if any, consciousness of ours.

This is so manifest that Mr. Lewes has come down boldly on the other tack and identified the objective with the subjective world, by proclaiming what no man had thought of before, that Motion is Feeling, which thus becomes the absolute form of all existence. We have remarked elsewhere that this is if possible a more flagrant form of idealism than the old one, since instead of obtaining a consciousness by differentiating the Plenum, it makes the Plenum a projection of consciousness. Waiving this criticism, what we have now to say is the converse of what we said in the preceding paragraph ; if the real world is to be admitted in this way into any part of consciousness it must be admitted everywhere. If there are modes of motion to be identified as the objective sides of crude sensations, there must equally be modes to be identified as the objective sides of the ideal constructions of science ; for if some feelings have objective sides and other some have not, there is a rent and dualism in phenomena which can't be patched up with an identical proposition. All consciousness is real or none of it is. Let us take our former examples, the series—point, line, surface, solid,—and the series,—Pangenesis, Survival of the Fittest, Ascidian, Monkey, Man. To these conceptions, says Mr. Lewes, there are nowhere in nature objective reals corresponding. We beg pardon, there is an objective real corresponding to every single one of them, namely, a molecular motion of the nervous center, or if Mr. Lewes prefers, a "reaction of the whole organism under stimulus." And we have to inquire what sort of a molecular motion or nervous discharge that is which is the objective side of Mr. Lewes's ideal conception "straight line," or "circle," or "man." Mr. Lewes's Reasoned Realism is an ingenious escape from the inner to the outer world by a circuitous identification of his delicate abstractions—the vast ideals of science—first with the primitive sensations, or sensible experience out of which they are raised, and then through them with certain objective aspects of sensation which he calls motion, matter and

force. In this way the antitheses are minimized into imperceptible gradations, the fatal contradiction between the starting point and the goal is forgotten in the length of the journey. We think we are justified in putting a stop to all that. The line of identification must run from the ideal constructions of science straight through the physics of the brain to the outer universe; between the idea of a circle and nature's rude attempt at a circle, Mr. Lewes must provide some intermediate process of nervous tissue that will enable him to identify the two. But to bring in psychological data when physiology gives out, and physiological data when psychology gives out, is a legerdemain which hardly suits the gravity of the philosopher or the ends of philosophy, no matter how ingeniously it is done.

The application suggests itself. The records of science and philosophy from Thales to Helmholtz and Spencer furnish no sample of "construction" so distinctly and superlatively 'ideal' as Mr. Lewes's cosmological theory. His affirmation of the Plenum and Continuum, the identity through space and time of all phenomena as modes of Feeling, is wholly ideal; his exclusion from the Plenum of substances, forces and causes other than the phenomena themselves is wholly ideal. These notions are precisely that "mental vision" which he describes as not less liable to error than optical vision, and as soaring "on the wings of Imagination into regions of the Invisible and Impalpable, peopling these regions with Fictions more remote from fact than the phantasies of the Arabian Nights from the daily occurrences in Oxford street." With all this discrepancy what is the exact relation of the phantasy to the fact? We ask the reader to dwell a little upon the situation which to our thinking is a very picturesque and instructive one. Here on the one hand is the illimitable, ever-during, endlessly varied universe; here, on the other, in the innermost vault as it were of a single consciousness, is Mr. Lewes's theory of the universe. The question is, what is the relation of this *eidolon spectis* to the great world outside? How far are we justified in lighting our tapers at Mr. Lewes torch, in setting up his "idols" in our own caves—in accepting his Phantasy as a representation of the Fact?

Now we desire to treat the processes and products of Mr. Lewes's interior consciousness with entire respect. As purely ideal constructions there are none of our time better entitled to those immunities and privileges which Kant proclaimed a hundred years ago for all exercises of Pure Reason. Let each thinker, he exclaims, pursue his own path. If you attempt to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of the crowd which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle speculations—you will only make yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage or disadvantage we are expected to reap from such inquiries; the question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of speculation apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may depend upon the exercise of speculative reason or must renounce all reliance upon it? His conclusion is, that the renunciation must be made, and that any exposure of the impotence of reason is not only to be admitted but to be welcomed. If you were to ask the dispassionate *David Hume*: What motive induced you to spend so much labor in undermining the persuasion that Reason is capable of assuring us of the existence of a Supreme Being? His answer would be: Nothing but the desire of teaching Reason to know its own powers better, and the internal weaknesses which it cannot but feel upon a rigid self-examination." So what remains for us is real life and the practical interests of humanity, which "are never imperilled in a purely speculative debate. For it is permissible to employ, in the presence of reason, the language of a firmly rooted *faith*, even after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge." Unquestionably Mr. Lewes's speculations are as much entitled to shelter behind the shield of the Königsberg Achilles as Hume's were. As showing "how far reason can advance in the field of speculation," and whether we must renounce all reliance upon it, there is no fault to be found with Mr. Lewes's idealism and nihilism. But Mr. Lewes's "reasoned realism" is a totally different thing; for its fundamental assumption is not the impotence but the sufficiency of reason, and its demand is for admission into and sovereignty over that very domain of real life from which Kant excluded it. Mr. Lewes is Hume

with a propaganda; his speculations upon the problems of Life and Mind are the "foundations of a creed;" we are to fashion our characters, regulate our lives, organize societies, and erect the civilization of the future upon them. It is a far cry indeed from the dispassionate speculator of the 18th century to the fervent apostle of the last quarter of the 19th, and we are hardly raising the cry of treason to humanity when we ask what sort of thing Mr. Lewes's creed is. Does his cosmological theory answer or not to the actual cosmos? Will it do for us to accept the very remarkable Phantasy which has got itself constructed in the interior chambers of Mr. Lewes's consciousness as a representation of the universe which surrounds Mr. Lewes?

Yes, Mr. Lewes replies, it will do; for the constructions of science and philosophy, however ideal, have this saving character, that they are not formed at random like the fictions of Fairyland and Metemprics; "they are constructed in obedience to rigorous canons and moulded by the pressures of Reality." To verify them we have but to reduce them back again to the elements of sensible experience out of which they are raised, when it will be found that they constitute a science "which is rigorously exact in itself and which harmonizes with that very experience it appears to contradict." This has a most suspicious likeness to the vicious circle Mr. Spencer has been revolving in so many years, and which we had hoped to be delivered from by the virtues of the identical proposition. Given, the pressures of Reality we get the ideal constructions of science: but what is it we seek in the constructions of science? Why the pressures of Reality, for the only realism Mr. Lewes will have anything to do with is "reasoned realism." We verify our theory of the universe by reducing it to sensible experience; but that sensation which includes experience of the universe is the very thing to be verified by the theory. It was to escape this see-saw, as we supposed, that we gave up the antithesis of subject and object and fell back upon the intuition of identity, resolving mind and the world into different aspects of the same Plenum. But if the elements out of which we construct are the elements to which we resort for verification, then we are no better off than before. Here is an ex-

tremely subtle and complex notion, including the constituent notions of space, time, infinity, infinite divisibility, the denial of substance and force, and others of the sort. We reduce the conception to its sensible elements. What do we gain thereby? A verification? Certainly not; we simply get the materials of construction. Where the conception has originated and how it has grown up we know; but that it is true, that the Kosmos is a Plenum we know no more than before. Having reduced the conception to its constituent sensations, there remains the task of reducing the sensations to their constituent motions, the subjective states to their objective elements; a task we have seen Mr. Lewes renounce as hopeless. A concept may be identified as a mode of feeling, but a mode of feeling can never be identified as a mode of motion. It remains, therefore, to identify motion as a mode of feeling; in which case we must recognize certain mysterious motions of Mr. Lewes's brain as the objective aspects of Mr. Lewes's conception of the Plenum; and the question then is, can such motions represent in any truthful manner at all the real world which surrounds Mr. Lewes.

It is hardly worth while to pursue any farther a discussion which threatens every moment to pass into pure burlesque. The whole truth is, that starting from Mr. Lewes's conception of the Plenum you can never reach the universe outside; or starting from the universe you can never reach the conception within, by any process of identification along the line of sensible experience. And this is so manifest that Mr. Lewes does not attempt to reduce his theory to sensible experience at all. The Plenum is simply "the unavoidable conclusion from the conception of Existence as continuous," and the continuity of Existence is "necessarily postulated" on the strength of the identical proposition that a body can act only where it is, and never where it is not. To this it is enough to reply, that the proposition is not identical; that it is not true; that if it were true it is not derived from experience; and that if it were identical Mr. Lewes as a Nihilist has no right to the use of it.

ARTICLE VIII.—ON SOME OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ISLÂM AND CHRISTIANITY.

THE faith of Islâm, when not viewed with rancorous hate—an inheritance, in part, from the times of the Crusades, and partly due to confounding the spirit of the religion itself with characteristics belonging to races which have adopted it—has been, for the most part, regarded as of only speculative interest; and inquiry has been chiefly directed to the character of Muhammad himself, as to his motives and claims. During the general darkness of the Middle Ages, the light of science and refined culture which shone forth from the seats of Muslim power, both in the West and in the East, drew to itself the attention of only a few rarely illuminated spirits of the Christian world, such as Abelard in France, and Frederick II. of Germany, who themselves, indeed, were largely indebted to Islâm for their attainments; while, so far as we know, no curiosity seems to have been directed to the investigation and explanation of that wonderful phenomenon of such brilliant light amid an otherwise universal eclipse of knowledge and refinement. Nor until within a few years has this subject been investigated with candor, and freedom from the old prejudices inherited from times of deadly conflict. But, at length, a fresh studying of the Kurân, with the opening of the mines of Muslim tradition, a more philosophical view of history, and, connected with this, an increasing appreciation of the obligations of later ages to the civilization of which Muhammad laid the foundations, have liberalized the minds of studious men; so that now Muhammad and Islâm are studied, to a good degree at least, with a simple desire to know the truth.

Meanwhile, however, the subject is assuming a more practical interest. Not only in the Turkish Empire, but in India, and even in the interior of Africa, Islâm is again becoming a living power: not that it is now rising to new importance in a political respect; in that respect it is evidently declining. European jealousies, were there no other hindrances, would

seem to preclude the possibility of the working out by the Turkish Empire, within itself, of those reforms which might secure to it renewed strength as a political power; and any reforms under European protection appear, for the same reason, equally impossible. Nor will European Powers tolerate any outburst of religious enthusiasm, among the followers of the Prophet, which seems to tend to an increase of political power. But for these very reasons the bonds of Islâm must be tightened, and the fire of religious feeling burn the more intensely in secret; so that, as, with the decline of the temporal power of the Pope, a fresh spiritual energy seems to be infused into the system of which he is the visible head, Islâm may avenge itself for its political insignificance by a revival of its power as a system of belief and practice. That this has begun to be the fact in Turkey, is fully established by observations of Mr. W. G. Palgrave, author of "Central and Eastern Arabia," in *Fraser's Magazine* for the year 1872—showing that schools, which were originally established for the express purpose of introducing Western ideas into the empire, have become strictly Islâmic in their course of instruction and intent; while school-buildings of former times, made ruinous by age, as well as dilapidated mosques, are restored and reconsecrated to their objects; that a stricter temperance and observance of the rites of Islâm is practiced; and that differences of doctrine which once separated Muslims into rival schools and sects, are now subordinated to a higher unity. Nor are there wanting conversions to Islâm in Turkey, from among the various forms of Christianity there recognized, to testify yet further to the revived power of the system. The same result, from the same cause, appears also in India, where, as a number of the *London Times* informs us, "year after year Islâm is converting hundreds of thousands of our [the British] Indian subjects, and especially the natives of Bengal, to the faith of the Kurân. This conversion, too, not now accomplished," the writer goes on to say, "at the sword's point, but in the peaceful shadow of British rule, works a marvellous transformation in the very inmost nature of the converted. It is said that the converts to Mohammedanism who are enlisted from among the unwarlike population of Bengal—a people with a constitutional dread of

physical danger, which Europeans can scarcely understand—assume with their new faith a hardihood which would make them dangerous enemies and priceless allies.” Singular exemplification, at this present day, of that wonderfully energizing influence which made the first followers of Muhammad the conquerors of the world! From Africa, too, come reports, as stated by Palgrave, “of whole Negro tribes abandoning their hereditary fetish for the religion called of Abraham; and, after all due allowance made for distance and exaggeration, the current idea that the Libyan Peninsula will soon be what its best portions in North and East already are, a land of Islâm, seems by no means destitute of probability.”*

The faith of Islâm, then, is no longer a theme for closet-speculation alone, but one which has to do with present interests of humanity, and those hopes, authorized by the past history of mankind, which are bound up in the widening spread of Christian civilization; and so we hope it may not be deemed untimely to direct attention to some views of Islâm in its relations to Christianity, and to some suggestions bearing upon a possible conflict between the two, in the near future, to be waged by other than material weapons. An oriental by birth, and a Muslim in faith, Syed Ameer Ali, concludes, indeed, a “Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed,” published in London in 1874, with these note-worthy words: “Let us hope that the time is approaching when Islâm, freed from the blind idolatry of letters and apotheosis of dead men, will regain her true character, and, joining hands with the Christianity of the devoted Prophet of Nazareth, will march on together in the work of civilization. Islâm and Christianity both aim at the same results—the elevation of mankind. The gain of the one is the gain of the other. Why, then, should the two be hostile to each other? Why should not the two harmonize? Islâm has done no evil to the world, nor has Christianity. Both have conferred the greatest benefits on mankind. Why, then, should not the two, mixing the waters

* For facts respecting the propagation of Islâm in the interior of Africa at the present day, see, further, R. Bosworth Smith's *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, a work published since most of this article was written, the candid spirit of which we take this opportunity heartily to commend.

of life treasured in their bosom, form the bright-flowing river which would bear our race to the most glorious fields of humanity? Every thing that elevates the heart of man is true; every thing that leads to goodness and purity in action and in thought is true. Why not, then, henceforth adopt the words of the Prophet of Arabia as the motto of Humanity?

“Try to excel in good works; when ye shall return unto God, He will tell you as to that in which ye have differed!”

Is this, however, a true presage of what is to come? Is Islâm reviving to co-operate with a reanimated Christianity? We shall find reason to believe, rather, that by its revival the Christian world is to be made more conscious of what its own faith has grown out of—that this faith has an inward connection of principle, as of a flower with its bud, with the Judaism which some would set in opposing contrast to it; and that Islâm, so far from being in advance of the religion of the Prophet of Nazareth, as claimed by its adherents, will be made to appear, distinctly, as a sort of reformed Judaism, or restoration of the more primitive Jewish faith—even as it was called, by the Prophet of Mecca, “the religion of Abraham.” Thus may Christianity become re-assured of its own foundations, and at the same time gain new victories, in peaceful encounters of argument, over its ancient foe.

What, then, was the burthen of the message of the Prophet of Mecca? It was a rebuke of idolatry, and of the heartless deism of professed worshippers of the true God, by the re-affirmation and vindication of the living and acting sovereignty of God. However he may have been instructed by human guides—and that he did draw largely from both Jewish and Christian sources is not to be questioned—yet he seems to have been one of those spirits, raised up from time to time, who are touched by an influence from on high, which imparts to natural powers and susceptibilities a capacity of discerning and feeling what other minds of the same age are insensible to. To Muhammad God announced himself anew, and through him to the world, as ruling in the storm, causing the tender herb to spring up for man and beast; the Lord of the revolving orbs; speaking in the conscience, and chastening men for neglect and forgetfulness of Him by devastation of their dwellings and

obliteration of races. The truth that God is, and that He is cognizant of His creatures, caring for them, and rewarding and punishing, was borne in upon the mind of Muhammad, prepared by natural endowment and the training of circumstances to receive it, with an impressiveness which forced him to seek relief, first by solitary communing with himself, and afterwards by devoting his life to the publication of the truth. Particular illustrations of what is here asserted need not now to be given; it is sufficient to say that such is the view of Muhammad, and of the burthen of his teaching, given to us by the Kurān itself, and by traditions having every appearance of verisimilitude. How like was he to one of the old Jewish prophets, in respect to his message! and, considering the religious condition of even the most highly favored nations, at the time of his coming forth as a messenger of God—bound up in formalism, or festering in the corruptions due to an altogether relaxed faith—and how much society needed to have a new life infused into it, must we not say that, in a true sense, he was a messenger of God? Judging of causes by effects which every one recognizes, is it doubtful that Muhammad was, in very deed, raised up, not only to vindicate God's sovereignty in the world, but to give to the minds of men the new energy, courage, and loftiness of aspiration, which come of realizing man's dependence on, and consequent obligation to, God?

But the very emphasis of his affirmation that "God is God," together with the lifelessness of the Christianity of his day—disguising its special significance—hindered his apprehending that element of prefiguration, that looking for a better hope, that intimation of the mercy of God, not wanting even in primitive Judaism, which, growing more and more distinct with the progress of time, was the beautiful rising light, heralding the perfect day of Christian faith. "The Merciful, the Compassionate," were epithets, indeed, under which Muhammad proclaimed God, as well as "the All-knowing, the All-mighty;" but in them he seems to have expressed only a sort of compliance with human infirmity, deemed needful as a shadow to the effulgent light of the divine being, if it were not rather to blind than to attract; not any approximation to the Christian idea of God as renovating character itself by the potency of His own love.

Islām, accordingly, may be defined to be, essentially, a new proclamation of primitive Judaism—a re-inauguration of the patriarchal form of it—with the Messianic element left out. Now this points to what should be the fundamental principle in all apologies for Christianity addressed to the Muslim. Let him be led to see that the teachings of his Prophet, true and noble as they were, in the main, were yet, in their distinctive character, not such as could be a completing revelation to man; that, in fact, he made a retrograde movement, necessary as it would appear, to give new force to divine messages of earlier times, and included in the providential scheme of the world's history, yet only provisional, to make way for a wider proclamation of the One greater than all prophets, who was the true "Seal of Prophecy."

The short-comings of Islām, in its relation to Christianity, are eloquently set forth in the following words of the late Frederick Denison Maurice: "Because the Mahometan recognizes a mere Will governing all things, and that Will not a loving Will, he is converted, . . . in the course of his history, from a noble witness of a Personal Being into a worshipper of a dead necessity. Because he will not admit that there has been really a man in the world who was one with God—a man who exercised power over nature, and yet whose main glory consisted in giving up himself, therefore he cannot really assert the victory of man over visible things when he most tries to do so. He glorifies the might of arms when he most talks of the might of submission. Because he does not acknowledge a loving Will acting upon men's wills, to humble them in themselves, and to raise them to God, therefore he becomes the enslaver of his fellows; therefore cheerful obedience to a master, which for a while distinguished him, becomes servitude to a tyrant. Because he will not acknowledge that the highest and divinest unity is that of love, but rests all upon the mere unity of sovereignty, he has never been able to establish one government upon earth. Mightily as he has fought for it, his kingdom has ever been splitting into fragments; one race has displaced another; nations have broken loose from the recognized center in each different age. It has been found that such a universality or unity is merely material; that it has no root in the

nature of things—in the divine order; that each new age must do something more to weaken its integrity and hasten its dissolution.” *

The peculiarity of Christianity as complementary to those views of God and of man's relation to Him which Islâm enforces, may be urged, it should be remembered, more hopefully upon the disciple of Muhammad than upon the Jew, because the Muslim has not to be first convinced, but already accepts as true, that Jesus was a teacher sent from God; and the presentation to him of Christianity in that aspect which shows it to be the natural rounding off of earlier revelations, if only candidly weighed, should be enough to silence his proud claim that he himself stands upon a higher footing of enlightenment than even the Christian believer.

The moral system of Islâm accords with its theology, being based upon reverence for God, and the ideal of character being absolute submission to His will. But how, it may be objected, is this consistent with certain social usages, prevailing among Muslims? How are polygamy and slavery, as upheld and practiced under Islâm, at the present day, reconcilable with the conception of virtue as a “purification of heart from all blameable inclinations and frailties, and the mind from all vicious ideas, and from all thoughts which distract the human attention from God,” as the Prophet is said to have declared it to be? In reply, it might be sufficient to set the example of those whom we ourselves are accustomed to regard as best embodying the spirit of obedience to divine teachings, antecedently to the coming of Christ, alongside of that sentiment expressed by one of them: “The fear of the Lord is clean.” As in their case the fear of God could coexist with conformity to usages of their times and countries, at variance with their own standard of virtue, so may it be as to the followers of Muhammad. But, further than this, the tendency of the Prophet's legislation in respect to both the subjects referred to was to the abolition of those social abuses. “By limiting the maximum number of contemporaneous marriages, by giving rights and privileges to the wives as against their husbands, by making absolute equity

* *Religions of the World and their Relations to Christianity.* London, 1847. pp. 157-8.

towards all obligatory on the man, by guarding against their being thrown helpless on the world at the willful caprice of a licentious individual, Mohammed struck at the root of the evil." So says Syed Ameer Ali, in his book already quoted, with reference to polygamy; and this writer believes that polygamy "will soon disappear under the new light in which the laws of the Prophet are being studied." Nor can slavery be perpetuated in the Muslim world, provided Muhammad's enactments respecting it are faithfully carried out: for in the first place he limited it to bondage of captives; and then made their liberation an act most acceptable to God; and moreover prescribed that "slaves should be dressed, clothed and fed exactly as their masters and mistresses," and should not be addressed as slaves, and that mothers should never be separated from their children; and the profession of Islām always conferred liberty, while the purchase of freedom was facilitated.

From these facts an important lesson may be drawn for the guidance of the Christian apologist—who will never gain any advantage by giving way to prejudices and misconceptions. The same point might be further illustrated by reference to Muhammad's inculcation of temperance, his prohibition of games of chance and of indecency of language, and his enjoining reverence for parents and kind treatment of animals. His enactments, generally speaking, both positive and negative, indicate a high moral standard; and in this view a revival of Islām which includes, as does that just now referred to, a return to primitive strictness, must be regarded, from the Christian point of view, with more of hope than alarm.

But what have been the positions actually taken up on either side, as Islām and Christianity have come together on the field of argument? Three sources of information here present themselves: first, a tract by the celebrated Roman Catholic missionary Xavier, with the reply made to it by Ahmad Bin Zain al-Âbidîn—both in Persian, preserved in MS. in the library of Queen's College, Cambridge—together with a rejoinder to the latter by the Jesuit Guadagnoli, written in Latin and published at Rome: these three works belonging to the first half of the seventeenth century; next the tracts, on one

side and the other, written by Henry Martyn and those with whom he contended for Christianity, in Persia, between 1811 and 1818—some in Arabic and some in Persian—manuscript copies of which were obtained from the collection of Sir Gore Ouseley: all of the above mentioned documents, with the exception of Guadagnoli's work, being known in the West only through a publication by the late Professor Lee, of Cambridge in England, entitled "Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mohammedanism, . . . translated and explained, etc.;" next, "The Mizan al Haqq, or "Balance of Truth," by the Rev. C. G. Pfander, D.D., translated into English by the Rev. R. H. Weakeley, Missionary at Constantinople, London, 1867; and last, two English works of very recent date, one "A Series of Essays on the Life of Muhammad and Subjects Subsidiary thereto," by Syed Ahmed Khan Bahadoor, Vol. I, printed in London in 1870; the other, already referred to, "A Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed," by Syed Ameer Ali, printed in London in the year 1873.

Zavier's tract is called "A Mirror Shewing the Truth." It opens with a chapter treating of man's need of divine revelation—quite superfluously, as addressed to a Muslim—and is then mainly taken up with a simple exposition of the teachings of Christianity. The third chapter, however, includes a section in defence of the integrity of the Christian Scriptures, in opposition to the charge, made by the followers of Muhammad, of a corruption of the text; and another section, "shewing that the Gospel has not been abrogated by the Koran; and why the religion of Moses was abrogated by the Gospel." But no extracts are given by which one might judge of the manner of treating this fundamental topic. The fourth chapter makes comparisons between Christianity and Islâm, as, for instance, in one section "on the difference between the Koran and the Gospel as it respects chastity and purity;" in another, "on the excellency of the character of Christ when compared with that of Mohammed;" in another, on Muhammad's miracles; and another "on the propagation of the religions of Mohammed and Jesus." But here, too, our information fails us as to the particulars of the discussion; we are only told that Xavier urged against Islâm its facility in accommodation to human weaknesses, and the Prophet's abrogation,

in certain instances, of precepts once promulgated. It is the more to be regretted that Professor Lee was not more liberal with his extracts, because he thought Xavier's tract, though deficient in elegance, ably written. Ahmad's reply to Xavier is entitled "The Divine Rays in refutation of Christian Error;" and begins with alleging passages of the Old and New Testaments as prophecies of Muhammad—quoting, however, so utterly at variance with the originals, as generally accepted, that it would be foolish to take any further notice of the argument. After this the writer takes up an objection of Xavier, based upon disagreements between Muhammad's teachings and those of prophets of former times, and of Christ himself. As to disagreements with the Gospels, however, he really says nothing, and so the claim that Muhammad was in advance of Christ, as a revealer of truth, derives no support from him. The whole drift of his defence is that, if Muhammad differed from what is taught in the Old Testament, Christ and his apostles differed no less—as, for instance, in respect to divorce and circumcision—and therefore that such difference must not be held to disprove the divine mission of Muhammad any more than it does that of Christ; and Xavier has the worst of the argument here, from not duly considering that the relation of the Gospel to Judaism forbade the Christian apologist to argue against Islâm on the ground of deviation from Jewish standards. The question of a corruption of the Scriptures is also discussed, not with reference to the Old Testament, however, but as to the New Testament only, probably because the necessity of argument in opposition to a Christian, in view of Muhammad's recognition of the divine authority of Christianity, appeared to call, especially, for proof that the New Testament, as received among Christians, cannot be taken for the rule of Christian faith. This position the writer attempts to establish, first, by what appear to him to be discrepancies in the Gospels as to the nature and offices of Christ, he being sometimes represented as human and sometimes as divine, now as subordinate to God and then as having all power committed to him, at one time giving the keys of heaven to an apostle and at another being derided and crucified; and discrepancies of statement, for instance, in respect to the daughter of Jairus, that she had died,

whereas Christ, when he came to her, said she was not dead; also, by the seeming irreconcilableness of the representations made of Judas Iscariot, now as one of the chosen apostles, in whom the Spirit of the Father would speak, and then as a traitor; again, by the declaration in the Gospels of things in their own nature inadmissible, for example, that Jesus was under the power of Satan in the temptation, and that God became incarnate; and lastly, by the wide diversities of opinion among Christians, Jacobites, Melchites, Nestorians and others holding doctrines too widely divergent to have been drawn from an authoritative source. The character and miracles of Muhammad are afterwards enlarged upon. Such is the substance of Ahmad's tract in reply to Xavier; enough has been said of it to show its bearings, and to make it appear to be, while not wanting in ingenuity, not hard to be answered. The discussion is resumed in Guadagnoli's "*Apologia pro Christianâ Religione*," the first part of which treats of the integrity of Scripture, proved "*auctoritate Pontificum, Conciliorum et Patrum*," as well as from the Kurân itself, and from other books of unquestionable authority among Muslims—while certain passages most liable to be regarded as corrupted, from the nature of their contents, are vindicated by examination; the second part is devoted to an exposure of "*mendacia, contradictiones, injustitiae et cetera*," which are thought to show that the Kurân is no law of God, but an imposture of Muhammad, falsely arrogating to himself the name of Prophet; "*et simul omnia pro eo a Persis allata refelluntur*;" and the rest of the volume is occupied with a setting forth of the doctrines of the Christian religion, as laid down by Roman Catholic authorities, and with special reference to objections urged against them.

Before passing on to give some account of Martyn's tracts and those of his opponents, it may be of interest to quote here a few paragraphs from Prof. Lee's Preface, referring to certain works, on the controversy between Christians and Muslims, of which only the existence is known. Possibly some investigator in the East, or rummager in European libraries, might make them available for new materials. Says Prof. Lee: "In Maracci's refutations of the Koran (p. 26), we find mention of one Ahmedus filius Abdholhalimus, who urges several of the

arguments detailed in these tracts [those made known by Prof. Lee]. In Hottinger's *Thesaurus Philologicus* (p. 126, ed. 1659), we find one Ahmed Ibn Edris asserting that the Scriptures have been corrupted. In the life of Abdollatif edited by Mauseley (p. 59), we find that a tract against the Jews and Christians had been written by that celebrated author. We find another cited by Abraham Ecchellensis in Labbe's edition of the Councils (tom. ii, p. 393). In the collection of Mr. Burkhardt, now preserved in the public library of Cambridge, there is another against both the Jews and Christians by Ali surnamed Elmunir of the Sect of Shafia."

The Martyn controversy, as it may be called, began with an argument for the divine authority of Islām by Muhammad Ibrahim Ibn al Husain al Hasani al Hussaini, in answer to a request from Henry Martyn that he would set down the proofs upon which he relied respecting the mission of Muhammad, and this first tract is almost wholly a statement of the proof derived from the alleged miracle of the Kurān. A miracle is defined to be "an effect exceeding common experience, corresponding to a claim of prophecy made, and accompanied by a challenge to produce the like"—the meaning of the expression "exceeding common experience" being, as appears from the language of the writer elsewhere, that it is an effect "which man, considered merely as such, cannot perform;" and the reality of a miracle may, it is said, be determined either by direct knowledge on the part of those before whom it is presented, or by the testimony of others capable of judging. The Kurān, then, is held to be a miracle, inasmuch as a sufficient number of competent judges from among the Arabs themselves, who cannot be supposed to have combined to uphold a falsehood, have declared that no unaided human power could have produced it; and Muhammad claimed authority as a messenger of God on the ground of its inimitability. A preëminence is claimed, furthermore, for this miracle over the miracles of Moses and Christ, believed in by Jews and Christians, in that even the miracles which Christians ascribe to Christ are known to the world only through the testimony of a few witnesses, which "by length of time becomes less and less convincing;" while the Kurān attests itself from age to age, unchangeably, a

standing miracle; and also a preëminence in this, that, being of a nature to appeal to the intellect, not to the senses, it has "more force with the better informed." We learn by "research," it is said, the fact that there has been such a concurrence of opinion among the Arabs, as to the impossibility of attributing the Kurân to a human origin, as constitutes it a miracle; and that concurrence is regarded as being the more noteworthy on account of the disputatious inclination of the witnesses in the case—though, meanwhile, the principle of the decay of historical testimony with the lapse of time, which the writer had just urged against belief in Christian and Jewish miracles, is overlooked. The contents of the Kurân, it is also asserted, "the mysteries and scientific subtilties which it contains, and the precepts founded thereupon," add weight to the argument for its divine origin.

Beside this one great and all-convincing miracle, others are attributed to Muhammad; such as "his dividing the moon into two parts, the singing of the gravel in his hand, the flowing of the water from between his fingers, the animals addressing him and complaining before him, his satisfying a great multitude with a small quantity of food, and many others." But, in view of discrepancies in the accounts which we have of these, they are not held to be, in themselves, specific proofs of the divine mission of the Prophet, but only to afford assurance, in general, that Muhammad "was, upon the whole, endued with miraculous powers"—just as the killing of a person may be assuredly known by the very multiplicity of statements of the fact, differing in particulars; "and this," it is said, "is sufficient to establish his claim to prophecy, although the particulars may remain unknown." Collateral evidence, however, may change such general testimony into what is specific. The writer's view of the proof needful to authenticate a miracle has, it will have been seen, the fundamental weakness of making a limited experience the measure of universal; and so Martyn begins his reply by taking up that point, and lays down the opposing principle, that what is contrary to universal experience can be determined only by a tacit or open consent which ~~has~~ never been known to vary anywhere: the essential nature of a miracle, as involving actual alteration of established laws of the

Creator, something beyond all mere relativeness of knowledge to time, place, or person, is not brought out. The insufficiency of the particular experience of the Arabs themselves, to establish the miracle of the Kurân, is then dwelt upon—known by such considerations as the following: that, the contemporaries of Muhammad, among his countrymen, being admitted to have been illiterate, their not having been able to produce an equal to the Kurân, supposing they were indeed unable, is no proof that such a composition exceeded the powers of Arab genius not supernaturally assisted, especially as the union of a high degree of eloquence with illiterateness is no extraordinary phenomenon; that, upon the establishment of Islâm, all attempts to imitate the Kurân would be necessarily suppressed; that the rules of rhetoric, in the Arabic language, cannot be appealed to for proof of the inimitable elegance of the Kurân, because this book itself has shaped those rules; and that many books, in all languages, are allowed to be inimitable, of which there is no pretence that they were written under divine inspiration. Martyn also repels the suggestion that a recorded miracle, if the record was made by an eye-witness, can lose any of its convincing force by time; and therefore denies that the miracle of the Kurân has any advantage over Christian miracles on that account. Such is the substance of the most important part of the first of three tracts in which Martyn replies to the apologist for Islâm. His second tract was intended to be a statement of positive grounds for not believing in Muhammad as a Prophet of God, though in parts of this, also, he simply argues against some claim set up on the Muslim side—for instance, that the Scriptures have been corrupted. It must be acknowledged, however, that no very weighty considerations of a positive sort, are presented—that is, none which a Muslim taking his own point of view, would not easily controvert with a show of reason. For example, it is urged that Muhammad conformed his precepts to his own lustful disposition; which a less prejudiced judgment on the facts would incline not to suggest. With more force, on the other hand, is the literary character of the Kurân made a ground for rejecting its claims; for, while it undeniably contains passages which glow with the fervor of a genuine eloquence, inspired by deep feeling, and betoken a spirit

truly exalted, yet the greater part of the book is remarkable chiefly for insipidity, and is disfigured by want of connection of thought. On the other hand, Martyn went too far in charging the Kurân, as he did, with vulgarity. The tract ends with an exposition of Christianity, not especially adapted to meet the mind of a Muslim, and perhaps not altogether just to the subject. Martyn's third tract is directed against the pretensions of Sufism—a system of mysticism borrowed from the remoter East, which allied itself to Islâm in Persia—as a means of perfection to man, contrasted with the power of Christian faith to unite the soul to God in communion of spirit. But Sufism is foreign from Islâm in its tendency, so that the views here presented do not now concern us. After Martyn's death, there appeared a more elaborate work than either of those which this controversy had before brought out, by Muhammad Rudhâ Ibn Muhammad Amîn of Hamadân, who replies to Martyn in defence of the writer against whom he had written his first two tracts, and brings forward certain supposed testimonies for Islâm not before noticed, or only partially adduced. It is entitled "A Guide for those who are in Error, in which the Reality of the Mission of Mohammed is established," and covers two hundred and ninety pages in Professor Lee's translation. So far, however, as relates to the main point in question between Muhammad Ibrâhîm and Martyn, the so-called miracle of the Kurân, no new support is given to this plea for Islâm; and yet it may be well to give one or two specimens of some of the reasoning employed, to show the need of circumspection in dealing with a subtile adversary. Whether or not he so held, Martyn had seemed to make the whole nature of a miracle to consist in its contrariety to human experience, providing only that this should be universal, and so exposed himself to the *reductio ad absurdum* of believing in miracles which yet he would declare to be only pretended; for Muslim saints and Brahman devotees had confessedly wrought wonders, not only exceeding, but contrary to, all experience—inexplicable according to any experience of mankind—and the advantage of this is duly taken by his opponent. As a piece of ingenious logomachy may be noticed, also, the reply to Martyn's allegation of the needfulness of appeal to the utmost exertion of human power, by way

of testing the reality of a pretended miracle, that to make such an appeal is to appeal to that which is not human experience. Again, Martyn had said that "some strange act, which really comes from God, may be performed in a science now unknown, such, for instance, as alchemy, but could not be said to exceed common experience," and therefore not to be a miracle; which, it is replied, is an "absurd supposition, because, when it has been supposed that such strange act has come from God, and also that it has been brought about by means of which men have no knowledge, . . . such act must be contrary to experience." The supposed testimonies in favor of Islām which this writer makes more account of than the other writers whose tracts have been reviewed, are passages in the Old and New Testaments, where Muhammad or his religion are thought to be foretold. One of these, very commonly cited, is that in which Christ promises the Paraclete, the whole force of which, as applicable to Muhammad, depends upon a misreading of the text, *περικλυτος* for *παρακλητος*, in order to make out a coincidence of name between the teacher here promised and Muhammad, the Praised One; and so is brought up the whole subject of the corruption of the Scriptures, insisted upon by Muslims—a subject which must be argued with them, not conjecturally, but from admitted facts, because their own acknowledgment of the divine missions of Moses and Christ cannot be made to tell against them so long as they may take up views of Judaism and Christianity to suit themselves, by simply declaring, as we have seen them do, that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, in their received form, are unreliable documents. Another passage supposed to testify of Muhammad is the prophecy respecting Ishmael, in the 16th and 17th chapters of Genesis. But no personal reference can be here established, without more certainty in respect to his genealogy than even the Prophet himself is reported to have had. The possibility of a divine intimation to Hagar and to Abraham of the grandeur to be attained in a far distant future, through the publication of Islām, by the Arabs, who at least in part are undoubtedly descendants of Ishmael, may be admitted. But other passages of the Old Testament, it is claimed, foretell the mission of the Prophet of the Arabs, specifically, as the medium of a divine revelation to

mankind which was to distinguish some later age : for example, the 15th verse of the 18th chapter of Deuteronomy, read thus : "A prophet like unto me shall God the Creator raise up from among thy brethren. Hear him"—which, it is said, must refer to Muhammad, for this reason, among others, that no other religious teacher, since the time of Moses, except Muhammad, has arisen, who could be said to have been from among the brethren of Moses, because Christ, being an Israelite, was in the same line of descent as Moses, and not collaterally related to the Jewish lawgiver, which Muhammad, descended from Ishmael, was. Such is the argument, all depending upon an interpretation, at least unnatural, of the expression "from among thy brethren." The Messianic prophecy, as it is generally understood, of the 42d chapter of Isaiah, is also appropriated to Muhammad, special emphasis, in favor of this reference, being laid upon the clause "He shall not become faint, neither shall he flee, until he shall have established his law in the earth" (following the text as quoted by our Muslim apologist)—which is supposed to point to a lawgiver to come who should maintain and propagate his statutes by the sword ; and another clause, as given by this writer, "Let them sing a new song, and praise him from the corners of the earth, even the seas, the islands, the deserts, the cities, the houses and the places which the children of Kedar do inhabit," is thought to refer yet more distinctly to the coming of the Arab Prophet. Thus much for this line of argument. Of other passages relied upon the meaning is still more strained, for argument's sake ; and in every case a text is alleged which more or less differs from that commonly received.

Leaving here the Martyn controversy, we have next to notice the work of Pfander. This work is more systematic than those by other Christian controversialists, already spoken of, and more to the purpose, though it fails, we think, to do full justice to Islām. After an introduction on the marks of a true revelation, it appeals to the Kurān itself, pertinently, in proof of the divine authority of the Old and New Testaments ; then controverts the claim that the former displaced the latter—not so satisfactorily, for the argument should rest upon the retrogressive character of Islām, as compared with Christianity, hinted at in the beginning

of this article; next disproves the assertion that the Scriptures have been changed and corrupted, while charging that the Kurān itself has, beyond the possibility of doubt, been materially altered from its original form. The second part of the work is an exposition of the doctrines of Scripture in respect to divine attributes, the fallen state of mankind, morally, the way of salvation, and the character and conduct acceptable to God. Then the author considers the claims of Muhammad to being a prophet of God: first, whether his coming was foretold in the Scriptures (the principal passages referred to being those already noted); second, whether the style of the Kurān constitutes a proof of its divine origin; third, the contents of the sacred book of Islām—where there is too little credit given for what was in advance of his age in the Prophet's teachings, and of an elevated moral tendency. A separate chapter, in conclusion, is given to the mode in which Islām was propagated—but slightly recognizing the principle of toleration which Muhammad distinctly announced, and which was acted on by the early champions of Islām, who succeeded him, as we shall see further on.

After this we find no new publications in the controversy between Islām and Christianity, until we come down to the present decade. The first of this late date is vol. 1st of the "Series of Essays" by Syed Ahmed, published in London in 1870, which, however, with the exception of two essays, treats of matters only introductory to our present subject; the second volume might be expected to contain more that would bear upon it. The two exceptions are an "Essay on the Question whether Islam has been beneficial or injurious to Human Society in general, and to the Mosaic and Christian Dispensations," and one "On the Prophecies respecting Muhammad, as contained in both the Old and the New Testament." The latter is worthy of notice, not for any new texts which it brings forward, but for its discriminations in respect to such citations. In the first place, it allows that some of the prophecies of a lawgiver to come, in the Old Testament, which have been claimed as pointing to Muhammad, might equally well apply to some other divine messenger. It also recognizes that some of the citations of Muslim writers must be set aside, either because no manu-

script authority is alleged for readings which vary from the received, or because there is reason to believe them to be quoted from books of Scripture now lost, or rejected as apocryphal, or to have been handed down by tradition alone. Furthermore, this essay speaks of two different views held by Muslims, in respect to corruption of Scripture, some supposing a "willful perversion of words," and others only a misinterpretation of texts accepted on both sides, or, at the most, "clerical mistakes in the manuscripts;" and this latter view is said to be that of the truly learned doctors. The other essay, by Syed Ahmed, introduces a new phase of our subject; and it is this which forms the main point of view of Syed Ameer Ali's "Critical Examination."

We might, therefore, now appropriately turn to the consideration of Islām and Christianity in some aspects of their influence upon one another and upon society, as historically manifested. But a few hints only on this topic must suffice, mainly by way of emphasizing suggestions already thrown out. While we would not for a moment think of bringing Islām into comparison with Christianity, as a rival system, in respect to moral and intellectual influence, yet it is not to be doubted that the Christian world has been too little mindful of what was purifying and elevating in primitive Islām. In a time of decline of Christian life, and amid the heats of angry theological controversies of Christians with each other, Islām did unquestionably awaken a fresh moral enthusiasm in the world, and bring in a revival of healthy activity of spirit; though it must also be said, for truth's sake, that the philosophers of Islām, to whom the world is indebted for the preservation and amplification of the science of the Greeks, were rather free-thinkers than Muslims in their religious faith. Deep metaphysical questions, interesting to all reasoning minds, first engaged the attention of studious Muslims, who were anxious to hold on to their faith consistently with the requirements of reason—for example, respecting the relations of free will to divine sovereignty; and as one reads of the differences which divided the schools of the mosques on this subject, in the time of the Abbāsides, one is constantly reminded of correspondences among Christian theologians. It is a very general error, by the way, to speak of fatalism as having

been taught by Muhammad, for the Kurân is as distinct in its assertion of human freedom and responsibility as is the Bible, although it no more explains their consistency with divine predestination than do our own Scriptures. Properly viewed, the fatalism of Islâm seems to have been a revolt of orthodoxy from the tendency of philosophers to attribute everything to second causes. It is due to Islâm to remark, also, that the great principle of toleration, which has had so hard a conflict with prejudice, even in the innermost sphere of Christian life, where the voice of the great Master of charity should have been most distinctly heard, and has been so little exalted in places of authority, was first instituted, as a social rule, after the days of the founding of Christianity, by the Arab Prophet, who said "Let there be no forcing in religion," and, "If the Lord had pleased, all who are on the earth would have believed together; and wilt thou force men to be believers?" Nor were these idle words: the temple of the fire-worshipper, the Christian church, and the Jewish synagogue could stand side by side with the mosque, from the earliest times of Muslim conquest; a not onerous tribute was all that was required as the price of perfect freedom of religious opinion and worship; and the now reigning sovereign of Persia could with truth say, as he did, having regard to recognized principle, that "complete toleration exists throughout his dominions." We bring up this point purposely, in view of the recent atrocities of the Turks in Bulgaria, because it illustrates what we have insisted upon in another connection, that Islâm may be most successfully opposed by confronting it with its primitive principles. This is, in fact, the burthen of our article, and so we end it.

ARTICLE IX.—MÜLLER'S RIG-VEDA AND COMMENTARY.

Rig-Veda Sanhita, the Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans ; together with the Commentary of Sayanacharya. Edited by Dr. MAX MÜLLER. Six volumes, quarto. London: 1849-74.

The Hymns of the Rig-Veda in the Samhita and in the Pada Texts. Reprinted from the Editio Princeps. By F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A., etc. Two volumes, octavo. London: 1876.

HARDLY another literary enterprise of the present century has become more widely known than M. Müller's publication of the Rig-Veda and its native commentary. Both in itself and in virtue of what it has led to, it has pressed itself in extraordinary degree upon men's attention. When it was begun, more than a quarter of a century ago, its author was an obscure young German student; when it is finished, he is one of the most noted men of the age. The records of literary history might perhaps be searched in vain for an example of more brilliant success. The native German has become a man of mark in English society, and an acknowledged master of English composition. He has thrown open to the English people more than one department of scholarly investigation until then unheeded by them, and they have come to regard him as well-nigh the creator of comparative mythology and the science of religions, of comparative philology and the science of language. Work after work has proceeded from his facile and fascinating pen; whole series of striking articles, of which he has gathered the choicest into a succession of popular and widely circulated volumes. It has seemed as if the great Veda-work, which originally brought him to England, was the matter which least pressed him and engaged his attention. But this too is at last completed, and stands before the world, in six heavy quartos. And we have lately seen its author, while looking back with satisfaction upon what he calls "the work of my life," and pointing to it with pride as in itself the sufficient result of a life's labor, yet at the same time seeking to be relieved of the

onerous duties of his Oxford professorship of comparative philology, that he may retire to the continent, and devote himself henceforth to the advancement of Sanskrit learning. There seems to be a little inconsistency here; perhaps a nearer view of the history of the enterprise will do something toward clearing it up.

At the time when Müller undertook his task, the Vedic literature, in all its numerous branches, was coming rapidly forward to the knowledge of scholars and of the world. The times were ripe for its treatment; all students of the Sanskrit and of India had come fully to see that here, and here alone, was the true and solid foundation of their study. Müller was one of many who were throwing themselves heartily into the work of making the Vedic texts accessible. In 1848, Benfey put forth the text of the Sâma-Veda, with translation and glossary, and with an abundance of auxiliary matter and learned discussion. In 1849, Weber began his edition of the White Yajur-Veda, with its native comment, and accompanied also by its Brâhmana, or canonical exposition: he finished the Veda itself in 1852, the Brâhmana in 1855. Aufrecht was meantime taking hold of the Atharva-Veda; but circumstances compelled his withdrawal, and this text was brought forth, by combined German and American labor, in 1855-56. For want of sufficient manuscript material in Europe, the Black Yajur-Veda was taken up considerably later: its text with native comment has been slowly appearing in the Bibliotheca Indica, at Calcutta, since 1855, and is still hardly more than half finished; but Weber has recently (1871-72) given us the whole text, in the *Indische Studien*.

All these undertakings, however, interesting and important as they were, were only secondary in point of interest and importance to the publication of the Rig-Veda; this was the oldest and grandest historical collection of the records of the Indian past; the others stood toward it in a position either of direct subordination or at least of inferiority. For bringing it out there was an abundance of manuscript material in the European libraries. Rosen had printed in 1838 the first *ashtaka* of the text, an eighth part of the whole, with Latin version; but his lamented death cut short his work. Two or

three of the leading scholars of Germany were, after 1845, maturing a plan for its issue; and Roer began at Calcutta, at about the same time, an edition of the text with commentary. Both these enterprises were abandoned in favor of the one inaugurated by Müller at London, under, as it seemed, peculiarly favorable auspices.

Müller's devotion to his task began about 1845, under the instruction and inspiration of Burnouf at Paris. Before the end of 1846 he had advanced so far, having already spent some time in England, using its manuscript treasures, that he had elaborated his plans, and found for the work a German publisher (Samter, at Königsberg). The joint prospectus of editor and publisher bears date of September and October, 1846, and promises two or three quarto parts a year, of about 160 pages each, at four thalers a part. What caused the failure of this enterprise has never, to our knowledge, transpired in public; Müller appears to make not a syllable of reference to it in any of his works, though the name of so courageous and enterprising a bookseller ought not to be forgotten. Nor do we hear anything of an arrangement concluded about the same time with a famous and powerful literary institution on the continent, which also received Müller's application and consented to become the patron of his work. All such plans, it should seem, were swept away and replaced by that formed, through the influence and aid of Bunsen and Wilson, with the East India Company, and continued by the Government of India after the dissolution of the Company. These were the natural and most acceptable patrons of the undertaking; and they have performed their part with an openhandedness which does them high honor. Neither to the work itself nor to its editor was their liberality stinted; the six volumes have been produced in a style which has left nothing to be desired, and distributed most generously to scholars who had any measure of just claim to receive them; and Müller received by the first arrangement an *honorarium* of about twenty-five hundred dollars (£500) a volume, with an additional *douceur*, at the end, of ten thousand (£2,000) more, for his services as editor.

The spirit in which Müller began his work, as set forth in the Samter prospectus referred to above, was worthy of all

praise. He had determined to make of the great advantages enjoyed by him in England that use which should be of widest and most direct avail to students of the Veda throughout the world: as he himself expresses it (p. 3), "rather to make over my work at once, in its present shape, to the study and criticism of Sanskrit philologists, than to subject it longer, in my own private interest, to my own criticism." He modestly recognizes thus (p. 2) the nature of his task: "the editing of the *Rig-Veda*, which deserved formerly to be admired as a work of genius, can now only be regarded as a work of patience." It is, indeed, difficult for scholars accustomed only to the circumstances attending the publication of classical texts to realize how comparatively simple is the labor of the editor of a Vedic text, where there are no real *variae lectiones* whatever, and only manuscripts enough are needed to eliminate the errors of the most recent copyists. With the native comment, to be sure, the case is quite different; and, as Müller's plan included especially the editing of the comment along with the text, a wide prospect of collating and balancing and selecting and amending was open before him; respecting the details of this part of the work he gives much interesting information in the prefaces to the successive volumes. As to the intrinsic value of Sâyaṇa's comment, constructed among the Dravidians of Southern India in the 14th century of our era, there has been not a little controversy; but the opinion of competent scholars is now as good as unanimous, to the purport that Sâyaṇa's exposition of the hymns is neither worse nor better than such works are wont to be in Oriental literatures: indispensable leading-strings in the infancy of European acquaintance with the ancient texts, but only of inferior and occasional value when Western philology and criticism have once gotten firm hold upon those texts. Müller, though his expressions have sometimes borne an ambiguous character and been misunderstood, has always held reasonable ground in the controversy over Sâyaṇa; thus, he says already in his prospectus of 1846:

"Though I am entirely of the opinion of Rosen and of most other scholars as to the value of the commentary, which is well known to be of the 14th century A. D., nevertheless I regard it as indispensable. Without doubt, the true understanding of the Veda has become lost in India itself; and theological, philosophi-

cal, and grammatical systems have forced these simple old hymns into the strangest moulds. But it is not to be feared that historical criticism and a true feeling for antiquity will let themselves be led astray by scholastic wisdom and pedantic subtlety. Our only concern is, to break our way by means of the commentary into the comprehension of this obscure language; and I doubt whether any one soever can attain such comprehension without first having devoted thorough study to the Indian comment."

No exception can be taken to these statements, even at the present time—unless, indeed, we are to regard the last sentence as implying that, in Müller's opinion, all scholars to come will have to arrive at their understanding of the Veda through its Indian interpreters; that the process of sifting the bushel of chaff for the two grains of wheat must needs be gone through with forever, by each new hungerer after Vedic scholarship. That is the *non-sequitur* which some have committed, and are even, perhaps, still committing: as it is also repeated, and far more persistently, by certain of the laborers in another department of Indian learning, the grammatical. Because the ancient Hindu grammarian Pânini and his successors and complementers and correctors and reworkers were the indispensable and efficient aids of the first Europeans who studied Sanskrit, therefore their works are still and must continue to be the true sources and highest authorities of Sanskrit students. The character of Müller's Sanskrit grammar shows that from this error, at any rate, he cannot be pronounced free.

At the time when Müller began his publication, European study of the Veda had already pretty well outgrown its leading-strings. Considerable fragments of the comment had been printed; much larger portions had been carefully studied by scholars who owned manuscripts of it, or had access to such in the libraries. The peculiarities of Vedic grammar and lexicon were beginning to be understood, and, in a host of matters, far better understood than by their Hindu interpreters. Translations of considerable passages, by competent men, had been made public. The historical and mythological contents of the Veda were in process of being brought to light, with true comprehension and in considerable detail. Every student who could get access to the text itself had the means in his hands or within his reach of studying it profitably, and contributing rapidly to the advancement of others' studies. There was an

eager desire for immediate command of fuller material. All over Europe, men were getting hold of what text they could, poring over hardly usable manuscripts, copying parts of them at first or second hand, and with an infinity of pains making their own *indices verborum* and special vocabularies. Sanskrit study was pausing and languishing for the Rig-Veda; and Müller had undertaken to relieve its necessities—cutting off, as we have seen, more than one promising plan of the same kind, and for the time effectually preventing the formation of any others. He had abundant material in his hands, and, by his arrangement with the Indian government, he could count upon an income from his Vedic work alone far exceeding the average salary of a German professor. Seldom has a man had a grander opportunity of earning to himself the lasting gratitude of his fellow-students, by mere patient labor and devotion to the task entrusted to him. If he had urged through the press, at the cost of the slightest self-sacrifice, a simple text-edition of the Veda, and an *index verborum* to it, he would have been looked upon as having redeemed all his pledges, and might, without the least objection from any quarter, have taken what time he chose for the more showy and imposing edition of Sāyana's commentary with the text annexed.

This was not the course which Müller elected to pursue. It does not appear at precisely what date his compact with the East India Company was made. But certainly within a very reasonably brief time thereafter—namely, in October, 1849—he was able to write the preface to his first completed volume, containing an eighth part of the text (just the part already produced by Rosen), a fifth part of the text and commentary combined. It was hailed with enthusiasm, as the first instalment of a great and noble work; and it lifted Müller at once, in the eyes of the world, to the very front rank of laborers in the Indian field. But for a continuation the students of the Veda had long to wait. The second volume bears a date five years later than the first, namely, 1854 (though the preface is dated Christmas, 1858). In the preface, the editor states that for the latter part of the volume he had enjoyed the services of Dr. Theodore Aufrecht as assistant, “and the benefit hence derived cannot be too highly valued;” by the aid of this scholar he hopes

to bring the edition to an end much sooner than he had at first expected. How much more than five years the continuation of the work would have had to be waited for if left to the labor of the editor himself, we can only conjecture. In the preface to the first volume, he had announced that "an introductory memoir on the Veda is in press, and will be published separately." In his "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," the appearance of which ten years later, in 1859, was the fulfilment of this promise, he explained that his duties as professor (since 1851) of modern European languages and literatures at Oxford had compelled him for years to discontinue his favorite studies. Of course it was, in a sense, wholly at Müller's option to turn aside from the work which first brought him to England, and devote himself to assuring his position there by other methods: but it is not strange that Sanskrit scholars should have been disappointed at the change, and felt that he was imposing upon them an undue part of that "patience" which he had formerly described as a leading accompaniment of the task of editing the Veda.

They would (as has been already intimated) have waited with exemplary long-suffering for the portly volumes of commentary, if they could have been helped to prompt possession of the text. It was well known in Germany that Müller had early perfected an arrangement with the celebrated publishing-house of Brockhaus at Leipzig for a pure text-edition; and this acted as an effectual bar to any similar undertaking on the part of other scholars. It was not, however, until 1856 that the first part of the promised edition appeared; and it came weighted with an appendix—the *Rig-Veda Prâtiçâkhya*—which, though valuable in itself, formed no necessary or even desirable addition to it, and proved a very millstone about its neck. Before the end of 1857 three parts were out, bringing the text down to the end of the first Book (*mandala*), less than one fifth of the whole; and the publication was never carried further. In 1873 (preface to the text-edition bearing his name, to be described further on), Müller tells us that the reason for his not having furnished a simple text long ago was that, though most anxious, he was "too poor to do it;" and that "the expense of the undertaking proved too great to allow the German pub-

lisher to continue the work to the end." This is a little strange. At just about the same time, a German publisher was found without any difficulty for the text of the Atharva-Veda, a work considerably more than half as bulky as the Rig-Veda, and so markedly inferior in importance to the latter that it could not aspire to anything like the same circulation—the editors receiving, in sole recompense of their labor, a dozen copies of the completed volume. Was it in the plan and style of publication which the editor prescribed, or in the heavy *honorarium* which he exacted, as being "too poor" to forego it—either or both—that the burden lay which so wealthy, enterprising, and far-sighted a firm as that of Brockhaus found itself unable to bear? It would be interesting to hear their account of the reasons why the undertaking turned out a failure.

The fortunate engagement as assistant of so eminent and faithfully laborious a scholar as Aufrecht still continuing, the third volume of Müller's great life-work appeared with the most gratifying promptness, in 1856, only two years after the second. But a separation of the two collaborators was already impending, as regretfully pointed out by Müller himself on the last page of his preface; it was followed some years later by the transfer of Aufrecht to Edinburgh as professor of Sanskrit in the University of that city. In view, perhaps, of the irreparable loss which he was about to suffer, we find Müller in the same preface indulging in melancholy anticipations. At the advanced age of thirty-two, and with only about three fifths of his task accomplished, he says (p. xiii.): "I feel that ten years of my life are gone, and I know not whether I shall have sufficient time left to finish a work which I once undertook perhaps with too much confidence. Yet even if I should not see the completion of this work, I should not be sorry for the time that I have spent on it"—and so on. He girds himself anew, however, to his labors; and we find him in 1859 (preface to his "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," p. v., note) promising that the fourth volume shall be published "next year;" while it actually makes its appearance late in 1862, more than six years after its predecessor. The important assistance of Aufrecht in its preparation is again duly acknowledged, and his Edinburgh appointment is spoken of as a matter for con-

gratulation. But Müller's feeling of dejection continues; and while (preface, p. lxxix.) he maintains as strongly as ever that "at the present moment the most pressing work is, no doubt, the Veda, and new hands are wanted both for the edition of texts, not yet published, and for the critical interpretation of the relics of the ancient poetry of the Rishis," he is obliged to add: "my own contributions can for the future be but small." This is in October, 1862. The next we hear from him on the subject is seven years later (1869), in the preface to his so-called first volume of a translation of the Rig-Veda. There, looking back with a kind of regretful admiration to his early period of youthful enthusiasm and unflinching industry, he claims on his own behalf (p. vii.) that "it required no small amount of self-denial to decide in favor of devoting a life to the publishing of the materials rather than to the drawing of the results which those materials supply to the student of ancient language and ancient religion." Then, a few pages after, as there rises more distinctly before his mind the remembrance of his great change of condition and temper, he glances at the complaints that had been made of the slowness of his execution of the work he had undertaken, and pleads thus (p. xii.) in abatement of judgment: "after all, one cannot give up the whole of one's life to the collation of Oriental MSS and the correction of proof-sheets. The two concluding volumes *have long been ready for press*, [the italics are ours] and as soon as I can find leisure, they too shall be printed and published."

Just how many years the two volumes had been ready and waiting Müller's leisure for their publication, we shall not probably ever know. In the preface to the fifth volume, which came forth at length three years later (1872), he speaks of "now, after the lapse of ten years, resuming the work of my youth," and of "doing so not without an effort." The natural inference from this would seem to be that he had done nothing since the appearance of the volume of 1862. Then he adds: "What I myself wished to learn from Sāyana, I have learnt, and the critical restoration and editing of his text will involve a sacrifice of time that I can ill afford." He quite forgets that he had said three years before that this labor was already long since accomplished, and that he had only to carry its result through the

press at his leisure. He goes on to explain that the urgent duties of the two professorships held by him in succession at Oxford, and the necessity of bringing up again his general scholarship, had compelled him for years to shelve Sanskrit almost entirely. "Life is meant for more—at least, I think so—" he exclaims (in the spirit of one of the quotations given above), "than the mere drudgery of collating MSS. and correcting proof-sheets;" and "the printing of six volumes like the present is enough to occupy the best part of a man's life." He explains his former threat, of October, 1862, to have meant that at that time he "hardly imagined it would still fall to his lot to bring out the remaining two volumes." He had, namely, formed other and more attractive plans; "but (he concludes) the extremely kind way in which I have been urged by scholars, not only in Europe, but also in India, to complete this edition of the text and commentary of the Rig-Veda, left me at last no choice." In all this we seem to have the explicit acknowledgment that Müller had grown utterly weary of the work which he once took up with such ardent zeal; that he had come to regard the labor which it imposed as "mere drudgery," unworthy of occupying his time and thoughts (forgetting that no man's life is meant for higher purposes than the faithful performance of a duty solemnly undertaken in the sight of all the world); that he shrank even from the burden of carrying through the press an already elaborated text, and left it lying for years in his desk untouched; and that, but for the importunity of his friends, he would have abandoned the work altogether, careless of the engagements he had formed, not only with the Indian Government, but with all the students of India and her institutions.

And yet, when the sixth and concluding volume at last came forth, two years later (September, 1874), Müller introduces its preface with the following paragraph:

"When I had written the last line of the Rig-Veda and Sāyana's commentary, and put down my pen, I felt as if I had parted with an old, old friend. For thirty years scarcely a day has passed on which my thoughts have not dwelt on this work, and for many a day, and many a night, too, the old poets of the Veda, and still more their orthodox and painstaking expositor, have been my never-failing companions. I am happy, no doubt, that the work is done, and after having seen so many called away in the midst of their labors. I feel deeply grateful that I have been spared to finish the work of my life. But habits established for so long a

time, are not broken without a wrench, and even now I begin to miss my daily task: I begin to long for some difficult and corrupt passages to grapple with, for some abrupt quotation from the *Sātyayanaka* to verify, or for some obscure allusion to Pānini to trace back to its original source."

A little later (p. viii.) in the same preface, he sums up with satisfaction and pride the grand total of his labors, and finds (he says), "to my own surprise, I confess, that I had published in my two editions of the *Rig-Veda*, the large one with, and the small one without the commentary of Sāyana, what would amount to an annual volume of nearly 600 pages octavo, during twenty-five consecutive years." It will help us to understand the value of this calculation, if we notice what he tells us elsewhere as to the amount of his personal contribution to one of its elements, the "small" edition. Its own title-page (given at the head of this notice) declares it to be "reprinted" from the "large" edition; and in its preface Müller says: "I gladly promised to supply the MS. with all the corrections marked in my own copy during the last twenty years, and I only stipulated that I should be relieved from the task of correcting the proof-sheets." That is to say: the text-edition was transcribed from the edition with commentary, *then already complete*; Müller furnished the corrections which he happened to have noted, four pages of preface, and his name upon the title-page; and the result counts for 1,800 pages, or three years' full work, in his twenty-five years' labor!

If these things look strangely, the responsibility is Müller's; we have done nothing more than put together his published statements, leaving them to suggest their own inferences to candid minds. And there is yet another point or two to which we may draw attention in passing. The date of the preface whose introductory paragraph, quoted above, would lead anyone to suppose that the editor had just laid down his pen, with a sigh of relief tempered by fond regret, is "September 14th, 1874, the first day of the International Congress of Orientalists in London;" and it is upon the record of the Congress that extra copies of the last sheet of text and commentary were handed around among the gathered *savans*, to invite their rejoicing and congratulation upon the at last completed work. But the preface of the "small" edition is dated in March, 1873, eighteen months earlier; and we have just seen that its issue

distinctly implies and acknowledges the prior completion of the other. Moreover, it was (in full accord with this publicly defined relation between the two) made known to special students of the Veda in February, 1873, that the sixth volume of the quarto *Rig-Veda* might be looked for about Easter of that year, since it was then already in type, even to the end of the *index verborum*. It is hardly to be supposed that the Oriental Congress would have played an eager part in that little scene of effusion over the winding-up sheet of the great and famous enterprise, if they had been aware that the volume, after being printed complete, had lain now for near two years waiting its editor's leisure to be given to the public. As the prefixed *varietas lectionis*, of 32 pages, must have been virtually worked out in the working-out of the text itself, one does not see what can have been left for the editor to prepare after February, 1873, save his preface, of 55 pages. Yet, at the end of 1874, in a *soi-disant* "Reply to Mr. Darwin" (*Contemporary Review*, January, 1875), we find him pleading as follows, in explanation of the fact that he had not read the Reviews of late, and so had learned only by accident that some profane person had been criticizing his views as to Darwinism and Language: "During the whole of the year that has just passed away, all my spare time has been required for the completion of my edition of the *Rig-Veda* and its Sanskrit commentary; I had to shut my eyes to everything else." Certainly the readers of that preface had not entertained a suspicion that its production could have caused its author such a tremendous expenditure of time and labor—and the less, as it showed signs of extreme haste: when censuring (p. x.) the Petersburg Dictionary for omitting certain technical terms, Müller had not had time to convince himself, as he might have done by a few minutes' search in the Dictionary, that the words in question were really there.*

* It appeared later, however, either that Müller does not possess the Dictionary, and judges its deficiencies out of his inner consciousness, or that he finds its arrangement too difficult for him to master. For when he explained at great length, in the London Academy (February 12, 1876), that he did not mean the particular terms he had specified as wanting, but only certain others, implied in the "etc." which he had added to the former, Böhtlingk was able to reply (*Jena Literaturzeitung*, February 26th), that these others were also to be read there in their proper place. And when once more, in his retort to Böht-

Long, however, before Müller's enterprise had reached the stage to which we have followed its fortunes, it had become a matter of comparative indifference to Indianists at what rate his edition with commentary should advance, and whether and when a text-edition from him should appear. We have seen that in 1857 his text at Leipzig came to a final, though unacknowledged, termination. As the years passed by, and no continuation appeared or was promised, its force as an obstacle in the way of other similar undertakings gradually died out, and Aufrecht, with the coöperation of Weber at Berlin, prepared to fill the void. His extremely practical and convenient edition (1861-3), giving (in transliteration) the complete *samhitā*-text along with all the essential parts of the *pada*-text, and with the statements of the native authorities in full as to authors and metres etc., makes, when bound together, a single handy volume of somewhat over 900 pages. It filled two of the volumes (vi. and vii.) of Weber's serial, the *Indische Studien*. Each volume, like all the others of the series, was aided by the German Oriental Society to the extent of about \$75, or sixteen cents (eight-pence) a page; and, in testimony of its sense of the value of the work, the Berlin Academy voted to the editor a free gift of about \$270 (£54).* To the end of the seventh Book, it followed, with collation and corrections, Müller's already published text; through the remaining books (two fifths of the whole), it was founded directly on the manuscripts.

Here was, at last, the whole Rig-Veda, the indispensable foundation of our knowledge of India, put within the easy reach of the students of India; and from this time dates almost a new era in Indian studies. Aufrecht's edition is the real publication of the Veda; nothing can take away from this scholar the chief honor of being editor of the Rig-Veda: with a true sense of the urgency of the need, with a self-devotion which sought and found its reward in a consciousness of the service he was doing to science, and not in honors and emolu-

lingk (ibid., March 18th), he lets drop respecting yet another Sanskrit word which he chances to use, that it does not stand in the Dictionary, he is for the third time set right, the word being in fact where it should be on its pages.

* See Weber, in the *Lit. Centralblatt* (Leipzig) of November 1, 1873.

ments, he gave his fellow-scholars what they were most craving. Nor, in estimating his merits in connection with it, should we forget the part which, acknowledged and unacknowledged, he bore in Müller's own edition after its first volume. It is exceedingly to be regretted that his work was not, by a little added liberality on some one's part, stereotyped, so that its (rare) typographical errors might have been corrected, and its continuance assured. At present it is out of print, and only to be picked up at second-hand. Some time it will have to be reproduced; for a work of precisely its character is called for, and will always command a steady sale.

The text-edition bearing on its title-page the name of Müller (although, as we have seen, he had stipulated against even reading its proof-sheets) also described itself in the same place as being "reprinted from the *editio princeps*;" nor is it by any means the only place where Müller ornaments his larger work with this high-sounding title. Doubtless its assumption will seem to many a little out of taste. We look back now, at the distance of a few centuries, to the period when the precious remains of antiquity were struggling out before the public amid the difficulties and discouragements of an art in its infancy and a community of scholars feeble in numbers and poor in wealth; and we honor the pioneer publication, in the case of each work, with the name of *editio princeps*. But it is almost profanation, it is certainly not less than ludicrous pretension, to confer the same title now, when books are dropping from the press as fast as autumn leaves in Vallombrosa, and upon the unnumbered productions of a newly opened literature, where almost every publication that is made would be entitled to receive it. There is hardly a Sanskrit scholar of any note who has not put forth, in this sense, from one to a dozen *editioes principes*; but, so far as we know, not one of them ever thought of blazoning his work with that name until Müller set the example; and it is greatly to be hoped that the practice will not become a general one. Nor has Müller's work a defensible claim on any ground to such a distinction. It was not the first edition begun: that honor belongs to Rosen's; it was not the first edition finished: that honor belongs to Aufrecht's; it can claim precedence for only about half the text. If Müller

would take a title which neither his contemporaries nor posterity can dispute, he should proclaim himself "responsible editor of the *editio princeps* of Sâyana's commentary:" it is all that truly belongs to him.

But Müller is not content with claiming to be first editor, he would fain also make himself out first translator, of the *Rig-Veda*. In the introductory sentence of his preface to his sole and only volume of translation, he says that it has unexpectedly fallen to his lot "to publish also what may, without presumption, be called the first translation of the ancient sacred hymns of the Brahmana." Later he explains that, when he says "translation," he does not precisely mean "translation," but rather "*traduction raisonnée*," a version accompanied by "a full account of the reasons which justify the translator in assigning such a power to such a word, and such a meaning to such a sentence." Then, in the preface to his fifth volume of Sâyana, he defends the claim at great length against the adverse criticism of Spiegel and others—but, in our opinion, with very indifferent success. He is at any rate consistent: if "*Rig-Veda text*" means "the text with Sâyana's commentary," then Müller is its first editor; if "translation" means "translation with Müller's commentary," then he is first translator. That is to say, he may perhaps become such, at some remote time in the future; for it is seven years since his first volume appeared, and it contained only one seventy-fifth of the text. Moreover, as was pointed out at the time,* the plan of accounting fully for every word and every sentence of one's version is quite incapable of being carried out, and Müller is far from having carried it out. To the objection that his version of the very first stanza implied an apparent false use of a grammatical form, upon which he had not spent a syllable of explanation, he has since replied (*Chips*, iv. 508; *Am. ed'n*, 490) that there must be a degree of division of labor in these matters, and that, as a certain noted Continental scholar was well known to be planning a Vedic grammar, he had purposely left all such points for him to discuss; if he had deigned also to notice the objection taken to the mythology of the same version, he would probably have replied

* See W. D. Whitney's *Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, i. 136.

that, one of these days, somebody would be sure to take up the mythological points, and hence it was proper to divide off that share of the work to him.* But as there are and are to be Sanskrit dictionaries also in existence, why should he not have been content, on the same principle, to divide off to them the treatment of the adjective meaning 'reddish' in the very same stanza, instead of devoting to it eleven pages of superfluous exposition? If we are to establish the rule that the priority of a translator depends upon the relative length of his comment, then, when some scholar comes along who shall carry out Müller's plan more completely, by taking in all those other relegated matters, and rendering, let us say, only one hymn in a volume, instead of a whole dozen, as Müller has done, this one will have a right to call himself, *à fortiori*, the "first translator"—until in his turn superseded by one who shall give an entire volume to a single verse: and so on, *ad infinitum*. In anticipation of this emulous race for priority, we may again suggest a slight modification of Müller's claimed title, to "*ad interim* first translator."

Besides the native comment, Müller's quarto edition contains one or two other important additions to the text. The report of the Hindu tradition as to author, divinity, and metre of every verse of the great collection, it shares with Aufrecht's edition; its *index verborum* and its index of *pratika's* (first words of each verse) are its own. We have spoken already of an *index verborum* as being by far the most valuable gift, apart from the text itself, which could have been made by an editor of the Rig-Veda to his fellow-students; in real worth it outweighs the comment twenty-fold. Müller tells us (vol. v., p. xxv.) that his own index was made and finished before his publication was begun. There is no telling how many years of solid and most fatiguing work, expended by other scholars in making their own duplications of it, would have been saved by its being given to the world at the outset. This must have been, for example, one of the very hardest preliminary labors falling upon the Vedic editor of the St. Petersburg lexicon. We have

* Those who have studied Müller's Sanskrit grammar will well remember that he claims to have omitted the Syntax because Professor Bühler in India had promised to write a treatise on Sanskrit syntax.

it in our hands at last; but, on the one hand, it has come too late to have more than a fragment of the importance which would have belonged to it earlier: for the lexicon is finished, and Grassmann has also put forth a dictionary to the *Rig-Veda* (Leipzig, 1872-75), which includes a complete index. And, on the other hand, it is in a shape which deprives it of no small part of the usefulness it ought to possess. It is an index made on the labor-saving principle; one to the preparation of which Müller need never have put his own hand at all; one which could have been made upon the *pada*-manuscripts by a person who knew nothing of the Sanskrit except its alphabet. It is simply a reduction to alphabetic order of the elements of the *pada* or 'word' text, as constructed by the Hindu scholars: a text in which each vocable is presented by itself, severed from euphonic connection with its predecessor and successor, and cleansed, sometimes, of certain irregularities characterizing the Vedic dialect. Müller has done nothing toward grouping together the inflectional forms belonging to one root or theme: if we desire, for example, to look into the conjugation of the root *kar*, we must find the forms *kar*, *akar*, *akṛta*, *kṛdhi*, *kṛyāna*, *cakāra*, etc., etc., scattered through half the alphabet; and the declensional forms *āpas*, *apas*, *adbhis* are only less widely sundered; while *samyatī* and *samyatā* are twenty pages apart, by reason of a peculiar technicality in the *pada*-treatment of the former. *Per contra*, there is no separation of words of widely different origin which chance to have the same form: *kaḥ*, 'who,' and *kaḥ*, 'he made,' are thrown indistinguishably together; so with *apām*, 'I drank,' and *apām*, 'of waters;' so with *asya*, 'do thou throw,' and *asya*, 'of it;' and so on, in instances which are by no means extremely rare. In short, it is an index upon which some weeks, or months, of hard work would have to be done by any scholar who should desire to use it otherwise than sporadically in the investigation of the *Rig-Veda* text; the best to be said of it is that now, Grassmann's vocabulary being accessible, it takes a place secondary or auxiliary to the latter, and its defects will be comparatively little felt; there is even a certain advantage in its not being a mere repetition of the other. The zeal and devotion of Grassmann, his anxious and ingenious care to do

for the Vedic student the utmost that can be done, are in refreshing contrast to the spirit displayed by his more famous contemporary, and merit high and grateful praise. His appended index of roots and bases, arranged alphabetically according to their finals, is a marvel of patient, accurate, and acutely applied industry.

Some of the same labor-saving spirit which we have noted in Müller's *index verborum* is to be traced also in his index of *pratīka's*. Dr. W. Pertsch of Gotha had given one, in 1858, in that great storehouse of original contributions to Sanskrit study, Weber's *Indische Studien*. The circumstances under which it was prepared, as explained at the time, took away all possibility of its being minutely accurate: it had been made for private use, its materials being gathered by several different hands, on several different systems, from single manuscripts and second-hand copies of manuscripts, before the publication of more text than is contained in Müller's first volume; and it was known to be in some degree defective; the editor had simply done all that was within his power to secure accuracy, and hoped, by aid of a long list of corrections at the end, to have made a tolerable approach to it. Müller, now, instead of making a new index of his own, or carefully verifying the old one, line by line, has merely reproduced the latter (as he himself explains in his preface), making such additional corrections as the editor was able to furnish him, and such as he had himself chanced to note in connection with his use of it. He is pleased to say that the names of the scholars concerned in its first preparation are "a sufficient warrant for completeness and accuracy;" but not one of them, certainly, would put forward any such claim on its behalf; they would assert only that, pending the completion of Müller's text or some other, it was as good as the circumstances admitted: a useful provisional work, until superseded by a better. It should never have been reproduced without a thorough verification, such as would have cost a careful worker perhaps a fortnight; in its present state it contains not a few errors inherited from its source, and there (but not here) excusable enough.*

* To show that we do not speak loosely, a few corrections are added. Insert *svayā ha svīd*, viii. 102 [Aufr. 91]. 3. Omit *agne atirivan* and *ghṛtavratō dhanadāḥ*.

We have felt it to be due to the cause of truth that the exposition here given should be put clearly upon record. It is no private and obscure enterprise that we have been describing, but (as we pointed out at the beginning) one of the most famous of the century; if misapprehensions are widely prevalent as to its character, they ought to be removed. A generation of Indian scholars is arising that have no personal knowledge of its history; it is proper that this should be told by one who has watched its whole progress, and shared the sentiments of those for whose especial benefit it claimed to be undertaken. While it was dragging slowly along, Müller was doing a large amount of real work, quite enough to make the reputation of any man. His "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," his "Sanskrit Grammar," his "Rig-Veda Prâtiçâkhyâ," his "Lectures on Language," his "Lectures on Religions," his "Chips," and the other numerous fugitive writings from which the Chips are selections—these are his genuine merits; and by their value, as tested by time and competent criticism, he has the right to demand to be judged. Many, perhaps most, will think that he was far more usefully occupied with them than with the Rig-Veda; that his time was, as he himself more than once intimates, too precious to be expended in the collation of manuscripts and the reading of proof-sheets. That is a question with which we have here nothing whatever to do. What concerns us is simply his relation to the Rig-Veda. When he and his friends set him up before the world in the attitude of first editor and first translator of the Veda, his mostly anticipated text in one hand and his version of twelve hymns in the other, and call on all men to admire his self-denying devotion and his patient and persistent industry, it is high time to raise an energetic protest. Of devotion and industry in this particular direction, since the publication of his first volume, his fellow-scholars are unable to discover a trace. At least half-a-dozen men have done far more for the Rig-Veda than he has personally done; indeed, whatever may

Correct reference numbers as follows: *agnîr mârâdhâ*, viii. 44. 16; *abhi tvâ vrahakhâ*, viii. 45. 22; *asya pida yasya*, vi. 40. 2; *upa te gâ iva*, x. 127. 8; *jushasva sapraâh* . . ., i. 75. 1; *pari'me gâm*, x. 155. 5; *yuvam surâmam*, x. 131. 4; *sahasracrâga*, vii. 55. 7. Correct phrases as follows: *tam sadhrîctr* and *pro 'grâm ptiim*.

be his deserts toward Sâyana and Sâyana's commentary, he has yet to link his name with the Rig-Veda itself by any special tie which will bear testing. This connection, of course, he may yet bring about in his German retirement: withdrawn, as he himself describes it, from the distractions of his public and private duties in England, and able henceforth to devote himself directly to the furtherance of Sanskrit studies. He has had his reward. No man was ever before so lavishly paid, in money* and in fame, for even the most unexceptionable performance of such a task. For personal gratitude in addition, there is not the slightest call. If Müller had never put hand to the Veda, his fellow-students would have had the material they needed perhaps ten years earlier, and Vedic study would be at the present moment proportionally further advanced. They will perhaps congratulate him personally on the good thing he has made of it, and wish themselves the tithe of his fortune. But their gratitude they will reserve for the liberal patrons whose bounty made the work possible, for the scholars who contributed to it with no adequate public recognition, and for the friends who sustained the sinking resolution of the responsible editor, and by their urgency prevented his breaking off in the middle, and leaving his text, what his translation is likely ever to remain, a fragment.

* The original *honorarium*, of about £500 a volume, is well-nigh or quite unprecedented in the history of purely scholarly enterprises; and the grounds on which the final additional gift of £2,000 was bestowed have never been made public. Mr. J. Fergusson, in his "*History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*" (1876; p. 732, note 2), calls attention to the fact that, at the very time when it was bestowed, the Government were refusing an application for £200 to aid the publication of a most important series of Indian inscriptions, declaring that it could not "consent to charge the public revenues of India with the cost of such an undertaking;" and he gives expression to the dissatisfaction with which the contrast was viewed by the friends of Indian study in England.

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

EADIE'S ENGLISH BIBLE.*—Appearances warrant the belief that the English-speaking people will not soon tire of the story of the English Bible. The agencies by which it has come to be what it is are numerous, and about some of the processes there is just enough of uncertainty to stimulate investigation. Each new explorer may confidently hope to detect and refute some blunders made by those who went over the path before him, and may count himself very fortunate if he succeeds in guarding his own statements from inaccuracy.

Dr. Eadie has essayed to tell the story in his way, sparing, as he says, no pains "to present the narrative in its truth and to disentangle it from conflicting statements and traditional errors." The course of his investigations carries him back to Anglo-Saxon times and the days of Cædmon and Bede, and he follows the history down through twelve centuries to the organization of a committee of revision in 1870 under the auspices of the Convocation of Canterbury.

To the subject of a revision of the New Testament, one hundred and fifty pages are devoted, presenting a formidable array of errors which in his judgment need to be removed from the version in common use; errors growing out of imperfections in the text, inexact renderings, want of uniformity, neglect of important distinctions, inconsistencies in dealing with the Greek article, misrendering of tenses and prepositions, variations in the form of proper names, and infelicities in terms for the productions of Palestine. These defects are pointed out with great detail. How far the author's suggestions will be heeded in the revision committee of which he was a distinguished member, it is not the province of the historian to tell, but the detailed enumeration of these possible improvements of the commonly received version is a noteworthy sign of the minute and careful attention which the

* *The English Bible.* An external and critical history of the various English translations of Scripture, with remarks on the need of revising the English New Testament. By JOHN EADIE, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, United Presbyterian Church. In two volumes, 8vo. London: Macmillan & Co. 1876. Vol. I. xx + 440. Vol. II. xii + 504 pp.

whole subject is undoubtedly receiving from the scholars in Great Britain and America who are now enlisted in this work.

Just here, without meaning to disparage that work in any degree, we are glad to produce some striking testimony to the general accuracy and fidelity of our version in its present familiar form. In various countries of Europe, as is well known, similar revisions of standard versions are recently completed or are still in progress. At Halle a revised edition of Luther's New Testament has been published, with the formal sanction of the Eisenach Conference. The changes in orthography and grammatical forms from the standard edition of 1545, are very numerous, but the total number of passages in which the translation is amended is only 259, and it is stated on good authority* that in 221 of these cases, the effect of the emendation is to bring Luther's version into harmony with the reading of our English Bible,—a most remarkable and unlooked-for tribute to the accuracy of our translators.

Dr. Eadie goes over the historical ground very thoroughly, endeavoring "to weigh the merits of each translator or company of translators, with open impartiality." He gives four chapters to Wycliffe, twelve to Tyndale, four to Coverdale, five to Matthew's Bible, and six to the Great Bible. In the second volume, six chapters are devoted to the Genevan version, three to the Bishops' Bible, two to the Douai version, and seven to the Authorized.

The chief merit of his work seems to us to be found in its attempt to show what influences were combined to produce each successive translation; what helps were furnished by editions of the original, or by new Continental versions, and what was the true bond of connection between these several versions for English-speaking people, the appearance of which, one after another, so peculiarly characterizes the century following the first publication of the Greek New Testament by Erasmus in 1516. Canon Westcott has done good service in the same direction, but Dr. Eadie's more ample pages give room for much more extended illustration.

It is somewhat refreshing to note the vigor with which he refutes the hasty and erroneous accounts of Froude, and Hallam, and other writers whose statements concerning the English Bible lack the foundation of fact.

We notice frequent carelessness in the typography of the volume, though the citations seem, as a rule, to be made with great care.

* Report of the British and Foreign Bible Society, 1871, page 406.

In the few cases, however, where the author has occasion to allude to America, he is not well informed. He speaks of an edition prepared for the American Bible Society in 1856, though evidently referring to that of 1851. He relies on Thomas' statement, now discredited, to the effect that Scriptures bearing the imprint of Mark Baskett, London, were printed in Boston in 1742 and 1752. He twice gives the name of Arthur, instead of Aitken, as the publisher of the Bible first printed without disguise in America in 1782 (which by the way was not a quarto but a 12mo), and says "this took place 162 years after the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers; and strange to say, a Genevan Bible had been already published in 1748." Very strange, if true; but it happened to be a German Bible and that was not so strange. We have no doubt that with regard to Scotland and England, Dr. Eadie was better informed.

We regret to mention that the decease of the author, whose valuable commentaries have made many familiar with his name, ended his earthly studies and labors shortly after these volumes were issued from the press.

OLD BIBLES.*—This little volume is attractive in its aspect, and is intended to give in a compact form some general information about the versions of Scripture which have been used by Englishmen from the earliest days. It shows some marks of care in the preparation and some marks of carelessness. Mr. Dore professes to have examined carefully every version referred to, and to have preserved the original spelling in all quotations, but his work is so full of inaccuracies and blunders as to be absolutely worthless as an authority. A single example must suffice. He says (p. 64), "The first edition of the Genevan or Breeches Bible was published by Rowland Hill at Geneva in 1560, and from that date until 1612 no year passed without one, two, or more editions, being issued from the press." The publisher's name was Rouland Hall. After the second edition, in 1561, no new one appeared till 1568. The edition of 1570 was the last on a foreign press. It was not printed in England before 1575. There seem to have been no editions published in 1584, 1604, and 1612, but the demand did not cease with the publication of the authorized version, for two editions appeared in 1613, one in 1614, two in 1615, and one in folio the following year. It will be hardly worth while for any one to look to such a writer for trustworthy information.

* *Old Bibles; or, An Account of the Various Versions of the English Bible.* By J. R. DORE. London: Pickering. 1876. pp. xviii, 104, 16mo.

MR. FROTHINGHAM'S "TRANSCENDENTALISM IN NEW ENGLAND"* is an interesting and valuable history, if a work so sketchy and uncritical deserves to be called a history. It is interesting for the manner in which the author has collected and arranged his materials and the pleasant way in which he has recited his tale of men and books and systems. It is valuable because it will preserve the memory of not a few incidents, the memory of which was fast dying out in the present generation. The phases of speculative thought in this generation are becoming very unlike those which astonished conservative Boston and traditional New England some thirty-five years ago, when Rev. George Ripley dared to defend Christianity on the ground of its inner spirit, in default and without the aid of miracles, and his doctrine was assailed by Prof. Andrews Norton as the latest form of infidelity; when Ralph Waldo Emerson vexed and grieved his father's friends and his own by his astonishing address to the senior class in Divinity College in 1838, and Theodore Parker sprung a mine among his brethren a few years later in his memorable ordination sermon.

Mr. Frothingham's sketch of the Kantian Philosophy cannot be said to be incorrect so far as it goes. Perhaps it goes far enough to satisfy its author and his readers. It is surprising that he omits altogether to record the application which Kant made of his own principles to the questions of supernaturalism and revelation, in which he anticipated, with a much more vigorous logic than that of many of his followers, the vague and florid unbelief of so many of the New England transcendentalists. We observe that the great movements for reform are referred by him more exclusively to the Unitarian and Rationalistic Transcendentalists as their originators than the truth would warrant. The orthodox faith and the orthodox conscience of many who were in no sense Transcendentalists contributed very largely to the growth and strength of the movement against temperance and slavery, and brought no little practical wisdom and self-sacrifice to the cause of right in the hour of trial. There were not a few philosophical Transcendentalists in New England who held fast to a supernatural Christianity as their predecessors had done in the days of Herbert and Collins. We ought not to be surprised that such a thinker and writer as Mr. Frothingham should not do justice to

* *Transcendentalism in New England.* A History by OCTAVIUS BROOKS FROTHINGHAM, author of "Life of Theodore Parker," "Religion of Humanity," etc., etc. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

these aspects of Transcendentalism. He has done the best which he could; as a literary artist he deserves our heartiest commendation, as a critic and a theologian he has done the best which so negative and mystical a thinker as he could possibly achieve.

PRESIDENT BASCOM'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION* is a vigorous and independent discussion of the grounds of religious belief. The topics are Matter and Mind, God, Nature, Man, Immortality, Revelation, Miracles, Inspiration, Interpretation, Sin and Divine Law, Trinity, Christ, his Divinity and Work, Holy Spirit, Sanctification, the Church, Future Life, Lines and Conditions of Progress. These topics are all treated with the greatest freedom from conventional language and traditions, with a spirit fully alive to the destructive tendencies of modern thought, and yet with a moral earnestness which now and then rises to eloquent fervor. The candid and thoughtful reader may fail to be convinced by some of the utterances the author puts forth as arguments, he may now and then weary of the needless length of his discussions, but he can not fail to find much in the volume which is pertinent to the difficulties and objections which are current in these times, and now and then an important contribution to the defence and vindication of the Christian Faith.

The discussions in this volume naturally invite extended criticisms, but these we must leave to each reader to furnish for himself.

PROF. HENRY N. DAY'S ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY* is a small volume of 248 pages, but it gives us the results of faithful and earnest and independent thinking and contains some novelties in the science of the human soul. The classification adopted by the author is peculiar to himself, in that he classes under the sensibility, the imagination and the memory in all their functions, so far as it would appear to the casual reader. Only the reader who is well acquainted with Psychological Science would correct this natural construction of the author's meaning and interpret him as referring only the passive and unconscious affections and activ-

* *A Philosophy of Religion*, or, the Rational Grounds of Religious Belief. By JOHN BASCOM, author of "Principles of Psychology," "Philosophy of English Literature," "Æsthetics," etc. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

* *Elements of Psychology*. By HENRY N. DAY, author of "Logic," "Moral Science," "Æsthetics," "Art of Discourse," etc. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

ities of the mind in imagination and memory to the sensibility, and this on the ground of their passivity. We have no doubt that this treatise may be made an interesting and useful text book, if it is used by an able and thoughtful teacher, and would recommend it to instructors and students as an able and ingenious and independent work, which does great credit to its much respected and most laborious author.

ROUND MY HOUSE.*—This book has a real value for its descriptions of country life in France, by a thoughtful and unprejudiced observer, who had his home for years in one of its remote provinces. Nothing can be more unlike what the foreigner usually sees in Paris than the people and the scenes which he describes. The results of his observations are the more deserving of attention just now, as the rural population of France are acquiring more and more political importance. In no country of Western Europe also is the "peasant-world," as he calls it, so large in proportion to the whole population. Mr. Hamerton tells us that among this vast number of people "few can read easily enough to do it for their pleasure," and that practically "the book and the newspaper have no direct influence upon peasant life." One of the results of the "incredible ignorance" of the French country people, he says, is that they do not even know what the word "France" means; and it was this entire absence of all geographical knowledge which made the peasantry, in a measure, insensible to any patriotic appeals during the Franco-German war. "Tell them that the war has ended in the loss of Alsatia and Lorraine. This conveys no direct idea to their minds. Why should they make sacrifices for the people of Alsatia who were always as foreigners to them." This absence of national feeling, incredible as it seems to us, is illustrated at length. We have no space in which to follow the author in his interesting description of this subject, or even to enumerate the titles of the other subjects which he takes up. It must suffice to say that he describes all the phases of country life in France as he became acquainted with it in the familiar intercourse of years with all classes and conditions of people in a provincial town. We ought not to close without some reference to the charm of Mr. Hamerton's style, which throws an additional interest around every subject which he treats.

* *Round my House*; Notes of rural life in France in peace and war. By PHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876. 12mo. pp. 415.

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
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
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